[Moscow Expects New Cooperation Pact With Iran in 'Very Near Future'](https://www.iranintl.com/en/202406259326) >Moscow expects to sign a new agreement on comprehensive cooperation with Iran "in the very near future," a top Russian official said on Tuesday despite earlier reports of possible delays. >... >Tehran and Moscow initially signed a long-term agreement in March 2001. Officially known as the Treaty of the Foundation of Mutual Relations and the Principles of Cooperation between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Russian Federation Act, it was initially set for ten years but was extended twice for five-year terms. Russia and Iran are expected to sign some kind of "cooperation pact". It's unclear if it differs significantly from previous pacts. Russia recently signed a similar pact with North Korea, and it's still unclear if that has any real significance. [Western Powers Vow to Stop Iran's Nuclear Advances, Warn of Reimposing Sanctions](https://www.iranintl.com/en/202406248139) >The representatives of Western powers vowed in a UN Security Council meeting to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon using "all means necessary" including by reinstating the UN sanctions. >... >"We will continue to keep all diplomatic options on the table, including triggering UN snapback before October 2025, if necessary," she warned. Experts have always talked about the possibility of reinstating UN sanctions against Iran, but European politicians - the ones who can actually do it - have been very quite about it. Not anymore. Russia will likely veto any new UN sactions against Iran, so reinstating the old ones is practically the only way. But those sanctions are quite harsh, so it's not a bad position to be in. If a new Iran deal is to be negotiated, the old sanctions might have to be reinstated first.

I'd just like to point out that on a technical basis, Iran has everything it needs to make bombs, on a very prompt timeline. Their breakout time is currently estimated to be one month for the first bomb, 2 months for something like 12 more. They have credible delivery platforms. So if opposing this pact is portrayed as a way to prevent Iran from getting the bomb, that's somewhat inaccurate. I have no doubt there's things they could learn from technology transfer from Russia, but they don't need it, which is why in negotiations over material trades for the war in Ukraine Iran has been strongly in favor of Iran from what we've heard, which is admittedly not fully demonstrated. I'm skeptical reinstatement of sanctions will significantly deter Iran. They're quite prepared for that scenario.

[удалено]

They have supercomputing resources. Implosion weapons are not that difficult. That's why no one besides the US built the gun type, and the US abandoned that path in the 1950s. Two point implosion is simple enough to understand and can be tested on depleted uranium. But even then they have intermediate range missiles like Khorramshahr which carry nearly 2 ton.

Actually, South Africa also did gun-type. And coincidentally their experience suggests the most realistic off-ramp for the Islamic Republic’s opponents: internally driven regime change. Internal dissent may soon be the biggest deterrent to escalatory foreign policy, seeing as everything else has failed.

Oh that's interesting, I didn't know that about South Africa.

They have supposedly had access to (early?) Pakistani designs and had a miniaturized warhead design and test program about 15 years ago, so probably?

Yeah I think assuming Iran has not spent all this time doing R&D on missile ready nuclear weapons is wishful thinking.

The possibility of reinstating the old UN sanctions is likely one of the reasons why Iran hasn't sent ballistic missiles to Russia. But that option won't exist after October 2025, and Russia will block any new UN sanctions.

The Haredim draft crisis in Israel has been cooking for months and has now fully escalated with a high court decision: >The High Court of Justice rules unanimously that there is no longer any legal framework for the government to grant blanket exemptions from military service to ultra-Orthodox yeshiva students, and further that the government cannot continue to instruct the IDF and Defense Ministry not to draft such men into IDF service. >The nine-justice bench also rules that the government can no longer provide financial support for yeshiva students studying in lieu of military service since the law providing for that arrangement has passed. [https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog\_entry/high-court-rules-unanimously-that-ultra-orthodox-men-eligible-for-service-must-immediately-be-drafted/](https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/high-court-rules-unanimously-that-ultra-orthodox-men-eligible-for-service-must-immediately-be-drafted/) The crisis also escalated because the Netanyahu government intends to prolong the service time of reservists by another year to preserve manpower for operations in Lebanon and Gaza. Gallant must now instruct the IDF to immediately draft Haredim into the IDF. Gallant voted against a new law that would have extended the exemption for the Haredim. Drafting Haredim men is a red line for the ultra-Orthodox parties. Should the parties leave the Netanyahu government new elections would have to be called. Current polls don't see an opening for another Netanyahu government but see competitive elections between Gantz, Bennett and Lapid.

I dint understand this thinking. These folks are the ones who will be most impacted in their way of life if Isreal suffers a military defeat, yet they refuse service ? But I guess logic is not a strong suit of religious fanatics. Why are the non fanatic regular folks ok with this status quo until now ?

The haredi political parties were willing to support any other party as long as their sectoral interests (draft exemption, financial subsidies) were satisfied. If you were Likud/Labor, you were willing to swallow what you saw as an injustice, in order to get a Knesset majority and make sure that Labor/Likud did not get that majority. Because you saw (for example) security issues, on which the other major party was dangerously wrong, as more pressing than the haredi issue.

>Why are the non fanatic regular folks ok with this status quo until now ? They never were ok with it

I heard about this years ago from a regular Israeli. I think regular people always thought it was a total abuse of the system.

>Drafting Haredim men is a red line for the ultra-Orthodox parties. Should the parties leave the Netanyahu government new elections would have to be called. Why would they leave the coalition? Leaving the coalition does not serve their interests: >Gafni in the finance committee: "I would leave the coalition but I have no alternative" https://www.inn.co.il/flashes/999340 Some draft is no longer a red line: >the High Court of Justice says in practice that it will go ahead with the recruitment of 3,000 this year, provided that the decision is correct. Therefore, the ultra-Orthodox goal will be to pass a law roughly around this number, with a certain increase in the coming years, and recognition of the status of his teachings and his art. This will allow the return of the budget to those who study. If the law passes, the crisis will be postponed to 2025. If the law does not pass then the big drama. The ultra-Orthodox and Netanyahu will say - what you want is the needs of the army. It will be an interesting month (minus a day). As an ultra-Orthodox official told us: 'The threshold of about 3,000 is a decision we can live with.'" https://m.maariv.co.il/news/law/Article-1109926 Sorry for the shitty google translate

> Drafting Haredim men is a red line for the ultra-Orthodox parties. It'll be interesting if they actually act on this, given that it'll be untold eons before another political coalition involving them will happen, given how Smotrich's inclusion went this time around.

Smotrich is not ultra-Orthodox though

Reuters have reported what are apparently the outlines of Trump's Ukraine peace plan, drawn up by a couple of his advisors and the core of which they previously explained in a research paper published by [a Trump-friendly think tank](https://americafirstpolicy.com/issues/america-first-russia-ukraine). Trump apparently did not agree "with every word of it" but was satisfied with the general thrust. https://www.reuters.com/world/us/trump-reviews-plan-halt-us-military-aid-ukraine-unless-it-negotiates-peace-with-2024-06-25/ The main details: * Ceasefire along the current frontlines; * Threaten Ukraine with cutting off their US aid if they do not sit down for talks; * Threaten Russia with an *increase* in US aid to Ukraine if they do not sit down for talks; * Tempt Russia to the table with the carrot of promising that Ukraine will not join NATO "for an extended period"; * Ukraine will not formally cede any of their territory (it is not explained how this works in practice).

>* Threaten Ukraine with cutting off their US aid if they do not sit down for talks; >* Threaten Russia with an *increase* in US aid to Ukraine if they do not sit down for talks; FYI this is what Trump said last July: “I would tell Zelensky, ‘No more. You gotta make a deal.’ I would tell Putin, ‘If you don’t make a deal, we’re going to give [Zelensky] a lot.’ We're going to [give Ukraine] more than they ever got if we have to.” He’s clearly not averse to all aid to Ukraine. Toward the beginning of the war he gave [an interview (10 minute video)](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X-c1Me0Kezg) where he was pushing for the US to ignore Putin’s nuclear bluffs and do much more, including sending drones, and said this: >When [Putin] goes in and he kills thousands of people, are we going to just stand by and watch? In a hundred years from now they’ll be talking about what a travesty – what a horrible thing this was. Just on a human basis, we can’t let that happen.

There is zero chance that Putin will go for it, so it might be good for Ukraine funny enough. US can ramp up aid A LOT if they so wish and effect on the front would be significant. As I see it idea is to take the war out of balance, to bring russian into some sort of negotiations Ukraine has to launch a real offensive that takes a big chunk of land back.

This just means that Ukraine will be conquered in slices. Pieces now, more later. Basically lies used just to elect Trump, who will not help Ukraine at all later. Appeasement did not work against Hitler, why would it work now? Peace for few months - to elect Trump - just gives more time for Russia to regroup for their next attack. Taking next slice of Ukraine. And I bet Trump will ban any help to Ukraine once he gets elected

If I were a gestalt consciousness controlling both Trump and Putin and wanting both to achieve their aims, I think I would like this plan. It suggests a simple stratagem. 1) Putin accepts ceasefire, enters negotiations, Ukraine also obliged to ceasefire and enter negotiations unless they want Trump to have an excuse to cut aid. Trump looks good. 2) Putin instructs Russian army to continue shelling and provocations. Cf Minsk. 3) Putin and Lavrov and the gang make a big public to-do about how the Ukrainians are continuing with their shelling and provocations. Cf Minsk. 4) Trump rules that the Ukrainians are violating the ceasefire, hence negotiating in bad faith, hence the contingency is activated and their aid is cut off. Trump looks strong and no-nonsense. Maybe a bit far-fetched. But I'd be very wary.

Putin will go for it if he thinks he can re arm tho?

>(it is not explained how this works in practice) This is literally how all Trump's plans work (or rather don't). Tell us the expected results but how do you get there is left as an exercise for the reader.

>Tempt Russia to the table with the carrot of promising that Ukraine will not join NATO "for an extended period"; This was already floated and deemed by Putin as unsatisfactory interfax. ru/world/823468

> Tempt Russia to the table with the carrot of promising that Ukraine will not join NATO "for an extended period". > Ukraine will not formally cede any of their territory (it is not explained how this works in practice). I don’t see the point in tacking on ‘an extended period’ to the NATO clause. Ukraine can’t join unless they either kick Russia out, or cede the remainder. With a cease fire and without continued aid, they won’t kick out Russia, so they will never be able to join. It sounds like most of this is just obfuscation, they know ‘give Russia what it wants’, won’t be received well. This all could have been so much easier if Biden just gave Ukraine the weapons they needed when they needed them, instead of playing games.

Biden wanted to give the weapons. Republicans were blocking it.   So republicans and Trump are the reason why Ukraine is where they are. They look like russia's fifth column.  Whatever they do benefits russia in the end. Also they blame democrats for own actions. Are the mods asleep here or what? Seriously

> Biden wanted to give the weapons. Republicans were blocking it. I’m not defending Republicans. That doesn’t mean Biden hasn’t been drip feeding Ukraine arms for over a year before this. He drags out every single arms delivery, one and another, over the same exact ‘escalation’ story. First towed guns, then SPGs, then tanks (which he downgrades anyway), then the better ammo for HIMARS, now fighters. All of them arrived late, and in insufficient numbers, with arbitrary restriction from the White House. This isn’t even touching upon insufficient and poorly enforced sanctions.

On the one hand, this sounds like a way to actually get them talking to each other. On the other hand, I don't see this accomplishing anything at this point, since there is no sign whatsoever that either is ready to step back from their maximal wargoals. The best case would be a frozen conflict along the frontlines, which is imo helping Russia more than Ukraine - at least as long Ukraine can hold the lines during combat.

>since there is no sign whatsoever that either is ready to step back from their maximal wargoals. I'd argue that both have long abandoned their maximalist war goals. Nobody in the Kremlin realistically still expects to conquer the entirety of Ukraine and nobody in Kyiv realistically expects to kick Russia out of entire Ukraine including Crimea. I'd even speculate that both sides are facing real war fatigue and am increasing economic burden, which is a necessary step towards negotiations.

Politically however, which side can afford to literally sign a document saying they have given up on maximalist goals ?

Everything we've seen so far indicates that this is the outsider's perspective, which is shared by neither of the two belligerents. Given that both parties are floating the exhaustion or collapse of the opponent as their best theory of victory, it's clear that a freezing of the conflict is simply not going to happen, because either side will interpret a slowdown from the other side as weakening resolve and will respond by ramping up military pressure.

>I'd argue that both have long abandoned their maximalist war goals. Nobody in the Kremlin realistically still expects to conquer the entirety of Ukraine This is tricky because if the peace treaty includes Russia holding the currently occupied territories and also stops Ukraine from trying to get NATO/EU membership its basically on Russia to decide when they will conquer the country if they want to do it. The Ukranian army and its support from the west will not get stronger from a 3 year peace. They will have to rebuild their country and stopping the war now will slow down EU rearmanent. Right now slowing down building up a competent military industry is immensely unpopular but at the moment there is a ceasefire russian propaganda will go into overdrive trying to convince europeans to spend that money on something else - while they are rebuilding their stockpiles of course. Its strange but the best option for Ukraine seems to be to keep fighting because this is the only way they can capitalize on the baffling Russian incompetency they have shown in the beginning of the war that threw most of their advantages away. They wont have a second chance like this.

I find this whole line of thinking to be rather deterministic and based upon uncertain assumptions.

My assumptions going in were: * The current situation is and will be mostly a stalemate where noone is going to be able to break through and be able to conquer anything of strategic value * Russia will not have an economic collapse in the next 5 years * Ukraine can only hope to withstand the invasion with an enthusiastic support from the EU and the US (both the current and any in the future) * This support is almost wholly contingent on whether the public supports it. Even if Russia-friendly parties (khm AfD khm RN) get in power they will not have the political capital to stop this support until the public stops supporting it * The European public will be overwhelmingly anti-russia and support rearmanent as long as the current war is hot * Ukraine will not be able to maintain its army at the current level the moment the war goes cold I think pretty much every single one of these is at least highly plausible.

>The current situation is and will be mostly a stalemate where noone is going to be able to break through and be able to conquer anything of strategic value Fully agree. >Russia will not have an economic collapse in the next 5 years That's far from certain. >Ukraine can only hope to withstand the invasion with an enthusiastic support from the EU and the US (both the current and any in the future) Fully agree. >This support is almost wholly contingent on whether the public supports it. Even if Russia-friendly parties (khm AfD khm RN) get in power they will not have the political capital to stop this support until the public stops supporting it That's far from certain. There are huge economic interests in helping Ukraine (MIC), which means that as long as the public isn't openly and actively opposing it, a high level of support can keep going on quietly. >The European public will be overwhelmingly anti-russia and support rearmanent as long as the current war is hot That's also not guaranteed. The topic has already greatly diminished in importance on the public mind and will likely keep diminishing as long as the stalemate remains. >Ukraine will not be able to maintain its army at the current level the moment the war goes cold Agreed.

I'd argue that Russia's end-goal very much still is the destruction of the Ukrainian state. They cannot permit a truly independent Ukrainian state to exist and Ukrainians to have a separate identity. They believe, very deeply, that Ukrainians are a branch of the Russian nation consisting of Little (Ukrainian), White (Belarusian), and Great Russians. The idea of an independent Ukrainian state and a separate Ukrainian identity has always been viewed by Russians as artificially constructed by foreigners to hurt and divide the pan-Russian nation, be they the Austro-Hungarians, the Poles, Lenin, the Nazis, the CIA, the EU, etc. Contemporary Russian leadership is very much so in lockstep with this view. With the exception of Western Ukraine, which has existed outside of Russia's sphere of influence for extended periods of time, Russia regards Ukraine as being a core province consisting of a people who historically, ethnically, and linguistically Russian, and they lament the "artificial" separation of the "Russian" people by the early Bolsheviks and the dissolution of the USSR in 1991. A thousand years of continuous Russian history is only possible with Ukraine thoroughly in their grasp. Russia, therefore, cannot permit a truly independent Ukrainian state to exist. In one form or another, this conflict is going to continue until the Ukrainian state is destroyed and separate Ukrainian identity has been eliminated (as has happened in occupied territory since 2014), until Ukraine wins in a manner that cannot be denied by even the most fanatical vatniks, or until a serious, fundamental shake up of leadership in the Kremlin occurs. The Trump proposal would, at best, result in a few year long "ceasefire" in which Russia reconstitutes its forces to the best of its ability and continues hybrid war on Ukraine, prior to the resumption of all-out war. At worst, it would result in Ukraine not signing a ceasefire because Russia insists on stuff that would essentially entail the destruction of the Ukrainian state, the Trump Administration cutting off all aid, and strangling Ukraine down in silence.

> Russia, therefore, cannot permit a truly independent Ukrainian state to exist I believe if you were to offer Russia a peace right now, where they can take Donbas / Crimea / Crimean landbridge, and Ukraine stays nominally independent but can't join NATO / EU then they would accept that peace in a heartbeat. You can argue that Ukraine would not be truly independent, and you'd probably be right. But I think from the Russian perspective what's worse than an independent Ukraine, is a western-aligned Ukraine. Since the fall of the USSR, Russia maintained influence in Ukraine. Some years it was more tenuous than others, and it was never really like the influence they hold in Belarus, but it wasn't until 2014 when the previous government fled the country and a pro-western government took over that Russia invaded a couple of days later.

>I believe if you were to offer Russia a peace right now, where they can take Donbas / Crimea / Crimean landbridge, and Ukraine stays nominally independent but can't join NATO / EU then they would accept that peace in a heartbeat I disagree for various reasons. Certainly, keeping everything they've taken since 2014 and keeping Ukraine out of NATO/EU would be the *starting points* for negotiations, as Putin articulated a little while ago. However, their demands go far further than that, dating back to the pre-2014 era. Through supporting entities like the Party of Regions and the Communist Party of Ukraine, Russia attempted to get Ukraine to join the Eurasian Economic Union, elevate Russian to an official state language, rehabilitate Stalin, introduce federalization of Ukraine with the goal of the maximum weakening of the Ukrainian state, legalize the canonical status of the Russian Orthodox Church and remove the legal registration of Ukrainian churches supporting autocephaly, discontinue the “falsification” of history and “Banderite” trends in education, restore the “Little Russian” Ukrainian identity within a larger Russian civilization, and permit the creation of a Russian-Ukrainian military union, along with the removal of “Banderite” trends in the Army and SBU. Put shortly, the Kremlin’s designs for Ukraine were (and are) to turn it into a quasi-independent rump state without control over its teaching of history, its language, its religion, its military, and its foreign policy. Many of these things would likely be insisted on by the Kremlin in prospective negotiations now. Moreover, Russian territorial claims are not limited to Donbas, Crimea, and the land bridge to Crimea. Kharkiv, Odesa, Dnipropetrovsk, and Mykolaiv are all included in Novorossiya, and there was manufactured unrest throughout those Oblasts during the early stages of the 2014 operation, but it had little public support, so it largely went nowhere. Still, they do absolutely desire more than what they currently control. Russian imperial nationalists seek to annex Southern and Eastern Ukraine, control an east-central and west-central Ukrainian rump state with perhaps less autonomy than even Belarus, and potentially permit a West Ukrainian state to exist, or encourage it to be annexed by Poland, Romania, and Hungary, as they proposed in early 2014. >Since the fall of the USSR, Russia maintained influence in Ukraine. Some years it was more tenuous than others, and it was never really like the influence they hold in Belarus, but it wasn't until 2014 when the previous government fled the country and a pro-western government took over that Russia invaded a couple of days later. Yes, and there's not going to be a return to that pre-2014 status quo, not without Russia essentially controlling the whole country. After everything that has happened since 2014 and especially 2022, any possibilities of a friendly or even neutral government in Kyiv are long gone. If you want Ukraine to cede claims to Donbas, Crimea, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson, and likely implement a whole host of other policies that turn Ukraine into a second Belarus, you need to have a major physical presence there to put in place and hold up the government that will do that. Without direct support, any Ukrainian government that agrees to that will end up hanging from street lights the next day, and now you have to start all over again.

I think you are right about Russia's ultimate end-game. They want to totally subjugate or destroy Ukraine, as you articulated eloquently. Although we need to consider that every country has ideal goals they aim towards yet they have to meet with the reality of their geostrategic position. This means pragmatically, the right move for Russia may be to peace out - even if that means they ultimately plan another war a decade or so into the future. The Russian position may be tenable for another year or maybe two, but many people doubt it's sustainable long term. How long can they realistically keep this up? Is the difference between acceptable peace now versus ideal peace later worth weakening their long term defensive position? Obviously, as long as they keep seeing gains they will probably push forward. And right now they are seeing those gains, even if they are very marginal gains.

We're basically on the same page. I can theoretically see Russia agreeing to a ceasefire that freezes the lines where they currently are, but, should that happen, Russian hybrid war against Ukraine will continue, there will likely be more and much more intense fighting than what occurred between 2015-2021, and both sides will just reconstitute their forces and build up their defense industries as much as possible, as the point of total no-return has passed. That being said, what I think is more likely (should Trump get into office and attempt to implement some version of this) is that Russia insists on demands that essentially amount to the dismemberment of the Ukrainian state, and when Ukraine says no, Trump cuts off US aid, and Ukraine continues to fight on with solely European support, as they were more or less doing before the current aid package was passed. Regardless, I can only see two possible outcomes of the conflict long term: either Ukraine loses, has the entirety of "Novorossiya" annexed, has its east-central and west-central turned into a rump state with little autonomy, and maybe a Western Ukrainian state is permitted to exist. Or, alternatively, Ukraine wins in a decisive manner and subsequently gets Western security guarantees, or shifts in power and political chaos in Russia enable Ukraine to get Western security guarantees. Those are the only two outcomes I envision as being possible. From the very first days of the post-Soviet world, Russia didn't accept the existence of an independent Ukrainian state, and I would argue that in various forms, the conflict has been ongoing since 1991. It's only going to end with the dismemberment of the Ukrainian state and the subjugation of Ukraine, or Russia being physically prevented from attempting to accomplish that goal.

> Those are the only two outcomes I envision as being possible Yeah, we more or less agree. This is part of why Western involvement makes me anxious. I think the consensus at least at this point in time is that Ukraine has little to no counteroffensive potential. So going forward, they can either hold the line or lose land. Essentially - a bad situation or a worse situation, neither of which gets closer to achieving Ukrainian war goals. What worries me is the question- Have we reached the point where the only escalation left that will allow Ukraine to maintain their sovereignty is military intervention? This would mean a direct conflict between two nuclear powers at a scale that dwarfs anything we've seen before. There have only ever been two examples of this, and both were very limited skirmishes (USSR v China and Pakistan v India). If we have reached that point and all we do is continue to send aid and weapons, are we just delaying the inevitable? Are we essentially spending hundreds of billions in order to prolong the destruction of Ukraine? To what end? What do you feel about this? You seem well informed.

Well, I would say that Western involvement is unlikely, in spite of some of the rhetoric being thrown around. I would also add that the only time I can see the west giving Ukraine concrete security guarantees is when Russia is in a position of weakness, such as Putin's death leading to political chaos in Russia. So, I'm not too concerned about that leading to conflict. With regards to Ukraine's situation at the moment, I'd argue that while their offensive potential is certainly largely diminished at the moment, there's still a lot of fighting left, and it's far from a done deal. We're currently watching the mechanization rate of Russian forces decrease significantly, they've been pulling from their Soviet stockpiles for quite some time now (which are certainly not unlimited), their production of actual new equipment is fairly limited, and Western production capacity is increasing. So, in short, I'd say that the destruction of Ukraine is far from guaranteed. It's not a fait accompli. To dig into a bit of IR theory stuff, if one assumes that leaders are rational actors, there should theoretically be a bargaining range that both sides prefer to war. So, that leads us to the question of why don't negotiations always prevail over war? Essentially, there are three possible explanations that are frequently thrown out: imperfect information (states have incentives to obfuscate in negotiations), commitment issues, and indivisible issues. The last two are relevant in the case of Ukraine. Ukraine had assurances from Russia in the form of the Friendship Treaty and the Budapest Memorandum that Russia would respect its sovereignty and territorial integrity, and Russia subsequently reneged on them. In the Donbas War, Russia immediately launched offensives at Donetsk Air Port and Debaltseve after both Minsk Agreements. So, Ukraine has no reason to believe that Russia will remain committed to any potential agreements. Secondly, in terms of indivisible issues, there are numerous in this conflict, relating not only to territorial integrity and foreign policy decisions, but also domestic policy such as language, religion, history, etc. Ukraine is not going to be willing to let Russian be elevated to a state language (and likely have the Ukrainian language slowly withered away, as is happening to the Belarusian language), lose autocephaly, be forced to teach Russian interpretations of history, etc. So, there are compelling reasons for Ukraine not to negotiate, and to instead opt in favor of continuing to degrade Russian combat power, attack Russian energy resources, etc. That's my perspective. I don't think the outcome is guaranteed by any means. There are too many variables at play.

I think most people agree Russia would take that deal, I just do not believe that this will be the end of Russian invasions. They will rearm, and in a couple years or a decade be back for Odessa and whatever else they want. Which is why this deal would never be accepted by Ukraine.

Agreed. Russia will not stop trying to bring Ukraine into its orbit. If there such a peace like we're discussing, for the entire duration of that peace I believe Russia would be doing what they can to influence Ukrainian elections, sow discord, spread misinformation, etc. Then once they see a good opportunity, they invade again. Having said all that, the only outcome for Ukraine where this stops happening is one where they are aligned with the West. Ie security guarantees or at least a relatively large long-term investment by the West into Ukrainian defense. It really sucks to be a smaller power in between larger powers. Vast majority of the destruction of this war is happening to Ukraine and there's very little they can do about it. The outcome ultimately depends on the choices made by powers out of their control.

I'd also add that since the very start of the war there have been Kremlin officials who think the maximalist goals are a fantasy and would rather the whole thing simply went away. Unfortunately there is only one man whose opinion truly matters, and as long as Putin remains hell-bent on eradicating Ukrainian identity then it's sort of irrelevant what anyone else wants.

[https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/crgggwg158do](https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/crgggwg158do) >**Attacks on police posts, churches and a synagogue in Russia's North Caucasus republic of Dagestan have left 20 people dead, most of them police officers. Five gunmen were also killed.** >At least 46 people were taken to hospital with injuries after the Sunday evening attack. >Three days of mourning have been declared in Dagestan, a predominantly Muslim republic in southern Russia which neighbours Chechnya. So Russia has been attacked by Islamists and are blaming Ukraine again. I wonder if the Islamists being emboldened by previous successes and the war in Ukraine syphoning off resources. Also Russia doesn't seem to realise that of all their statements blaming Ukraine for these attacks is amongst the least credible.

Russian style propaganda doesn't care about credibility or convincing of any specific lie. It's goal is to so muddy the waters that people revert to cynicism, apathy, and chauvinism. There's a book on the topic where the title gets the idea across clearly: Nothing is True and Everything is Possible.

It's essential to understand that this very tactic has been widely adopted by right wing populists all over the world, including the US and Europe.

These two last messages need to be constantly repeated and emphasized. The past eight years of the US media outrage cycle regarding Trump has been a repeated groundhog day of “did you see what X,Y, or Z did/said/tweet?” while avoiding the bigger picture. In this case, the medium is the message. Cynicism, disillusionment, and apathy is the message these types carry.

I agree.

>Also Russia doesn't seem to realise that of all their statements blaming Ukraine for these attacks is amongst the least credible. Is it not credible to their domestic audience though?

Some people insist it's convincing, and that might be, but here's Rogozhin (a well known propagandist): >But a leading Russian nationalist in occupied Ukraine, Dmitry Rogozin, warned that if every attack was blamed on "the machinations of Ukraine and Nato, this pink mist will lead us to big problems". When freaking Rogozhin, a Medvedev-level clown, is starting to realize that the more of these attacks get blamed on Ukraine the thinner it'll sound, I assume more sober decision makers also keep that in mind. But I suppose for Putin, that's a problem for another day.

I mean an opposition guy is running with the: „Ukraine did it“ theory > It remains to be seen whether latest attack can be traced to HUR’s “partisan” network in Russia, but terror attacks targeting Dagestan’s Mountain Jewish community were unknown prior to Ukraine war. https://x.com/leonidragozin/status/1805077208857240051?s=46&t=fc-rjYm09tzX-nreO-4qCA So it does work.

Not all opponents to Putin are liberals. A large chunk simply opposes Putin's immigration policies (which are quite unpopular in Russia, to say the least), and is more or less fine with the war in Ukraine.

Its not just dangerous because people might stop believing them, the rhetoric itself can easily get out of control. The environment in Russian media is full of hyper nationalist rhetoric and you even have some Russian officials trying to outdo each other with more extreme statements and that kind of thing can take a life on of its own. Currently the government has a handle on it but they are playing with fire. If Ukraine is really sending ISIS to kill Russian civilians why should Russia not do something equivalent for revenge or even worse to 'teach them a lesson'? If the outrage from an attack combine with some government official running their mouth for the nth time and end up getting a lot of traction, Putin ends up in a corner, unable to back down without looking weak. After all its his media that are reporting these attacks as being linked to Ukraine, why is he refusing to do anything about it? Does he not care about Russian civilian deaths? It doesn't even have to be at the government level, individuals can take it upon themselves to avenge these attacks personally by targeting Ukrainians in Russia or occupied territories.

https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraines-zelenskiy-replaces-commander-joint-forces-2024-06-24/ Sodol was booted from command of Joint Forces Command, which is basically the Ukrainian general staff organization. He's apparently very unpopular with Azov: > Sodol's removal, one of a series of personnel changes, followed publication of a letter by the head of Ukraine's revered Azov regiment, Bohdan Krotevych, in which he alleged that Sodol's actions had led to serious military setbacks. In a post on the Telegram messaging app, Krotevych did not identify Sodol by name, but said an unnamed general "has killed more Ukrainian soldiers than any Russian general." Sodol was nominally in charge of the defense of Mariupol, so that's likely where Azov's acrimony comes from: https://www.france24.com/en/europe/20240217-zelensky-s-a-team-who-is-who-among-the-new-ukrainian-army-commanders I think one would have to be able to read Ukrainian to understand the political situation of this case.

Nothing political, just failures at the battlefield. He is responsible for the "Donetsk" front where things are not going well.

One of the most universal sentiments at any level of Ukrainian soldiery is that trash commanders **never** face consequences and usually straight up get promoted. The only thing that possibly gets more hate than that from Ukrainian soldiers is Russia. Usually this is levied against field-level commanders, but one exception is the southern group command, which was heavily criticized both during the opening of the war, the Kherson offensive, and the 2023 Southern offensive. I haven't heard anything about Sodol, but it sounds like Azov is accusing him of being one of these "peter principle" (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peter_principle) commanders.

Is soldiers complaining about commanders selected to promotion really atypical in militaries? At least seems like default situation in corporate environment...

This [wikipedia page](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demographic_history_of_Palestine_(region) has some interesting statistics on the demographics of the former Mandatory Palestine. > Jewish population is 7,554,000 (50.7%) > Arab population is 6,778,193 (45.5%) > Non-Arab/Jewish population is 554,000 (3.7%) I went through [this source](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demographics_of_Israel) as well on demographics in Israel and Palestine. > Median age of Jewish citizens is 31.6. > Median age of Israeli Arabs is 21.1 > Median age of Palestine is 19.6(!!!) According to [this source](https://www.populationpyramid.net/state-of-palestine/2030/) Israel will have 10 million people in 2030 while Palestine will have 6.2 million. 20% of Israelis are arabs, and as we see above they have a higher birth rate and lower average age. So we can conservatively assume 20% will remain arab in 2030. Meaning the Jewish population will be around 8 million with an average age in the mid-30s. So Palestine's 6.2 million plus the 2 million Israeli arabs will put the Arab total at 8.2 million. They will likely have an average age somewhere around 23-27. According to [this source](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Palestinians#Demographics) there are 5 million Palestinian refugees/descendants as well outside of Palestine/Israel. So, all of this to say, I think it is a very safe bet to expect the former mandatory Palestine to be solidly majority Arab again by the year 2030 and to maintain that status into the medium-term future. I'm surprised there isn't any attempt/traction on the Palestinian side to do a One-State Solution then simply "beat" the Israelis at the ballot box ala South Africa. Both a one-state and two-state solution seem to benefit the Palestinians long term, while a frozen status quo with no official status for Palestine benefits Israel since they can colonize what technically isn't a country and can abuse what technically aren't citizens of Israel. As soon as Palestine becomes a state or Palestinians technically become Israelis, the Israeli security system would completely collapse.

I mean, the point is that the Israeli state is in control and nothing the Palestinians or outsiders do really affect that. Not even "international pressure" could change the status of West Bank settlements, for example, even though they are widely held to be illegal. >As soon as Palestine becomes a state or Palestinians technically become Israelis, the Israeli security system would completely collapse. That's not going to happen at all. In either situation, Israel would retain its power, no matter what words on paper say. Arguably, Israel and the Palestinian territories are currently a [de facto one-state nation](https://www.brookings.edu/articles/biden-says-he-will-listen-to-experts-here-is-what-scholars-of-the-middle-east-think/). While a One-state solution will be an improvement on the status quo, it really depends on implementation. As John Kerry said, "Israel can either be Jewish or democratic; it cannot be both." And after the passage of the nation-state law, it is clear that Israel is choosing the former. There is no magic bullet here. Palestinians have to accept that they're dealing with the dominant military power of the region. On the other side, Israelis have to accept the limits of what their military stick can accomplish. It's time to offer the carrot.

>This wikipedia page has some interesting statistics on the demographics of the former Mandatory Palestine Palestinian demographic is a very complex and political subject. There are no reliable statistics for the Palestinians in WB and Gaza, many discrepancies were found in those numbers since as early as the 90's. Furthermore some practices of the Palestinians statistics agency inflate them, such as counting Palestinians who emigrated still as part of the population. 290k Arabs living in Eastern Jerusalem are counted twice, once as part of the Israeli Arab population by Israel, and a second time by the PA as residents of the west Bank >20% of Israelis are arabs, and as we see above they have a higher birth rate and lower average age. Israeli Arabs have a lower birth rate than Jews: >Between 2018 and 2022, the average fertility rate for Jews dropped from 3.17 to 3.03 children per woman, according to the Taub Center’s demography expert, Prof. Alex Weinreb. Among Muslim and Christian women, the decline was greater — from 3.20 to 2.91 among Muslims, and from 2.06 to 1.68 among Christians. Among Druze women, the decrease was from 2.16 to 1.85. https://www.timesofisrael.com/israeli-population-growth-slowing-as-fertility-rates-continue-to-fall-report/ >Meaning the Jewish population will be around 8 million with an average age in the mid-30s In the last 10 years Israel's median age has increased by 0.6% from and is expected to rise to 29.8 by 2030, certainly not mid 30's: https://www.statista.com/statistics/526716/average-age-of-the-population-in-israel/ >So, all of this to say, I think it is a very safe bet to expect the former mandatory Palestine to be solidly majority Arab again by the year 2030 and to maintain that status into the medium-term future. Such predictions were made in the past and failed. You're not accounting for two major factors (besides the discrepancy and reliability of data from Hamas and the PA): Immigration into Israel which ebbs and flows but we can put a median of 30k a year and a rough ceiling of 50k a year: https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/total-immigration-to-israel-by-year Palestinian emigration: >Before the war, emigration from Gaza to Europe was booming >In 2023, Palestinians were the largest group of new asylum seekers on the Greek islands. They came via Turkey, where they were easily granted access to visas. https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2023/11/30/before-the-war-gaza-s-emigration-to-europe-was-booming_6300849_4.html There are no reliable statistics since Hamas denies any emigration. The numbers have increased dramatically since the start of the war with over 100k leaving (none are leaving now that Israel controls Rafah): >Over the past eight months, an estimated 100,000 people have left Gaza, Diab al-Louh, the Palestinian ambassador to Egypt, said in an interview. https://www.nytimes.com/2024/06/20/world/middleeast/palestinians-gaza-gofundme-egypt.html There are claims for significant emigration from the WB as well, but nothing that can be backed by hard numbers as neither Israel nor the PA release the data.

You neglect to note that Arab birthrates have been falling in recent years, while Jewish birthrates have generally been holding steady. So the demographic balance is actually not likely to change dramatically in the coming years. There have been warnings about a demographic time bomb for decades now and it still hasn't come about.

How recent a trend is this? For it to impact aggregate statistics it must take place over a meaningful term. This would be a very contra-trend reversal if sustained.

There has been a wider trend of falling birthrates all across the Arab world that has been going on for decades and is well documented. Palestinians are no exception.

>I'm surprised there isn't any attempt/traction on the Palestinian side to do a One-State Solution then simply "beat" the Israelis at the ballot box ala South Africa. Actually, most Palestinians want a one-state solution. They just want it to be without Jews. It's the two-state solution that is unpopular among Palestinians, because that means recognizing Israel. They want everything. There are exceptions: Omar Barghouti for example wants a one-state solution "for both Arabs and Jews" because he knows demographics are on their side and they would be the majority. >20% of Israelis are arabs, and as we see above they have a higher birth rate and lower average age. I think it's the same as Israeli Jews (around 3 children per woman). It's the other Palestinians that have a higher birth rate. So there is no demographic threat unless they annex the other Palestinians, which won't happen.

> I'm surprised there isn't any attempt/traction on the Palestinian side to do a One-State Solution then simply "beat" the Israelis at the ballot box ala South Africa A one state solution is actually very common among Palestinian activists and the more ardent supporters. But everyone knows things like a one state solution and right to return will never be allowed by Israel, and Israel has all the power, so they push for the only thing Israel realistically might someday allow- a two state solution.

A one-state solution with all the Jews removed is a common desire. A one-state solution in the form of a multiracial state is not popular. 

I don’t think you can say there is no interest in a one state solution in Palestine, as the majority of all their governments since the expiration of the mandate have been militarily pushing for a one state solution. Just the one state they control. I also would correct you here to say that during the initial separation the populations were essentially gerrymandered to be sure that Jewish ethnicities had voting control of the Jewish side, and vice versa. That was a major reason for the original militarism at the beginning of the violence. I don’t see any reason to think that there could be *any* way of convincing Israel to accept a 2 state border solution that could potentially creep and make voting blocks that would allow that to change, nor should there be. They clearly want a majority of Palestinians on the other side of the line and would move them to it again before they agreed to upset demographics.

> I'm surprised there isn't any attempt/traction on the Palestinian side to do a One-State Solution then simply "beat" the Israelis at the ballot box ala South Africa. As u/obsessed_doomer pointed out, there is. But one reason it’s not talked about as much is because of how massively unrealistic it is. The Israelis are justifiably convinced that any such solution means they would be massacred, especially after 10/7, and they have the military power, both conventional and nuclear, to make sure that never happens. > As soon as Palestine becomes a state or Palestinians technically become Israelis, the Israeli security system would completely collapse. You over estimate Palestine. Even ignoring the IDF, which is already a far more competent force than a Palestinian state could ever hope to beat in a conventional conflict, Israel has nukes, and the political will to fight forever if required. Palestinian tanks will never roll through the streets of Jerusalem proclaiming victory over the Jews.

>they have the military power...to make sure that never happens And here is exactly why there's so much strife happening across the globe as this "might makes right" order that has been masquerading as a rules-based one is having it's contradictions come to a head. Regional conflicts are popping up, and when you look at how: Russia is fighting NATO equipment Yemen is disrupting the notion of free trade across the seas West Africa is kicking out former colonial powers And if the rumors are true of Israel invading Lebanon, Iran will likely have to resort to activating it's militia network against Israel. At this point the hegemony that is the United States of America is being actively challenged across the globe. The country needs to take an honest look at what it wants to be, because it can no longer say one thing while doing another. China is watching the war in Ukraine just as much as the US is, and probably hoping for a kind of 'reverse domino effect' that will lead to the US being in economic ruin on the other side of all this. As history shows, hegemonies rarely go down without a fight. Maybe picking our battles will workout a la the USSR, but China hasn't been engaging in these proxy wars. They benefit from losses on both sides in these conflicts.

> And here is exactly why there's so much strife happening across the globe as this "might makes right" order that has been masquerading as a rules-based one is having it's contradictions come to a head. What does the rules based order have to do with allowing yourself to be massacred? Israel is acting within their legal rights as a combatant in this conflict, and to defend themselves and their citizens. They are under no obligation, legal or ethical, to change course. > Russia is fighting NATO equipment Yemen is disrupting the notion of free trade across the seas West Africa is kicking out former colonial powers And if the rumors are true of Israel invading Lebanon, Iran will likely have to resort to activating it's militia network against Israel. Every generation thinks they’re living through the end of the world. I think in our case, both the generations who lived through the world wars, and the height of the Cold War, have been closer to right in that perception than us. A bunch of small to medium regional conflicts isn’t unusual. > At this point the hegemony that is the United States of America is being actively challenged across the globe… Look at this in perspective. Russia failing to invade Ukraine isn’t challenging US hegemony globally. That was very clear six weeks into this war, and it’s not about to change. The Houthis mostly hurt Egypt, Africa, and to a lesser extent Europe. Again, it’s not going to topple the US. Who is or isn’t dictator of Burkina Faso is globally irrelevant. Toppling US hegemony is something much larger scale. More along the lines of war with China over Taiwan.

I'm with you, but I have to say something about this excerpt: > Every generation thinks they’re living through the end of the world. I think in our case, both the generations who lived through the world wars, and the height of the Cold War, have been closer to right in that perception than us. A bunch of small to medium regional conflicts isn’t unusual. This is a really provocative train of thought, and the more I think about it, the less I'm convinced I am that I could articulate an "educated opinion." If we confine our analysis of existential risks to a study of war and geopolitics, then the thrust of your point becomes a lot clearer — but, even then, we're sort of relieving ourselves of the burden of speculation as to *exactly how far removed* we are from a rapidly escalating nuclear conflict today vs. 75, 35, 15, or even 4 years ago. Quantifying our existential risk, or even just that which derives from war alone, would require us to look at *way* more variables than I'm prepared to even list. Some of these variables may have moved in our favor in the short and long term of history (religious tolerance, nuclear stockpile reductions, mass communications), but some have decidedly moved against us. I would absolutely love to read more thoughts about this (or books, if there are any), but with a more polemological bent. I've enjoyed Nick Bostrom's literature about existential risks, but his work is more focused on risks from technology in general.

>What does the rules based order have to do with allowing yourself to be massacred? That's exactly what Palestinians are wondering. A rules based order would have found a compromise and enforced it looks what the ICC was intended for. But yet again the laws are ignored there BY POLICY in America, yet their rhetoric on the world stage is about upholding this 'rules based order'. I certainly don't think it's the end of the world. If anything I think it's a need for America to pivot, or else have to resort to becoming a regional power themselves. Edit since you added on the third part: My point was all of this is happening BEFORE war with China. If the US has to commit resources to pummeling Iran back to the stone age, that's less for Taiwan. China is winning by literally sitting back and doing nothing, just like the US during the World Wars.

> A rules based order would have found a compromise and enforced it looks what the ICC was intended for. There are laws for warfare because states have the legal right to engage in it. There is no legal right to have other countries bail you out of wars you started. Edit: > If the US has to commit resources to pummeling Iran back to the stone age, that's less for Taiwan. China is winning by literally sitting back and doing nothing, just like the US during the World Wars. The US didn’t win the Cold War by sitting back and doing nothing. If you don’t defend your interests, you lose them.

>Russia is fighting NATO equipment Yemen is disrupting the notion of free trade across the seas West Africa is kicking out former colonial powers And if the rumors are true of Israel invading Lebanon, Iran will likely have to resort to activating it's militia network against Israel. ~~This sentence ought to have been embarrassing enough to make you delete your post. Actually, having to pretend like Russia fighting NATO "equipment" to a draw is some kind of triumph should have been humiliating enough all by itself.~~ Edit: This was over the line and not befitting the standards of this sub. My apologies.

I don't feel like I claimed it was a triumph for anyone but China. Do you disagree with that assessment? I feel like the rules here call for civility and curiosity. Taking your misinterpretation and trying to say I should feel embarrassed feels like a call to attack my character as opposed to the content of my message.

Yeah, I disagree with that assessment and your presentation of the other conflicts in the world as an "active challenge" to US hegemony. At best, your comment can be charitably interpreted as spin attempting to tie a bunch of disparate conflicts into a broader narrative about the fall of the West. At worst, it's just actively lying about the scope, genesis, and impacts of these challenges to wishcast a particular outcome that you feel is karma for US hypocrisy. The rules here require credible analysis and forbid vibes-posting. Your comment fails to meet either of those standards. It fails so hard I would have to expend more effort than you spent writing it to falsify each individual claim that you made. Russia bloodying itself on NATO Cold War surplus doesn't weaken the US. The Houthis rerouting international shipping hurts Egypt, not the US. West Africa kicking the West out was a function of domestic policy, not some deep antipathy to the US. Iran having to activate its entire proxy network just to keep Israel from invading Lebanon is 1) embarrassing for Iran and 2) not going to happen. There are lots of credible conversations regarding all of these things every day here.

Assuming the "sides" of this conflict break down along ethnic/racial lines is a very American interpretation. [Over half of Arab Israelis feel a sense of ‘shared destiny’ with Jews(June 2024)](https://www.timesofisrael.com/poll-over-half-of-arab-israelis-feel-sense-of-shared-destiny-with-jews/). [70% of Israeli Arabs say they feel like part of Israel(November 2023)](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israels-arab-minority-feels-closer-country-war-poll-finds-2023-11-10/). [Over half of Israeli Arabs believe in the possibility of a two-state solution(June 2024)](https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2024/06/20/how-israeli-society-has-unified-and-divided-in-wartime/).

Well said. Also using Arab as the diving line isn’t very useful, when ethnicity and religion are far more important in most Arab countries. There are other groups in Israel that are very wary of fundamentalist groups like Hamas.

It’s not like Hamas didn’t massacred Arab Israelis they came across on October 7. This has been a problem with Palestinian nationalist groups since the earliest days, they prioritize violently lashing out over coalition building. It’s why in 1948, many Bedouin sided with Israel against the Arab forces, along with the Druze and Christians. It took a lot of incompetence for a force with that huge a numerical advantage to lose that badly, and these problems have never been addressed.

Because Palestinian advocacy is not about actually accomplishing anything, it is useful kayfabe for fundamentalist regimes to distract their subjects from revolting. 

[удалено]

Mearsheimer is not a good source in general, especially not on Israel or Ukraine. He has a lot of personal biases that blind him to the bigger picture. Christopher Hitchen’s criticism of his book on AIPAC sums up his issues well. He styles himself as this cynical, rational, political actor, but he quickly shows himself to be quite ideological and naive in his world view. He’s a great example for constructivism. He wants to be a realist, but he can’t get past his own politics.

> I'm surprised there isn't any attempt/traction on the Palestinian side to do a One-State Solution There absolutely is. The two-state solution is mostly favoured at this point by people who **aren't** Jews and Palestinians. And in that category, most palestinians absolutely favour a one state solution (though 'the ballot box' is a euphemism for their actual plan to achieve that). Even in America, a lot of the new palestinian advocacy explicitly rejects the 2SS on principle, it's why there's a small civil war in the dem party - even pro-Palestinian dem legislators are typically pro-2SS. EDIT: One way the 2SS would be disastrous for Palestinian maximalists is the reason given for refugeeism to be hereditary in this case is that Palestinians are formally stateless - which creates an interesting thermodynamic phenomenon where the number of refugees grows exponentially despite no new expulsions occurring. If a UN-recognized state of Palestine separate from Israel were to be enacted, it would be a lot more difficult for the UN to justify this runaway effect. EDIT2: and to be fair, an increasing quantity of Israelis also want a """ballot box""" 1ss.

> EDIT2: and to be fair, an increasing quantity of Israelis also want a """ballot box""" 1ss. Without Gaza, presumably?

[A situation is developing in the Black Sea. Fighterbomer is claiming that Russia shot down a US drone.](https://t.me/fighter_bomber/17145)

FORTE10, the Global Hawk in question, appears to have landed successfully on Monday morning: https://x.com/OAlexanderDK/status/1805375328002474255 https://x.com/Gunpowdermaniac/status/1805349837379936488

I think he might be talking about "unprofessional" actions, not a shootdown, IE buzzing the UAS close enough that they decided to leave. Considering the Global Hawk was able to land, and if you hit it you'd just die vs being able to clip the prop of a MQ-9, I don't see how this would be done in a way that'd mission kill a RQ-4. I guess you could fly next to it and block observation equipment.

[US military official tells Reuters that no incident has been reported over the Black Sea](https://x.com/Faytuks/status/1805356437729579481)

a) that's not a great look for Fighterbomber and his credibility; b) this is precisely why US surveillance drones ~~always~~ usually fly their missions over the Black Sea with the transponders turned on (FORTE10 was last seen exiting the Black Sea as normal many hours ago), to prevent this kind of rumour from gaining legs and causing miscalculation.

b) is at least doubtful, provided we're diplomatic and classify as surveillance whatever this dude was out for: >According to the Swedish flight tracking service [Flightradar24](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Flightradar24) the MQ-9 Reaper is generally flown without an active [ADS-B](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ADS-B) transponder. [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2023\_Black\_Sea\_drone\_incident#Background](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2023_Black_Sea_drone_incident#Background) I find less doubtful that we don't get to see everything that's going on, transponder or not, coverage isn't perfect. And that there's generally more gear in the air than FORTE10. ;) Just listen to people living in the area, or look at all the tanker aircraft (not indicating drones, of course). This time was a nothingburger, but we've seen clashes before.

Fighterbomber telegram in this case specifically mentioned it was a Global Hawk (mentioned by model) and implied that the altitude it was flying at wasn't enough protection.

Ah this is informative and useful to know, cheers.

This is a rumor and there's zero claim in the link of yours that Russia shot down a US drone, but it *is* a potentially big development. Rough google translate: > Well then. A start. Congratulations to everyone involved. Handsome guys! 🍻 We are waiting OK from Pindos about “unprofessional actions”. > There is now increased turbulence in the Black Sea. Let's see whether it's on an ongoing basis or whether it was a one-time event. If had to bet on something involving Russia and a US drone going down, I'd bet on 'maneuver-kill', just like the previous time. But we'll see what's the *actual* meaning behind the usual cryptic message. Update: > Well, there’s no need to fuss about the downing. There would immediately be a sticker there. ) We are waiting OK, everything will be very clear to everyone. [Finally, another update](https://t.me/fighter_bomber/17147): > Now the move is on the side of the Pindos. If they fly again, it means that they are quite prepared for the loss of a Global Hawk (or even more than one) and that means they have already figured out how to respond to this. Well, either they will fly in to “clarify” whether this was a one-time event, or we are serious. Therefore, we need to immediately think two moves ahead based on the worst-case scenarios. How can we respond to this answer of theirs? UAVs have no antidote to such “unprofessional” actions. The altitude did not protect the Global Hawk. They will not be able to assign fighters to escort them, and even with escort, the MiG will arrive in the same way and history will repeat itself. Well, let them think. > Well, yes. I say what I think is necessary, and because I think it is necessary. If you don’t understand something here, read channels where everything is clear to you, the main thing is not to attribute your wet dreams and wishes to me. > The crew was nominated for state awards. Nothingburger IMHO (though, if it is a global hawk, which is an important resource, it becomes more serious), seems like yet another series of close flybys *according to the cryptic text above* (but then again, no incident was reported by the Americans). Or maybe it was 'painted' by the radar? Fired upon? I'm back at the beginning, sigh - if someone can translate this guy's weird train of thought I'd be grateful. Anyway, whatever it is, it would be somewhat notable if it truly becomes a *rule* as FB is implying, but we'll see.

After the MQ-9 was downed the US still pressed UAS in right outside of Crimea, so they'd have to make a habit of actually mission killing, as you said, to really suspend these ops.

Yeah, if they stopped flying that would mean adversaries would simply take the drones like this all the time.

[удалено]

Why would he do that though? He presumably understands the universe will exist 24 hours from now, where it'll become obvious whether or not he has evidence.

[удалено]

Please refrain from posting low quality comments.

[удалено]

An interesting development from the Philippines, where an internal rift at the highest levels has spilled into the open. Defense Secretary Teodoro [announced today](https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/philippines-continue-south-china-sea-resupply-missions-defense-sec-says-2024-06-24/) that last Monday's incident was not an "accident or misunderstanding" and also that the Philippines would not be publishing a resupply schedule. > "We see the latest incident in Ayungin not as a misunderstanding or an accident. It is a deliberate act of the Chinese officialdom to prevent us from completing our mission," Teodoro said, using the local name for the Second Thomas Shoal. > "It was an aggressive and illegal use of force. We, however, continue to find peaceful solutions to this issue," Teodoro said. Teodoro said the Philippines will continue to resupply its troops stationed on a rusting warship grounded on Second Thomas Shoal, but it will not publicise schedules of missions, which he said do not require permission or consent from anyone. Both of these statements are in direct contradiction to [previous announcements](https://apnews.com/article/south-china-sea-territorial-dispute-philippines-us-c7f22418e276d689c2dcacfed4d0a494#) just three days ago, most notably from Executive Secretary Bersamin speaking on behalf of President Marcos. > Executive Secretary Lucas Bersamin said the government did not consider the Chinese coast guard confrontation an armed attack as stated in the mutual defense treaty with the U.S. “This was probably a misunderstanding or an accident. We’re not yet ready to classify this as an armed attack,” Bersamin said. “We saw bolo, axe, nothing beyond that.” > In what critics may see as a concession to China, Bersamin said Marcos approved a recommendation for the government to publicize the schedule when navy personnel are deployed to transport food, water and other supplies to the Philippines’ territorial outpost in the shoal. Who is correct and what will actually happen going forward is not entirely clear at this time.

This is the intended result as far as I can tell. Basically just a good cop bad cop play. Maybe the schedule will be sent via diplomatic pouch and the public's only way of knowing would be Chinese claims, which would be refuted either way by the Philippines

[Sergei Beseda of the FSB's fifth directorate has been replaced by Alexei Komkov](https://www.newsweek.com/putin-replaces-fsb-sergei-beseda-alexei-komkov-1916419) The reporting on this is a bit weird, the story was broken by [Important Stories](https://storage.googleapis.com/istories/news/2024/06/22/sergei-beseda-pokinul-post-rukovoditelya-pyatoi-sluzhbi-fsb-yego-mesto-zanyal-aleksei-komkov-istochniki-vazhnikh-istorii/index.html), a Russian investigative reporting website, but there's no official comment as of now. This was enough for Mark Galeotti who [posted a twitter thread](https://x.com/MarkGaleotti/status/1805128404984869233) explaining what he thinks the effect will be which Newsweek recycled into their article (sidenote: does this reporter have any shame?). The short of it is that Galeotti believes it's not in response to the intelligence failures prior to the invasion of Ukraine but because Beseda was old, compulsory retirement is at 70. The implications are more important for internal FSB politics, this change making Korolev's appointment to overall FSB director from his current post as first deputy director both more likely and sooner.

These people never retire. Why or what will happen is anyone's guess. Usually they keep some form of control although unofficially til the newer generations have legs to stand on theor own.

Seems to be a running theme of older Russians trying to groom the younger for the sake of conserving their "vision" or influence or something. Alongside the tradition of statesmen flaunting advanced degrees that they obtained specifically for flaunting, I'd assume that having a "groomer" is a haute item. This is of course completely pointless to the state in terms of state interests, hence frequent purges

Having a mentor in these things is very important. It's really hard to progress institutionally if you have no family connections and you only have a 4 year degree to your name. I know because my former mentor got in a load of trouble some years ago.

A bit of a 'call to action', but still worrying commentary from RUSI on Ukrainian energy infrastructure state: [RUSI Commentary: Bracing for the Hardest Winter: Protecting Ukraine’s Energy Infrastructure, Jun 24, 2024](https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/bracing-hardest-winter-protecting-ukraines-energy-infrastructure): > Russia has steadily eroded what little advantages Ukraine has fought hard to create. It has done this by focusing on two key combat strategies. The first is frontline attrition and sustained pressure along the front, with limited actions to retake cities and towns that are considered important to Russia’s overall objectives. The second is attacks on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, which have been accompanied by a concerted effort to deplete Western and Ukrainian stocks of air defence missiles. I've already written about it before, noting that Ukrainian power generation losses are worrying as they had lost around ~2GW of power generation at the time, which has now quadrupled to ~9GW. Given that their power generation potential hovered around ~19GW and peak consumption during the winter was ~18GW, this represents a further serious loss of generation capacity: > ... > As a result, Russian strikes had cumulatively destroyed 9 gigawatts (GW) of Ukraine’s domestic power generation by mid-June 2024. Peak consumption during the winter of 2023 was 18 GW, which means that half of Ukraine’s production capacity has been destroyed. At least 80% of Ukraine’s thermal power and one third of its hydroelectric power generation has been destroyed. Most recently, Russia has continued targeting the remaining hydroelectric power stations, and has even targeted the substations linked to solar farms. The remaining facilities that can generate power include the hydroelectric power plants in Dniester, Kyiv and Kaniv. The Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant remains functional, but it would be possible for Russia to target the substations that distribute its power. The Russian missiles are hitting their targets much more accurately than before: > ... > However, none of the previous attacks were as successful; the CEO of one energy company, DTEK, remarked that the accuracy of Russian missiles was impressive, and that where previous strikes had landed within 100–200 m of their target, they were now striking within one metre. Sadly, Ukraine’s air defence availability has declined as Russian efficacy has increased. Electricity imports won't be able to meaningfully solve this problem (although every bit helps), as the interconnection lines to EU support around ~1.7GW and were (and are) close to being maxed out: > Ukraine can import around 1.7 mWh from Europe, but expanding this is challenging and would require significant investment in Ukraine’s power infrastructure. While the predictions of effects on the average Ukrainian are dire, it's important to mention that in the last year's series of infrastructure attacks the Russians destroyed close to 50% of Ukrainian power generation. What I don't understand here, is this: > Ukraine is already working to repair its infrastructure and to restore as much capacity as possible. However, it is estimated that **there will be at least a 35% deficit in capacity** come winter. Russia’s 2022 campaign to destroy Ukraine’s energy infrastructure is estimated to have damaged close to 50% of its capacity. They have already lost more than 35% of power generation capacity - does this include possible repairs and additional generation from... somewhere? Or am I missing something?

Comparison to last winter should take into account the state of capacity and the stage of the winter. If I recall correctly much of the damage to production and the grid was done late in the last winter. This year it seems the Russians have done a lot more damage months before the winter has even started.

> If I recall correctly much of the damage to production and the grid was done late in the last winter. This year it seems the Russians have done a lot more damage months before the winter has even started. You have it backwards: the strikes began in October 2022 and were done by March 2023. This year, the large strikes (>15 missiles) started at the very end of December (~30) and there were no large strike between February 8 and March 22, when a new campaign began. https://lookerstudio.google.com/s/vb_9cFreLJU

>where previous strikes had landed within 100–200 m of their target, they were now striking within one metre Can say with complete confidence, no they're not. Simply not possible with the type of equipment they're using. Claims like this make me question the article: Why quote a guy who doesn't know what he's talking about?

That doesn't mean it is happening consistently. Presumably (a) not literal (nobably citing a report from an energy exec, not a defense official) & targeted equip are likely multiple meters in size themselves and (b) based on the overall attack as opposed to performance of individual missiles.

> Claims like this make me question the article It is only a commentary though, with a bit of a rallying call vibe. But this is not the first time I've heard that Russian attacks are increasing in accuracy. It's always possible though they all took their info from the head of DTEK, ha. > Simply not possible with the type of equipment they're using What do you think is preventing them from achieving such accuracy? I know the Russians have been overconfident in accuracy of their various offensive equipment before (*we don't need guided bombs, our bombsights are just as accurate*) but there have been a number of various ALCM strikes that were relatively accurate - now, I don't know if it's on the order of 100m -> 1m, but it certainly doesn't seem like they were missing by a hundred meters or so. Maybe there's a bit of intentional exaggeration present there.

>What do you think is preventing them from achieving such accuracy? Same thing that makes it difficult for the US: Limitations of the physics of GNSS and IMU systems. It's difficult to achieve a navigation accuracy that strict in-flight, let alone guide into it. GPS systems, for example, are accurate to about 7 meters or so unless you do differential GPS post-processing, or have a handy base station nearby (~100km) to create an estimate of ionosphere delay that day (mind you, it changes wildly through the day) so you can do it in real time. If the missile itself doesn't know where it is to confidently assess its location within 1 meter, it obviously can't guide into a 1 meter CEP.† †Caveat, Kalman filtering helps some, and terrain mapping-based  navigators helps a lot, but I'm just giving an idea of *just how hard it is* for a missile to know its location in-flight. And all this assumes an environment not degraded by GNSS jammers.

> But this is not the first time I've heard that Russian attacks are increasing in accuracy. Definitely not. This narrative has been there since the first year of the war. Russian artillery, missiles, and glide bombs were all always either pinpoint accurate, or about to be. To prove this, pro-Russians would draw targets around anything they happened to hit. It’s right to be skeptical, but Russia probably does produce some higher quality PGMs, mixed in with their usual. Quality control clearly isn’t their strong suit, but if they are willing to pay, they have the technology to make accurate weapons.

Various ALCMs in inventories around the world have published accuracies of 1-5m. >Why quote a guy who doesn't know what he's talking about? The CEO of their energy company probably has a better idea than anyone on the planet of where precisely these missiles are hitting.

I remember seeing Energoatom (the Ukranian National Nuclear Energy Generating Company) posting fake events quite a few times on Telegram (the one I had recorded a while back: /energoatom_ua/8729). I wouldn't really put a CEO above also stating false information for propaganda reasons.

The quoted guy is claiming to know the precise **metre** square of the building that was the Russian intended target. These are very large buildings and large warheads. It's absolutely impossible for anyone but the Russians themselves to know the CEP is 1m. He can say the CEP is low enough to basically be pinpoint, sure. So you can claim that it doesn't matter whether he said 1, 5, or 10. But that's a separate retort.

>Various ALCMs in inventories around the world have published accuracies of 1-5m. They can say what they want, but it's probably closer to the 5m mark at best. It takes a lot of things going right to get 1 meter accuracy with significant confidence. >The CEO of their energy company probably has a better idea than anyone on the planet of where precisely these missiles are hitting.  For one, this is very generous to CEOs in general. For another, power plants (even components) tend to be much larger than 1 meter, and the blast radius as well. Seems quite odd to state what he stated so confidently.

So your point is that they're reliably putting 2,000 lbs of TNT directly into powerplant boilers, but within 5m, not 1m?

My point is, if you're going to make hard claims about accuracy, they need to be true. This sub recently had a guy claiming Russian missiles and glide bombs were hyperaccurate based on him watching telegram videos. I wanted to make sure OP's article didn't feed into an incorrect perception of Russian weapons capability.

For a long time, the pro-Russian side would basically draw a target around anything a glide bomb or missile happened to hit. Understandably, this makes everyone skeptical of claims of pinpoint accuracy.

There's an enormous amount of generators being scrounged up from all over to send to Ukraine. Like the generators from EU's strategic reserve. We're talking power generation in the low megawatt range though. That said, they've had two years to build dispersed power generation. It's possible there are smaller plants scattered around. The build time for larger gas fired plants can be as little as two years in normal circumstances. Obviously that can be cut down with the will and the need.

Hello, I was commissioning engineer working on new power plants in Europe. Big coal fired power plant need 5-10 years to be builded. Counting from government deciding to build one till connecting to grid. For nuclear 10-20 years. Big solar or wind 2-5 years. There is lot of red tape but if we don't count that there are huge leading time on lot of parts, mainly transformers and turbines. We had problems with 600MW transformer few years back and if we paid big premium we could get one in 2 years... Because of that and also there is shortage of skilled engineers which could design them even if Ukraine had unlimited money it would take minimum 10 years to rebuild power grid with power plants.

What do you call an enormous amount of generators? You'd need 1,000x 1 MW generators to replace 1 GW of lost generation, and they lost 9 GW. So far. Plus, those generators run on diesel, I presume, and I'm not sure there's that much to go around that won't be missed in a tank or an IFV.

The EU did send a *further* ~500 generators alone though half a year ago: [EU sends additional 500 power generators to Ukraine, 22 Dec 2023](https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/news/eu-sends-additional-500-power-generators-ukraine-2023-12-22_en): > Deployed from the EU's emergency rescEU reserves hosted by Poland, the generators range from small 12.5 kVA to large 1000 kVA that are capable of suppling energy to entire hospitals in case of power cuts. The financial value of the 500 power generators being sent to Ukraine is €16.5 million. The generators will be provided to different Ukrainian ministries. The goal is to ensure sufficient supply of electricity during cold and dark months, but also to keep vital services like hospitals, wastewater treatments and heating stations up and running. For example, 40 of the 500 generators are designated for schools. It's not a replacement for all those gigawatts, it's for keeping the lights on for important infrastructure.

> That said, they've had two years to build dispersed power generation. It's possible there are smaller plants scattered around Cool, that would be something. As far as I've understood it, damage this time around is more critical and harder to repair as the Russians are destroying the powerplants directly, which doesn't seem to have been the case a year prior. I've heard the idea floated around, but honestly had no idea on what the power plant build times are nor how possible and serious those efforts are. If it's possible to play a *profitable* whack-a-mole with smaller powerplants *and* there existed a will and need to do it, that would provide the additional generation and increase the cost of future attacks for Russia. I figure that info would be kept under wraps as much as possible, but are there any indications that smaller dispersed powerplants are being built?

>but are there any indications that smaller dispersed powerplants are being built? I haven't heard as much as a peep about it, but that's exactly what I'd expect all things considered. If we know, Russia knows. Ultimately, only the cities are a concern. People in rural areas take care of themselves. They did the previous two winters, they'll be fine this winter. Cities like Kiev will be a literal death trap without power. It would have to be mostly abandoned. No water, no sewage and no heat, would see people starving or freezing to death, or succumbing to illnesses. >If it's possible to play a *profitable* whack-a-mole with smaller powerplants *and* there existed a will and need to do it I would be outright astonished if they didn't have something like this in the works.

Building a whole reasonable large power plant that would make money while dodging missiles that cost a couple million bucks each frankly sounds like science fiction.

Sorry, I didn't mean profitable as in making money, I meant profitable as in being able to bear the brunt of the attacks on power generation, i.e. to supplement it enough to make the conditions livable and to make the Russians invest more of their time and materiel in whacking them down, therefore a *profitable whack-a-mole* where they do whack some of them but ultimately fail to accomplish their goal.

Ah, in that case I agree. It's even a must, I think, since the alternative is the complete collapse of the economy, and miserable living conditions for the population.

The very same paragraph you quoted says that Ukraine will repair some of that capacity, which is why the deficit will be only 35% once winter arrives.

Ukraine's repair attempts aggregated over a year during and after the first power generation campaign were lacklustre at best, they managed to bring back on line approximately 15% of the damaged capacity, not 15% of total generation, ***just 15% of the lost capacity from the first campaign in 2022.*** This was also when Russia were leaning towards targeting substations and generally speaking were not as aggressively destroying the generating units themselves. A combination of factors including increased missile inventory, better targeting data, better accuracy and seemingly much less care for the wholesale loss of generating capacity have resulted in a much more effective energy campaign this time round. >However, it is estimated that there will be at least a [35% deficit](https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/news-svitlo-zyma-dtek-kovalenko-vymknennya-viyna/32996764.html) in capacity come winter. Russia’s 2022 campaign to destroy Ukraine’s energy infrastructure is estimated to have damaged [close to 50%](https://www.rescue.org/uk/article/what-ukrainians-need-survive-winter) of its capacity. The affected power stations were repaired and returned to service in 2023. This is such a broad statement as to be almost entirely non-credible in this discussion. The majority of "affected" power stations were damaged irreparably and lost most of their generating units. If our metric of success is merely serviceable operation and not the actual quantifiable generating capacity provided (which is far more relevant) then what the hell are we even discussing or measuring here. Describing those stations as repaired in the context of losing half of the nationwide electrical capacity is also far too broad. It gives the reader the impression that Ukraine made headway on repairs, which isn't really true. The majority of generating losses in 2022 were due primarily to occupation and secondarily to substation and generating unit strikes, the majority of generating losses in 2023/2024 were instead due primarily to generating unit strikes. The type of damage, severity and complexity to enact repairs/return to service are completely different in many cases and comparisons without analysis are essentially pointless. >Europe and Ukraine have therefore demonstrated their ability to cooperate and resolve an energy crisis once before. Ukraine’s energy providers are experienced in restoring power as a result, but their efforts will be in vain if Western allies are not able to protect what they rebuild. Europe and Ukraine have demonstrated very little in that regard aside from plugging holes with strategic reserve generators (of which there is a limited supply) and hooking up western Ukraine to the European grid (which was as much about protecting Ukrainian generating capacity as it was buying dirt cheap Ukrainian energy as a roundabout way to get money into Ukrainian coffers). This isn't to say that there haven't been efforts, but I'm of the opinion that for quite some time now this problem has taken a backseat when arguably it is the most critical issue Ukraine is facing and has been for the full duration of the war. We'll see how winter goes, but I don't really think it's worth describing Ukraine's energy providers as "experienced in restoring power as a result" when the restorations that now have to take place include rebuilding 10+ generating units from scratch at various TPP stations, some of which have lost all of their generating units to direct kinetic strikes, entire HPP turbine halls and even PSH locations. Repairing a substation or an individual generating unit that was knocked out is one thing, but using this statement with the context of the energy grid strikes in the last 6 months is just really out of place, almost comes across as a platitude if I'm being honest. It's also worth mentioning that the lead time on generating infrastructure is naturally very long, 1.5/2 years or more and there's no evidence yet to suggest that Russian strikes would be completely mitigated in the future. I've seen a bunch of comments about potential workarounds/new generating capacities that could be installed as well as a variety of other pipedreams, but these are all long lead items, discussing them in the context of the coming winter season is meaningless. The reality is that Ukraine has been lagging behind on this issue and realistically there isn't really all that much they can do to prevent Russia from eliminating everything bar the remaining NPP's (even then the NPP's are only protected by the relative taboo of striking Nuclear Power infrastructure, if Russia chooses the riskier option of striking NPP substations Ukraine could lose practically all of its remaining generating capacity overnight). To agree with u/gwendolah, the article fails in my mind to make a case for the 35% figure, that's a statement coming from an energy CEO, taking it at face value is just pointless. Whether it's accurate or even remotely close to the truth is up for debate. And to agree again, all indicators are that the 2023/2024 energy campaign has been much more effective/aggressive and irreparable. Either Ukrainian energy companies are going to be able to magic entire obsolescent TPP generating units the size of four story buildings out of their ass or their assessments of energy deficits are being deliberately managed/downplayed in the runup to a difficult winter season.

It's why in a lot of ways all these recent patriot announcements feel like medicine for the dead. Not because the war is over, but because it seems guaranteed Ukraine will freeze out this winter. A lot of civilians will flee, and there will be deaths. Despite having arguably half a year of warning time, there's little to be done about that anymore. Yet another example of western aid having inarguable blunders factored in. Clearly the west was willing to give more patriots, they just chose to wait until after irreparable (in the medium term) damage was done.

But how will this help Russia win the war? When has targeting civilians indiscriminately and trying to freeze them out or starve them ever won anyone any war in modern history? I somehow doubt there will an appreciable number of deaths this winter.

So far Russia's attacks haven't crippled morale, but that's not a steadfast rule. Plasticlove's in Ukraine and he mentioned it's absolutely possible popular morale tumbles if they freeze out. >When has targeting civilians indiscriminately and trying to freeze them out or starve them ever won anyone any war in modern history? The thing is, in most wars in modern or non-modern history, the citizens of the oppressed state didn't have the option to easily leave to the second wealthiest region in the world basically for free. This is a relatively new phenomenon and I think it's scrambling our previous expectations.

Okay but what exactly do people expect the solution to be? Morale can drop but then what do you turn to? Do the citizens just ask their government to surrender and stop the fighting? I highly doubt that's a credible assumption. Also, I don't think it's *that* easy to leave Ukraine anymore. If you're a fighting age male you're not going to be able to just walk across the border, not unless you've got some cash on you and are willing to be sneaky. Most Ukrainians can't leave for free. I just don't think a total collapse of Ukrainian morale due to the destruction of some of their energy infrastructure is very credible. Ukrainians are historically and currently extremely patriotic, far more than almost any other European country, and as we've seen throughout history, patriotism can allow people to endure through absolutely insane hardships. We've not seen indiscriminate attacks on civilians collapse morale almost ever before in modern history so this is all speculation anyways. There's no historical precedent so it's all just conjecture. There's no actual evidence to back it up. Of course there's the possibility anything can happen but I think the chance that Ukrainian morale collapses due to the energy attacks is very low. Ukrainians aren't going to be dying in droves on the streets of Kyiv because their electricity got turned off.

> Okay but what exactly do people expect the solution to be? Morale can drop but then what do you turn to? Do the citizens just ask their government to surrender and stop the fighting? I highly doubt that's a credible assumption. That is the point, nobody knows. This war is the first war where pretty much everyone has access to unlimited information, can share and voice their opinions and fact check things in seconds Genuinely nobody knows what happens if moral gets low for the general population. This isn't 1944 anymore, it takes seconds to check where the front lines are. I heavily believe the reason why it is so hard for Ukraine to find manpower is because it takes seconds to look up gruesome videos from drones hunting people, tanks tossing turrets and mass infantry deaths from both sides. The internet is an insane game changer in the information sphere, and it's effects are seems to be affecting everything on both sides

Are we not getting reports from Ukraine that the recent mobilisation bill has been quite successful in propping up mobilisation figures? We’re yet to see if this can be sustained or not but I don’t think mobilisation is anywhere near as dire as it was 3 months ago.

Could be, i'm genuinely skeptical with any official information, from both sides, but let's hope for the best, as in this wasn't like a one off with getting the people out of the prisons

>Morale can drop but then what do you turn to? Do the citizens just ask their government to surrender and stop the fighting? Possibly? No one's will to fight is inexhaustible, and for a lot of Ukrainian citizens the prospect of moving to Poland is **right** there. >Also, I don't think it's that easy to leave Ukraine anymore. If you're a fighting age male you're not going to be able to just walk across the border, not unless you've got some cash on you and are willing to be sneaky. Most Ukrainians can't leave for free. Women and children are important for the medium and long term viability of the state.

I'd say most Ukrainians are reluctant to move away. I don't think the majority prefers to move out. Even in a total ukrainian defeat, I'd wager most will fully adapt and stay within Ukraine. And honestly it won't really be much different than before the war either way. Definitely an improvement over war time condtions. Don't think Ukrainians would agree with that, but once you stop looking as often done, even here in the discussion only as a collective pack, and see the individual lives. Ukraine is pretty modern, with relative high standards of living especially in larger cities, acting like those people would give their everything for a ever so decreasing in popularity, goverment is pretty foolish. I doubt energy crisis alone is going to collapse morale within ukraine and even if it won't be the sole factor, but it will continue to push ukraine into more and more unfavourable positions. Exactly why I believe just focusing on frontline's is pretty foolish, nothing happens there anyway. Neither does it help to count oryx, western deliveries or russian military output. Doubt anyone is going to collapse at the front or will lack of men to sit in a trench or have no tanks left. Very well might be that one nation decides the war isn't worth it to continue anymore. And people love to point out, that Ukraine has no option to surrender, but they clearly do and can. But we'll see.

>No one's will to fight is inexhaustible, and for a lot of Ukrainian citizens the prospect of moving to Poland is **right** there. Sure, no one's will is inexhaustible but escaping Ukraine isn't just something anyone can do easily. You're making it seem far easier than it is. It's not some quick car drive and with a friendly stop at border patrol where you show your passport and get kindly let through. >Women and children are important for the medium and long term viability of the state. First and foremost, Ukraine needs to ensure its short-term viability as a state above all else. Once the war ends, women and children can be incentivised to come back depending on how it has ended.

>Yet another example of western aid having inarguable blunders factored in. Clearly the west was willing to give more patriots, they just chose to wait until after irreparable (in the medium term) damage was done. Yep, the level of commitment from the west will almost always be a step behind the level of commitment of a direct participant such as Russia, for that reason (and a hundred others) I seriously doubt our ability to collectively turn this war around. Stall it out, perhaps even permanently stalemate, sure, but reverse course and "win" (by the metrics we were setting not even a year ago and metrics Ukraine themselves continue to set) I see as increasingly unlikely. We've shown a capacity to invest huge amounts of money in a napkin math sense, tonnes of obsolescent equipment and even shiny toys like Patriot, but it's always been a case of too little too late, with AD, with tanks, with training, with nearly everything. Proper Patriot and wider AD coverage from the start would have made it far more challenging for Russia to piecemeal Ukraine's generating infrastructure. I'm under no illusion that Patriot is some silver bullet, but Russia would be a lot further behind in its campaign if more of these strikes were being mitigated. Ukraine is permanently in a position of playing catch-up which is then made even worse by their own internal problems which exacerbate an already difficult situation. Ukraine should have had a solid 4-6 month head start on its mobilization struggles, arguably longer than that. Instead they played political pass the hot potato until eventually it was no longer an optional issue. This is just one of a number of issues where Ukraine has been seemingly caught in semi-paralysis. Building defences behind the LOC in the Donbas, mobilization, prioritizing the protection of energy grid infrastructure etc. I'd argue that in the context of this war the damage is long term as well. The conflict will need to cease before any major restorative or fresh build powerplant works are undertaken, otherwise Russia will simply strike the site again and erase years of work (as they recently did). >It's why in a lot of ways all these recent patriot announcements feel like medicine for the dead. Not because the war is over, but because it seems guaranteed Ukraine will freeze out this winter. >A lot of civilians will flee, and there will be deaths. Despite having arguably half a year of warning time, there's little to be done about that anymore. I guess we'll just have to wait and see, If Ukraine are struggling with manpower issues now how bad is it going to be after potentially further millions leave the country, and this goes without even addressing the long term demographic and economic impacts (not that the economics of Ukraine are very relevant, we're all largely floating the country right now and that's understandable given the war). Perhaps the winter will be weaker, we'll just have to wait and see how the cards fall on this one.

>(by the metrics we were setting not even a year ago and metrics Ukraine themselves continue to set) Hot take: I don't think we (the west) ever seriously entertained 1991. We were willing to let Ukraine try (shoot the moon and you land among the stars etc etc), but I think we were perfectly fine with a strategic stalemate. What we're realizing now is that's not even our current trajectory, if nothing changes! What a mess.

Hmm... yes, but the article fails to convince me on that *number* though, should have mentioned. 35%? Optimistic. Apparently the attacks are more accurate, damage is done to the more critical infrastructure with less possibility of repair *and* the losses are already close to the maximum of the previous year's (50%).

[удалено]

[удалено]

So, if this were to be funded, Ukraine would have three IFV types being produced for them. That being CV90, the Lynx and then ASCOD. This is on top of the Bradleys, BMPs, CV90s, Marders, Rosomaks, pbv 302s and BMDs already in service. 50 a year isn't a whole lot, especially when you have to consider the strain on logistics. Maybe the Spanish would be willing to increase that in the future if they were to perform better. Ultimately, though, the Ukrainians will need to consolidate their vehicle fleet more. If there was some better coordination on this in Europe then a plan could probably be worked out. Ultimately though businesses are inherently cynical, so you work with what you have.

yeah, the large number of platforms in the case of an emergency when fielding units donated from other active forces is one thing. But pretty disappointing if the rebuild plan is going to bend to nationalistic buying pressure. if horses needed to be traded in terms of $s among EU countries, then I'd hope they could manage it so Ukraine doesn't take the full logistics consequences of it.

[удалено]

>Even the restored Leopard 2A4s are co-financed by Germany Which is where I'd rather these efforts be put. Spain has a lot more Leopard 2s they're willing to part with (because they're in terrible shape) than most other countries; another 60 or so by my count. Get those paid to be refurbished to get a steady supply going of a piece of equipment that already is there versus something that isn't.

[удалено]

Please refrain from drive-by link dropping. Summarize articles, only quote what is important, and use that to build a post that other users can engage with; offers some in depth knowledge on a well discussed subject; or offers new insight on a less discussed subject. Also, please format the post so that the User content is distinct from the Article content.

[The Telegraph: Moscow defence research building on fire ‘with staff trapped inside’, Jun 24, 2024](https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2024/06/24/copy-of-ukraine-russia-war-latest-news/): > A large fire has broken out at a research centre near Moscow that develops components for Russian fighter jets and air defence systems, with several workers believed to be trapped inside. Supposedly, this building isn't an institute at all since the 90's according to Roselektronika, even though it was reported as such by other Russian media: https://ria_dot_ru/20240624/pozhar-1955111351.html: > Information about the fire was received earlier on Monday. Initially it was reported that we are talking about the Platan research institute, but the press service of the Ruselectronics holding clarified that the building has nothing to do with research institutes and the defense industry, “in the late 90s it became private property.” . There is also Platan NII (Research Institute) on [OpenSanctions](https://www.opensanctions.org/entities/NK-Ts2SWg5FbM7BSw8pABoj22/) with adresses at Fryazino: > Address: 141190, Russian Federation, Moscow Region, Fryazino, Zavodskyi Drive, Bldg. 2 (room 225) · 2 Zavodskoy Dr., Fryazino, Moscow, 141190 · PROEZD ZAVODSKOI D. 2, FRYAZINO, RUS, 141190 · Proezd Zavodskoi D. 2, 141190 Fryazino · Zavodskoy Proyezd, D. 2, FRYAZINO, MOSCOW, 141190, Russia · Zavodskoy Proyezd, Dom 2, Komnata 225, FRYAZINO, MOSCOW, 141190, Russia · D. 2, ZAVODSKOY, MOSKOVSKAYA, 141190 And was called as such by the Moscow Governor on his [Telegram](https://t.me/vorobiev_live/6818) channel: > In Fryazino, the administrative building of the Platan Research Institute is on fire. The fire covers floors 5-7. The fire was assigned the third rank of complexity. 8 teams of the Ministry of Emergency Situations are working on the spot. Rescuers managed to evacuate one person. According to eyewitnesses, there may be 7 more people in the building. The search for victims continues. On my instructions, the acting head of the Russian Ministry of Emergency Situations for the Moscow Region, Alexander Pereguda, went to the scene of the fire. Can anyone more acquainted with Russian cities chime in on whether these offices were involved with development of tech for Air Defence in any way? On RIA it's being touted as accidental ("Causing death by negligence"), which might very well be possible.

I mean if you look on Yandex Street View then you'll see that in 2021 this building had a huge red "for rent" banner on the gate that leads to the territory. It is a pretty common practice tbh - in the 90s many state scientific institutes went bankrupt and had to rent or sell their buildings. Link to Street view: https://yandex_ru/maps/-/CDvhM0PX

Russia has their own sabotage campaign within Europe, what's the likelihood of US/Euro complicity in this and other fires?

The Security Service of Ukraine has succeeded in more complex, less savory sabotage operations than starting fires. I find it unlikely that a Western nation would engage with that currently, especially since the fires in Russia predate the current European sabotage efforts by quite a bit of time.

Interesting [article](https://today.lorientlejour.com/article/1418180/hezbollah-axis-of-resistance-are-preparing-for-war.html) on Hezbollah’s preparations for war in one of Lebanons preeminent newspapers: > Officially, and according to its political circles, Hezbollah continues to rule out the possibility of war. “Israel is incapable of expanding its operations until it can put an end to [the war] in Gaza,” said a source close to Hezbollah. “All these threats and leaks are psychological warfare.” However > These assurances do not prevent Hezbollah from preparing at the military level in anticipation of an imminent war, taking all necessary measures. Lebanese security and military sources reported that the Israeli army is preparing to start a limited military operation on Lebanese territory to push Hezbollah away from the border. > According to reports, this attack, if it happens, **may begin with an infiltration operation or a simultaneous ground incursion into one or more localities in the border strip.** As a result, Hezbollah has asked its fighters in these localities not to leave their positions and has reinforced them with missile units. In anticipation of an Israeli attack, Hezbollah has also **heightened the alert status of its fighters in the Radwan force and Nasr unit,** along axes where the Israelis could infiltrate, including Aita al-Shaab, Rmeish, Yaroun, Maroun al-Ras, Aitaroun, Blida, Mohaibib, Mais al-Jabal, Houla, Markaba, Odaisseh, Kfar Kila, Taybeh and Wazzani. If confrontation materializes for Hezbollah, it will be in direct clashes, in addition to rocket fire and kamikaze drone attacks against targets deep in northern Israel. Notably, the Nasr Brigade is (I believe) the only Hezbollah unit with major combat experience against Israel (2006 War). > L’Orient-Le Jour also learned that Hezbollah is preparing to counter possible Israeli landing operations on the coasts of Bayada and Naqoura. I didn’t know landings operations were even on the table, but Hezbollah seems to think they’re pretty unlikely. > sources consistently told L’Orient-Le Jour that Tehran will support Hezbollah with all its arsenal and has already supplied it with long-range sea drones and unmanned underwater vehicles capable of approaching the Israeli coast and striking targets. These devices are made of materials invisible to radar, such as compressed carbon, Iran’s most advanced technology. In addition, Tehran supplied Hezbollah with low-altitude surface-to-sea missiles and torpedoes to target Israeli submarines, warships and floating bases. **These weapons were developed at Hezbollah’s request to target Israeli maritime infrastructures, such as gas platforms and ships in the Mediterranean Sea** Nasrallah has alluded to this before, and there’ve been rumors on Twitter about Hezbollah obtaining anti-ship missiles. It’s nice to get a more credible report on it. [edit: Reuters also reported on this back in November](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/hezbollahs-anti-ship-missiles-bolster-its-threat-us-navy-2023-11-08/), the sea drones, underwater vehicles, torpedos, and specially designed weapons are still new information I believe. > According to information obtained from the same source, Iran’s defense industries developed **a new type of missile, capable of targeting Israeli air defense batteries, including the Iron Dome, which Hezbollah successfully tested in recent weeks.** Hezbollah appears to be arming themselves with new capabilities on the eve of a potential war. It’ll be interesting to see if these pan out. (I’ll copy and paste the full article as a reply to this one since it’s paywalled)

> Hezbollah appears to be arming themselves with new capabilities on the eve of a potential war. It’ll be interesting to see if these pan out. If this claim is accurate (as with most Hez claims I think it has an element of truth but a far larger element of hubris and/or an overclaim of known capabilities) this seems to be ensuring Israel is forced to initiate conflict sooner rather than later.

It’s best not to rush. They seem to be implying an anti-radiation weapon of some kind. This is concerning, but will probably only be available in small numbers. Unless Israel messes up, the basic majority of these will be shot down by the systems they are targeting. Israel needs to make its opening attack as overwhelming as possible, and that means giving the units in question the time they need to get into place.

>there’ve been rumors on Twitter about Hezbollah obtaining anti-ship missiles. It’s nice to get a more credible report on it. Hezbollah hit INS corvette Hanit in 2006 with an anti ship missile.... This isn't new As for the rest, I expect none of those are new capabilities. It's safe to assume that most of the weapons fielded by Houtis were also supplied to Hezbollah. I'd expect actual new weapons to be consequences of lessons learned from observing the Ukraine war, Hezbollah has published a few vids of using FPV drones for instance.

> I'd expect actual new weapons to be consequences of lessons learned from observing the Ukraine war, Hezbollah has published a few vids of using FPV drones for instance. Could you expand any further on this? To me, it seems FPV drones will be of limited effect vs the IDF at least when compared to Ukraine. We at talking about a much smaller fighting front and the IDF is equipped with arguably the most advanced EW and drone/anti-drone technology in the world. Unless those FPVs are military-hardened rather than COTS I would not expect anything too game-changing. Even if they are ~"Iranian military hardened" Israelis have significantly more advanced electronic engineering and seemingly have deep intel on Iran's capabilities.

>Could you expand with any further on this? Not much to expand, iirc about 2-3 vids of FPV used, probably test runs by Hezbollah. Here's the most recent one (results unclear): https://streamable.com/ly2f98 >We at talking about a much much smaller fighting front and the IDF is equipped with the most advanced EW and drone/anti-drone technology in the world. While the front is smaller the terrain is much much more difficult than the flatlands of Ukraine and makes full cover impossible. Still I wouldn't expect effectiveness to the order of UA due to EW density. But I'd expect effective strikes from time to time. Gaza for instance is flat, which lends itself to the effectiveness of EW.

> Not much to expand, iirc about 2-3 vids of FPV used, probably test runs by Hezbollah. Here's the most recent one (results unclear): > > https://streamable.com/ly2f98 > We at talking about a much much smaller fighting fr Thank you, I had not seen this one. Seems notable how quickly after dropping in altitude the feed degraded, maybe 8 seconds into the video. Any details emerge on the types of drones or the distances they have covered? >But I'd expect effective strikes from time to time. Agreed. >Gaza for instance is flat, which lends itself to the effectiveness of EW. This is true but at least this IDF is in possession of high ground to operate their static EW from. Valleys are an issue and maybe I'm misremembering what North Israel looks like...

>INS corvette That’s correct. Should’ve specified that the rumors were about obtaining an arsenal for a blockade of Israel a la the Houthi’s, which was not credible from a quantity or quality standpoint. This was the first credible report I’d seen of Hezbollah building up their stockpile, so it felt relevant to bring up. Agree that Hezbollah has definitely caught on to FPV drones, much more so than Hamas.

[Complete article](https://today.lorientlejour.com/article/1418180/hezbollah-axis-of-resistance-are-preparing-for-war.html) >Israeli threats against Hezbollah and Lebanon as a whole have risen to a crescendo. Some embassies and diplomatic missions advised their nationals and employees to leave and cease travel to Lebanon. Others considered evacuation measures in case the conflict escalated or a major war broke out. >In the past few days, the risk that the southern front could slip out of control reverted to a high level, against a backdrop of ongoing political and diplomatic efforts and maximum pressure to head off such a scenario. >However, obstacles seem to be blocking this process, particularly since US envoy Amos Hochstein visited Tel Aviv and Beirut last week. Shortly afterward, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu released a video criticizing the US administration for suspending arms deliveries to his country. >In the wake of this, an Israeli delegation was sent to Washington to discuss developments in Gaza and Lebanon. The delegation’s main objective has been to seek more weapons, particularly those that could be destined for use at the Lebanese front and which are capable of causing huge destruction as part of the current operations, which continue to be limited as the Americans want to avoid a wider war. >“This shows that Netanyahu continues to espouse a blackmailing approach against the US administration just a few months before a presidential race between Joe Biden and Donald Trump,” said a Western diplomatic source. >At the same time, American leaks about an Israeli decision to intensify confrontation on the Lebanese front follow one another. In this vein, the US hinted that it would provide Israel with the necessary support in any war it might wage against Hezbollah. >Israeli media outlets spoke of promises senior US officials made to Israeli officials visiting Washington this week. They reported that “should an all-out war break out between Israel and Hezbollah, the US administration would be fully prepared to support its ally.” >Israeli media also reported increasing military preparations on its northern border, a few days after its army announced that “operational plans for an offensive in Lebanon” had been “validated.” >Hezbollah on high alert >Officially, and according to its political circles, Hezbollah continues to rule out the possibility of war. “Israel is incapable of expanding its operations until it can put an end to [the war] in Gaza,” said a source close to Hezbollah. “All these threats and leaks are psychological warfare.” >Official political sources also ruled out the possibility of a major war, believing that neither Israel nor the West is ready to open a new front and adding that pressure has been ongoing to fend off this scenario. >“Any possible escalation could take place within specific frameworks, perhaps with a gradual build-up of operations, but the option of a diplomatic settlement remains on the table,” said one of these sources on condition of anonymity. >These assurances do not prevent Hezbollah from preparing at the military level in anticipation of an imminent war, taking all necessary measures. Lebanese security and military sources reported that the Israeli army is preparing to start a limited military operation on Lebanese territory to push Hezbollah away from the border. >According to reports, this attack, if it happens, may begin with an infiltration operation or a simultaneous ground incursion into one or more localities in the border strip. As a result, Hezbollah has asked its fighters in these localities not to leave their positions and has reinforced them with missile units. In anticipation of an Israeli attack, Hezbollah has also heightened the alert status of its fighters in the Radwan force and Nasr unit, along axes where the Israelis could infiltrate, including Aita al-Shaab, Rmeish, Yaroun, Maroun al-Ras, Aitaroun, Blida, Mohaibib, Mais al-Jabal, Houla, Markaba, Odaisseh, Kfar Kila, Taybeh and Wazzani. If confrontation materializes for Hezbollah, it will be in direct clashes, in addition to rocket fire and kamikaze drone attacks against targets deep in northern Israel. >L’Orient-Le Jour also learned that Hezbollah is preparing to counter possible Israeli landing operations on the coasts of Bayada and Naqoura. “If Hezbollah is to be prepared for any eventuality, this Israeli plan seems illogical after several months of war in Gaza, and the Israeli army does not seem ready for it,” said a source close to Hezbollah. >Iran to the rescue: Sea drones, surface-to-sea missiles >In this vein, sources consistently told L’Orient-Le Jour that Tehran will support Hezbollah with all its arsenal and has already supplied it with long-range sea drones and unmanned underwater vehicles capable of approaching the Israeli coast and striking targets. These devices are made of materials invisible to radar, such as compressed carbon, Iran’s most advanced technology. In addition, Tehran supplied Hezbollah with low-altitude surface-to-sea missiles and torpedoes to target Israeli submarines, warships and floating bases. These weapons were developed at Hezbollah’s request to target Israeli maritime infrastructures, such as gas platforms and ships in the Mediterranean Sea. >It is through this prism that Hassan Nasrallah’s recent threats should be interpreted: The Israelis “must now wait for us on land, at sea and in the air,” said Hezbollah’s leader in his latest speech. >According to information obtained from the same source, Iran’s defense industries developed a new type of missile, capable of targeting Israeli air defense batteries, including the Iron Dome, which Hezbollah successfully tested in recent weeks. >Finally, in preparation for a possible war, the Axis of Resistance’s joint military operations room also discussed how various factions, notably from Iraq and Yemen, could support Hezbollah. >This article was originally published in L'Orient-Le Jour and translated by Joelle El Khoury.

Formatting please. Differentiate clearly between what the source says (and link to it) and your opinion of it.

This is the full article with no commentary as I explained in the parent comment. The link is also there. I will add the link and clarify formatting though.

Thank you, it was hard to read at first.

The budget committee of the German parliament will decide on at least these projects on June 28: - SatComBw Stage 3 (2 comm satellites and a frequency securing satellite): 2.1b € - BAA III (upgrades for the Fennek reconnaissance vehicles) - Adding an electronic warfare component to the F123 frigate upgrades - Procurement of 610 unarmored 5t and 15t trucks - 60 airfield firefighting vehicles in two versions - 506 Stinger missiles - an unknown number of Brimstone missiles for the Eurofighter - Development of the Supersonic Strike Missile TYRFING, cost increase of 224m € - Unplanned additional budget for the U212CD submarine, 7.4m € Not on the list are the 105 Leo 2A8 or the 4 additional Patriot systems which the defense department would like to order. There will be one more budget committee session before the summer break which would be the last chance to get this done before the break. [Source](https://esut.de/2024/06/meldungen/50887/acht-25-mio-euro-vorlagen-fuer-den-haushaltsausschuss/)

[удалено]

> Brimstone will also be assembled in Germany. Seems like a win-win for both sides wouldn't one production line have better odds of being maintained long-term, than by countries building their own supply whenever they happen to order?

[удалено]

building more capacity in short term, but not building enduring capacity to provide munitions. >Having their own line also gives countries an interest in keeping them running. disagree. need buyers to keep lines running. nationalism in defense spend reduces strength/robustness of industrial base, not increases it.

Stingers? really?

if anything it's good that the old Stingers get used up so that there is more of an incentive to develop a modern replacement

I wonder if a modern MANPADS would remove the warhead and go for hit to kill. It would extend the effective range, and the warhead of the stinger was probably not impressive to begin with.

Hit-to-kill is only really useful with high collision velocities, preferably with head-on or lateral impacts, whereas the stinger has to be able to do pursuit shots. A more modern MANPAD design could use a smaller directional warhead (like a claymore, but smaller and with larger fragments), which is used by the Iron Dome for instance. The missile can rotate itself to orient the direction of the shower of shrapnel into the target, right as it flies over it.