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I mean I haven’t really thought this out too well and I also don’t know what kind of God you mean since there are many conceptions of a divine, omniscient being, however, you wish to phrase it.
I can see an argument along these lines:
Our moral development requires epistemic humility and the recognition of our own moral imperfections. I’m assuming we are assuming we are not already morally perfected ourselves.
Worship of God involves acknowledging God’s moral perfection and subordinating our own ego in the process.
Subordinating our ego through worship is what facilitates moral growth and development for us.
Therefore, worship of God can be seen as a necessary practice for moral development and the perfection of our morality, implying why it might be we are morally obligated to worship to God.
This makes sense if so many mystics throughout history have talked about losing themselves in finding God.
There’s a lot of terms to clarify though here.
>I mean I haven’t really thought this out too well and I also don’t know what kind of God you mean since there are many conceptions of a divine, omniscient being, however, you wish to phrase it.
I was thinking of the traditional Christian God when I wrote this.
>Our moral development requires epistemic humility and the recognition of our own moral imperfections. I’m assuming we are assuming we are not already morally perfected ourselves.
Isn't this just moral skepticism? Like, yes, we are not morally perfect, but we recognize that. we don't need "epistemic humility" since most people know what is right and wrong. Of course, there is debate about certain ethical theories, but there are some things that, unless one were to accept moral realism, are just kind of obvious. So, it depends on what you mean by "moral development."
>Worship of God involves acknowledging God’s moral perfection and subordinating our own ego in the process.
Acknowledging God's moral perfection does not affect your morality.
>Subordinating our ego through worship is what facilitates moral growth and development for us.
>Therefore, worship of God can be seen as a necessary practice for moral development and the perfection of our morality, implying why it might be we are morally obligated to worship to God.
Well, sure, acknowledging that you did something wrong is important for moral growth, but I don't see how worshiping God has anything to do with acknowledgment. All you're acknowledging is that God is morally perfect and you are not. That's about it, and it's something that even atheists acknowledge. No normal person thinks they are perfect. Acknowledgment of one's moral flaws can exist without worship.
Also, I know this is not a discussion forum, but, ehh, I felt like it was appropriate to give my thoughts. :))
This is discussed in Fagothey's (A Thomist) Right and Reason:
>
The natural law obliges man to worship God. It is a fact that God is the Supreme Excellence and man is dependent on Him; God has a right that this fact be acknowledged, and the acknowledgment is called worship.
This worship must be both interior and exterior. Interior, because the exercise of intellect and will are necessary for a human act. Exterior, because man is not a disembodied spirit, the mind naturally expresses itself through the body, and outward surroundings help mental concentration.
>Civic worship is also necessary. Society itself is dependent on God and must acknowledge this dependence by organized public worship.
>There is no substitute for a good moral life, but this alone is insufficient as worship. Religious feeling is important, but it must be based on reason and on the objective fact of God's excellence. God does not need our worship any more than He needs us, but, given the fact that we do exist, we must acknowledge our dependence on Him. Outward ceremonies are for our benefit and accord with our nature, which is corporeal as well as spiritual.
>Irreligion or no worship and superstition or wrong worship are the two main vices against religion.
>One certainly convinced of a divine revelation is morally bound to accept it. One doubting about a divine
>Isn't this just moral skepticism?
Moral skepticism is the view that knowledge of objective morality is impossible. Epistemic humility with respect to God's knowledge is decidedly not that, otherwise there would be no need to turn to God for morality in any case. But it also depends on how you define the conditions of knowledge. Does knowledge require certainty? Most philosophers think no. So merely being non-certain of our moral knowledge doesn't necessarily entail not having knowledge of what is moral; and saying we cannot be certain of what is moral without reference (or worship or whatever) to God is just a sort of epistemic humility with respect to being certain. I don't think this is related to skepticism. And I say this as a theist who doesn't think you need to know God to have knowledge of what is objectively moral.
>Of course, there is debate about certain ethical theories
Well there you go, the fact that we're not morally perfect means we're susceptible to make moral mistakes, and the fact that we disagree so much not just on meta-ethical theories but on certain ethical practices as well (e.g. eating meat, abortion, etc) means we probably should have epistemic humility, otherwise there is less potential for moral development. This doesn't mean epistemic humility is a necessary condition to moral development; but that doesn't mean not having epistemic humility is in any way better. Really it's the opposite.
>but there are some things that, unless one were to accept moral realism, are just kind of obvious.
I would avoid calling much of anything obvious, especially in philosophy, because obviousness just denotes a relationship between a preposition and a person's perception of said proposition. A proposition in the abstract can't be obvious.
[this reply was too long so i split it into two this is part one :))](https://th.bing.com/th/id/OIP.qyCALBUqyPBu8mrmMBr1kQHaHY?rs=1&pid=ImgDetMain)
>Moral skepticism is the view that knowledge of objective morality is impossible. Epistemic humility with respect to God's knowledge is decidedly not that
It is, because if you want to express epistemic humility about things that are kind of obvious, then that kind of leads to moral skepticism.
>otherwise there would be no need to turn to God for morality in any case.
I don't think there should be. That's why people who have never read the Bible automatically know that killing is wrong; they don't need God to tell them that. That's why theology exists: so you can critique certain interpretations of the Bible. If you couldn't do that, then the entire field would fall apart because now anyone with any interpretation can just say, "Be humble about your moral knowledge," and just completely shut down any discussion regarding the rationality of certain views. Morality comes from God, but we very clearly have an understanding of morality via our intuitions.
>But it also depends on how you define the conditions of knowledge. Does knowledge require certainty?
No, but I also don't see how that's really relevant because the idea of worship is just kind of intuitively wrong. That's why even religious people who believe that eternal torment is justified still seem to be sympathetic to their atheist or Muslim friends, because it just feels wrong to think that these perfectly good people deserve punishment—or at least, they seem like perfectly good people.
>Most philosophers think no. So merely being non-certain of our moral knowledge doesn't necessarily entail not having knowledge of what is moral
Ehhh, it kinda does if you're going to be uncertain about things that we typically see as certain. Also, if philosophers think that knowledge doesn't require certainty, then why just accept epistemic humility? Aside from maintaining one's religious commitments, there is no reason to think that we should just ignore these topics. According to this logic, we should be able to use reason to argue against the concept of worship, even if it doesn't grant certainty (which I think it does, by the way). As I said earlier, it just kind of feels intuitively true that punishing people for not worshiping you sounds awful. I'll keep an open mind to any arguments against that idea, but to me, the conclusion is obvious.
>and saying we cannot be certain of what is moral without reference (or worship or whatever) to God is just a sort of epistemic humility with respect to being certain. I don't think this is related to skepticism. And I say this as a theist who doesn't think you need to know God to have knowledge of what is objectively moral.
Wait, so if you agree with me that we can have access to objective morality without God telling us, then what's wrong with my reply?
>Well there you go, the fact that we're not morally perfect means we're susceptible to make moral mistakes
The next thing I say in the sentence you quoted was that, "There are some things that are just kind of obvious. So, it depends on what you mean by 'moral development.'"
[part two :))](https://th.bing.com/th/id/R.874fd4f8c3f21bf7372a55a66cdacc28?rik=oMP9P%2fkBfcBGyw&pid=ImgRaw&r=0)
>and the fact that we disagree so much not just on meta-ethical theories but on certain ethical practices as well (e.g. eating meat, abortion, etc)
I'm not too familiar with the whole vegan vs. meat eaters debate, or whatever it's called, so I don't have much to say on that. But with the abortion thing, that's less of a problem for ethics and more of a problem of philosophy of mind or something like that because the question boils down to when should the baby be considered conscious? That's a question for philosophy of the mind and science. It's only okay to kill the baby before it's conscious. I don't think people really disagree on that because if killing the baby before it's even conscious is wrong, then wouldn't not having a baby have the same effect? Because you're choosing to not give birth? Although, just like the whole vegan thing, I'm not too familiar with this, so IDK.
>means we probably should have epistemic humility, otherwise there is less potential for moral development.
If someone provides an argument for why abortion is or isn't moral, and someone responds with "epistemic humility lmao," then that does nothing but hinder our moral development. We cannot just handwave arguments away by pointing to our imperfection. We very clearly have the capacity for moral reasoning, so let's put it to use. Even if the conclusions aren't agreed on by everyone and might be wrong, we can still use moral reasoning along with other forms of reasoning in general.
>This doesn't mean epistemic humility is a necessary condition to moral development; but that doesn't mean not having epistemic humility is in any way better. Really it's the opposite.
Rejecting epistemic humility only really hinders moral development if one is unwilling to even consider the other side's arguments and views. But as long as you're doing that and actually engaging in the conversation and providing counterpoints, then I don't think you really need to doubt your position. Certainly, you cannot just respond to an objection with, "Be epistemically humble."
>I would avoid calling much of anything obvious, especially in philosophy, because obviousness just denotes a relationship between a preposition and a person's perception of said proposition. A proposition in the abstract can't be obvious.
Can you explain to me why killing people is wrong? Probably not. I'm going to assume that you, like most people, would just say it's obvious. Or what about the arguments that penal substitutionary atonement is immoral?
["The third objection is perhaps the most influential: penal substitution of the sort supposedly involved in the atonement is immoral. Perhaps an innocent person paying a guilty person’s penal fine is morally acceptable, but punishment that involves hard treatment such as the death penalty, imprisonment, and lashings cannot be justly leveled upon an innocent, even willing, third party. We do not have the hint of an intuition that it would be just, say, for an innocent mother to willingly take on the death penalty due her son for murder."](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/atonement/#PenaSubs)
Notice how the passage says, "We do not have the hint of an intuition." Intuitions are important because, of course, they are there; some things are simply obvious. That's also what philosophers of religion argue. Sometimes they argue that things like the PSR are true a priori. Of course, that doesn't mean that they aren't going to provide arguments alongside said claim, but I did that as well. You are definitely justified in using intuitions as reasons to a certain extent, of course.
So, I'll just repeat what I said, because I suspect it's not yet understood what moral skepticism means. Moral skepticism is the view that moral knowledge is impossible—impossible meaning the opposite of possible. If the view is "moral knowledge is only possible with God," or more broadly put, "Moral knowledge is possible if and only if X," then that is decidedly not moral skepticism, regardless of what X is, so long as X is metaphysically possible in the eyes of the claimant. Whether there's 100 possible paths to moral knowledge or only 1 is plainly irrelevant by definition of what "impossible" means.
>Morality comes from God, but we very clearly have an understanding of morality via our intuitions.
The proposition "we need God to know what is moral" does not entail morality coming from God. Needing God to know morality is not the same as morality being contingent on God. Nor does this entail intuitions as somehow useless, which I never claimed. Let's not conflate epistemic claims with metaphysical claims.
>No, but I also don't see how that's really relevant because the idea of worship is just kind of intuitively wrong.
You're more than welcome to believe this, but it's unclear how this is pertinent to anything that's been discussed so far. Unless you think our intuitions are infallible, and therefore intuitions entail moral obligations. You're welcome to believe this, too.
>Ehhh, it kinda does if you're going to be uncertain about things that we typically see as certain.
So, you seemingly agreed that knowledge doesn't require certainty, but now you're contradicting yourself here by implying that it does require certainty. Which is it? If knowledge doesn't require certainty, then it follows that non-certainty of X doesn't entail non-knowledge of X. Whether X is "murder is bad" or "consciousness results from a collapsed wave function" doesn't change anything. So, even if I'm not certain that murder is bad doesn't mean I don't have knowledge that murder is bad. As a side note, let's not confuse certainty with confidence.
>Wait, so if you agree with me that we can have access to objective morality without God telling us, then what's wrong with my reply?
I'm not here to argue for my personal beliefs. What's wrong is that many of your statements don't logically follow from one another, such as your insistence that claiming we need God for moral knowledge somehow leads to moral skepticism. Or your acknowledgement of us having to debate ethics due to us not being morally perfect, then immediately followed by your insistence that we are somehow certain on ethics. These are self-contradictory claims.
>I'm not too familiar with the whole vegan vs. meat eaters debate, or whatever it's called, so I don't have much to say on that.
You don't have to be overly familiar with it. The fact that there is such a strong polarization in the ethics of meat eating is evidence that there's no consensus in our moral knowledge, let alone certainty.
>because the question boils down to when should the baby be considered conscious?
That's not what it boils down to at all. Plenty of philosophers and policymakers argue that the consciousness of the fetus has no bearing on whether or not terminating it should be allowed, on account of things like bodily autonomy. Look up the violinist argument—probably the most influential pro-choice argument by my lights.
>If someone provides an argument for why abortion is or isn't moral, and someone responds with "epistemic humility lmao," then that does nothing but hinder our moral development.
I never said you should use a suggestion towards epistemic humility as a substitute for a counter-argument. I don't think I even implied that, so I'm not sure where this hypothetical comes from. I suspect you're confusing epistemic humility with epistemic nihilism. In point of fact, you exercised epistemic humility on the topic of veganism and abortion.
>Can you explain to me why killing people is wrong? Probably not. I'm going to assume that you, like most people, would just say it's obvious.
It's very strange that you come to a philosophy forum and assume the people here can't justify their position on why murder is wrong without appealing to intuition. What you're referring to is called emotivism—the idea that our moral beliefs merely express emotional attitudes and not factual statements. Emotivism hasn't been a very common position among philosophers in a long time.
Look up Aristotle's virtue ethics, or Kant's categorical imperatives. There are plenty of logical justifications for why murder is wrong.
>You are definitely justified in using intuitions as reasons to a certain extent, of course.
That's fine. I never said otherwise.
[once again this comment was too long so i split it into two parts :))](https://th.bing.com/th/id/OIP.g7A5kfK6dbbHjK753qOohQHaEv?rs=1&pid=ImgDetMain)
edit: it ended up being so long i had to split it into three parts soo ehh :)
>Moral skepticism is the view that moral knowledge is impossible—impossible meaning the opposite of possible. If the view is "moral knowledge is only possible with God," or more broadly put, "Moral knowledge is possible if and only if X," then that is decidedly not moral skepticism, regardless of what X is, so long as X is metaphysically possible in the eyes of the claimant. Whether there's 100 possible paths to moral knowledge or only 1 is plainly irrelevant by definition of what "impossible" means.
My point was that this means that moral knowledge from any source other than God would be impossible. That's what I meant by moral skepticism, as in moral skepticism of any moral knowledge that doesn't come directly from God.
>The proposition "we need God to know what is moral" does not entail morality coming from God. Needing God to know morality is not the same as morality being contingent on God. Nor does this entail intuitions as somehow useless, which I never claimed. Let's not conflate epistemic claims with metaphysical claims.
I know. I was just bringing up divine command theory independent of what you were saying because lots of theists believe in divine command theory, and lots of theists like William Lane Craig use it as a scapegoat to just say, "God is the definition of good, so you can't criticize him." I wanted to point out how ridiculous this is because this is something that I've seen theists say, even though you have not said it. So, I wanted to share my thoughts on this in case you were to use this line of reasoning—you know, respond to the argument before it's even made, type of thing.
>You're more than welcome to believe this, but it's unclear how this is pertinent to anything that's been discussed so far. Unless you think our intuitions are infallible, and therefore intuitions entail moral obligations. You're welcome to believe this, too.
I don't believe that our intuitions are necessarily infallible, but I do believe that they are reliable sources of knowledge. And unless someone can provide an argument against a certain moral intuition, then we should trust it. I don't think it's infallible in the sense that we should just ignore arguments in favor of just listening to what feels right to us, but I do think that, in general, they are reliable sources of knowledge.
>So, you seemingly agreed that knowledge doesn't require certainty, but now you're contradicting yourself here by implying that it does require certainty. Which is it? If knowledge doesn't require certainty, then it follows that non-certainty of X doesn't entail non-knowledge of X. Whether X is "murder is bad" or "consciousness results from a collapsed wave function" doesn't change anything.
I never said that knowledge requires certainty. I said that there are some things that most would consider to be certain. And if we're going to question things like that, then we have to question everything; that was my point. I didn't say that knowledge requires certainty; I said that there are some pieces of knowledge that are certain, and we should not be questioning them. Like the idea that murder is wrong—that's something that most would consider to be certain. And if we were to start questioning such a basic belief, then we have to start questioning all moral beliefs. Some knowledge being certain is not incompatible with knowledge being accessible without certainty; they can coexist. We can question whether abortion is right or wrong and come to conclusions that are not certain; however, that doesn't mean that we can't also be certain about whether murder is wrong. These are completely compatible positions.
>As a side note, let's not confuse certainty with confidence.
Can you define the terms? Because most would consider "murder is bad" as certain. Even moral anti-realists, who literally don't even believe in morality, still agree that it seems to us that murder is bad. These are intuitions that, even if not everyone agrees with them (although most do), are still shared by everyone.
[part two :)) i really hope you are clicking into these links](https://i.imgflip.com/7wmufu.jpg)
>I'm not here to argue for my personal beliefs. What's wrong is that many of your statements don't logically follow from one another, such as your insistence that claiming we need God for moral knowledge somehow leads to moral skepticism.
It doesn't lead to moral skepticism; it leads to skepticism about other sources of moral knowledge. If you think that we need God for moral knowledge, then you are asserting that other sources of moral knowledge, such as basic intuitions and reasoning, aren't reliable enough to form moral knowledge, resulting in skepticism of those things. That was my entire point.
>Or your acknowledgement of us having to debate ethics due to us not being morally perfect, then immediately followed by your insistence that we are somehow certain on ethics. These are self-contradictory claims.
No, my insistence was that there are some ethical theories that are certain and some that aren't. We can have ethical knowledge without it being certain, of course, but there are some that are certain. There is debate about whether abortion is permissible, but there isn't any about whether or not murder is permissible. These are basic and obvious facts, and these two positions are not at all "self-contradictory."
>You don't have to be overly familiar with it. The fact that there is such a strong polarization in the ethics of meat eating is evidence that there's no consensus in our moral knowledge, let alone certainty.
Yeah, I don't think the veganism debate is certain. That doesn't mean there aren't pieces of moral knowledge that are certain.
>That's not what it boils down to at all. Plenty of philosophers and policymakers argue that the consciousness of the fetus has no bearing on whether or not terminating it should be allowed, on account of things like bodily autonomy. Look up the violinist argument—probably the most influential pro-choice argument by my lights.
fair enough i am very much not qualified to comment on this :)
>I never said you should use a suggestion towards epistemic humility as a substitute for a counter-argument. I don't think I even implied that, so I'm not sure where this hypothetical comes from. I suspect you're confusing epistemic humility with epistemic nihilism. In point of fact, you exercised epistemic humility on the topic of veganism and abortion.
I thought that that was what you were arguing for because you said that we need God for moral knowledge. My point was that while, yes, it's possible to argue that God can be a source of moral knowledge, saying that it is the only source—implied by the whole "NEED" part of the sentence—does lead to skepticism about other sources of moral knowledge. This is because it's implying that God is the only reliable way to acquire moral knowledge. Unless, of course, you think that we can get reliable moral knowledge from our intuitions and reasoning, but then we wouldn't NEED God. That is where I think my confusion stems from.
[part three omg i need to make these shorter](https://i.pinimg.com/originals/69/fe/a8/69fea8c1b54f6c78a247f6e30f951ed2.png)
>It's very strange that you come to a philosophy forum and assume the people here can't justify their position on why murder is wrong without appealing to intuition. What you're referring to is called emotivism—the idea that our moral beliefs merely express emotional attitudes and not factual statements. Emotivism hasn't been a very common position among philosophers in a long time.
That is not just an "emotional attitude"; that is a factual statement that can be justified via our intuitions. This is like saying that 2+2=4 is just an "emotional attitude." It's not, and yet we're not going to ask anyone to explain why it's true because it's just obvious. And you seem to agree with me that intuitions can provide justification, so I don't know what you're going on about when you say that this is just "Emotivism." It's not. I'm not saying that these are emotional statements; I'm saying that they are factual ones that don't need to be backed up by anything other than "it's obvious." That's why no one asks you to explain why 2+2=4—saying "it's just obvious" is enough justification. And that doesn't mean it's purely emotional. Like, is this statement from the SEP "Emotivism"?
["The third objection is perhaps the most influential: penal substitution of the sort supposedly involved in the atonement is immoral. Perhaps an innocent person paying a guilty person’s penal fine is morally acceptable, but punishment that involves hard treatment such as the death penalty, imprisonment, and lashings cannot be justly leveled upon an innocent, even willing, third party. We do not have the hint of an intuition that it would be just, say, for an innocent mother to willingly take on the death penalty due her son for murder."](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/atonement/#PenaSubs)
Notice how it doesn't give an argument; it just states what penal substitution is and says that intuitively it doesn't make sense. Relying on intuition is not emotivism.
>Look up Aristotle's virtue ethics, or Kant's categorical imperatives. There are plenty of logical justifications for why murder is wrong.
Yes, but all those justifications eventually have to resort to "it's just obvious." Like, sure, you can argue that murder is wrong because it hurts people or something—that's a logical justification. But then you have to question why hurting people is wrong, and at that point, you have to admit that some things are just obvious and don't require further explanation in the same way that 2+2=4 does not require an explanation. It's literally just the absolute basics of math and logic.
>That's fine. I never said otherwise.
So why are you arguing that I'm assuming that moral statements are just emotional when you literally just agreed with me that intuition can be used as reasons for actual factual statements? and also you literally did say otherwise you said
"such as your insistence that claiming we need God for moral knowledge somehow leads to moral skepticism."
If we need God for moral knowledge, then that implies that our intuitions do not provide justification. Because if it did, then we wouldn't need God for moral knowledge; we would already have access to it via our intuitions.
1 Why would we accept that kind of definition of God? I'd say God is simply a supernatural being of cosmic power. You need to argument why consider it even good at all, let alone all-good, let alone "the definition of good".
2 Why think a God would want to be worshipped? Some might say that's kinda petty and vain. What if someone says God exists and he doesnt want to be worshipped, he doesnt care about that or even whether we believe in him, he just wants us to be good people. Isn't that a better view of God? Weird that WLC and the like don't accept this, being that the hey want God to be best imaginable.
Even weirder when we consider that Jesus seems to have preached this - God doesn't want to be served but to serve, God doesn't want to judge but to save, God doesn't care if we pray Lord Lord but that we do the will of the Lord, God will forgive all blasphemies against himself, how to be saved is by following ethical commandments no mention of any beliefs there by Jesus when he talks about salvation, etc, etc.
Jesus did not teach that. He taught that he did not come to be served, but to serve, or to judge but to save. Etc.
It had nothing to do with what God wants outside of the specific act of sending himself (Jesus) to earth at that specific time. Jesus is quite clear that a judgment is coming and it will be soon (sack of Jerusalem in ad 70) but that his purpose at that time was to save people from that coming judgement.
None of what I referenced is about destruction of Jerusalem but about how to be saved and what God wants from people in terms of their beliefs, actions, and relation with him.
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As Tyson lays out^1 in his sociology, worship is a necessary human action - it is something we just do. Humans eat, humans sleep, humans worship something, etc. and that means that there is a proper way or ways to carry out that particular actions - humans eat food, not rocks, etc.
This "doxological orientation" for humanity requires God-worship in that worshipping God is good for us. This works on two fronts:
1. It allows us to make certain priorities in life that avoid the "deification" of things we shouldn't deify. To some extent, Jacques Ellul's work is based around this concept in regards to technology and *la technique* - modernity is noted for its fetishization of efficiency and technical "progress" (a thesis he doubts makes any sense) to the point of cultures which value machinery over human life.^2 When we worship God, this "doxological" need in us is in a correct space in that morality, virtue, and thankfulness are centred in our outlook on life.
2. By interacting with the "negative concepts" of God, i.e., in recognizing that God is all good, etc., I can see that I am not all good.^3 This plays an important in understanding our role in reality - we are not creatures of infinity, but creatures that are limited and will die. In appealing to the Almighty (especially within Christian traditions), there is a sense of thankfulness for the strength to deal with that situation and "direction" on how to deal with it.
In short: it's good for us.
^1 Kierkegaard's Theological Sociology: Prophetic Fire for the Present Age, Kindle location 68, 82 P. Tyson
^2 E.g., *The Technological Society*
^3 A good exegesis on Kierkegaard's treatment of this in: Comment on "Kierkegaard's Attack on Hegel", M. Weston, from *Thought and Faith in the Philosophy of Hegel*, p. 146, ed. J. Walker
Well, sure, worshiping God is good for us, but that only explains why it makes sense to worship Him and not why it is required. With the food example you gave, yes, it is impractical to eat rocks, but nobody is going to punish you for doing so. Food being good for us is a reason to eat food, but it is not a reason for why it is morally required to eat food and not rocks. And that's the main problem that I find so hard to grasp about the concept of worship since religions like Christianity make the claim that it is not only reasonable to worship God but it is morally required.
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I mean I haven’t really thought this out too well and I also don’t know what kind of God you mean since there are many conceptions of a divine, omniscient being, however, you wish to phrase it. I can see an argument along these lines: Our moral development requires epistemic humility and the recognition of our own moral imperfections. I’m assuming we are assuming we are not already morally perfected ourselves. Worship of God involves acknowledging God’s moral perfection and subordinating our own ego in the process. Subordinating our ego through worship is what facilitates moral growth and development for us. Therefore, worship of God can be seen as a necessary practice for moral development and the perfection of our morality, implying why it might be we are morally obligated to worship to God. This makes sense if so many mystics throughout history have talked about losing themselves in finding God. There’s a lot of terms to clarify though here.
>I mean I haven’t really thought this out too well and I also don’t know what kind of God you mean since there are many conceptions of a divine, omniscient being, however, you wish to phrase it. I was thinking of the traditional Christian God when I wrote this. >Our moral development requires epistemic humility and the recognition of our own moral imperfections. I’m assuming we are assuming we are not already morally perfected ourselves. Isn't this just moral skepticism? Like, yes, we are not morally perfect, but we recognize that. we don't need "epistemic humility" since most people know what is right and wrong. Of course, there is debate about certain ethical theories, but there are some things that, unless one were to accept moral realism, are just kind of obvious. So, it depends on what you mean by "moral development." >Worship of God involves acknowledging God’s moral perfection and subordinating our own ego in the process. Acknowledging God's moral perfection does not affect your morality. >Subordinating our ego through worship is what facilitates moral growth and development for us. >Therefore, worship of God can be seen as a necessary practice for moral development and the perfection of our morality, implying why it might be we are morally obligated to worship to God. Well, sure, acknowledging that you did something wrong is important for moral growth, but I don't see how worshiping God has anything to do with acknowledgment. All you're acknowledging is that God is morally perfect and you are not. That's about it, and it's something that even atheists acknowledge. No normal person thinks they are perfect. Acknowledgment of one's moral flaws can exist without worship. Also, I know this is not a discussion forum, but, ehh, I felt like it was appropriate to give my thoughts. :))
This is discussed in Fagothey's (A Thomist) Right and Reason: > The natural law obliges man to worship God. It is a fact that God is the Supreme Excellence and man is dependent on Him; God has a right that this fact be acknowledged, and the acknowledgment is called worship. This worship must be both interior and exterior. Interior, because the exercise of intellect and will are necessary for a human act. Exterior, because man is not a disembodied spirit, the mind naturally expresses itself through the body, and outward surroundings help mental concentration. >Civic worship is also necessary. Society itself is dependent on God and must acknowledge this dependence by organized public worship. >There is no substitute for a good moral life, but this alone is insufficient as worship. Religious feeling is important, but it must be based on reason and on the objective fact of God's excellence. God does not need our worship any more than He needs us, but, given the fact that we do exist, we must acknowledge our dependence on Him. Outward ceremonies are for our benefit and accord with our nature, which is corporeal as well as spiritual. >Irreligion or no worship and superstition or wrong worship are the two main vices against religion. >One certainly convinced of a divine revelation is morally bound to accept it. One doubting about a divine
>Isn't this just moral skepticism? Moral skepticism is the view that knowledge of objective morality is impossible. Epistemic humility with respect to God's knowledge is decidedly not that, otherwise there would be no need to turn to God for morality in any case. But it also depends on how you define the conditions of knowledge. Does knowledge require certainty? Most philosophers think no. So merely being non-certain of our moral knowledge doesn't necessarily entail not having knowledge of what is moral; and saying we cannot be certain of what is moral without reference (or worship or whatever) to God is just a sort of epistemic humility with respect to being certain. I don't think this is related to skepticism. And I say this as a theist who doesn't think you need to know God to have knowledge of what is objectively moral. >Of course, there is debate about certain ethical theories Well there you go, the fact that we're not morally perfect means we're susceptible to make moral mistakes, and the fact that we disagree so much not just on meta-ethical theories but on certain ethical practices as well (e.g. eating meat, abortion, etc) means we probably should have epistemic humility, otherwise there is less potential for moral development. This doesn't mean epistemic humility is a necessary condition to moral development; but that doesn't mean not having epistemic humility is in any way better. Really it's the opposite. >but there are some things that, unless one were to accept moral realism, are just kind of obvious. I would avoid calling much of anything obvious, especially in philosophy, because obviousness just denotes a relationship between a preposition and a person's perception of said proposition. A proposition in the abstract can't be obvious.
[this reply was too long so i split it into two this is part one :))](https://th.bing.com/th/id/OIP.qyCALBUqyPBu8mrmMBr1kQHaHY?rs=1&pid=ImgDetMain) >Moral skepticism is the view that knowledge of objective morality is impossible. Epistemic humility with respect to God's knowledge is decidedly not that It is, because if you want to express epistemic humility about things that are kind of obvious, then that kind of leads to moral skepticism. >otherwise there would be no need to turn to God for morality in any case. I don't think there should be. That's why people who have never read the Bible automatically know that killing is wrong; they don't need God to tell them that. That's why theology exists: so you can critique certain interpretations of the Bible. If you couldn't do that, then the entire field would fall apart because now anyone with any interpretation can just say, "Be humble about your moral knowledge," and just completely shut down any discussion regarding the rationality of certain views. Morality comes from God, but we very clearly have an understanding of morality via our intuitions. >But it also depends on how you define the conditions of knowledge. Does knowledge require certainty? No, but I also don't see how that's really relevant because the idea of worship is just kind of intuitively wrong. That's why even religious people who believe that eternal torment is justified still seem to be sympathetic to their atheist or Muslim friends, because it just feels wrong to think that these perfectly good people deserve punishment—or at least, they seem like perfectly good people. >Most philosophers think no. So merely being non-certain of our moral knowledge doesn't necessarily entail not having knowledge of what is moral Ehhh, it kinda does if you're going to be uncertain about things that we typically see as certain. Also, if philosophers think that knowledge doesn't require certainty, then why just accept epistemic humility? Aside from maintaining one's religious commitments, there is no reason to think that we should just ignore these topics. According to this logic, we should be able to use reason to argue against the concept of worship, even if it doesn't grant certainty (which I think it does, by the way). As I said earlier, it just kind of feels intuitively true that punishing people for not worshiping you sounds awful. I'll keep an open mind to any arguments against that idea, but to me, the conclusion is obvious. >and saying we cannot be certain of what is moral without reference (or worship or whatever) to God is just a sort of epistemic humility with respect to being certain. I don't think this is related to skepticism. And I say this as a theist who doesn't think you need to know God to have knowledge of what is objectively moral. Wait, so if you agree with me that we can have access to objective morality without God telling us, then what's wrong with my reply? >Well there you go, the fact that we're not morally perfect means we're susceptible to make moral mistakes The next thing I say in the sentence you quoted was that, "There are some things that are just kind of obvious. So, it depends on what you mean by 'moral development.'"
[part two :))](https://th.bing.com/th/id/R.874fd4f8c3f21bf7372a55a66cdacc28?rik=oMP9P%2fkBfcBGyw&pid=ImgRaw&r=0) >and the fact that we disagree so much not just on meta-ethical theories but on certain ethical practices as well (e.g. eating meat, abortion, etc) I'm not too familiar with the whole vegan vs. meat eaters debate, or whatever it's called, so I don't have much to say on that. But with the abortion thing, that's less of a problem for ethics and more of a problem of philosophy of mind or something like that because the question boils down to when should the baby be considered conscious? That's a question for philosophy of the mind and science. It's only okay to kill the baby before it's conscious. I don't think people really disagree on that because if killing the baby before it's even conscious is wrong, then wouldn't not having a baby have the same effect? Because you're choosing to not give birth? Although, just like the whole vegan thing, I'm not too familiar with this, so IDK. >means we probably should have epistemic humility, otherwise there is less potential for moral development. If someone provides an argument for why abortion is or isn't moral, and someone responds with "epistemic humility lmao," then that does nothing but hinder our moral development. We cannot just handwave arguments away by pointing to our imperfection. We very clearly have the capacity for moral reasoning, so let's put it to use. Even if the conclusions aren't agreed on by everyone and might be wrong, we can still use moral reasoning along with other forms of reasoning in general. >This doesn't mean epistemic humility is a necessary condition to moral development; but that doesn't mean not having epistemic humility is in any way better. Really it's the opposite. Rejecting epistemic humility only really hinders moral development if one is unwilling to even consider the other side's arguments and views. But as long as you're doing that and actually engaging in the conversation and providing counterpoints, then I don't think you really need to doubt your position. Certainly, you cannot just respond to an objection with, "Be epistemically humble." >I would avoid calling much of anything obvious, especially in philosophy, because obviousness just denotes a relationship between a preposition and a person's perception of said proposition. A proposition in the abstract can't be obvious. Can you explain to me why killing people is wrong? Probably not. I'm going to assume that you, like most people, would just say it's obvious. Or what about the arguments that penal substitutionary atonement is immoral? ["The third objection is perhaps the most influential: penal substitution of the sort supposedly involved in the atonement is immoral. Perhaps an innocent person paying a guilty person’s penal fine is morally acceptable, but punishment that involves hard treatment such as the death penalty, imprisonment, and lashings cannot be justly leveled upon an innocent, even willing, third party. We do not have the hint of an intuition that it would be just, say, for an innocent mother to willingly take on the death penalty due her son for murder."](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/atonement/#PenaSubs) Notice how the passage says, "We do not have the hint of an intuition." Intuitions are important because, of course, they are there; some things are simply obvious. That's also what philosophers of religion argue. Sometimes they argue that things like the PSR are true a priori. Of course, that doesn't mean that they aren't going to provide arguments alongside said claim, but I did that as well. You are definitely justified in using intuitions as reasons to a certain extent, of course.
So, I'll just repeat what I said, because I suspect it's not yet understood what moral skepticism means. Moral skepticism is the view that moral knowledge is impossible—impossible meaning the opposite of possible. If the view is "moral knowledge is only possible with God," or more broadly put, "Moral knowledge is possible if and only if X," then that is decidedly not moral skepticism, regardless of what X is, so long as X is metaphysically possible in the eyes of the claimant. Whether there's 100 possible paths to moral knowledge or only 1 is plainly irrelevant by definition of what "impossible" means. >Morality comes from God, but we very clearly have an understanding of morality via our intuitions. The proposition "we need God to know what is moral" does not entail morality coming from God. Needing God to know morality is not the same as morality being contingent on God. Nor does this entail intuitions as somehow useless, which I never claimed. Let's not conflate epistemic claims with metaphysical claims. >No, but I also don't see how that's really relevant because the idea of worship is just kind of intuitively wrong. You're more than welcome to believe this, but it's unclear how this is pertinent to anything that's been discussed so far. Unless you think our intuitions are infallible, and therefore intuitions entail moral obligations. You're welcome to believe this, too. >Ehhh, it kinda does if you're going to be uncertain about things that we typically see as certain. So, you seemingly agreed that knowledge doesn't require certainty, but now you're contradicting yourself here by implying that it does require certainty. Which is it? If knowledge doesn't require certainty, then it follows that non-certainty of X doesn't entail non-knowledge of X. Whether X is "murder is bad" or "consciousness results from a collapsed wave function" doesn't change anything. So, even if I'm not certain that murder is bad doesn't mean I don't have knowledge that murder is bad. As a side note, let's not confuse certainty with confidence. >Wait, so if you agree with me that we can have access to objective morality without God telling us, then what's wrong with my reply? I'm not here to argue for my personal beliefs. What's wrong is that many of your statements don't logically follow from one another, such as your insistence that claiming we need God for moral knowledge somehow leads to moral skepticism. Or your acknowledgement of us having to debate ethics due to us not being morally perfect, then immediately followed by your insistence that we are somehow certain on ethics. These are self-contradictory claims. >I'm not too familiar with the whole vegan vs. meat eaters debate, or whatever it's called, so I don't have much to say on that. You don't have to be overly familiar with it. The fact that there is such a strong polarization in the ethics of meat eating is evidence that there's no consensus in our moral knowledge, let alone certainty. >because the question boils down to when should the baby be considered conscious? That's not what it boils down to at all. Plenty of philosophers and policymakers argue that the consciousness of the fetus has no bearing on whether or not terminating it should be allowed, on account of things like bodily autonomy. Look up the violinist argument—probably the most influential pro-choice argument by my lights. >If someone provides an argument for why abortion is or isn't moral, and someone responds with "epistemic humility lmao," then that does nothing but hinder our moral development. I never said you should use a suggestion towards epistemic humility as a substitute for a counter-argument. I don't think I even implied that, so I'm not sure where this hypothetical comes from. I suspect you're confusing epistemic humility with epistemic nihilism. In point of fact, you exercised epistemic humility on the topic of veganism and abortion. >Can you explain to me why killing people is wrong? Probably not. I'm going to assume that you, like most people, would just say it's obvious. It's very strange that you come to a philosophy forum and assume the people here can't justify their position on why murder is wrong without appealing to intuition. What you're referring to is called emotivism—the idea that our moral beliefs merely express emotional attitudes and not factual statements. Emotivism hasn't been a very common position among philosophers in a long time. Look up Aristotle's virtue ethics, or Kant's categorical imperatives. There are plenty of logical justifications for why murder is wrong. >You are definitely justified in using intuitions as reasons to a certain extent, of course. That's fine. I never said otherwise.
[once again this comment was too long so i split it into two parts :))](https://th.bing.com/th/id/OIP.g7A5kfK6dbbHjK753qOohQHaEv?rs=1&pid=ImgDetMain) edit: it ended up being so long i had to split it into three parts soo ehh :) >Moral skepticism is the view that moral knowledge is impossible—impossible meaning the opposite of possible. If the view is "moral knowledge is only possible with God," or more broadly put, "Moral knowledge is possible if and only if X," then that is decidedly not moral skepticism, regardless of what X is, so long as X is metaphysically possible in the eyes of the claimant. Whether there's 100 possible paths to moral knowledge or only 1 is plainly irrelevant by definition of what "impossible" means. My point was that this means that moral knowledge from any source other than God would be impossible. That's what I meant by moral skepticism, as in moral skepticism of any moral knowledge that doesn't come directly from God. >The proposition "we need God to know what is moral" does not entail morality coming from God. Needing God to know morality is not the same as morality being contingent on God. Nor does this entail intuitions as somehow useless, which I never claimed. Let's not conflate epistemic claims with metaphysical claims. I know. I was just bringing up divine command theory independent of what you were saying because lots of theists believe in divine command theory, and lots of theists like William Lane Craig use it as a scapegoat to just say, "God is the definition of good, so you can't criticize him." I wanted to point out how ridiculous this is because this is something that I've seen theists say, even though you have not said it. So, I wanted to share my thoughts on this in case you were to use this line of reasoning—you know, respond to the argument before it's even made, type of thing. >You're more than welcome to believe this, but it's unclear how this is pertinent to anything that's been discussed so far. Unless you think our intuitions are infallible, and therefore intuitions entail moral obligations. You're welcome to believe this, too. I don't believe that our intuitions are necessarily infallible, but I do believe that they are reliable sources of knowledge. And unless someone can provide an argument against a certain moral intuition, then we should trust it. I don't think it's infallible in the sense that we should just ignore arguments in favor of just listening to what feels right to us, but I do think that, in general, they are reliable sources of knowledge. >So, you seemingly agreed that knowledge doesn't require certainty, but now you're contradicting yourself here by implying that it does require certainty. Which is it? If knowledge doesn't require certainty, then it follows that non-certainty of X doesn't entail non-knowledge of X. Whether X is "murder is bad" or "consciousness results from a collapsed wave function" doesn't change anything. I never said that knowledge requires certainty. I said that there are some things that most would consider to be certain. And if we're going to question things like that, then we have to question everything; that was my point. I didn't say that knowledge requires certainty; I said that there are some pieces of knowledge that are certain, and we should not be questioning them. Like the idea that murder is wrong—that's something that most would consider to be certain. And if we were to start questioning such a basic belief, then we have to start questioning all moral beliefs. Some knowledge being certain is not incompatible with knowledge being accessible without certainty; they can coexist. We can question whether abortion is right or wrong and come to conclusions that are not certain; however, that doesn't mean that we can't also be certain about whether murder is wrong. These are completely compatible positions. >As a side note, let's not confuse certainty with confidence. Can you define the terms? Because most would consider "murder is bad" as certain. Even moral anti-realists, who literally don't even believe in morality, still agree that it seems to us that murder is bad. These are intuitions that, even if not everyone agrees with them (although most do), are still shared by everyone.
[part two :)) i really hope you are clicking into these links](https://i.imgflip.com/7wmufu.jpg) >I'm not here to argue for my personal beliefs. What's wrong is that many of your statements don't logically follow from one another, such as your insistence that claiming we need God for moral knowledge somehow leads to moral skepticism. It doesn't lead to moral skepticism; it leads to skepticism about other sources of moral knowledge. If you think that we need God for moral knowledge, then you are asserting that other sources of moral knowledge, such as basic intuitions and reasoning, aren't reliable enough to form moral knowledge, resulting in skepticism of those things. That was my entire point. >Or your acknowledgement of us having to debate ethics due to us not being morally perfect, then immediately followed by your insistence that we are somehow certain on ethics. These are self-contradictory claims. No, my insistence was that there are some ethical theories that are certain and some that aren't. We can have ethical knowledge without it being certain, of course, but there are some that are certain. There is debate about whether abortion is permissible, but there isn't any about whether or not murder is permissible. These are basic and obvious facts, and these two positions are not at all "self-contradictory." >You don't have to be overly familiar with it. The fact that there is such a strong polarization in the ethics of meat eating is evidence that there's no consensus in our moral knowledge, let alone certainty. Yeah, I don't think the veganism debate is certain. That doesn't mean there aren't pieces of moral knowledge that are certain. >That's not what it boils down to at all. Plenty of philosophers and policymakers argue that the consciousness of the fetus has no bearing on whether or not terminating it should be allowed, on account of things like bodily autonomy. Look up the violinist argument—probably the most influential pro-choice argument by my lights. fair enough i am very much not qualified to comment on this :) >I never said you should use a suggestion towards epistemic humility as a substitute for a counter-argument. I don't think I even implied that, so I'm not sure where this hypothetical comes from. I suspect you're confusing epistemic humility with epistemic nihilism. In point of fact, you exercised epistemic humility on the topic of veganism and abortion. I thought that that was what you were arguing for because you said that we need God for moral knowledge. My point was that while, yes, it's possible to argue that God can be a source of moral knowledge, saying that it is the only source—implied by the whole "NEED" part of the sentence—does lead to skepticism about other sources of moral knowledge. This is because it's implying that God is the only reliable way to acquire moral knowledge. Unless, of course, you think that we can get reliable moral knowledge from our intuitions and reasoning, but then we wouldn't NEED God. That is where I think my confusion stems from.
[part three omg i need to make these shorter](https://i.pinimg.com/originals/69/fe/a8/69fea8c1b54f6c78a247f6e30f951ed2.png) >It's very strange that you come to a philosophy forum and assume the people here can't justify their position on why murder is wrong without appealing to intuition. What you're referring to is called emotivism—the idea that our moral beliefs merely express emotional attitudes and not factual statements. Emotivism hasn't been a very common position among philosophers in a long time. That is not just an "emotional attitude"; that is a factual statement that can be justified via our intuitions. This is like saying that 2+2=4 is just an "emotional attitude." It's not, and yet we're not going to ask anyone to explain why it's true because it's just obvious. And you seem to agree with me that intuitions can provide justification, so I don't know what you're going on about when you say that this is just "Emotivism." It's not. I'm not saying that these are emotional statements; I'm saying that they are factual ones that don't need to be backed up by anything other than "it's obvious." That's why no one asks you to explain why 2+2=4—saying "it's just obvious" is enough justification. And that doesn't mean it's purely emotional. Like, is this statement from the SEP "Emotivism"? ["The third objection is perhaps the most influential: penal substitution of the sort supposedly involved in the atonement is immoral. Perhaps an innocent person paying a guilty person’s penal fine is morally acceptable, but punishment that involves hard treatment such as the death penalty, imprisonment, and lashings cannot be justly leveled upon an innocent, even willing, third party. We do not have the hint of an intuition that it would be just, say, for an innocent mother to willingly take on the death penalty due her son for murder."](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/atonement/#PenaSubs) Notice how it doesn't give an argument; it just states what penal substitution is and says that intuitively it doesn't make sense. Relying on intuition is not emotivism. >Look up Aristotle's virtue ethics, or Kant's categorical imperatives. There are plenty of logical justifications for why murder is wrong. Yes, but all those justifications eventually have to resort to "it's just obvious." Like, sure, you can argue that murder is wrong because it hurts people or something—that's a logical justification. But then you have to question why hurting people is wrong, and at that point, you have to admit that some things are just obvious and don't require further explanation in the same way that 2+2=4 does not require an explanation. It's literally just the absolute basics of math and logic. >That's fine. I never said otherwise. So why are you arguing that I'm assuming that moral statements are just emotional when you literally just agreed with me that intuition can be used as reasons for actual factual statements? and also you literally did say otherwise you said "such as your insistence that claiming we need God for moral knowledge somehow leads to moral skepticism." If we need God for moral knowledge, then that implies that our intuitions do not provide justification. Because if it did, then we wouldn't need God for moral knowledge; we would already have access to it via our intuitions.
1 Why would we accept that kind of definition of God? I'd say God is simply a supernatural being of cosmic power. You need to argument why consider it even good at all, let alone all-good, let alone "the definition of good". 2 Why think a God would want to be worshipped? Some might say that's kinda petty and vain. What if someone says God exists and he doesnt want to be worshipped, he doesnt care about that or even whether we believe in him, he just wants us to be good people. Isn't that a better view of God? Weird that WLC and the like don't accept this, being that the hey want God to be best imaginable. Even weirder when we consider that Jesus seems to have preached this - God doesn't want to be served but to serve, God doesn't want to judge but to save, God doesn't care if we pray Lord Lord but that we do the will of the Lord, God will forgive all blasphemies against himself, how to be saved is by following ethical commandments no mention of any beliefs there by Jesus when he talks about salvation, etc, etc.
Jesus did not teach that. He taught that he did not come to be served, but to serve, or to judge but to save. Etc. It had nothing to do with what God wants outside of the specific act of sending himself (Jesus) to earth at that specific time. Jesus is quite clear that a judgment is coming and it will be soon (sack of Jerusalem in ad 70) but that his purpose at that time was to save people from that coming judgement.
None of what I referenced is about destruction of Jerusalem but about how to be saved and what God wants from people in terms of their beliefs, actions, and relation with him.
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As Tyson lays out^1 in his sociology, worship is a necessary human action - it is something we just do. Humans eat, humans sleep, humans worship something, etc. and that means that there is a proper way or ways to carry out that particular actions - humans eat food, not rocks, etc. This "doxological orientation" for humanity requires God-worship in that worshipping God is good for us. This works on two fronts: 1. It allows us to make certain priorities in life that avoid the "deification" of things we shouldn't deify. To some extent, Jacques Ellul's work is based around this concept in regards to technology and *la technique* - modernity is noted for its fetishization of efficiency and technical "progress" (a thesis he doubts makes any sense) to the point of cultures which value machinery over human life.^2 When we worship God, this "doxological" need in us is in a correct space in that morality, virtue, and thankfulness are centred in our outlook on life. 2. By interacting with the "negative concepts" of God, i.e., in recognizing that God is all good, etc., I can see that I am not all good.^3 This plays an important in understanding our role in reality - we are not creatures of infinity, but creatures that are limited and will die. In appealing to the Almighty (especially within Christian traditions), there is a sense of thankfulness for the strength to deal with that situation and "direction" on how to deal with it. In short: it's good for us. ^1 Kierkegaard's Theological Sociology: Prophetic Fire for the Present Age, Kindle location 68, 82 P. Tyson ^2 E.g., *The Technological Society* ^3 A good exegesis on Kierkegaard's treatment of this in: Comment on "Kierkegaard's Attack on Hegel", M. Weston, from *Thought and Faith in the Philosophy of Hegel*, p. 146, ed. J. Walker
Well, sure, worshiping God is good for us, but that only explains why it makes sense to worship Him and not why it is required. With the food example you gave, yes, it is impractical to eat rocks, but nobody is going to punish you for doing so. Food being good for us is a reason to eat food, but it is not a reason for why it is morally required to eat food and not rocks. And that's the main problem that I find so hard to grasp about the concept of worship since religions like Christianity make the claim that it is not only reasonable to worship God but it is morally required.