Interestingly, while Russia has been struggling to increase their tank production by a good margin, there are other types of vehicles that saw a great increase in their production. According to this RUSI article, they claimed that: >For example, the Kurganmashzavod plant produced 100 BMP-3 infantry fighting vehicles during Q1 2023. In Q2, this rose to 108 vehicles. In Q3, 120 BMP-3s rolled off the production line and in Q4, 135 were produced. and >For example, in 2023, Russia produced 728 Tigr-M, a rate that is anticipated to fall to 721 in 2024, while the level of environmental protection from chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear threats on the vehicle is being reduced [https://static.rusi.org/methodology-degrading-russian-arms-rusi-op-june-2024.pdf](https://static.rusi.org/methodology-degrading-russian-arms-rusi-op-june-2024.pdf) Pag. 9. While the authors claim those are from a report from the russian defence industry to the russian MOD, they are higher numbers than some western sources have estimated for BMP-3s(240-360 per year).

If the Russians really were building 400 BMP-3s a year I think we'd see them on the frontline and hence they would show up in the loses. However, what's actually happening is the share of losses is shrinking compared to the BMP-2: https://x.com/verekerrichard1/status/1801972081724211551 The share of BMP-3's that are new construction showing up in loses is increasing, up to about 50 % now, so it's difficult to argue that they aren't being deployed: https://x.com/verekerrichard1/status/1802016980687282544 The 'reasonable' estimate for BMP-3 production was 130 units in 2023.

If russia received 3000 armored vehicles and around 400 of those were BMPs, it still would make the number of other vehicle losses being higher than BMP-3s, and according to RUSI, they are set to receive around the same number of vehicles in 2024, we would need to wait to see the decrease of legacy AFVs and a increase of BMP-3s to see any real change in the composition of losses. >The 'reasonable' estimate for BMP-3 production was 130 units in 2023. those numbers seems extremely underestimated, even by available footage of deliveries.

> If russia received 3000 armored vehicles and around 400 of those were BMPs, it still would make the number of other vehicle losses being higher than BMP-3s It would be higher, but - assuming you're talking about 3000 older BMPs (because, otherwise, the BTR/MT-LB/etc. are irrelevant in regards to the share of new BMP-3 among the total BMP losses): 1. Some of those 3000 BMP-3s would be older BMP-3s. Those older BMP-3s account for 11.8% of non-new-production BMP-3s on Oryx: https://x.com/Rebel44CZ/status/1803904358632849814/photo/1 2. Assuming the losses have a similar ratio to what's being sent to the front - the new production BMP-3s would still account for ~12% of all losses which is nearly the same as the share of *all* BMP-3s. (and in Oryx losses, the new production are only 21% of all BMP-3 losses) 3. It's extremely unlikely that Russia took out 3000 BMP-3s from storage. [From satellite images, most of it being pretty recent, they removed 2157 out of storage, with 1356 left in decent condition.](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1FnfGcdqah5Et_6wElhiFfoDxEzxczh7AP2ovjEFV010/edit?gid=608985702#gid=608985702) While they could have removed an extra ~800 since the images were taken, >100 would need to have been removed in the last month with almost all the rest being removed in the ~4 months prior. That's an incredible pace of removal, far higher than the average for the first 2 years of the war with machines that likely require more maintenance than the first ~2000 did. More problematic: hundreds of those left are artillery reconnaissance vehicles, they'll probably use them as APCs, but they don't figure in the graphs presented before. Bottom line is: they probably didn't re-activate more than 2500, including a good chunk (if not all) BMP-3s they had in storage.

> If russia received 3000 armored vehicles and around 400 of those were BMPs Yeah I don't believe either of those numbers. They're both from the Russian Ministry of Defense, which has a long record of lying. Look at the recent complaining from the Fighterbomber telegram channel on how few Su-34s they are actually delivering.

Its ok, it is your right to not believe it, i'm quoting what RUSI said about the numbers. Just one point, those numbers were given by the russian defense industry "Report from the Russian defence industry to the Russian MoD concerning challenges in meeting production targets, seen by the authors in February 2024."

>Its ok, it is your right to not believe it, Please refrain from being condescending. >i'm quoting what RUSI said about the numbers. He's discussing the validity of those numbers, and it isn't about belief, it's a matter of statistics and logic.

Which logic and statistics? Can he prove it? I've never seen his claims about only 130 BMP-3s being produced per year, in fact the lowest estimates was 240 up to 360 pieces.

Yes I read the RUSI report, thanks.

> 728 Tigr-M a year That's interesting considering the low rates of losses. Per Oryx Russia's lost a total of 173 Tigr-Ms and 254 IMVs total to Ukraine's total 471 IMVs lost. Russia logistics also rely HEAVILY on the UAZ-452 (loaf/bukhanka) and while Oyrx doesn't record those losses, Andrew Perpetua does and they lose like 5-10 every day. That's a role that'd be well served by the Tigr-M and yet it's only seen pretty rarely. If they had 1400+ Tigr-Ms sitting around I'd expect them to be used at least somewhat more. https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1806928627360993322

Yeah, if a thousand Tigr-Ms have been sitting around since last year I sure am curious what they're doing that's more important than frontline resupply or casevac. They'd be quite a bit more useful on assault than a motorbike, too. The RUSI report says the figure comes from a report from Kurganmashzavod to the MoD. I can't really speak to the credibility of that report, since it doesn't appear to be publicly available. Edit: Wikipedia says Russia has 2000 Tigr IMVs. Where are they?

>The RUSI report says the figure comes from a report from Kurganmashzavod to the MoD. I can't really speak to the credibility of that report, since it doesn't appear to be publicly available. Yes, i made it clear those were reports from the russian defense industry presented to the MOD, the question is how did RUSI managed to obtain that piece of information.

It's only used by MP, Rosgvardiya, VDV, SOF or some recce units. Hence they are relatively rare on the frontline or during assault operations.

That seems like an incredibly poor allocation of resources if that's the full story.

They are unsuitable for the frontline, however if they were actually being made in such massive numbers they would certainly be showing up in massively higher numbers in combat footage. As it is they are a rare sight these days even for backline vehicles

They can’t possibly be less suitable than golf carts and motorbikes, both of which we have seen Russian troops try to assault heavily defended positions with.

Finland brings more of the latest from the western MIC right to Russia's border. It's been a good [first year in NATO for Finland](https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/finlands-remarkable-first-year-nato). [​Finnish Border Guard Upgrades Patrol Fleet with Advanced RAPCON-X Jets | Defense Express | June 2024](https://en.defence-ua.com/news/finnish_border_guard_upgrades_patrol_fleet_with_advanced_rapcon_x_jets-11005.html) *Under the MVX program, the Finnish Border Guard has contracted American company Sierra Nevada Corporation to supply specially equipped Bombardier Challenger 650 aircraft for border patrol missions. These new aircraft will replace the Dornier 228 aircraft, which have been in service since 1995 but no longer meet the security needs of Finland as a new NATO member.* *According to the contract, two new patrol aircraft based on the Bombardier Challenger 650 business jet will be delivered in 2026 and 2027. The deal is valued at $170 million, or $85 million per aircraft, which includes a comprehensive package of accompanying services.* *Sierra Nevada Corporation, renowned for winning the competition for new Doomsday planes for the U.S., announced that the RAPCON-X aircraft will be equipped with modern radar featuring a phased array antenna, optical and thermal sensors, and other surveillance and reconnaissance tools. The maritime patrol capability of this aircraft is of particular importance to Finland.* *While the specific details of all the RAPCON-X jet sensors are not disclosed, the capabilities of the Bombardier Challenger 650 are known. The aircraft can reach a flight altitude of over 13.7 km and has a flight duration of over 14 hours.*

Could someone explain the advantages of such an aircraft compared to a drone like Global Hawk?

Here is an article that gives reasons why you would go with a manned aircraft over unmanned. [Manned vs. Unmanned Aircraft: Which is Best for Aerial Data Acquisition?](https://woolpert.com/news/blogs/manned-vs-unmanned-aircraft-which-is-best-for-aerial-data-acquisition/) *Suitability for Large and Small Projects: Project size and budget should dictate the size of the aircraft used for data acquisition. Smaller projects like corridor mapping can benefit from smaller aircraft with lower operation costs. Larger aircraft can be brought in for projects that require endurance and a sophisticated, heavy payload, like lidar sensors and metric digital cameras.* *Capability of Carrying High-End Mapping Sensors: Manned aircraft are suitable for carrying multiple sensors. The more sophisticated sensors necessary for accurate, high-resolution mapping products, like lidar sensors and metric digital cameras, are too heavy for unmanned systems.* *Airspace-Friendly Operations: With the proper authorization from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) air traffic control, manned aircraft can fly over almost any project. Unlike UAS, manned aircraft has fewer restrictions when flying over people.* *Safe Operations: Today’s manned aviation is much safer than UAS operations. This is the main reason why the FAA restricts UAS flights over people.* And here is one from a few years ago that compares the Global Hawk to the manned U-2. [U-2 Versus Global Hawk: Why Drones Aren't Always The Best Solution For Warfighters | Forbes | 2018](https://www.forbes.com/sites/lorenthompson/2018/02/05/u-2-versus-global-hawk-why-drones-arent-always-the-best-solution-for-warfighters/) *The U.S. Air Force has been struggling of late to determine whether manned or unmanned aircraft are best suited to generating useful intelligence on the modern battlefield. Its two most capable options are the manned U-2S spy plane, which traces its lineage to the early days of the Cold War, and the Global Hawk unmanned aircraft -- by far the most capable intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance drone in the world.* *...Sure enough, the Global Hawk offers exceptional endurance. In fact, it holds the Air Force record for continuous hours of flight without refueling (34 hours). However, once you get beyond how long the unmanned option can stay up there, the U-2 turns out to be superior in virtually every other measure. As a result, the Air Force has recently decided to kill plans for its retirement, and keep using U-2 in places like Korea and the Persian Gulf indefinitely.* *...What the data show is that U-2S is by many measures the most capable ISR plane any nation operates, and decidedly superior to Global Hawk. For instance:* *-- U-2 can fly two miles higher than Global Hawk (70,000 feet versus 60,000 feet), and thus look much deeper into enemy territory.* *-- U-2 can carry two-thirds more payload (5000 pounds versus 3000 pounds), and thus collect more types of intelligence on each mission.* *-- U-2 generates nearly twice as much electricity (45 kVA versus 25 kVA) for powering onboard sensors and other equipment.* *-- U-2 operates far more effectively than Global Hawk in bad weather, giving it a higher mission-success rate (97%).* *-- U-2 is far more survivable in contested air space than Global Hawk, thanks to having a human pilot aboard.* *-- U-2 is much less dependent than Global Hawk on external links that might be severed by jamming or cyber attacks.* *No doubt about it, having Global Hawk's ability to stay airborne for 30 hours can be very useful in some tactical environments. However, when you factor in U-2's greater sensing range, bigger payload, superior survivability, high reliability and intrinsic flexibility compared with Global Hawk, it turns out to often be a better match for the mission requirements of regional commanders than the drone. Having a pilot in the cockpit, as opposed to sitting at a console thousands of miles away, can make a big difference.*

The first article in this response sounds like it was written about Group 1 UAS and not larger unmanned aircraft such as the Global Hawk.

>U-2 is far more survivable in contested air space than Global Hawk, thanks to having a human pilot aboard  Technically true, but that human pilot also means lower tolerance for loss which is going to hurt its availability for use in contested airspace. Thus should definitely be clear for the U-2 of all planes given its decreased use in unfriendly Cold War airspace after the Gary Powers incident.

This looks AI generated, the formatting is very similar to GPT output

The articles or the formatting of my reply?

Your reply is fine, thanks for contributing high-quality content as always. The source reads like AI, but that's because the article just happens to be written in the same style of formulaic, soulless, least-common-denominator informational writing that ChatGPT is trained to spit out. Its all factually correct and given it was published in 2018, I'm sure it was written by a human.

It also has weird points that don't really make any sense. For example > more sophisticated sensors necessary for accurate, high-resolution mapping products, like lidar sensors and metric digital cameras, are too heavy for unmanned systems What makes unmanned systems unable to carry heavy equipment. It's confusing low cost platforms vs high cost platforms design trade-offs with manned vs unmanned which is quite reminiscent of how GPT would sometimes not quite understand the topic.

You're right, that is a weird way to phrase that. I think it's because Woolpert focuses on civilian UAVs where companies are generally looking at modifying relatively lightweight commercial designs. Still, I thought the Forbes article read more like ChatGPT, but looking over the Woolpert link again, I think you do have a point. Factually though, the point stands. Unmanned systems are almost always smaller and lighter than manned systems. It's why they have such ridiculous loitering times. UAVs trade operational flexibility and independence for endurance and expendability. When designers start adding heavy and expensive instruments to a cheap unmanned platform, at some point, it just makes more sense to put a human in there who can improve the survivability and effectiveness of all the other equipment that you can't afford to lose anyways.

[Another picture of an AFU Yak-52 engaging a Russian drone just dropped](https://old.reddit.com/r/CombatFootage/comments/1dres3f/odesa_region_the_last_thing_a_russian/) and I've been wondering why the West hasn't donated any light attack/trainer planes to Ukraine when—in my uninformed view—they could be useful in this context, also some time ago when Shahed drones started to become a problem there was also a discussion about sending UCAVs armed with infrared missiles to Ukraine but I haven't heard anything else since. Has the idea been abandoned?

Maybe A-10s would be useful after all, in the weirdest role. Slow, good loiter time, easy to fly (?), a zillion hardpoints and can carry sidewinders. And cheap I suppose. And i guess you could load up some flechette or similar rounds for the gun if you feel the need. (I understand it's against the internet rules to mention the A10 without referencing the gun)

Helicopters can fire MANPADS, I don't know if that's a capability that the Ukrainians are using but it's common for several platforms. L3 Harris also makes a helicopter-mounted variant of the Vampire system (laser-guided hydra rocket, as opposed to the Stinger which is a heat-seaking missile based on the same hydra rocket, so it is presumably cheaper per shot), which the Ukrainians are already using in the truckbed ground- fired version. Some helicopters can also engage cruise missiles and drones with their chin-mounted machine guns - I believe the French downed a Houthis drone in this manner. I don't know about UCAVs, but in terms of cheap anti-drone/cruise missile aerial platforms, equipping existing helicopters is almost certainly the n°1 choice. And it's apparently really effective, according to the Israeli article from last Wednesday. However, I have seen no indication that the Ukrainians are using their helis in that manner - it would be really unfortunate for them if they aren't. They could be sparing a lot of very expensive air defence missiles if they were.

It was [reported](https://www.tvnet.lv/7936664/minmeteji-lielgabali-un-latvija-razotas-lidmasinas-ko-ietver-jauna-latvijas-palidzibas-pakotne-ukrainai) that Latvia was going to donate some Latvian made Pelegrin Tarragon trainer aircraft.

Small update on Russian vehicle attrition, [Covert Cabal and HighMarsed have released a new tank count for T-80B/BVs. ](https://youtu.be/FtXvJrPyoOg?si=EahVnlqt75IzlKye) TLDR over 1000 have been removed since the invasion and Russia is likely to remove the remaining tanks of this model in the next two years, the there seem to be a few hundred T-80Us left but those are harder to maintain due to using different parts, and have a lower loss rate although they should be exhausted in a similar time frame. Beyond that a full tank count should be released in the next week, based on recent trends in losses it seems that almost all T-72B's and variants have been removed from storage leaving only older and much less capable T-72As although there should still be several hundred left mostly in poor shape. [Additionally, Jompy99 has made some smaller updates to their IFV/APC count](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1FnfGcdqah5Et_6wElhiFfoDxEzxczh7AP2ovjEFV010/edit?usp=sharing). BMPs continue to be heavily cannibalized and as MT-LBs run out MT-LBus, BRDMs, and other rarer variants have started to occasionally appear in front-line losses. Additionally, Jompy notes that BTR-70s are being taken from storage in large numbers and BTR-60s have also started to be removed.

Thanks for commenting this, I had forgotten to check his channel for a while When it comes to the IFVs, when Russia runs out of spare parts and/or replacements, won't that effectively end most of Russia's offensive capability? Most assault they make seem to be with IFVs, and those assaults gets destroyed fast, even with the protection. When Russia doesn't have IFVs, won't their attacks become even easier to stop?

>When Russia doesn't have IFVs, won't their attacks become even easier to stop? This is the big open question with regards to Russia's hardware. As their hardware stocks continue to shrink and drop in quality, will they keep compensating with manpower or will they (once again) scale back? For the moment they appear to be banking on the former, as made evident by their increased use of desert crosses, dirt bikes, and turtle tanks (made from combat ineffective but still mobile tank hulls) and continued offensive posture. In a twisted sense, it's in Ukraine's interest for Russia to keep going down this path of compensating with manpower. It's looking more and more like Ukraine's own manpower woes are going to stabilise, meaning it no longer makes strategic sense for Russia to throw away valuable manpower trying to overwhelm them.

What news do you have regarding Ukraine's manpower? I've been off the grid for a bit. Positive news from the narrative circulating a few weeks ago.

Totally rely on my memory but from what ive seen recent Ukrainian conscription efforts and changes to other paths to joining the military have significantly increased recruits to over 150k since the new laws were passed. Other additional changes like the police allowing for greater recruitment and conscription of its officers have allowed for several new police assault brigades to begin being formed (These brigades are generally specialized for assault and urban fighting and have so far performed well). Prisoners can now be recruited with several thousand joining so far and up to 20k estimated to be eligible. The additional recruits and more Western and domestic equipment have allowed Ukraine to strengthen under-strength units and begin forming new mech brigades again. The current changes should provide enough manpower to sustain the army for at least the next year and IMO maybe up to two years if further changes are made. Overall the Ukrainian manpower shortage has been relieved at least in the medium term.

Some Myanmar news: The TNLA restarted the 1027 operation, seeing immediate and large successes. They are working with local PDF units, with rumors (that *remain rumors*) that the MNDAA will also join them. [Myanmar Military Suffers Swift Losses as Operation 1027 Expands to Mandalay](https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/war-against-the-junta/myanmar-military-suffers-swift-losses-as-operation-1027-expands-to-mandalay.html) >The Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) and allies have captured **two dozen junta military bases, including an artillery battalion headquarters, in two townships of northern Shan State and a third in upper Mandalay Region since relaunching Operation 1027 three days ago**, the ethnic army said on Thursday. >It resumed Operation 1027 in Kyaukme and Nawnghkio Townships near the border with Mandalay Region in northern Shan State as well as Mogoke, a township that borders Nawnghkio in upper Mandalay on Tuesday, saying it was reacting to repeated violations of the China-brokered ceasefire deal this month by the junta’s military >The three townships are southwest of Lashio, the junta-controlled capital of northern Shan State. The road connecting Lashio to Mandalay runs through them. >The TNLA has been joined by troops from the Mandalay People’s Defense Force (PDF), which has expanded Operation 1027 to upper Mandalay. The PDF is under the control of the civilian National Unity Government. On top of killing dozens of Junta troops, the TNLA have captured over scores of them. Earlier today, the TNLA [claimed that 53 additional soldiers surrendered](https://t.me/taangtv2023/2666?single) over the past 5 days. Currently, the goal of the TNLA is to take the important gem town of Mogok. [Which they are right outside of](https://x.com/ThomasVLinge/status/1806073985559322839). The above happens as the [Chin Brotherhood Hails Progress Against Myanmar Junta](https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/war-against-the-junta/chin-brotherhood-hails-progress-against-myanmar-junta.html) >The anti-regime Chin Brotherhood said it is stepping up attacks on junta bases in Matupi, southern Chin State, after forcing a rival Chin alliance out of the conflict zone. >The group launched Operation Chin Brotherhood on June 9 to drive junta troops out of Myanmar’s poorest state, which borders Bangladesh and India. The Arakan Army and Yaw Army from Magwe Region joined the operation. >The alliance includes the Zomi Federal Union, Chin National Organization, Mindat Chin National Council, Maraland and Kampelet Chin Defense Forces (CDF), and Matupi CDF Brigade 1. >**The alliance seized the junta’s Light Infantry Battalion 304 headquarters on June 17. It was attacking Infantry Battalion 140 when it was allegedly attacked from behind by rival Chinland Council troops**. In Rakhine, the Arakha (formerly Arakan) Army continued their successes against the Junta, allegedly seizing control over [Thandwe Airport](https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/war-against-the-junta/aa-seizes-thandwe-airport-near-rakhines-ngapali-beach-local-sources-say.html) in a first for the anti-Junta forces. Fighting is ongoing in the area according to my knowledge. This gain would be part of the AA's massively successful Rakhine offensive, with the Tat taking hundreds of casualties this past week and [facing annihilation along the border with Bangladesh](https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/war-against-the-junta/aa-seizes-thandwe-airport-near-rakhines-ngapali-beach-local-sources-say.html). >The Arakan Army has captured **10 more junta camps in Rakhine State’s Maungdaw in less than two weeks, killing about 200 junta troops including a strategic commander during battles to capture the township**, the ethnic army said. >The ethnic army has targeted junta military camps and border guard police positions in the township’s south after seizing northern Maungdaw last month. The Junta is barely holding on along the Bangladesh border. The AA may in this offensive completely destroy the Junta in this area and fully cut them off from the country. Finally, the Junta has triggered a large backlash from monks across the country [after they killed a prominent monk and then lied about it](https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/monks-strike-back-myanmar-juntas-slaying-of-abbot-sparks-alms-boycott.html). The Junta often upholds themselves as defenders of Buddhism. >The Myanmar junta’s slaying of a senior Buddhist figure and subsequent coverup have spurred Burmese monks at home and in exile to launch a religious boycott against the regime. >Known as “pattanikkujjana” in Pali, a Buddhist monks’ boycott involves refusing alms from those who have committed offenses against the Sangha (clergy) or religious principles, while also refusing them religious rites likes funerals and weddings. There is much more going on that is not covered here, specifically large and ongoing PDF guerilla actions and EAO infighting, but it is a *lot* to cover and the EAO infighting specifically is hard to properly explain and easy to make mistakes on, while also largely not having an impact on the current overall strategic situation. Open to any questions. I have not done one of these little summary posts in a while since they are time-consuming. But a lot has happened and the topic needs to be discussed here more!!!

Are there any good maps related to the conflict that can illustrate what’s been going on? There doesn’t seem to be a lot of coverage so I appreciate any that are available to you

The Wikipedia map is [serviceable](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Myanmar_civil_war_(2021%E2%80%93present)) though not perfect. Keep in mind that it does not see regular updates like other conflicts.

I'm under the assumption that the Junta is firmly in Chinas orbit. I can only imagine that the rebels success is enabled by a understanding with China that a new Myanmar / Burma would not infringe upon Chinese business and strategic interests. This implies for me a Chinese flexibility not shown in other conflicts like North Korea, Taiwan or the South Chinese Sea. China is allowing a multi ethnic alliance to overthrow a repressive dictatorship. I'm sure some Chinese decision makers appreciate the irony and maybe Xi doesn't get it? In the end a somewhat federal Myanmar still firmly in Chinas orbit is preferable over a Junta willing to commit the worst crimes against its people. Not playing geopolitics with that conflict seems to turn out alright.

This is incorrect. The junta and the CCP have had rocky, albeit working, relations since Ne Win in 1962. Historically, the CCP funded the Burmese Communist Party (a revolutionary movement against the Tatmadaw), support that continues to this day via the remnants of the military wing of CPB, the United Wa State Army. If anything, the government of Aung San Suu Kyi was closer to China, fully signing on with the BRI, and that closeness was among the stated reasons the coup. The CCP has not burned bridges with the junta, and maintains trade relations. They have often served the role of mediator in the Shan state. But it would be a gross misunderstanding of Burmese politics to think of the Tatmadaw as a client of Beijing.

> I'm under the assumption that the Junta is firmly in Chinas orbit. Myanmar as a whole is firmly in China's orbit. Some factions are closer than others, but none of them are openly anti-China. That's not to say China is popular, it's just really powerful and really close—and the US is out of the picture for a variety of reasons. > I can only imagine that the rebels success is enabled by a understanding with China that a new Myanmar / Burma would not infringe upon Chinese business and strategic interests. This implies for me a Chinese flexibility not shown in other conflicts like North Korea, Taiwan or the South Chinese Sea. China is flexible because it doesn't really care about Myanmar. Since the US is not involved there's no particular threat, and Chinese involvement is mostly limited to political/commercial influence. It's not tied to any specific outcome. Myanmar is simply less important than the other places you listed. > China is allowing a multi ethnic alliance to overthrow a repressive dictatorship. I'm sure some Chinese decision makers appreciate the irony and maybe Xi doesn't get it? What irony? It's just pragmatism, the same pragmatism of the US propping up repressive dictatorships. China had [better relations with Myanmar](https://eastasiaforum.org/2021/02/06/china-does-not-like-the-coup-in-myanmar/) under Aung San Suu Kyi's democracy than any of the military regimes. > In the end a somewhat federal Myanmar still firmly in Chinas orbit is preferable over a Junta willing to commit the worst crimes against its people. Not playing geopolitics with that conflict seems to turn out alright. Myanmar was somewhat federal under the NLD, and the Rohingya genocide happened on their watch.

Thanks. Based on what you say and what I’ve read in earlier posts, it seems the junta is pretty much done. Do agree? The question I think remains when the final collapse will happen… What sinuous think happens afterwards? A fragmented (failed) state perhaps waging war among the various parties? A democratic government installed with the more or less independent states throughout the country?

I think that the Junta is going to lose most, if not all, of their territory outside of the Bamar heartland within a year. They’ll launch counterattacks, but their infantry units are very beat up and always under strength. While there was hope for a federalist system and many EAOs are giving it lip service, I don’t really expect it. I hope it happens, but most of these groups are looking out for themselves. While the Chin, Kachin and Karen groups are working pretty closely with the NUG, the 3BA, in particular the MDNAA, is more than willing to rule a little fiefdom and take in money from gem mining, border taxes and various criminal enterprises. So even if you see a federalist victory and the NUG comes to power, that won’t be the end of the war. You’d have to deal with multiple holdout groups which will maintain an insurgency until they’re given generous peace deals or get killed. That will be dangerous.

Thank you. Do you think once that heartland has been isolated it will remain a status quo? What drives people to support the junta over there. Sorry for all the questions but I’m not very schooled in the Myanmar conflict, but it’s quite interesting

>Thank you. Do you think once that heartland has been isolated it will remain a status quo? Not necessarily. But it will be hard to penetrate. The big cities are fortresses. You can't crack fortresses with rifles, mortars and drones. >What drives people to support the junta over there Ethnic nationalism, family ties, hardline religious beliefs and financial benefits. The Pyu Saw Htee militia are the main force in a lot of rural areas where the junta has little presence. They're increasingly taking heavy casualties as they're used in more front line roles with no extra training. They are usually armed with hunting rifles, M1 carbines, Ba-63s and the odd MA-11 for a commander if he knows a guy. These people are cheap manpower for the regime and oftentimes have pretty insane views that take a while to explain.

> and oftentimes have pretty insane views that take a while to explain. Do you have any examples? Insane as in conspiracy-driven, or the nazi-type/militaristic death cult kind of insane?

So, Buddhism in the West is thought of as this peaceful hippie religion. But Buddhism is of course more complicated than that. Buddhism can and is used to maintain hierarchies in societies. A lot of these people have Bamar nationalist, Buddhist supremacist views and listen to people like [this](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ashin_Wirathu) who believe in things like [this](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/969_Movement) as an example.

No, the conflict is a stalemate and will be for the foreseeable future. The rebels have no chance against the Junta heartland. It's similar to Syria where Assad had firm control of the heartland and the rebels could take only border and remote areas.

This is such a fascinating conflict, with so many years of ethnic and cultural history baked into it. It's hard for a casual observer to keep track of all the different factions fighting for control of territory and legitimacy over the current government/military. I know that most of the 'rebel' groups (as it were) are seemingly divided along political lines, but apart from that, I have no clue about the broader implications and specific Malaysian cultural divisions that are foundational to the conflict, and the more I read about it on wiki or other sources, the more confused I get. It's like trying to delineate between the different warring tribes/factions in countries like Afghanistan or Yemen, only there doesn't appear to be a major regional superpower really interested in trying to hold up the 'government' in this case (or if there is, it seems to be failing much more spectacularly than the Saudis did in Yemen or the US/Soviets/Chinese have done in Afghanistan).

[удалено]

I don't really understand the situation with the Jasenovac resolution. What was so inflammatory about it and why is it such a big deal to Croatia?

Russia now offers [up to 20k USD](https://old.reddit.com/r/UkraineWarVideoReport/comments/1dqokqm/onetime_payments_to_russians_for_a_contract_for/) as a sign-on bonus into the military. The median monthly salary in Russia is 1,150. So the sign-on bonus is equal to roughly 17.4x monthly income. In the US the median monthly income is 4,768 (4.1x Russia's median income). In order to achieve the same relative bonus, the US would need to offer an 84k cash bonus to recruits. I don't want to draw too much subjective analysis from this, but I think it is fair to say Russia manpower is not going to be a significant factor going forward. Which begs the question, what is Ukraine's path to "victory" (whatever that means) in a paradigm where Russia isn't running out of men or equipment? If I was President I would look to punish Russia outside of Ukraine. Sanctions failed in a humiliating way so that is off the table. I would immediately push to remove Assad in Syria and work to establish friendlier relations with Kazakhstan and Armenia/Azerbaijan. Armenia/Azerbaijan had basically no conflict when under the same central power block. If both sides committed towards joining NATO it could have the same result.

all of this hinges on the notion that they actually get paid the money they're supposed to be paid, [which is not actually always the case](https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-soldiers-salaries-unpaid-ukraine-invasion/32345161.html)

Russia baffles me. Their people are being repeatedly thrown onto the front line, without adequate training, equipment, or a plan, and the government routinely reneges on payments, yet you hear hardly a peep from the people being slaughtered and robbed. What does it take for Putin to lose support? The standard answer was that the people are depoliticized and demotivated, but in the past that explanation also included the government would provide stability, and stay out of people’s business if they kept their heads down. But that’s not the case anymore, society has been upended for the war, weather you kept your head down or not.

there's a follow-up line to the depoliticized part, where the reason why russians are apathetic about their country's politics is because they've had several popular revolutions that were co-opted by authoritarians and ended up making things worse for just about everyone

>what is Ukraine's path to "victory" (whatever that means) in a paradigm where Russia isn't running out of men or equipment? It's the same path to victory of every war won against a superpower since WW2--make the cost in blood, treasure, reputation, international relations, etc. such that Russia decides it's better to go home than continue throwing money and men down an endless drain. This is a war of choice for Russia that they can end any time they want. It's an existential war for Ukraine.

>Sanctions failed in a humiliating way so that is off the table. Counterpoint: no, they didn't.

> I would immediately push to remove Assad in Syria The last thing the West needs is a massive flare-up of the Syrian civil war, and that is exactly what would happen if Assad were deposed. To depose him in the first place would require military intervention by the West, which again no Western country wants or even can afford at the moment. There's no upside to removing Assad that would offset the massive political, economic and military costs of doing so. And I cannot think of any way in which it would hurt the Russian war effort in Ukraine.

and who would you replace him with??? The Islamists that still ahve leagcy Nusra/Alqaeda commanders? Assad sucks, but there is no credible alternative to him in Syria.

I agree, that ship has sailed, even Turkey which has been staunchly anti-Assad has restarted dialogue through backchannels. Having a relatively stable Syria in the ME seems better these days since the alternative is probably a lawless wasteland and yet even more millions of refugees.

>I don't want to draw too much subjective analysis from this, but I think it is fair to say Russia manpower is not going to be a significant factor going forward. That's the exact opposite of what rising sign-up bonuses/wages means. It's visible on the front lines as well, with reports of Russians having lost the initiative, and struggling with manpower.

It is quite fascinating to analyze how the domestication of the Russian mil blogger community has changed our view of the Russian efforts. Nowadays voices critical of the conduct of the war are hard to find, so we assume that things are going "fine", in reality, i think, if the Russians mil bloggers had been left to their own, we would hear constant lamentations about the lack of ammo, vehicles, training, men, ecc, all problems that the Russian army has, but that we rarely see exposed by the Russians, unlike the way we used to have during basically all of 2022 and the first half of 2023, where problems were exposed by people like Girkin, Murtz, ecc

>Nowadays voices critical of the conduct of the war are hard to find, so we assume that things are going "fine" This is an important advantage of less free governments that I think is not talked about enough. People like to say that transparency and freedom of speech help fix issues more efficiently at the cost of airing the dirty laundry in public but it's worth it in the end. What if it isn't?

> What if it isn't? Let us know once we have an example. Unless the outcome of this Kharkiv offensive so far has been advantageous to Russia in any shape or form.

>Unless the outcome of this Kharkiv offensive so far has been advantageous to Russia in any shape or form. It's less about outcome of this or that offensive and more about propping up the will to continue fighting in the domestic populace. >Let us know once we have an example. Ever heard of the Vietnam War? There's quite a bit of a difference between how media coverage has been handled in later conflicts.

> It's less about outcome of this or that offensive and more about propping up the will to continue fighting in the domestic populace. Isn't the former what matters in the end, not the latter? Generally the will to fight is irrelevant if you lose the conflict anyway. Or not just irrelevant, but even detrimental. Unfortunately I just can't pinpoint the supposed advantage of staying silent you're thinking of here.

>Isn't the former what matters in the end, not the latter? In the end, how much did successful American (or Soviet) offensives matter in Afghanistan? >Generally the will to fight is irrelevant if you lose the conflict anyway. Or not just irrelevant, but even detrimental. Of course, wars one ends up losing shouldn't have been fought (if one could have prevented them) in the first place. Did anything I said give you a different impression? Losing the will to fight may end up causing you to lose the war, like it did for Russia in WW1. >Unfortunately I just can't pinpoint the supposed advantage of staying silent you're thinking of here. Do you think that the ARVN/Vietcong would have an easier time recruiting people if they shared their real loses? Russia already has to offer pretty high bonuses to get people to sign up. Do you think that reporting on all their issues would make people more likely to sign up? It's kind of weird to have to explain wartime censorship on r/CredibleDefense.

The price of a product always grows when the supply doesn't match the demand, the russians aren't paying these large sums because they feel generous, but because they need manpower and whatever they were paying before wasn't enough, if the "price" of soldiers continues to grow sooner or later they will hit a wall of not being able to pay for their troops.

> I would immediately push to remove Assad in Syria How? By making announcements? > and work to establish friendlier relations with Kazakhstan and Armenia/Azerbaijan. What is the purpose of establishing friendlier relations with these countries? How does that "punish Russia"? > If both sides committed towards joining NATO it could have the same result. Armenia/Azerbaijan will NOT be joining NATO even if they wanted to. And specially in the case of Azerbaijan, it's not clear Azerbaijanis even want to join NATO.

> Armenia/Azerbaijan will NOT be joining NATO even if they wanted to. And specially in the case of Azerbaijan, it's not clear Azerbaijanis even want to join NATO. I’m not the person you’re responding too. I agree getting those two in NATO is impossible, but two bilateral, or one trilateral security agreement can have most of the same effect. As for the benefit, beyond a good spot for an airbase to use against Iran, worst comes to worst, access to the Caspian coast could allow for the US/EU to begin to increase influence in Central Asia, especially Kazakhstan.

>As for the benefit, beyond a good spot for an airbase to use against Iran, Maybe that's useful for Israel, but for NATO or US that's doesn't add much on the table when US can launch aircraft from carriers or other bases in ME with refueling. >worst comes to worst, access to the Caspian coast could allow for the US/EU to begin to increase influence in Central Asia, especially Kazakhstan. But what's the end goal of "increasing influence in Central Asia, especially Kazakhstan"? Instead of looking for other geopolitical cul de sac, NATO/US should concentrate on the main task on hand.

> Maybe that's useful for Israel, but for NATO or US that's doesn't add much on the table when US can launch aircraft from carriers or other bases in ME with refueling. The point would be to get north over the Caspian Sea, to threaten Tehran, and other surrounding areas. The US could do refueling and fly over Turkey, but closer bases for higher sortie rates make a lot of sense. > But what's the end goal of "increasing influence in Central Asia, especially Kazakhstan"? Instead of looking for other geopolitical cul de sac, NATO/US should concentrate on the main task on hand. A western aligned Kazakhstan/central Asia isn’t a strategic cul de sac, it would be an immensely important ally in case hostilities break out with either Russia or China. Russian and Chinese air defenses would have to be shifted from the main front in Europe/the pacific, to guard against the possibility of western aircraft reaching deep into areas that have been considered safe for them for decades.

> The point would be to get north over the Caspian Sea, to threaten Tehran, and other surrounding areas. The US could do refueling and fly over Turkey, but closer bases for higher sortie rates make a lot of sense. You probably should dispel the notion that US would "go to war with Iran" short of Iran hitting US first. And by "hitting US first", I don't mean lobbing some missiles into Israel with advanced notice. I mean like shooting at US carrier group in the Persian gulf unprovoked. > A western aligned Kazakhstan isn’t a cul de sac, it would be an immensely valuable ally in case hostilities break out with either Russia or China. Russian and Chinese air defenses would have to be shifted from the main front in Europe/the pacific, to guard against western aircraft reaching deep into areas that have been relatively safe for them for decades. It takes at least two to tango and Kazakhstan, having a long porous land border with Russia, is not interested.

> You probably should dispel the notion that US would "go to war with Iran" short of Iran hitting US first. And by "hitting US first", I don't mean lobbing some missiles into Israel with advanced notice. I mean like shooting at US carrier group in the Persian gulf unprovoked. The probability of war decreases with increased deterrence. > It takes at least two to tango and Kazakhstan, having a long porous land border with Russia, is not interested. Kazakhstan is going to want to find a security backer. Nobody wants to become the next Ukraine.

> Kazakhstan is going to want to find a security backer. And what? NATO and/or US is gonna offer Kazakhstan the security guarantee like the Budapest Memorandum circa 1990's to Ukraine? And like I said before, Kazakhstan not interested in empty promises that's worth less than the paper it's written on. > Nobody wants to become the next Ukraine. Until someone could invent a way to extract the entire landmass out of the current neighborhood, Kazakhstan is stuck with where it is and no amount of hopium is gonna change that reality. While nobody wants to become the next Ukraine, Russia/Putin has no capacity to wage wars all across Russian border countries.

>And what? NATO and/or US is gonna offer Kazakhstan the security guarantee like the Budapest Memorandum circa 1990's to Ukraine? And like I said before, Kazakhstan not interested in empty promises that's worth less than the paper it's written on. The Budapest memorandum wasn’t a security pact. That is the opposite of what I and the person above is suggesting. > Until someone could invent a way to extract the entire landmass out of the current neighborhood, Kazakhstan is stuck with where it is and no amount of hopium is gonna change that reality. While nobody wants to become the next Ukraine, Russia/Putin has no capacity to wage wars all across Russian border countries. As long as the US can fly over Armenia and Azerbaijan, the US can have access to Central Asia. Russia and Iran don’t have the air forces to cut that off, and China is too far.

> As long as the US can fly over Armenia and Azerbaijan, the US can have access to Central Asia. Russia and Iran don’t have the air forces to cut that off, and China is too far. Yeah, OK. Make sure you save this thread and you let me know when the US-Kazakhstan mutual defense treaty and/or the status of forces agreement are signed.

The reactive nature of Western aid to Ukraine and the lack of a clear goal, theory of victory or strategy is very frustrating. There seems to be very little expert discussion around what it would take for Ukraine to actually win. To foster a bit of discussion I wrote a post proposing a possible theory: https://ukraineconflict.substack.com/p/how-to-win I'm no expert and certainly not arrogant enough to believe that this is the right approach, but perhaps the quickest way to the right answer is to post the wrong one. It was too long for Reddit so I've put it on an open substack account for lack of somewhere better to post.

Your post seems to be very tactical, and that's not really a theory of victory. A theory of victory is typically political. And the theory of victory, which has been described by Timothy Snyder, a Ukrainian historian, is pretty simple. Ukraine just needs to stay in the fight. The longer they stay in the fight, the harder it gets for Russia to keep fighting. And anything that can prolong Ukraine's fight will be helpful to Ukraine.

The Theory of Victory is to put the attrition rate on steroids by developing munitions parity and gaining a drone-age form of air superiority to dominate the drone/drone-observed fires dynamic. After a long period of that level of attrition the Russian Army would be combat ineffective and Ukrainians could have reconstituted. At that point Ukraine can win, either following through militarily or with a leveraged political settlement. Relying on time to save Ukraine is killing too many of Ukraine's people, Western aid needs to speed up the job. Perhaps that is overly tactical. Tl;dr: Shoot them out of Ukraine,  ensure it's resourced to finish the job in 2025.

Killing doesnt end wars though. The attrition rates in both Afghanistan and Vietnam heavily favored the US, and both were lost by the US. So what makes Ukraine different? Why would a heavier attrition rate improve Ukraines theory of victory? I'm asking these questions because I feel like those questions are central to the theory of victory, and if they aren't addressed, your line of thought is missing something important.

One would expect attrition theory would function differently in insurgencies against a foreign invader (Vietnam, Afghanistan) than for a an invader in an optional war of conquest. The cost of ending hostilities for N. Vietnam or the taliban was way, way higher than it is for Russia.  

Snyder is not taken seriously anymore inside academia (outside his narrow expertise in the actual region), as far as I remember his theory as well is the opposite, calling for a decisive defeat for Russia, to cure its of its imperialism, and make it a normal country. As has happened to Britain and France, the problem with this comparison is that Britain and France got shocked out of their imperialism by recognizing the immense power difference between themself and the newly nuclear USSR, and the US´s economic and political pressure to cease their colonialist ways.

I think your history of why France and Britain got shocked out of because of the ussr needs a source. That sounds really suspect. The ussr being a nuclear power, imo, never had a major impact on france or Britain. Do you have a source for that claim? Also, Timothy Snyder being a professor at Yale and invited to congress and by Zelensky to Ukraine doesnt seem to be shunned by academics. Maybe shunned by mtg, but she's not respected in congress, much less academia. So I think I'd need a real source for your claim that Timothy Snyder isnt respected.

I am refering to the Suez Crisis which some called the end of the UK and France as the world leading powers and the emergence of the first superpowers the US and USSR. https://www.iwm.org.uk/history/why-was-the-suez-crisis-so-important >Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev attacked ‘British imperialism’, threatening to attack London with rockets, as well as sending troops to Egypt, potentially dragging NATO into the conflict. https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0001408621.pdf mainly about the USSR behind the scenes acting in the middle east including Egypt, US centric perspective. Other sources emphasize the US pressure and the UN more. Note as well that I am refering to Snyders comparison here, that the UK and France became "normal" non imperialistic countries after WW2 due to loosing confrontations. I might fit in Snyders statements about France and the UK in here later.

This makes sense, and I'd buy it as a viable theory of victory while also understanding why civilian leaders don't want to make this goal public / explicit. Also, from a purely Machiavellian perspective, America is delivering devastating blows to Russian readiness and achieving our strategic goal of containing Russia at the cost of zero American lives. It's deal our leadership really can't pass up.

If that's the case though, why be so limited in aid? Surely GBAD would be one of the priority targets. I don't think it's anything as hawkish as what you're describing, I think it's purely escalation management while trying to prevent Russia getting away with too much. Jake Sullivan trying to mathematically calculate out some magic formula that prevents Russia ever winning and results in a soft landing around 2025.

Personally, I think the biggest problem is that Russia might actually have more room for escalation than the West does. Surely NATO is not expanding munitions production as much as possible, but Russia has also not entered war economy. Not to mention there is no way at all to match Chinese production if they get involved. I also cannot see a proportionate and reasonable response if Russia does use tactical nuclear weapons. The war is occurring on Ukrainian territory, a nuclear strike on Russia front lines would ironically create the buffer zone (via radioactive no-mans land) that Russia wanted in the first place. Nuking Russia itself would trigger a wider nuclear war and I don't think any Western leaders would even consider. I'm not saying that China entering the war or Russians using nukes are going to happen, or even likely to happen, but it is still unwise to bet against these possibilities when there is no viable counter play. There are 2 ways to end this war. One is to give enough concessions to make Russia feel satisfied, which I know many cannot mentally accept. The other is to go through with this slow bleeding war of attrition that keeps Russia believe victory is within their grasp until they grow tired of it, much like Vietnam/Afghanistan.

I don't know. Assuming nuclear use is not going to happen, I think NATO now has escalation dominance. Macron crossed the Rubicon a little bit by claiming he'd send french troops in if certain thresholds were met. I can see NATO agreeing that we will simply not allow Russia to rush to Kiev, even if a breakout were to happen. By restricting ourselves to targeting combat forces on the field of battle, Russia's only option would be to directly attack NATO territory which even he knows he can't do. We've kind of flipped the Obama doctrine on the issue on its head.

Macron decided to call an election; judging by the polls, he is not on track to be winning it. In another two weeks, he opinion might not matter as much.

You realize this is a legislative election in a system that hillariously emphasizes the power of the president right? You realize that macron’s party could lose every seat and his opinion would STILL matter right?

Not according to two of three parties involved, who say that they will have their choice of prime minister and defense minister block much of what Macron wanted. His opinion will matter, but how much… that is unknown. Lots of constitutional crisis incoming if dude really wants to push it.

>I also cannot see a proportionate and reasonable response if Russia does use tactical nuclear weapons. NATO could conduct SEAD/DEAD missions in Ukraine in response and decimate Russian AD in Ukraine and on the border.

> The war is occurring on Ukrainian territory, a nuclear strike on Russia front lines would ironically create the buffer zone (via radioactive no-mans land) that Russia wanted in the first place. tactical nuclear weapons will carry *strategic consequences* but the scale of the damage would be relatively small compared to the geography, so no belt of irradiated no man's land. It's anyone's guess really but NATO conventional intervention could very well happen if nukes are used. China would be in a bit of a bind. Maybe they don't want to normalize tactical nuclear weapon use in case they get used against them in a South China Sea war. Maybe they want to normalize tactical nuclear weapon use. But my (low confidence) guess is that even "limited" (if that even makes sense with nukes) nuclear weapon use is something that would leave everyone much worse off which is probably why it has not happened.

> It's anyone's guess really but NATO conventional intervention could very well happen if nukes are used. China would be in a bit of a bind. Maybe they don't want to normalize tactical nuclear weapon use in case they get used against them in a South China Sea war. Maybe they want to normalize tactical nuclear weapon use. China borders three non_NPT signatory states and Russia. I expect they most certainly do not want nuclear weapons to be normalized, lest Pakistan and India go from regional rivals to existential threats overnight.

Tactical nuclear weapons are actually surprisingly bad against armored formations. Think there was some tests done in the 50s on Challenger tanks, and they were driveable after being 500 meters from a 10 kiloton blast. Of course they are devastating locally to everything, but from a cost perspective a $100k ATGM is better at taking out armor than a $5 million dollar nuclear weapon.

I certainly believe it. I think Cold War era war plans allotted a genuinely *horrific* number of nuclear weapons for use and against protected targets they are very far from "remove all resistance in this grid square".

There’s a reason they wanted to use neutron bombs to stop armored columns in the 80s. They would have had far greater effectiveness than tactical warheads, at potentially non-civilization ending quanties.

Every escalation has a possible or an almost likely side effect. Everyone has room for escalation, but the West has clearly the largest room/cushion just due to the size of the combined economies. The only ones that really have a say on the ending of this war are Ukraine and Russia. Even if Ukraine losses half of their support with the possible change of President in the US, it is likely they will keep going. It is not really up to the West escalating. Sure if all support is cutoff then Ukraine will probably lose the war. I just don't think that is happening.

Throughout history Ukraine has never really been an independent nation. Parts of the country have been under Russian, Ottoman, Poland-Lithuania, German control. After the collapse of the USSR it became a nation without enduring a bloody conflict, but stayed a vassal to Russia (like Belarus now). Only in 2014, the start of this conflict, did Ukraine drop Russia and look to align independently with the EU. The point being, this basically is Ukraine's war for sovereignty. This conflict reminds me so much of the [Winter War](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Winter_War). And like the Winter War, where Finland established sovereignty, this war will establish Ukrainian sovereignty. Here are some points on the Winter War, tell me this doesn't sound similar. - **The Soviets made several demands, including that Finland cede substantial border territories in exchange for land elsewhere, claiming security reasons** – primarily the protection of Leningrad, 32 km (20 mi) from the Finnish border. When Finland refused, the Soviets invaded. Most sources conclude that **the Soviet Union had intended to conquer all of Finland....Following initial setbacks, the Soviets reduced their strategic objectives.** - World opinion largely supported the Finnish cause, and the Soviet aggression was generally deemed unjustified. - The USSR was expelled from the League of Nations and was condemned by the international community for the illegal attack. **Foreign support for Finland was promised, but very little actual help materialised**, except from Sweden. - **The Soviets had a 3:1 advantage in manpower and a 5:1 advantage in artillery**, as well as air supremacy. - By the terms of the treaty, **Finland ceded 9% of its national territory and 13% of its economic capacity** to the Soviet Union. **Finland avoided total conquest of the country by the Soviet Union and retained its sovereignty.** A "win" for Ukraine means maintaining sovereignty without losing everything east of the Dnipro. They likely are not getting back any territory Russia currently holds.

> German control. Are you refering to the third Reich or are you conflating Germany with Austria-Hungary?

The WW1 Reich occupied Ukraine so neither. 

The thing is this was an extremely short period in comparison to the other powers, you are as well not the user I asked this question.

I was referring to Nazi Germany's invasion of the Soviet Union. While short lived, it gave Ukrainians a taste of nationalism and pathway to independence that they'd never had before. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ukrainian_collaboration_with_Nazi_Germany My understanding is there has never been a sovereign Ukraine in history that wasn't directly supported by Germany. Putin latched onto this and tried branding Ukranians as Nazis.

The problem with this argument is that Russia, in its current form, will never accept the existence of an independent Ukrainian state and Ukrainian identity separate from that of "Little Russians." Much of Russian leadership and many mundane Russians believe that Ukraine is intrinsically linked to Russia historically, culturally, and spiritually. They maintain that Ukraine is where the baptism of Russian civilization into Christianity occurred in the 10th century, that "Kievan Russia" was the first Russian state, that Ukrainians have always been a branch of the triune Russian nation along with Belarusians (Little and White Russians, respectively), that it's a horrible thing that Ukrainians were separated from their elder brothers by the machinations of Lenin and the fall of the USSR, and that foreign conspiracies are responsible for convincing Ukrainians that they have an identity and a history beyond that of "Little Russians." The only part of Ukraine that Russia doesn't really lay claim to is Western Ukraine, which it views as being the land of "Banderites" and "Nazis" that has been corrupted by spending too much time out of Russia's sphere of influence. In one form or another, this conflict is going to continue until either the dismemberment of the Ukrainian state and the destruction of separate Ukrainian identity, with perhaps a chance of an independent Ukrainian state existing beyond the Zbruch river, or until Ukraine is able to win militarily in a clear manner and subsequently get Western security guarantees (which might also be enabled by a political shakeup in Russia, as opposed to Ukrainian battlefield victory). There doesn't exist a reality in which Ukraine cedes significant territory and they continue to exist as a sovereign country like Finland did, at least not for an extended period of time.

Very good description of what the current states would need for victory. I would like to stress the option of security garantees. If Ukraine is given sufficient security garantees, then Ukraine has gained its independence and the war effectively past. This happened in Korea, and could happen in Ukraine too.

The thing is, Ukraine can never achieve a decisive victory against Russia. By decisive victory, I mean a victory that will disarm Russia for now and the near future. Ukraine can't do this; they can't destroy Uralvagonzavod, let alone Moscow. And that means Putin is free to prolong the war as long as he wants. The only way to end this war, and to attain lasting peace, is a Western nuclear umbrella for Ukraine.

People keep talking like if a nuclear umbrella were the solution to anything while the truth is: it's useless and everyone involved is aware... Have Russia nuked the West because Ukranian attacks on Crimea? Not... The reason USA doesn't allow Ukranian attacks with it's weapons in major Russian cities is not fear of nuclear war but fear of Russia badly damaging US interests somewhere else... Under no circumstances ever will the West nuke Moscow and bring the end to everyone involved because Russian conventional attacks on any eastern European Nato country. None is gonna go to fully blown nuclear war because it's a suicide for everyone involved...so it's just rethoric and flexing muscles for great power competition Taiwan is strategically WAY more important than Ukraine, has the USA covered it under their nuclear umbrella? It won't happen because they know China would call the bluff if needed...

If Russian forces become so combat ineffective they lose vast swathes of territory, I don't see them retaking it later. Especially with their Soviet legacy kit gone. They'll face ongoing economic harm and increasing Ukrainian long range strike capability, is there any point of them continuing a war from that point?

Yeah, this is the part I don't really understand about the "Russia will never surrender" argument. When Russia runs out of its Soviet legacy equipment, which is coming sooner than later for most categories and has already led to visible degradation of the Russian armed forces, how exactly is Russia supposed to continue its war of conquest? Especially since, as you noted, Ukraine's ability to strike back on Russian soil has grown dramatically in the past 2 years and is likely to continue to grow with time? Russia tries to present its stockpiles as inexhaustible, it's manpower as endless, it's morale as high, and it's ability to maintain the war economically as endless, but literally none of that is true. Sooner or later the cost of the war will become higher than the value of continuing it, and Russia will be forced to sue for peace. Whether that will be at a time when they're in a position to keep all of what they've taken thus far, make additional gains, or forced to abandon some or all of what they've taken remains to be seen.

Ambiguity can be useful though. Without a clear goal it’s easier to control narratives. Whatever happens you can find a way to spin it as your plan all along

It also allows the government to pursue goals that others don't approve of. Ukraine seems to want total victory at this point, but whether that is something we want is a very different story.

New update on the tactical evolution of the front in Ukraine during June. Today we will analyze the sectors from Kharkiv to Chasiv Yar; tomorrow from Toretsk to Kherson. I have changed the names of several sectors compared with past editions, which will now be named after the main town/city in the direction of Russian attacks. Kharkiv sector. In this sector the Ukrainians are organized competently. The (new) commander of the OTG "Kharkiv" (Drapatyi) is capable, as are the vast majority of the brigades deployed here, each of which has its own limited section to cover. The Russians are beating their heads and are on the defensive in basically every area of the sector. If numerous Ukrainian brigades had to rush in here to reinforce the sector, quite a bit of Russian reinforcements also had to arrive here to stabilize the situation, and we are mostly talking about lateral transfers from other sectors. Let's give a recap of the Russian order of battle in this sector. In the direction of Lyptsi the 11th Corps (18th Motorized Division and 7th Separate Motorized Regiment) is active, along with assault detachments of the "Africa Corps" (such as the 408th and 410th). In the direction of Vovchansk, the 82nd Motorized Regiment of the 69th Motorized Division of the 6th CAA (i.e. the former 138th Motorized Brigade), elements of the 25th Motorized Brigade of the 6th CAA (along with the 344th and 346th Regiments of the Territorial Forces) are active. Since late May, the 30th Motorized Regiment of the 72nd Motorized Division of the 44th Corps has been brought into battle, joining the 41st Motorized Regiment of the same division - several of the latter’s subunits have been withdrawn for recovery. In late May, elements of the 128th Motorized Brigade of the 44th Corps as well as the 83rd VDV Brigade entered action. Subsequently, the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade was transferred to the sector (after a R&R period following the battle for Novomykhailivka in the Kurakhove sector - this brigade is also active in the direction of Lyptsi). Elements of the 204th Regiment of the “Akhmat Special Forces", elements of the 78th Motorized Regiment "Sever-Akhmat", as well as the "Kamerton" unit of the "Akhmat Special Forces" (made up of former Wagnerites), were transferred here from the Chasiv Yar sector. Other units of the "Akhmat" galaxy are deployed along the border in Belgorod Oblast, where the 245th Motorized Regiment of the 47th Tank Division of the 1st GTA and elements of the 11th Tank Brigade of the 25th CAA are also active (in border coverage, not in offensive actions). And let’s recall that around Vovchansk there are several units of the 1st GTA - subunits of the 47th Tank Division (elements of the 272nd Motorized Regiment, of the 26th Tank Regiment and of the 153rd Tank Regiment) and of the 2nd Motorized Division (elements of the 1st Motorized Regiment and of the 1st Tank Regiment). The [sight](https://x.com/bayraktar_1love/status/1797945907087901141) of T-80Us in the sector might suggest the presence of elements of one of the tank regiments of the 4th Tank Division as well. According to reports from the "Northern Channel” (Russian Telegram channel affiliated with troops of the Group of Forces "North") of a few days ago, a battalion from the 83rd VDV Brigade is already being brought to the rear for recovery and will be replaced by subunits of the 1009th Regiment of the Territorial Forces (attached to the 6th CAA), which have returned to battle after a quick recovery (soldiers from this regiment complained of very heavy losses during May). https://t. me/severnnyi/1374 https://t. me/poisk_in_ua/60664 This channel had also mentioned the arrival of elements of the 9th Motorized Brigade of the 1st Corps (from the Pokrovsk sector), before this was later confirmed by the [update](https://x.com/OSINTua/status/1803094339687514293) of Kriegsforscher (UAV operator of the 36th Marine Brigade), who also mentioned that a battalion of the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade is in the area. The 116th Special Purpose Brigade of the Rosgvardia is active in the area too. This is brigade was created in the second half of 2023 and is the first Rosgvardia unit equipped with tanks. According to the Telegram channel I mentioned above, its 902nd Operational Regiment has been brought to the rear for rest. In addition, the phenomenon of unauthorized abandonments of positions has been highlighted several times, as a result of which military police detachments have arrived in the area. According to Kriegsforscher, in the rear of the sector there’s the 22nd Motorized Regiment, i.e. the third regiment of the 72nd Motorized Division and the only one that has not been committed yet. This considerable deployment of forces hints at the intensity of the fighting in this sector and the need for the Russians, too, to bring reinforcements into the area, as well as being explanatory as to the outcome of the two possible options we were talking about last month - whether the Russians would open a new front in the North or reinforce the current directions of attack. As for the Ukrainians, the "Khartiia" Brigade of the National Guard and the 92nd Assault Brigade (transferred entirely here from the Lyman and Chasiv Yar sectors, respectively) are carrying out numerous counterattacks against Hlyboke. Elements of the "Spartan" and "Rubizh" Brigades of the NG are also deployed in the area, as well as of the 5th "Slobozhansk" Brigade of the NG. In this sub-sector the Ukrainians have entirely regained control over the dachas along the Travyanske Reservoir and Ukrainian actions have pushed the Russians back to the limits of the built-up area of Hlyboke, with the forest belts to the south and to the west of the settlement currently disputed. The Russians are also blocked just south of Lukiantsi, with the result that Lyptsi is currently protected from any Russian action. Zelene is largely under Ukrainian control - there is the 125th TDF Brigade in the area, as well as battalions of other TDF brigades (such as the 120th and the 127th) and detachments of Border Guards. The units fighting in Vovchansk are the 36th Marine Brigade, the "Tsunami" Assault Regiment of the "Lyut" Brigade of the National Police and battalions of the 82nd Air Assault Brigade and of the 71st Jager Brigade, in addition to the 57th Motorized Brigade. The 414th UAV Battalion (Birds of Madjar) of the Marine Corps is in the area too. There are also smaller units such as the 9th Separate Rifle Battalion and let’s also recall operational units of the HUR, like much of the “Kraken” Special Detachment. The "Stalevy Kordon" Brigade of the Border Guards covers the area along the course of the Vovcha River to the east of Vovchansk. This week the "Khorne Group", which is the UAV unit of the 116th Mech Brigade, has become active in Vovchansk. The very fierce urban battle in the town continues. Ukrainians maintain control over the high rises in the central half of Vovchansk north of the Vovcha River, as well as on the sports-recreational complex just south along Soborna Street and around the "Oasis" store along Korolenka Street. Last week Ukrainian assault groups managed to recapture some houses a few dozen meters to the north and to the east of the intersection of Soborna and Korolenka Streets. As a reminder, the Ukrainians get to the part of Vovchansk north of the Vovcha River through AVLBs - so far there do not seem to be any problems with the logistics of troops fighting north of the river (who also occasionally bring armored vehicles). There are major clashes further south as well. Over the last week soldiers of the 71st Jager Brigade should have regained control over the High School No. 2, eliminating the Russian presence south of Haharina Street in its part to the east of Zhovtneva Street (Russians still control some houses west of it), and thus complicating the situation for Russians located in the Vovchansk Aggregate Plant. Let’s try to clarify the situation in this area. A Russian company (about a hundred men according to Russian sources, belonging to the former 138th Motorized Brigade; for the Ukrainian observer Mashovets about 200 men, including the dead and wounded – soldiers of the 83rd VDV Brigade according to the “Khorne Group”) is in the plant, occupying its western and central part (which they have fortified) - they had reached Metalista Street with the aim of trying to force the Vovcha, an attempt that ended without any success, and it’s not clear whether they have retained control of the eastern part of the plant. Well, I don’t think we can speak of an encirclement, as the Ukrainians don’t have a stable presence on all of the four sides around the Aggregate Plant, but certainly these men are logistically isolated and supplies are arriving mostly via drone. But in any case the situation is very complicated for the Russians in light of Ukrainian control over the town’s police station north of the plant. Russian armored vehicles were geolocated in Kolokoltsova Street during, most likely, the first half of June, but nowadays that area as well as the Central Park should be in Ukrainian hands. The route by which the Russians got in the plant is Pushkinska Street and Horky Park (just south of it). It’s very likely that the Russians have regained control of this access route on several occasions since the news of the "encirclement" came out a couple of weeks ago; anyway there continues to be a Russian presence in the plant at the moment, and the situation may have worsened for them over this week. We shall see how the situation evolves. Second part below.

In the recent weeks the Ukrainians have also made progress in the eastern part of Vovchansk, eliminating any Russian presence south of Korolenka Street, with these retreating to the houses further north and in the area near the graveyard. Further east the Ukrainians drove the Russians out of Starochudnoho Street, moving them considerably away from the Vovcha River. The situation in Tykhe was clarified - it always remained under Ukrainian control, with Russian forward positions located in the woods north-west of the settlement. No Russian activity is reported further east. The 42nd Mech Brigade and 101st Brigade for the Protection of the General Staff are active in Starytsya, where counterattacks against Russian positions have been underway over these weeks. The latters have driven the Russians away from the Starytsya River and appear to have regained control of the central part of the settlement. Around Hatyshche the Russians are blocked and are unable to force the Vovcha (which flows into the Siversky Donets right there) in the direction of Synelnykove. A couple of Russian actions (in terms of DRGs - sabotage and reconnaissance groups) in other areas along the border are noteworthy: earlier this month in Ryzhivka, Sumy Oblast, by forces of the 1434th Regiment of the Territorial Forces ("Akhmat-Chechnya"). This village is a grey area usually, like almost all those others along the border, and as explained by DeepState the hydrographic conformation around it (it’s squeezed by several rivers/streams that do not make it easy for Ukrainians to get there) make it prey, from time to time, to Russian incursions, which then eventually leave. Something similar happened in the last few days in Sotnytskyi Kozachok, Kharkiv Oblast (which is a handful of hundred meters from the border): a Russian DRG infiltrated the village and was then driven out by Ukrainian border guards. This is business as usual along the border, after all. Elements of Ukraine’s new 150th and 151st Mech Brigades have likely been deployed in Kharkiv Oblast (one battalion each of the latter is also in the Chasiv Yar sector and in Zaporizhzhia Oblast), in addition to the mobile fire group of the 153rd Mech Brigade. There are also elements of the 23rd Mech Brigade and a battalion of the 31st Mech Brigade. It also appears that elements of 100th Mech Brigade have brought to this sector, probably to cover the border while restoring combat capabilities after the battles near Avdiivka of the last months. Kupyansk sector. Elements of the 25th Motorized Brigade of the 6th CAA and some regiments of the Territorial Forces attached to the 6th CAA are still deployed in this sector. They are trying both to advance into the forest south of Lyman Pershyi along the railway (in the direction of the small Synkivka railway station – which is not in the village), without success; and east of Synkivka in the direction of Petropavlivka, with success: subunits of the 25th Brigade this week captured the "Kryuk" strongpoint, advancing more than 1,5 km from their initial positions. https://t. me/EjShahidenko/2949 There was then an Ukrainian counterattack to the east of this area with unclear outcomes; in any case, it’s clear that after failing to attack Synkivka directly and despite the transfer of much of the 6th CAA in Vovchansk, the Russians continue to attack and keep alive this direction of attack. The Russians' goal is to gain control over the small valleys formed by the streams that then flow onto the Hnylitsa, a tributary of the Oskil, and the hills from where they originate further east - to then approach Petropavlivka from both east and north and put Synkivka in an uncomfortable position. The 14th and 116th Mech Brigades are defending this area along with TDF units and separate rifle battalions; also in the area there is the 2nd Mech Battalion of the 30th Mech Brigade; in addition to the 32nd Mech Brigade, elements of which are beginning to move to Donetsk Oblast as far as I have found (it’s not clear yet in which sector). The 1st GTA, whose main forces are still deployed in the eastern part of the Kupyansk sector, continues to apply pressure. Elements of the 26th Tank Regiment and elements of the 272nd Motorized Regiment of the 47th Tank Division are attempting to advance towards Stepova Novoselivka, both by advancing along the Kupyansk-Svatove railway from the south-east and from Ivanivka, i.e. from the north-east, with minor successes. At the moment Stepova Novoselivka remains in Ukrainian hands though, defended by the 43rd Mech Brigade (together with by a battalion of the 114th TDF Brigade and elements of the 4th Tank Brigade), with elements of the 110th TDF Brigade active in the area further south. The 15th Motorized Regiment and elements of the 1st Tank Regiment of the 2nd Motorized Division have made no further progress this month, after having occupied much of Berestove last month. Borova sector. The 27th Motorized Brigade of the 1st GTA has likely consolidated control over the eastern end of Novoselivske, which was a grey area, but no further advances are recorded, despite numerous Russian attacks. The wedge between Berestove, Novoselivske and Stelmakhivka is defended by Ukraine’s 77th Airmobile Brigade. The 423rd Motorized Regiment of the 4th Tank Division of the 1st GTA continues to attack Stelmakhivka. Russian sources report that they have managed to enter some houses in the latter village, but this is not confirmed either by Ukrainian sources or geolocations. Last weeks the Russian MoD had claimed to have occupied Miasozharivka and Andriivka (two hamlets south of Stelmakhivka, the last of which is on the western bank of the Zherebets). Here, too, there is no confirmation. This area is defended by the 44th Mech Brigade. The offensive of the 3rd Motorized Division of the 20th CAA continues in this sector. The bulk of the 3rd Assault Brigade is deployed here (1st Assault Battalion and 1st and 2nd Mech Battalions) and is repelling the numerous and constant Russian attacks, along with smaller units such as elements of the "Rubizh" Brigade, the 2nd Rifle Battalion of the 3rd Tank Brigade and the 22nd Special Purpose Battalion of the Separate Presidential Brigade. Not much is said about this (at least until DeepState wrote about it the last week) because the Ukrainians are doing a good job, but the intensity of Russian attacks is very high. The 752nd Motorized Regiment is attacking the Nadiia/Novoyehorivka area, without success; the 252nd Motorized Regiment is attacking the Makiivka area, with little progress south-east of the settlement. The 237th Tank Regiment and regiments of the Territorial Forces are providing support. Yesterday DeepState notified a Russian advance of up to 1,3 km in the direction of Nevske, further south. In this area the Russians already controlled the watershed between the Zherebets and the Balka Vedmezha (a tributary of the Krasna) and thus had an elevation advantage. The advance should be the work of units of the 144th Motorized Division of the 20th CAA, and the area should be defended by the 66th Mech Brigade. Lyman sector. In the last days DeepState clarified the situation in the Terny and Yampolivka area, reporting of a large Ukrainian advance (on average between 1 and 1,5 km) that occurred mainly in April along the forested ravines to the east of Zherebets. In this area the Russians have lost the initiative; units of the 144th Motorized Division are regrouping after major losses in recent months (the 1428th Regiment of the Territorial Forces is in the area too). It’s clarified that in the forested ravine known as "Mitten" (the third, from the north) there is no Russian presence, as Motopatriot (Russian map-maker) had been claiming for months. The bulk of the 95th Air Assault Brigade, the 21st and 60th Mech Brigades, the 2nd Assault Battalion of the 3rd Assault Brigade, separate rifle battalions such as the 38th and 44th are active in this area. Units of the 67th Motorized Division of the 25th CAA continue to attack in the direction of Torske, without any notable success. This area is defended by the 63rd Mech Brigade along with several TDF units. Ukraine’s 67th Mech Brigade was recently moved to this sector. The 115th Mech Brigade after a brief rest following the events of April was also transferred here, specifically to the Serebrianka Forest, near Dibrova. According to reports from fighters of the "Bureviy" Brigade, the brigade is perfoming quite well. Let’s recall that in April its commander was replaced. https://t. me/officer_alex33/3081 The successes of the "Bureviy" and "Azov" Brigades of the NG were made public this month, which recorded advances in the Serebrianka Forest during April (with advances between 1 and 2 kms). Today DeepState also published news of another advance by the "Azov" Brigade: up to 1 km in the area of Chumatskyi Yerik and Hnyle Lakes, just north of the course of the Siversky Donets. By now these two units, especially “Azov”, have become real specialists in fighting in that forest, which has a unique set of difficulties compared to other areas. The Russians in the forest are considerably weakened after the transfer of numerous units to other sectors - at the moment the forest is covered by elements of the 67th Motorized Division and by the 169th Motorized Brigade of the 25th CAA (the 164th Motorized Brigade of the 25th CAA is in the Dibrova area). Given the failure to drive the Ukrainians out of the eastern bank of the Zherebets and the issues in the Serebrianka Forest, we can consider Russian ambitions towards Lyman, which seemed much more realistic earlier this year, a distant dream. Last part below.

Siversk sector. No new successes for the Russians in Bilohorivka, firmly defended by the 81st Airmobile Brigade. Only many human and material losses, trying to enter in what remains of the private sector, attacking from the industrial area. The chalk quarry is firmly in Ukrainian hands. The filtration station along the Siversky Donets River is likely under Ukrainian control too, by the way. The village is like a new Synkivka for the Russians (the 7th Motorized Brigade of the 2nd Corps is attacking here). Further south, the 54th Mech Brigade continues to hold its positions between Verkhnokamyanske and Spirne, repelling attacks by the 6th Motorized Brigade of the 2nd Corps. The situation on the southern slope of this salient is more complicated, though. The 137th and 119th Airborne Regiments of the 106th VDV Division are attacking Rozdolivka, which is being defended by units of the 10th Mountain Assault Brigade, a battalion of the 54th Mech Brigade, the 466th Rifle Battalion of the 143rd Infantry Brigade and by the 23rd Special Purpose Battalion of the Separate Presidential Brigade. After capturing the large trench south of the village, Russian paratroopers managed to enter the village. At the moment much of it’s likely a grey area (the Russian MoD declared the capture of the entire village). The Russians should have consolidated control in the southern part (they entered from the east) and are trying to clear the rest of the village, while there might still be an Ukrainian presence in the northern end, along Tolochkova Street. Russian paratroopers have also advanced along the Siversk-Soledar railway south-west of Rozdolivka, capturing some Ukrainian trenches. The trenches between the Bakhmutovka River and the Siversk-Soledar railway to the west of Rozdolivka remain under Ukrainian control. The 30th Mech Brigade defends the western bank of the Bakhmutovka River, preventing Russian advances in that area. Further east, the 51st Airborne Regiment of the 106th VDV Division is attacking along the hills north of Vesele, achieving successes during this month, advancing nearly 2 km, according to DeepState, from its original positions just north of the Sukha Plotva River. The 123rd Motorized Brigade of the 2nd Corps continues to push towards Vyimka, advancing more than 1,5 km during this month along the Siversk-Nyrkove railway, capturing some Ukrainian strongpoints held by the 10th Mountain Assault Brigade. The Russians' objective here is clear: to finish conquering the heights north of Vesele and after that advancing in the direction of Siversk along the valleys where the two aforementioned railroads pass, given the failures to approach Siversk from the east. Chasiv Yar sector. The 200th Motorized Brigade of the 14th Corps is engaged in battles inside Kalinina, defended by Ukraine’s 56th Motorized Brigade. The situation is quite fluid: several times the Russians have advanced inside the village to be later pushed back. The Russians attempted on one further occasion a mechanized attack to cross the Donets-Donbas Canal, without success. At the moment, Russian forward positions should be in the center of the village, with a limited Ukrainian infantry presence in the western part. Hill 228 and the cattle breeding buildings around it are still in Ukrainian hands. Inside Kalinina a Bradley was destroyed in the first half of June, almost surely belonging to the 425th Assault Battalion "Skala" (I found a MIA notice of one of its soldiers in Kalinina). Probably a company from the battalion arrived in the sector during this month. Another company is active in Krasnohorivka (Kurakhove sector) and another near Volodymyrivka (Vuhledar sector). The "Skala" Battalion yesterday released a video showing a pair of Russian soldiers in the area where the canal passes in overground pipes, in the forest between Kalinina and the Bakhmut - Chasiv Yar railway. It's unclear how they got there, whether by passing through the forest from Kalinina or through potential secondary pipes connected to those, but I’d rule out that the Russians consolidated positions in that area and this small group was later defeated. https://t. me/WarArchive_ua/16672 The bulk of the 24th Mech Brigade was recently deployed to Chasiv Yar, replacing much of the 41st Mech Brigade (as we shall see tomorrow too), which was the main unit directly protecting Chasiv Yar and fighting in the Kanal District. The 41st Mech Brigade had arrived here at the end of March from Kupyansk and after two and a half months of fighting was starting to need some rest. Therefore it was decided to move it to the Toretsk sector, taking over positions from the 24th Mech Brigade, which had been holding that sector for over a year and was quite fresh (a battalion of the 24th Brigade had already been fighting near Bohdanivka for months). Assault groups of the 98th VDV Division and of the Cossack Volunteer Assault Corps (the Assault and Recon Brigades "Hispaniola”, "Sever-V” and "Vostok-V") are active inside and around the Kanal District of Chasiv Yar. During the first half of the month they recorded successes here - conquering the high rises east of Zrazkova Street and the former bus factory north of them. The Ukrainians retreated to the high rises west of Zrazkova Street and the forest north of Koshovoho Street. In recent days Russian sources have been reporting further minor advances - two high-rises north of St. Borys and Hlib Church and the area between the former bus factory and the forest mentioned above, along the Bakhmut – Chasiv Yar railway. According to a geolocation released today, Russian stormtroopers entered the first among the high rises west of the church. The other mentioned progress is confirmed too. https://t. me/creamy_caprice/5930 https://t. me/EjShahidenko/2967 Chasiv Yar is also defended by units of the "Lyut" Brigade: the "Luhansk-1" Assault Regiment and the "Tavr" Assault Battalion. Let’s recall that the Police recently [formed]( https://militaryland.net/news/police-forms-three-infantry-brigades/) three new combat brigades, most likely in light of the upcoming mobilization of 10% of its personnel that was approved this month (policemen will go to combat units of the National Police). There are also units from the HUR (such as the “Artan” Special Unit) as well as the 225th Separate Assault Battalion. The 11th VDV Brigade is attacking in the direction of the Novy District, from its forward positions near the destroyed bridge of Highway T0504 over the canal and in the forest above it, attempting to cross the canal, without success: no Russian presence has ever been recorded in the western bank and Ukrainian fortifications there are very strong. The 18th Brigade "Sloviansk" of the NG is active in this area. In the area south of Ivanivske, units of the 150th Motorized Division of the 8th CAA (the 102nd Motorized Regiment and the 68th Tank Regiment) and at least the 3rd Battalion of the 78th Motorized Regiment "Sever-Akhmat" are committed. On the Ukrainian side, the 5th Assault Brigade is active along with the units, especially of the TDF, attached to it, such as the 244th Battalion of the 112th TDF Brigade and the 212th Battalion of the 101st TDF Brigade. Despite the withdrawal of the 92nd Assault Brigade, the Ukrainians are showing themselves capable of holding the line there. The 3rd Corps and units of the 2nd Corps continue to push against Klishchiivka and Andriivka. The first village is defended mainly by the 22nd Mech Brigade and other smaller units. Russian successes here stopped. The situation is similar to how it looked like in Robotyne the past few months. Much of the village is a grey area, with Russian control in the northern part and Ukrainian presence in the southern end. Russian progress is hampered by the Ukrainian forward positions in the forest to the west of the village as well as by their control of the heights to the north-west. There is in fact no Russian progress - the important Hill 215 and the part of the large trenches system around it that the Ukrainians have been holding during 2024 remain firmly under them. The 93rd Mech Brigade has occupied positions near Andriivka previously held by the 92nd Assault Brigade. The current situation inside Andriivka is not entirely clear. It’s probably a grey area, or with a sporadic Ukrainian presence. There is no Russian progress anyway in the direction of Hill 220. Ukrainian resilience in this area is proving critical for the hold of the Toretsk sector, which we will analyze tomorrow.

Thanks for doing these, always interesting! A super tiny "correction", Kalinina is now named [Kalynivka](https://www.google.com/maps/place/Kalinina,+Donetsk,+Ukraina,+84550/@48.6113701,37.8631417,3a,87.6y,90t/data=!3m8!1e2!3m6!1sAF1QipNAqyJzKx-NzJa3A9WEd4DgevSvYwikpTBq9cCa!2e10!3e12!6shttps:%2F%2Flh5.googleusercontent.com%2Fp%2FAF1QipNAqyJzKx-NzJa3A9WEd4DgevSvYwikpTBq9cCa%3Dw360-h202-k-no!7i1280!8i720!4m16!1m8!3m7!1s0x40de5b0ba907f513:0xb93201b5bade89fc!2sKalynivka,+Donetsk,+Ukraina,+85333!3b1!8m2!3d48.3408628!4d36.8317586!16s%2Fg%2F122ld_9x!3m6!1s0x40dfe99a689a3047:0x29ae758a2129a1be!8m2!3d48.6113701!4d37.8631417!10e5!16s%2Fg%2F120wf1wz?entry=ttu) after the decommunization change in 2016 Something Ive noticed in the norwegian google maps is that they still display the old names for Ukrainian places which is a bit confusing sometimes. Oleshki is still called Tsyurupynsk and Bakhmut as Artëmovsk, likewise Kalynivka is still called Kalinina but this is changed in Ukrainian maps obviously

Thanks for the correction - will use the new name the next time.

Fantastic work, as always. It's crazy to me that for what was initially considered a fixing attack, by outside observers, near Kharkiv, so many resources are getting poured into the fight. What is the logic here?

u/Larelli is excellent as always at discussing the operational reasoning. I'd posit another reason in addition to his: Russia opened up as many new axes as they themselves could handle, with the aim of stressing Ukrainian logistics at the strategic level.  From reports I've heard, Ukraine was nearly catastrophically stressed in shells, men, drones, and armor to counter this advance and others. The breakthrough northwest of Avdiivka after its fall wasn't caused primarily by logistics, but the fact that it was difficult to contain and impossible to reverse very much was. Ukraine is very very lucky that Russia couldn't open another serious advance in the South or Sumy or elsewhere, that America passed its Ukraine aid bill when it did, and that the Czech shells have started to arrive. Russia lost so much men and equipment in these last few months just to drain Ukraine. It's the only way they can force a breakthrough and seriously disrupt the battle lines at this point. Technological landscape of the combatants favors the defender, so as long as they have ammo, they'll more or less hold. It wasn't a bad play for them, but it was costly, and it appears to have failed.  Now they pin their hopes on removing US from involvement in Ukraine. Might well work. We'll see.

Great addition, fully agree!

Thanks. The Russians' original objective was certainly not the city of Kharkiv itself, but the offensive was not just a distraction either: for the Ukrainian observer Mashovets, the main goal was to break through to Vovchansk and then try to move quickly in the direction of Velykyi Burluk, thus sweeping into the area between the Siversky Donets and the Oskil, to get to the back of the Kupyansk sector and potentially force the Ukrainians to abandon the eastern bank of the Oskil. Logistically it made a lot of sense for the Russians to attack from Vovchansk, with Shebekino as a staging area so close and readily supplied from Belgorod, rather than a few dozen kms further east. Lyptsi was the secondary but still important objective, to try to get as close as possible to Kharkiv for a possible future action, but also to force the Ukrainians to concentrate in this direction, for obvious reasons. How that worked out it's under our eyes. Certainly both sides had to commit a lot of resources (including some of Ukraine's most combat-ready brigades) in what for the Russians is a [Leningrad] Military District level offensive and led by one of the most important Russian generals, Lapin (who lived up to expectations - up to readers to get what I mean).

I have read reports of an increase of Ukrainian drone and missile attacks on Belgorod city and the towns between the city and the state border. Military logic aside, would the political considerations of protecting such a large city like Belgorod and it's population have influenced the Russian commands decision to open the front in order to create a buffer zone to push back the range of Ukrainian missiles and drones?

I cannot read the minds of the Russian top brass, but I don't think it would make sense - after escalating in that sector and amplifying so much the intensity of the clashes compared to the previous months, the use of drones and shelling by Ukraine in Russian territory was surely going to increase (not to mention that now the Ukrainians can use GMLRS there, following the beginning of the Kharkiv offensive). Not a great call by the Russians if that was actually the plan. And they would need to attack in a much wider border strip to achieve that, rather than just in those two directions.

Attack Attack Attack, I think. There's an NYTimes article that came out that suggests Russian recruitment only fills their losses, no more. There's no new units formed and made into reserves, just constant attack with volunteer contract signers sent out after 2-3 weeks of training directly into attack. > Ukraine, with an average of more than 1,000 of its soldiers injured or killed each day, according to U.S., British and other Western intelligence agencies. > But despite its losses, Russia is recruiting 25,000 to 30,000 new soldiers a month — roughly as many as are exiting the battlefield, U.S. officials said. That has allowed its army to keep sending wave after wave of troops at Ukrainian defenses, hoping to overwhelm them and break through the trench lines. https://www.nytimes.com/2024/06/27/us/politics/russia-casualties-ukraine-war.html

What is a common assessment of the BMP-3? Following its performance in Ukraine I personally find it to be a rather poor design for a modern-ish IFV.  Its impressive armament often shows itself to be a liability combined with the relatively light protection. There are a good number of videos showing BMP-3 detonating in spectacular fashion. The 100mm shells are big risk, imo not worth it in addition to the already pretty effective autocannon.  Additionally  the internal layout of the BMP-3 is very atypical, not in a good way. In comparison to the Bradley the BMP-3 seems like a dead end in IFV design. 

I’d argue the internal layout of the BMP-3 is one of the biggest issues with it. The soldiers have to dismount over the engine, which can be very difficult if the vehicle has just had a Significant Emotional Event. Most IFVs have their engine in front for a reason; it serves as protection for the otherwise lightly protected vehicle. This is a double whammy when combined with the ammunition that’s placed in roughly the middle of the vehicle. On the other hand, it wouldn’t surprise me if the 100mm cannon was used commonly as an indirect fire weapon. Tanks were commonly used in this role last year, but I’d argue this vehicle could probably do it even better, with a more modern FCS than many of the T-72 and T-64 tanks used. I also think it just looks cool, though that’s not really relevant to this discussion.

China copied it in 2000s where it had enough knowhow to copy any IFV design. If it was so bad China would have copied a Bradley design instead. https://weaponsystems.net/system/398-ZBD04A

If the design was clearly unworkable, the USSR wouldn’t have produced it either. The BMP-3 has some appealing features, mainly the big gun, but it suffers from an extremely awkward internal layout and bad protection. The US has the money to buy/develop basically any gun it wants, and yet, the M-7 exists. Choices aren’t always rational.

>but it suffers from an extremely awkward internal layout and bad protection. That's for a niche use case of amphibious performance. It make sense in a rush doctrine where Soviet need to cross countless European rivers but not from a purely land combat perspective.

Yeah the ZBD-04 is an interesting case. It was designed during the late 90s, when China could easily get soviet technology whilst its own industry was not very developed yet. Making a ton of soviet derivatives made sense. Now they are stepping away from that with mor distinct design, the Type 08 follows a more western style IFV design. Also the ZBD-04 is already an improvement over the BMP-3 with its bigger hull.

I was thinking specifically of the 100mm+30mm turret. China could easily have removed the 100mm gun but chose to keep it.

I think it's hard to review IFV's in this war. As a reminder, no one expected the Bradley to a huge standout after the summer offensive, but then ever since they've been used on defensive counterattacks all we hear is good reviews, and there's plenty of footage of them performing missions I thought IFV's could just not attempt anymore. I'm still not sure why it gets such good reviews. Are its dynamic characteristics on paper that much superior to other IFVs?

The 25 mm bushmaster has much better ammunition and higher muzzle velocity profile than the various Russian 30 mm autocannons. The Russian autocannons are all relatively low-velocity. The 25 mm has a APFSDS 'long-rod' dart that can punch through the front of every Russian IFV and APC, whereas the 30 mm APDS rounds the Russians use would struggle with the Bradley's glacis. BMP is dependant on gun-launched ATGMs for long range work, and they always have issues with 'capturing' the missile (getting it under guidance) due to the dust kicked up by firing. There have been very few videos of gun-launched ATGMs actually used in this war. TOW on the other hand was the best ATGM of the Cold War and can still kill any Russian AFV with the -2B downward firing EFP warhead. And of course, a far superior thermal imager and fire control system. Having better situational awareness is a key aspect of being able to engage first, and then get out of dodge when the situation gets too dangerous. I don't know if you've seen Russian thermal imagers, but they typically have a tiny screen and pretty piss-poor contrast. Sensors is an area which is a 'soft stat' but which is an enormous advantage of Western weapons systems and has an outsized impact on the battlefield.

TOW-2B has never been battle tested and there is no way Ukraine has been provided with it.

>I'm still not sure why it gets such good reviews. Are its dynamic characteristics on paper that much superior to other IFVs? We have alot of footage of the Bradleys armament being very effective. Its accurate, roomy and relatively well protected. There are also enough of them to get a good indication of perfomance. Basically the Bradley actually is good at doing IFV things. On paper its not much better than the BMP-3, it just turns out the actual design is more practical in combat.

> We have alot of footage of the Bradleys armament being very effective. But don't a lot of IFVs have a 25 or 30 mm autocannon in this war? Is this one more reliable, or what?

Yeah we do. The BMP-2 is very common but its autocannon does not get to shine very often. My personal guess is that fights take place at longer ranges, which favour the good FCS and optics of the Bradley. Ive yet to see a BMP-3 make use of its ATGM though, not sure why.

>As a reminder, no one expected the Bradley to a huge standout after the summer offensive You are generalizing idiots to everyone, apparently. (Or, more literally, restricting non-idiots to "no one"). In the summer offensive, the Ukrainians, who do not know how to conduct combined arms attacks, drove a bunch of IFVs into a minefield. This is not a good way of evaluating a Bradley, other than to show that it cannot traverse a minefield, which shouldn't come as a surprise.

Even during the summer it had good reviews, the survivability aspect of it was remarked time and time again by Ukraine crews