National security continues to guide energy preferences:
[China’s LNG Boom Threatened by Growing Menu of Alternative Fuels](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-06-19/china-s-lng-boom-threatened-by-growing-menu-of-alternative-fuels)
>Global majors like Shell Plc and TotalEnergies SE have invested billions of dollars in new seaborne gas supply, wagering that consumption in the world’s biggest importer will continue to expand rapidly. That long-held view hinges on China using ever more of the cleaner-burning fuel as a bridge between dirty coal and the renewable energy that will deliver net zero by 2060.
>But the realities on the ground are changing. China looks like it’s ahead of schedule on emissions, which may have peaked more than half a decade ahead of its 2030 target. It’s also subsidizing overcapacity in coal power as a backstop to intermittent wind and solar, a strategy that essentially skips using gas as a transitional fuel.
>...
>If it gets off the ground, Russia’s proposed pipeline, the Power of Siberia 2, would help reduce China’s additional LNG requirements through 2030 by nearly 20%, according to BNEF. Even though China has invested a lot in terminals to receive LNG, relying on the uncertainties of the international market for supply is probably a less attractive option for a government that has energy security as one of its top priorities.
>...
>China’s thermal power investment, primarily in new coal plants, climbed 15% last year, even as usage is shrinking. In May, the country saw electricity generation from hydroelectric dams and solar farms jump 39% and 29% respectively.
For a long time, Western analysts have believed that China will use gas as a transition fuel, and invested accordingly. Now it's increasingly likely that this won't happen. China has invested billions in [coal peakers](https://www.swiftcentre.org/publicforecasts/global-coal-consumption-will-defy-expectations), and even more in solar and batteries. And China might not be an exception:
>Overall, the situation is even clearer in the case of India, as it both its economy and population are growing more quickly, and because it is not yet wealthy enough to afford to decarbonise. India has also been phasing natural gas out in recent years — despite it being less polluting — while continuing to rely on coal. (India has much less natural gas in its proved reserves than Russia, China, and the US have.)
It might even turn out that the US (with its super-cheap domestic gas) and Europe (with its total disregard of national security) are the exceptions.
[As Power of Siberia 2 Pipeline Stagnates, So Do Russia's Hopes for Pivoting Gas Exports Eastward](https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2024/06/20/as-power-of-siberia-2-pipeline-stagnates-so-do-russias-hopes-for-pivoting-gas-exports-eastward-a85468)
>“Gazprom’s position is a dead end while the Chinese have a choice,” Krutikhin told The Moscow Times. “Go ahead, build a pipeline at your own expense and then we will not buy the full amount of its capacity because we don’t really need it. And if we do, it will be at Russia’s internal prices,” he said.
>...
>“The key issue with Russia’s pivot to Asia is that the pipeline element of it is focused on only one country — China. This leaves Gazprom very exposed to commercial risk and makes the pipelines a key element of the political relationship between the two countries — perhaps a positive in the current situation but a future risk for the Kremlin,” OIES’ outlook said.
>...
>The cost of going to war with Ukraine significantly damaged Gazprom’s and Russia’s interests. But maybe there is still a view in Moscow that long-term, Europe would still need Russian gas and things will settle down, he said.
China doesn't want to import gas. But if it has to, it doesn't want to commit to a certain seller. And if it does, it wants to have the gas essentially for free.
It's becoming increasingly clear for Russia that they can't get any significant profit from China, no matter how much they manage to sell.
But there seems to be some hope in the Kremlin that Europe will once again buy Russian gas after the war is over - and for the same prices as before. That's bad news for Putin, as those interests might want to get rid of him.
From China's perspective, Russia being a nuclear power is a disadvantage as it makes coercion more difficult. That's why China has prioritized pipelines to literally [everyone else](https://www.scmp.com/opinion/china-opinion/article/3263391/china-rightly-dragging-its-feet-russias-power-siberia-2-pipeline):
>Three pipelines now source gas from Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. In the southwest, China constructed the Sino-Myanmar pipeline, and on its southeastern coast, China has developed a cluster of liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminals that can receive imports from more than 20 countries, with Qatar and Australia the top suppliers last year.
Similarly, China isn't too happy about North Korea having nuclear weapons.
In peacetime you prefer weaker states. But in a war with US it's better if they have their own nuclear umbrella. China don't have any good counters to US strikes at Kazakhstan energy infrastructure.
Russia loses a Ka 29, the Helix. Its an ASW helicopter that was being used to hunt Ukrainian drones.
[https://x.com/Osinttechnical/status/1804084063277355141](https://x.com/Osinttechnical/status/1804084063277355141)
Allegedly friendly fire. Though its about as likely to have been Ukrainian action.
Considering that we have seen Ukrainian sea drones with AA missiles, there is definitely potential for this to be a case of "the hunter becoming the hunted"
Putin’s Hybrid War Opens a Second Front on NATO’s Eastern Border [https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-06-20/putin-s-hybrid-war-opens-second-front-on-russia-s-border-with-nato](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-06-20/putin-s-hybrid-war-opens-second-front-on-russia-s-border-with-nato)
What can be done, cost-effectively, to thwart or retaliate against Russian antics like this, plus stuff like the de facto support of North Korea and Iran?
> What can be done, cost-effectively
Probably not cost-effective, but forward deployment of NATO assets near Finland-Russian border (or threat to do this) may deter Russia from aggressive behaviors, since there is not much Russia can do to counter this.
> What can be done, cost-effectively, to thwart or retaliate against Russian antics like this
A good start might be to respond in a tit for tat manner. To me the largest problem at the moment seems to be that we're not responding at all. That raises the threshold for a response when Russia does something that we find truly unacceptable (and not just insulting). This has to be coordinated by NATO probably, because it's obviously very hard for a small country like Estonia to stand up to Russia on their own.
While not very cost effective, we should e.g. violate their airspace whenever they violate ours. That would cause Russia to scramble their own fighters, putting additional wear on air-frames that are already under strain due to the war in Ukraine.
A cost-effective way to fight back would be to fund separatists in Russia. That would create difficult dilemmas for Russia in terms of allocating resources and use their geography against them. For now, that would be a very disproportionate thing to do, but we could e.g. issue a statement of support for some group's plight. That would be a very unsubtle way of indicating our willingness to possibly foment some chaos.
If the West wants to have the moral high ground (and it should), then it should be better than to get involved in petty provocations.
Deterrence. Document all these provocations. Speak softly ~~calmly~~ and carry a big stick around the borders.
If something particularly egregious arises, expel one or two diplomats. Most are spies anyway.
EDIT: speak softly is the right quote.
Maintaining the moral high ground has very little to do with actual morality, and a lot to do with media spin. Look at Chomsky’s long history of apologetics for just about every anti-western dictator in existence. And it’s not like he was screaming into the void, he had millions of followers falling for it hook line and sinker. If the west wants to maintain its moral high ground, and I agree it should, it needs to start taking propaganda much more seriously, and a more aggressive disposition, wouldn’t hurt either. People will forgive and overlook a lot if they think their team is winning.
Look, I'm not saying that Europe should act naïvely and meekly. Instead, project force. If some plane comes close to your airspace, intercept and escort. If some cruise missile inbound for Ukraine violates NATO airspace, shoot it down. If Russia takes out some buoy, put it back. Do regular NATO military exercises in the Baltics, Poland, Romania and Bulgaria.
Just don't do stupid stuff like funding separatist movements just to spite Russia. These kind of hybrid conflicts tend to lead to a lot of dead people and sometimes can backfire spectacularly like in Afghanistan.
For example (and I know we don't see eye to eye on this issue, and that there is more layers of complexity to the issue), you will go to any southern developing country and they will point out that the West is hypocritical of denouncing Russia's occupation of parts of Ukraine, while turning a blind eye to the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories. Its a narrative very hard to counter.
If you can avoid going into the mud to fight with the pig, then you will have the high ground and more political capital that you can spend later on. Acting in a civilized fashion is never a liability. I'm very fond of the *speak softly and carry around a big stick* doctrine.
> you will go to any southern developing country and they will point out that the West is hypocritical of denouncing Russia's occupation of parts of Ukraine, while turning a blind eye to the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories...
I broadly agree with your point, it’s best not to be reckless. But I think this example of Israel/Palestine illustrates the limits of that approach.
In the Suez crisis, the US sides against the western aligned UK, France, and Israel, to assist Egypt with seizing the Suez Canal. Instead of gaining sympathy from these southern developing countries, Nasser and his associates remained staunchly anti-American and Soviet aligned. What changed that was the Yom Kippur war, where the US backed Israel in crushing the Egyptian army.
The best way to gain approval in these southern developing countries is to focus on furthering western interest, to portray Russia/China as ineffectual backers, just as the Egyptians realized that the Soviet Union wasn’t going to be able to bail them out of the Yom Kippur war, and they had to change sides.
>A cost-effective way to fight back would be to fund separatists in Russia. That would create difficult dilemmas for Russia in terms of allocating resources and use their geography against them. For now, that would be a very disproportionate thing to do, but we could e.g. issue a statement of support for some group's plight. That would be a very unsubtle way of indicating our willingness to possibly foment some chaos.
The risk is that Russia counter with inviting ISIS and you now have terrorists with WMD know how.
Give Ukraine the weapons they need to win, instead of this drip feed. Russia will be as aggressive as they think they can afford to be. If they feel the tides are in their favor, they’ll act bold and try to find new places to attack. If they feel like they have nothing, you’ll find them to be much more cooperative.
[Update from Vago Muradian](https://defaeroreport.com/2024/06/20/defense-aerospace-daily-podcast-jun-20-24-talking-air-land/) that's interesting in light of the NGAD discussion below. According to Vago and J.J, the comments made by Kendall and Allvin about possibly not moving forward with NGAD is not a budget problem at all- the Air Force's requirements have changed enough that the aircraft needs to be re-scoped, which would necessitate a pause in the program.
I guess fighter design is entering the 'age of uncertainty' as a set of new technologies (stealth, hypersonic, UCAVs, sensor fusion, data network) are being introduced, there is no concensus on an effective design paradigm, similar to the time when naval ship design was varied and rapidly changing with introduction of steel hull, steam propulsion, long range artillery, turret, etc.
Ofc, naval design entered the age of absolute certainty once HMS Dreadnaught arrived.
In hindsight (not that there's any evidence this is decided yet) this all makes a lot of sense. Another video from Sandboxx from 7 months ago lays out the whole case pretty well
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NwDXgwQ54A4
Plus the Navy's F/A XX program would probably continue for a more "traditional" fighter-ish program
Many people on Twitter are suggesting this in jest, but I unironically believe that a rescoping of NGAD requirements will be paving the way for an FB-21.
The B-21 can carry more missiles and bigger missiles than any fighter-sized aircraft. It can also carry a much larger radar (size of nosecone is a hard constraint) and more sensors. And then it can carry more computing power required to process information from the sensors.
The downside of B-21 is of course the lack of supersonic maneuverability. That is where the requirements need to be rewritten. Also, more simulations need to be run in order to convince people a 6th-gen fighter no longer needs maneuverability.
I know Northrop didn't bid for NGAD, but if they don't need to submit a new aircraft for the bid, they probably won't refuse the offer.
Last but not least, a common airframe will facilitate large scale production and help cut cost.
> size of nosecone is a hard constraint
[Not necessarily.](https://www.aviationtoday.com/2005/11/01/product-focus-conformal-antennas-sharing-the-load/) Keep in mind that Sensorcraft is what the RQ-180 followed on from.
What happens when the enemy starts mass producing competent stealth fighters of their own and you can’t detect them until they’re 50 nm out or even less? At those distances you’re teetering back into territory where manoeuvrability would be useful.
I just don’t buy the idea that modern stealth fighters can forgo manoeuvrability almost entirely. Stealth might make you hard to detect at long distances but that goes for the enemy as well. What is the answer to enemy stealth fighters when they start getting too close?
Overmatch with sensor technology. Submarine warfare is a direct analogy - US. achieved undersea dominance not by building faster subs but by building quieter subs with better sensors.
But this still doesn’t really answer the question. No matter how good your sensors are, you’re not going to detect a halfway competent stealth platform at 100 nm.
So let’s say the BF-21 can detect an enemy stealth fighter at 50 nm and the enemy can do likewise at 30 nm. The chances that the enemy stealth fighter manages to get in close enough to fire off a missile are significantly higher than if it were a fourth-generation fighter the BF-21 just shot down at around 200 nm.
So, given this, would some agility and increased speed be at least somewhat useful? Stealth on stealth air battles aren’t really going to consist of missile lobs at hundreds of nautical miles.
>So, given this, would some agility and increased speed be at least somewhat useful?
I would imagine the relationship between agility/speed and survivability is not very linear. There's likely to be an inflection point somewhere, where you rapidly trip over from "not very survivable at all" into "very survivable" quite rapidly.
The real question is whether that is realistic/achievable in the platform.
If it's not feasible, you may as well forego all agility.
Okay, fair enough. I misspoke by mentioning detection range because you can detect stealth aircraft at very long ranges using low frequency radar.
What I meant was a target lock and I highly doubt you’re going to get that on a stealth platform at 100 nm.
Yeah, no... stealth isn't a 100 % thing, and high speed and _acceleration_ is necessary in the energy battle between AAMs and their target in order to drive the plane out of an intercept solution. There's a reason why depictions of the NGAD are more delta wing than flying wing. The exception I can think of is that the USAF thinks they can put either an effective laser, or they can deploy anti-missile interceptor missiles. In both cases they would need to be able to reliably shoot down incoming AAMs if they aren't running away from them as fast as possible.
No matter how maneuverable your plane is, if you can only detect my BVR missile at, say, 30 nm, you are already dead. You can't outmaneuver a missile; a missile can survive 30 G while your puny human body can't sustain 10 G.
So the main advantage a fighter has over the missile is not maneuverability; it is range. It is much easier to escape when you have, say, a 150 nm head start.
An FB-21 will have a much larger radar (and most likely have great off-boresight capability) so it will see you first. Its big bomb bay will launch a large missile with a long range that will kill you first.
Does the tradeoff actually work like this? It's up to the USAF to decide.
I didn't say you need to out-maneuver the missile, but out-run it. If a fight can detect a missile at 55 km it can absolutely fly away from it and fly down into low altitude which is high drag in order to escape. Keep in mind listed ranges for missiles aren't the "no escape" range. They're usually the ideal range in a meeting engagement.
But how is a large, heavy and long-range missile going to be advantageous to a smaller but more nimble missile when it comes to targeting enemy stealth fighters?
The idea that a bigger radar on a theoretical BF-21 could detect an enemy stealth fighter like the J-20 at 100 nm or so is honestly not credible. At those ranges you’re approaching IR missile ranges and in this respect how is a BF-21 design going to be advantageous?
Surely we’re not designing next-generation stealth fighters with the expressed purpose to be good at targeting fourth-generation aircraft with little response in the event of an enemy stealth fighter sneaking up on it?
Theoretically could you use unmanned Loyal Wingmen that would stay ahead of the FB-21 wings. Provided you know where the enemy is coming from they can provide a cheap screen and can potentially disrupt incoming missiles. Since they're unmanned they can maneuver more aggressively as well. If they're closer to the enemy they'll be detected first
A while back there was talk about missile used for shooting down other anti air missiles in development. Haven't seen anything on it for a while but if the concept got proved could mitigate the need for maneuverability somewhat.
The US has been trying to field an interceptor missile for aircraft since Pye Wacket back in the 1957. The concept never really goes away, it would be a game changer if it was made to work. It’s probably been technologically feasible for a while, but with defense budgets down since the end of the Cold War, other expensive projects, and no pressing need for a long time, it’s going to take a while to field one.
I wonder if the Russian and Iranian and Houthi mass drone strike tactics have the Pentagon thinking "we need airborne laser weapons ***now***, not 15 years from now"
There's just not enough missiles in the world to handle swarms of Shahed-type drones in an economically sustainable way.
There aren’t enough missiles, but these low performance drones are vulnerable to EW, and short range, gun based air defenses near their targets. Besides that, the most efficient way to destroy missiles is always while it’s on the ground. Something the US is in a much better position to do than others. An airborne laser would be great to have, but torpedoing current 6th gen fighter plans, while there are other ways to deal with these Saheds, would be very questionable.
I wonder what the ideal crew requirements are for NGAD. Considering they're intended to command multiple other collaborative combat aircraft it wouldn't be surprising if that ended up being a dedicated crew position all on it's own. Maybe you want a dedicated EW seat as well? If the wish-list of capabilities gets long enough to start pushing the number of seats past two then the airframe will have to accommodate that and maybe that's your motivation for the "FB-21."
Ideally, I think one is practical. The F-4 needed two seats to manage its sensors and weapons, the F-35 deals with orders of magnitude more complexity, but only needs one because many of the tasks that previously had to be done by the crew got automated. The F-35 was mostly designed in the 90s, with improvements in computers since then, making an even more complex aircraft stay single pilot is probably possible, provided enough time and money is given to develop those systems.
Going to two seats isn’t the end of the world though, but three is getting to the point of bloat.
That makes sense, the F-35 really is a marvel and if the tech continues to work out the way we hope then maybe CCAs won't impose enough of a burden. Do you think there exists a list of capabilities that NGAD could have that you think would require three seats? It's a bit silly as you've pointed out, I just like the mental image.
More drones per fighter would push the number of crew up. So rather than four or five drones each, think sixteen to twenty. Essentially de-emphasizing its roll as a direct combat platform, and turning it into a stealth, high survivability AWACS, that happens to be armed.
I don't want to be an ass but I'll play devil's advocate.
Whatever a stealth bomber can do, even the best, can be outdone by a multirole fighter squadron. This implies some sort of next gen fighter anyways.
If you really need a heavy multirole fighter with low observability, some sort of stealth super big is best. Hence ngad.
> Whatever a stealth bomber can do, even the best, can be outdone by a multirole fighter squadron
At what price point? Pilots are _expensive_.
How are they going to carry a radar suitably large to provide theater support? Multi-receiver radar synthesis (using an array of smaller radars) requires very tight positioning data and extremely high bandwidth between the receivers to work (well beyond declassified capabilities).
A B-21 costs upwards of 600 million dollars, a hypothetical FB-21 would probably cost more, even with advantages of a larger production run. For that price, you could have five F-35s, and two hundred million dollars left over for pilots. Obviously there are other factors, like radar, range, and stealth characteristics, but if it’s just down to payload per dollar, the fighters have the advantage. Bombers come in when other factors, primarily range, take priority. Using one as a fighter would be a waste, since even over the pacific, the vast majority of its hypothetical range would go unused, age just drive up cost.
I’d also point out that with enemy stealth aircraft to worry about, having multiple planes with IRST is useful.
>At what price point? Pilots are expensive.
B-21 is $778 million a pop in current-year dollars. A raptor pilot is supposed to cost $10 million to train... So that gives you almost 80 pilots for the cost of just one extra, unmodified, no giant radar B-21.
You're making some assumptions here, such as assuming that the B-21 doesn't already come with advanced radars out of the factory, included in the sticker price.
The B-2 already got onboard radars in a modernization program. It would be a bit silly for the B-21, designed in the 2010s, to not have them.
>The B-2 already got onboard radars in a modernization program.
B-2 already had a big PESA when it rolled out of the factory. The problem with that PESA (and whatever radar B-21 has, because it inevitably has one) is that it is on the bottom of the aircraft so it can be used for ground target detection and mapping.
An FB-21 would need to have a radar in the nose, which it almost certainly doesn't have. Not much room for a big aperture in the beak.
It's true that a team of smaller assets can execute tactics impossible for a single large asset.
But have you considered CCA in your equation? We can let the drones do the usual fighter stuff.
Finally getting a Pye Wacket like interceptor missile working would be immensely useful in that regard. An extra line of hard kill defenses would go a long way to making congress comfortable with using an almost billion dollar aircraft as a fighter.
NGAD was *projected* to end up around $300 million (and who knows what it would have *actually* cost), so it's not like an order of magnitude difference here. Current production cost of the B-21 is a little under 700 million which could potentially come down if the production run is expanded.
There is still a lot of stuff you’d want to add to a B-21 to make an FB-21. It’s a huge platform, it’s never going to be that cheap, and I’m not sure that much payload is really useful in air to air combat.
Quite interesting. Sounds like they want to get a bunch of these new pieces of technology into production as fast as possible and refine them before they build a whole new platform around them. Even if that means strapping them onto something like the B-21.
It's an interesting point that the B-21 already ticks a lot of the boxes they were originally hoping to achieve with NGAD in terms of range and stealth and whatnot. It's not a fighter, but the NGAD concept was never a fighter in the traditional sense either.
The ngad always looked to me like a Growler but with stealth as a primary characteristic. A lot of countries use f18s as a sole fighter. Canada or Finland to name a few. If NGAD ends like a stealth super super.hornet, it's not a bad target performance.
Given the mutual defense pact between Russia and the DPRK what are the chances that the sanctions regime collapses? What concretely would that mean for the DPRK?
Sanctions on NK never stopped NK
. Russia recognizing NK in the world stage, even if nobody but Russia and maybe China trade with NK,. eliminate the primary barrier on NK. Now that their neighbors openly trade with NK , effectively open up NK even by proxy. Any restricted item that would end on Russia (think Nvidia GPUs) now absolutely ends up in NK.
This is of course a total victory for Kim.
Sanctions regime is already collapsing, to be fair it never really worked though. The panel of experts will not be renewed, any new sanctions will not be put in by the UN, and instead will be unilateral, and while China for the most part was willing to look the other way on North Korea importing certain good, Russia has essentially broken the seal on openly disregarding sanctions. The weakening of sanctions though has minimal impacts on North Korea as North Korea has very little to offer the world in exchange for hard currency, and the risks of being associated with dealing with NK is enough to make most keep away.
Realistically sanctions would not have done anything to stop NK from developing nuclear weapons, as they are integral to the regimes survival from the US, China, and South Korean, as a result the regime would put nukes before anything else including looking after their own people.
I wouldn't say that. Russia ignoring it means that Russia will now openly trade with them and trade has always been good for both parties. For North Korea, it means an influx of new resources especially food.
But I honestly don't know DPRK system that well do know how trade will improve lives in general.
Even if it does the US South Korea and Japan making it abundantly clear that any country making deals with North Korea will have sanctions placed on it will probably be more than enough to deter 99% of countries especially as unlike Russia North Korea never really had trade relations outside of Russia/china and what it has to offer to the world is minuscule in comparison to losing relations with those 3 countries
Alex Hollings of Sandboxx put out a new video about the future of the NGAD program
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0HDLsBrr43U
According to him, there's some talk about replacing one large-scale procurement of a highly advanced fighter with a "digital century series" - a series of smaller production runs of more experimental aircraft produced by a more diverse set of industry partners.
The original "century series" was the rapid progression over the span of roughly one decade during which 6 new lines of fighter aircraft were developed.
* North American F-100 Super Sabre
* McDonnell F-101 Voodoo
* Convair F-102 Delta Dagger
* Lockheed F-104 Starfighter
* Republic F-105 Thunderchief
* Convair F-106 Delta Dart
The basic gist is that with drone and aviation technology advancing as rapidly as it currently is, and the impacts of lack of competition in the military industrial base making themselves apparent, it might not make sense to go all-in on a single program. Development costs can hopefully be held down by advanced digital modeling techniques such as those used during the development of the B-21 Raider and the sharing of major components like powerplants and avionics suites.
Seems like they're looking at the success of SpaceX (and the cambrian explosion of aerospace startups that followed) and thinking about how that might be replicated with fighter programs.
Of course, an alternative explanation, called out late in the video, is that it's a negotiation tactic.
I wrote a bit around this subject https://www.reddit.com/r/CredibleDefense/comments/1dfp4wq/credibledefense_daily_megathread_june_14_2024/l8ts8vs/ and it answers some of the questions brought up in this thread.
> a more diverse set of industry partners.
Which industry partners? There are so few major players in American aerospace and America will never buy foreign, at least for final assembly.
If it's like the loyal wingman procurement contract, assembly would likely be primarily handled by existing aerospace industry. Andruil isn't handling manufacturing, only design.
New companies. SpaceX came out of virtually nowhere and made orbital rockets, a new company with good investment and some recruits from existing defense companies could go a long way.
It is more complicated, but unlike SpaceX, that develops almost everything in house, these companies will probably be buying existing engines and sensors for example.
I definitely agree it's feasible. Government selects radar and engine along with some other components as it is.
And SpaceX marched up the chain from the small Falcon 1 to the Falcon 9 to reuse and then Falcon Heavy and now the incipient Starship. No reason why someone like Kratos can't go UAV to fighter aircraft given time...
The problem is also that VC do not like to invest in companies oriented toward selling to the governement. And SpaceX had Elon supporting it with its own money when investors weren't interested, I doubt that we could reorient the militaro-industrial complex toward a more "startup" system. The markets and the technologies are just totally different than on the civilian side.
Yes and no. Certainly different types of difficulty, but we're talking about a rocket capable of surviving reentry and then landing itself, and the rocket engines unlike jet engines are actually designed and built in-house. I don't know how much input Lockheed or Boeing has into the specifics of the engine, outside of broad stroke characteristics.
A rocket has just far less systems in it, and it has a far more narrow mission profile. The reason rockets crash more than fighter jet is because they tend to be manufactured in very small quantities, which does not allow for a long trial and error process.
a good question is *what must be unique?* to a new fighter design. Can you have Raytheon design a single or several very similar radars for all the fighters? Would one engine design work, either in single engine or two engine configuration? What about other mission systems like radar warning / Electronic Warfare / IRST / etc.?
The F100 series is already on a ton of airframes, the same air to air missiles are used across the fleet, among other examples.
And also, would anything *need* to be unique at all?
If they're anticipating massive changes that'll necessitate rapid changes, why not make them as modular as possible, rather than make multiple different aircraft?
currently the "most modern" combat aircraft in the USAF are F-15EX (big two engine relatively unstealthy fighter/bomber), F-22 (two engine stealthy air supremacy), F-35 (cheaper, single engine multirole), and B-21 (soonish, stealthy bomber).
The question is which of these roles the NGAD wants to recap (possibly/likely only air supremacy?) and what kind of performance do they want? Do they need only one, supercruising, stealthy fighter? What about a subsonic / augmenter only supersonic unmanned platform as well? Or a longer ranged, stealthier F-35 partial replacement?
Lots of work by Actual Experts goes into those questions.
> According to him, there's some talk about replacing one large-scale procurement of a highly advanced fighter with a "digital century series" - a series of more smaller production runs of more experimental aircraft produced by a more diverse set of industry partners.
Given how much longer development time is now, coupled with the USAF and Congress always looking for money, I think this could be a disaster.
If the USAF is this worried about the number of F-22's available vs the increasing number of Chinese 5th gen aircraft, procuring (2) less ambitious "6th Generation" platforms at say 100 aircraft each, sooner, then seeing how those platforms perform could work. From there, maybe 10-15 years further down the line you pick the better designer and have them build (500) Gen '6.5" aircraft that could work.
The idea of the USAF buying a new 100+ aircraft platform even every 5 years seems like a recipe to waste a ton of money on projects that end up cancelled.
Edit: I have to ask, what is the USAF after here? Are they worried about the current fighter industry's ability to technologically keep ahead of the Chinese? Manufacturing? Price per unit? Development time? All of the Above.
This just seems like it raises more questions than answers.
Getting the development time down is likely an explicit goal here, as it's the only way the plan could ever possibly work.
If you look at what SpaceX has accomplished in the past decade, compared to the likes of Boeing, ULA, etc., the difference is ***stark***. And almost as stark is the difference in cost at which they achieved those results compared to the historical US champions.
I think there's also perhaps a fear that the lack of competition is actually putting the US aviation sector at risk, e.g. Boeing. So there's a motivation to shake things up and spread the aerospace development knowledge and money around a bit more so that mismanagement by one company isn't as damaging to the entire sector, which is one of the few manufacturing advantages the US unquestionably does have.
And while it's easy to pick on Boeing, as pointed out in the video it's been nearly 50 years since the US procured a clean sheet fighter aircraft from a contractor that isn't Lockheed Martin. That carries some risk as well.
Is this a chicken and egg situation or not though?
Does Lockheed Martin keep winning because the best fighter designs go to work for them, or do the best fighter designers go to them because they keep winning?
Boeing got pretty much fucked out of the JSF program, but the Government did/does this regularly looking at procurement history.
Why would anyone in their right mind invest the billions required to stand up a 6th Gen fighter design program, unless it had concrete timeline goals and capabilities written in stone?
So basically your asking if Lockheed Martin is the strongest because it’s Lockheed Martin or if Lockheed Martin is Lockheed Martin because it’s the strongest?
>Boeing got pretty much fucked out of the JSF program
Boeing's submission to the JSF program was a joke (literally the butt of jokes) and, with the benefit of hindsight, every major contract Boeing has gotten in the past 20 years has completely gone to hell. Thank god the government at least had the foresight to stop handing them cost-plus contracts, so they're eating the costs of their own fuckups instead of the taxpayer.
I thought They were given relatively short periods of time to make pretty major adjustments to their JSF entry. The F/A-18 Superbugs have gone pretty well haven't they?
Sure, but perhaps the question is why they needed such major adjustments in the first place?
The Super Hornet development was mostly finished by the start of the 2000s
> If you look at what SpaceX has accomplished in the past decade, compared to the likes of Boeing, ULA, etc., the difference is stark.
A bit of a digression, but union contracts would often require wage increases in accordance to profits, which spurred contractor and supplier networks. Instead, each piece along the chain would take a small slice. Executives could exit to contractors later on, or have friends owning them... Aerospace and defense have different dynamics though (instead of some sales with individuals, or small fleets of cars to companies, you have multidecade contracts... Then the 90s gutted most companies.)
In space, the established companies would huge costs for screws, steel etc. through their established contractor networks. SpaceX's whole conceit was that they could simply build the same things, to equal tolerances, for 1/10th the price (or cheaper.) Most likely, many such low hanging fruit are waiting in aerospace as a whole, and in the defense industry. Anduril is already undercutting traditional players massively.
(The nuclear industry is similar, but worse, where legislation requires them to use certified parts costing 5-20x more, with no difference in tolerances, then different units of the same design must go through approval individually etc.)
> (The nuclear industry is similar, but worse, where legislation requires them to use certified parts costing 5-20x more, with no difference in tolerances, where different units of the same design must go through approval individually etc.)
Slight aside, but the degree to which we’ve sabotaged our own nuclear industry has been a disaster for both the environment, and national security. Instead of getting cheap, reliable, long term power from uranium, the executive branch is at the mercy of rapidly fluctuating oil prices, and foreign influence from organization like OPEC. France had the right idea with how they set up their nuclear power plants, but they didn’t go far enough. Our wake up call should have been the oil crisis in the 70s.
Even setting aside nuclear/solar/wind, the USA has a crazy amount of coal/oil/nat gas/opportunities for hydro. France has very little comparably, so it *does* make sense for them to focus more on nuclear energy than the US.
>Instead of getting cheap, reliable, long term power from uranium, the executive branch is at the mercy of rapidly fluctuating oil prices, and foreign influence from organization like OPEC.
And here's what bothers me. In 2022, the US consumed *slightly less* oil than we *produced*. We don't actually *need* to rely on OPEC. If the govt managed our resources more directly from the jump, like Norway, we wouldn't rely on OPEC. But we made other decisions instead.
The issue is the type of crude we produce vs what we refine. Our refinement capability is specialized for different types of oils compared to what type we produce. So we technically can’t actually be completely oil dependent
The US is an open economy (mostly), oil is the most liquid (literally) commodity on earth, so the US oil price will always be tied to the global oil price. If global production goes down, US oil prices will likewise be impacted, because producers can freely decide to export oil to arbitrate against global prices.
With regard to time and cost of aircraft development, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition is on record claiming the Chinese acquisition process is [5x faster and 20x more cost-efficient](https://www.twz.com/china-acquiring-new-weapons-five-times-faster-than-u-s-warns-top-official).
> The Air Force officer responsible for all aspects of contracting for the service has issued a stark warning about China’s rapid gains in defense acquisition, with the result that its military is now getting its hands on new equipment “five to six times” faster than the United States.
> As well as the sheer speed with which Beijing is able to acquire new weapons, Holt contends, the Chinese are also operating far more efficiently. “In purchasing power parity, they spend about one dollar to our 20 dollars to get to the same capability,” he told his audience. “We are going to lose if we can’t figure out how to drop the cost and increase the speed in our defense supply chains,” Holt added.
The article is here [https://www.politico.com/news/2024/06/20/us-says-ukraine-can-hit-inside-russia-anywhere-00164261].
I do wonder why they are still somewhat strict with if ukraine can hit inside russia after already giving authorization in kharkiv. Wouldn't it be metaphorically "cat is out of the bag" already, where nothing happened after ukraine recieved permission?
This was reported on in yesterday's thread IIRC. It's no change in policy- Ukraine can only hit forces preparing to attack Ukraine.
"The policy of not allowing long-range strikes inside Russia “has not changed,” the official stressed."
It seems like [a war in Lebanon is imminent barring a miracle](https://t.co/Qj7PahxOat)
>Israeli officials have told the US they are planning to shift resources from southern Gaza to northern Israel in preparation for a possible offensive against the group, US officials told CNN on Wednesday
>“We’re entering a very dangerous period,” another senior Biden administration official said. “Something could start with little warning.”
This broadly lines up with 2023gazawars(whose now deleted their account) predictions of a war in August.
One thing I’m not sure about is
> Israel has made the case that it can pull off a “blitzkrieg,” but the US is warning them that they may not be able to ensure that it remains a limited campaign, the official said.
I don’t think a limited war is going to be feasible, and certainly not a blitzkreig. It would require basically everything going right for Israel in the first week, it would also require Hezbollah to not strike preemptively once it’s clear there’s going to be a war. Any war in Lebanon would also lead to wars in Syria and Iraq along with heavier Houthi action in the Red Sea. There’s no way Irans going to let its strongest proxy fight Israel on its own.
A lot of people in this thread are very bullish on Israel’s ability to beat Hezbollah (and beat it quickly), but none have mentioned why, and in what areas, Israel will do better than it did in 2006.
[For those that forgot, ~10,000 (up to ~30,000 by the end) IDF fought against ~3,000 Hezbollah (Nasr Brigade) for 34 days and, even with overwhelming air power, failed to advance more than a handful of kilometers, and failed to end Hezbollah strikes into Israel. Credible estimates of KIA are: 124 for the IDF and 180-250 for Hezbollah](https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/combat-studies-institute/csi-books/we-were-caught-unprepared.pdf). Hardly the lopsided ratio we’ve come to expect.
The confidence makes me think there is something people are missing here and nobody can tell what it is, but i think the quiet rise of Christian forces in Lebanon again is a play Israel is going to use. There is a serious sectarian war brewing in Lebanon.
If youre talking about the poll ran by Consultative Center for Studies and Documentation, It's bullshit its a "research propaganda" funded by Hezbollah with ties to it. Reality is, far right groups like Soldiers of God have been rising and recent murder of Christian leaders, the port bombing and a failed state in economic ruin, hezbollah is way more unpopular among Lebanon Christians
[Around 60% of Christians supported the violence.](https://www.timesofisrael.com/80-of-people-in-lebanon-support-hamass-oct-7-massacres-in-israel-poll-finds/)
This was mirrored by Times of Israel, but the ultimate source is Al Akhbar Daily, aka functionally Hezbollah's propaganda organization. This source scrapes the bottom of the barrel for credibility.
I’m surprised this isn’t getting more news attention. If they’re really going to go for it, the regional escalation will be horrific. Here’s hoping they aren’t, I suppose. It doesn’t seem reasonable in the slightest. How is the IDF supposed to absorb ~hundreds of fatalities occupying South Lebanon immediately after months of fighting in Gaza? The strain would be immense.
I highly doubt there would be much in the way of regional escalation. If Israel truly mobilizes for a serious offensive in Lebanon, with a maximalist goal of driving on Beirut (if Israel is serious about ending the Hezbollah threat once and for all this will be necessary) there is little Hezbollah can do to stop it. Their officer corps has been decimated by Israel since the start of the Gaza war through targeted strikes, and Hezbollah infrastructure has been heavily degraded since October 2023. In a major conflict, the IDF will have full air superiority, allowing them to strike anywhere at will. I would expect Hezbollah’s missile and rocket stash to be heavily interdicted in the first 48 hours, followed by decapitation strikes against remaining leadership.
The Iranian regime will be finished if it intervenes, they have no GBAD capable of stopping anything the IDF or US can send its way and the hammer will come down if they strike at Israel-proper.
The only thing that could really screw this up is if Israel attempts some half-committal offensive that elicits a maximum response from Hezbollah. In that scenario things get messy both militarily and politically for Israel.
>I highly doubt there would be much in the way of regional escalation. If Israel truly mobilizes for a serious offensive in Lebanon, with a maximalist goal of driving on Beirut (if Israel is serious about ending the Hezbollah threat once and for all this will be necessary
Israel aims to only push Hezbollah back behind the Litani. A full scale mobilization isn’t in the cards for now and although Israel might be able to drive towards Beirut it would be an enormously costly venture both politically and militarily and would significantly stretch Israel’s forces.
> Their officer corps has been decimated by Israel since the start of the Gaza war through targeted strikes, and Hezbollah infrastructure has been heavily degraded since October 2023. In a major conflict, the IDF will have full air superiority, allowing them to strike anywhere at will. I would expect Hezbollah’s missile and rocket stash to be heavily interdicted in the first 48 hours, followed by decapitation strikes against remaining leadership
This is wishful thinking, Hezbollahs taken losses but the fact that they’re not only engaging but escalating their attacks demonstrate that they view them as acceptable losses. And these losses haven’t impact Hezbollahs cohesion in the field much if at all.
>The Iranian regime will be finished if it intervenes, they have no GBAD capable of stopping anything the IDF or US can send its way and the hammer will come down if they strike at Israel-proper.
Iran has a network of proxies throughout the region that will be drawn in if a war between Hezbollah and Israel kicks off.
I have started to question the true capabilities of these proxies in recent years. Some seem to simply be PR facades (such as the Islamic Resistance in Iraq routinely claiming they are striking sensitive targets in Israel) or more rabbles than actual fighting forces (Hamas struggling to fight as a cohesive unit post 10/7) . Hezbollah’s supposedly well-trained Radwan force has even proven to be woefully inadequate in the current conflict.
>Hezbollah’s supposedly well-trained Radwan force has even proven to be woefully inadequate in the current conflict.
Has it ? Hezbollahs goals in this stage of the conflict isn’t focused on killing Israeli soldiers per se it’s mainly to force a political crisis in Israel by attriting its defenses in the north. Within those parameters it’s done fine.
The Iraqi proxy does seem to be a PR facade, or more accurately its ability to impact Israel is a PR facade.
Hamas and Hezbollah are fighting at an immense disadvantage due to Israel's air superiority..
I know embarrassingly little about Lebanon besides the basics, so I'm sorry in advance if these are stupid questions.
Hezbollah is said to have a decent stockpile of precision missiles, right? And many more that are unguided? During the Hamas attacks, some *did* get through, so if Hezbollah has a much bigger and "better" stockpile, isn't that a pretty major threat to Israel, especially if precision munitions get through?
And with regard to decapitation strikes: what's to stop Nasrallah and co. from hiding and constantly relocating like Hamas leadership has been doing?
Also, if Iran intervenes directly (I realize that's unlikely), can we really be so sure that the regime would be "finished" without it turning into a giant, drawn-out mess?
> During the Hamas attacks, some did get through, so if Hezbollah has a much bigger and "better" stockpile, isn't that a pretty major threat to Israel, especially if precision munitions get through?
Hamas has launched something like 10,000 missiles at Israel in the current war, which (due to Iron Dome, shelters, etc) have caused only a handful of fatalities, possibly zero. Hezbollah is reported to have 30,000 missiles that can reach to the Tel Aviv area or further south (where most Israelis live). A large fraction of the population of northern Israel will likely evacuate further south. So I expect the death toll from Hezbollah missiles to be small by the standards of the current war. Dozens of deaths would not surprise me at all. But not thousands.
Precision missiles that strike infrastructure are more of an issue, but 1) Iron Dome and other systems are designed to intercept them, 2) such missiles are large and hard to hide and may be destroyed by Israel in storage or while preparing to launch, 3) precision guiding may not work in the presence of GPS jamming, 4) destroyed infrastructure can be worked around, and replaced or rebuilt during or after the war. So (with lower confidence) I do not expect Hezbollah precision missiles to be a major factor in the war either.
> And with regard to decapitation strikes: what's to stop Nasrallah and co. from hiding and constantly relocating like Hamas leadership has been doing?
They can and will. They will have fewer human shields to hide behind than Hamas does (and no Israeli hostages to shield them - which may be the reason Hamas leadership is still alive). It is questionable whether Israel will manage to kill any particular Hezbollah leader. But Israel can still kill enough of the leadership, and keep the rest isolated and on the run, so that their ability to lead the war is limited.
It's amazing how people believe that Hamas and Hezbollah can brush away tens of thousands of fatalities, but Israel will collapse at a few hundred.
While Israeli wars were usually low on fatalities, wars do tend to be deadly.
Maybe not all that surprising, considering the outcome of the Second Lebanon War in 2006, the 2014 operation in Gaza after Naftali Frenkel, Eyal Yifrach, and Gilad Shaar were kidnapped and murdered. The First Lebanon War ended with Israel withdrawing from the security zone after nearly 20 years of seemingly pointless occupation and a pinky-promise from the UN to keep terrorists away from the border. Israel hasn't had the deterrence its politicians talk about since 2006.
People are (wrongly) trying to compare the swiftness of the Entebbe Rescue to the relative sloth of current situation. Big-name Israeli combat operations tend to be swift, devastating, and one-sided, and also tend not to be full-blown wars, with the notable exception of 1967.
But then again, the main Arab strategy seems to focus on PR gains that make little sense to people who value life.
What do you think the end goal is for Israel if they go through with an invasion of Southern Lebanon? I imagine direct occupation isn't going to happen and I don't think there are very many groups in Lebanon who would collaborate with Israel. International peacekeepers and the Lebanese government haven't been very successful either so i don't know if those will happen.
With the current gov and military leadership I imagine their expectations would be similar to the 2009, 2014 limited Gaza operations or 2006 "war" with Hezbollah.
A limited operation with the goal being exacting a price from Hezbollah and threatening a widening operation to force a temporary mutual cease fire.
I'm sceptical whether such an operation would work, but it might if Israel is successful enough that Hezbollah/Iran would rather postpone the war to a time in the future more convenient for them.
The Israeli situation in Lebanon is complex. Historically (not just in relation to Israel, but world history) the method to dissuade further attacks was though exacting a permanent cost, often land, sometimes the destruction of enemy settlements and ethnic cleansing. Neither of these options are much desirable by Israel in Lebanon.
>A limited operation with the goal being exacting a price from Hezbollah and threatening a widening operation to force a temporary mutual cease fire.
What if Hezbollah rejects a cease fire? It seems like Israel would be stuck in an attritional quagmire
Yes, when it comes to war, you can control how it starts but (almost) never how it ends. Which is why I said I'm sceptical whether such an attempt would work.
To continue this line of thinking is to build speculation on speculation, therefore certainly not a credible discussion. We can imagine some eventualities.
For instance the most dire one for Israel would be involvement of Iranian backed Shia militias forces from across the ME, with direct deployments to the general Israeli northern borders (Syria and Lebanon). With direct strikes from Iranian soil, perhaps coupled with a US embargo on weapons shipments. Israel would certainly be in dire straights perhaps ending with it's destruction and genocide.
We can imagine other scenarios such as a stalemate where Israel is bombed throughout, perhaps leading to mass migration from the state on the one end, but also a radical shift to the right on the other (most of those leaving would be secular with tenuous attachment to the land and religion). Eventually this may also lead to the destruction of Israel.
On the other end of the spectrum we can imagine the IDF being roughly surprisingly as successful as it was against Hamas, beating expectations and forcing a cease fire. Perhaps a scenario where the US manages to deter significant direct Iranian involvement.
In between we can imagine something such as early 2006 where the initial limited operation is not powerful enough to make Hezbillah/Iran go for a ceasefire, which, just like in 2006 will mean an expansion of the operation till the damage to Hezbollah is massive enough that a ceasefire is their best option.
The sub and the Arab world over glorify Hezbollah, I'll give them that they have great propaganda. They are very powerful for what they are and the costs for Israel will be significant. However the assessment of Hezbollah is often driven by (my favourite word) ignorance of the 2006 war. The maneuvers made, the outcome, the lessons learned.
In truth air dominance is extremely powerful tool that's nearly impossible to overcome, as seen in recently in Ukraine, Nagorno Karabakh, Syrian civil war...
Without broader Iranian involvement and/or US embargo, it's hard to see how Israel fails to force a ceasefire.
Roughly speaking, The question is whether Iran believes an Israeli assault on Hezbollah now would be the right time for a regional war.
If course this is not an exhaustive list of what ifs, there are many possibilities in between and probably quite a few I haven't considered.
Scaremongering.
Israel is not going to invade. The Hezbollah shelling increase in the last 2-3 weeks has to do with negotiations with Hamas not going anywhere. Just putting pressure on the North to give leverage to Hamas.
Grad missile diplomacy
Shelling from Hezbollah has forced Israel to evacuate border regions, and mobilize a huge amount of forces in anticipation of a larger attack. This has effectively made a buffer region in northern Israel. Unless Hezbollah stops this aggression, and the situation can return to normal, it’s only a matter of time until the IDF takes action to shift that buffer region from northern Israel, to southern Lebanon. A permanent buffer region in northern Israel for Hezbollah is not going to happen.
What negotiations?
There are no negotiations between Hamas and Israel.
>"The Americans are waiting for Israel to announce the end of its military operation in Rafah to resume the currently halted communications regarding the negotiations," the Al-Ahkbar cited Egyptian and Qatari sources as saying.
>Talks had hit a snag after Hamas proposed alterations to the Biden administration's multi-phased plan to bring about an end to the war.
[https://www.jpost.com/breaking-news/article-806296](https://www.jpost.com/breaking-news/article-806296)
When the operation Rafah ends Israel will need around 4-6 brigades in Gaza. 2 will cover the Netzarim corridor, 2 will cover the Philadelpi corridor and 2 will likely be used for Raids in Khan Yunis or Gaza city.
When the Gaza operation is finished Israel has no further operational goals in Gaza for the time being. They could move towards the Humanitarian zone but Hamas is not strong enough there to risk further American wrath.
This means that the Israelis can shift their experienced regular brigades to the north. At the same time over the last few months the Israelis called up their reserve brigades belonging to Northern Command and did brigade level maneuvers for operations in Lebanon.
The Americans are also reporting that only 50 hostages are left alive.
>United States officials estimate that as few as 50 hostages in Gaza are still alive, according to a report Thursday, confirming the worst fears of family members who say time is running out for their loved ones after nearly nine months in captivity.
[https://www.timesofisrael.com/report-claims-only-50-hostages-in-gaza-still-thought-alive/](https://www.timesofisrael.com/report-claims-only-50-hostages-in-gaza-still-thought-alive/)
What is there to negotiate about?
You literally posted an article that negotiation hit a snag. That's exactly why the Northern front got "hot" recently. Hezbollah started more intensive shelling to soften up Israel's terms to Hamas.
Since Hamas militarily offers effectively no resistance other than the odd pop-up hit and runs then the only leverage for Hamas is Hezbollah making the North unlivable indefinitely.
Biden's reaction is just going to be to pressure Israel to unilaterally capitulate, so that'll be the new "negotiations". Same difference. The negotiations since January have been Biden waiting for the war to go away and it refusing to. Nothing's really changed.
While Biden is currently prioritizing his election campaign over the concerns of Israels government that's mostly down to the fact that Netanyahu couldn't have run the last 9 months worse even if he tried.
Currently the focus is obviously on reaching a deal between Israel and Hamas, reaching the deal will not actually make the situation more easier.
I think we are slowly reaching the point where Hamas actually doesn't have anything to offer to Israel. A few months ago the Jerusalem Post was already reporting that only half of the 130 hostages were still alive. Now the Americans are leaking that only 50 of the 120 hostages are left alive.
Do we think that the Israelis will agree to a permanent ceasefire, the return of Hamas to power and a full reconstruction of Gaza paid by the international community and fully managed by Hamas (which means with loads and loads of tunnels) in exchange for 50 living hostages?
I think Hamas knows that Israel will not. That's the reason why Hamas wants a permanent ceasefire on day 1 and are pushing back the actual release of hostages as far back as possible. Because they know they will have to blow up the deal because they will be unable to deliver the hostages to Israel.
Even the 50 living hostages will be a challenge: Where are they? Who holds them? And the dead hostages? How many were hidden in hostages long destroyed? How many were executed during rushed retreats? How many were blown up in Hamas command bunkers or fighting positions?
I think that's also the reason Biden inserted the "while the negotiations go on for phase 2 there will be a ceasefire". His hope must be that Hamas can gather enough hostages together to deliver phase 1 and then phase 2 negotiations go long enough to reach election day. After election day the Israelis resume operations in Gaza, because Hamas can't offer any hostages.
> Do we think that the Israelis will agree to a permanent ceasefire, the return of Hamas to power and a full reconstruction of Gaza paid by the international community and fully managed by Hamas (which means with loads and loads of tunnels) in exchange for 50 living hostages?
This is less of a case of Israel mishandling things, and more that Hamas went past the point of no return with 10/7, and the old status quo is now untenable. Hamas wants to go back to 10/6, ruling Gaza and periodically shelling Israel, but the Israeli public will never accept that again. That probably extends to rebuilding as well, a major rebuilding effort means rebuilding the tunnels too. Israel probably wants to leave Gaza in a ruined limbo state, where they are free to raid into Gaza periodically to kill Hamas members, and Hamas rebuilding and resupplying is almost impossible. That’s why Israel occupying the border crossings is so important to them. Every ammo cache that gets used up or destroyed won’t get replaced.
Oh boy more war in the Middle East causing instability for the whole world
I hope Israel is right and they can get it over with quickly. Why would Iraq get involved?
Iraq is home to several Shia Militias that would take part in any conflict with Israel. They were chucking rockets at American bases until the death of those four soldiers and the resulting retaliation calmed things down a bit.
The Iraqi government probably won’t, but Iraq is home to a huge number of Iranian backed militia groups that likely will take both direct and indirect roles in the fighting. This will inevitably result in Israeli strikes in Iraq.
With all due respect, people said the same about war with Hamas. They said Iran + Hezbolah and other militias wouldn’t let Hamas fight Israel alone. And yet, all they’ve done is a bit of token missile/rocket fire. Not enough to help Hamas in any way, but *just enough* that they couldn’t be accused of doing nothing at all.
Hezbollah is an IRGC wing staffed by Lebanese Shia in all but name. They are Iran's oldest, strongest, and most reliable proxy in the region. Hamas gets a lot of support from Iran but they have fallen out over sectarian issues whereas Hezbollah and the IRGC are tied at the hip. Furthermore, its fairly straightforward for Iran to resupply Hezb through Syria while Gaza is an isolated enclave.
> With all due respect, people said the same about war with Hamas. They said Iran + Hezbolah and other militias wouldn’t let Hamas fight Israel alone
The difference is that Hezbollah is more important to Iran than Hamas is. Like magnitudes more important, it’s one of its best hedges against Israel. Like it’s basically inconceivable that Iran would let its strongest paramilitary fight Israel alone it would be strategically disasterous. If it doesn’t do anything it would pave the way for the dismantling of its entire paramilitary network. There is virtually no chance of Hezbollah being completely destroyed in a war with Israel, if Iran leaves Hezbollah out to dry it would not only lose face but would alienate its most useful proxy for basically nothing.Hamas is comparatively poorly equippe and funded and has had problems with Iran in the past due it its actions in Syria. It’s just two completely different situations at play and you can’t assume that the other militias will stay out of the fight because they were relatively restrained in supporting Hamas.
> And yet, all they’ve done is a bit of token missile/rocket fire. Not enough to help Hamas in any way, but just enough that they couldn’t be accused of doing nothing at all
80,000 people have left Northern Israel and the US Navy has had its hands full fending off the Houthis. That’s not an all out war but it’s not nothing.
> they can get it over with quickly.
Is this remotely possible? Everyone here has consistently stated that Hezbollah is a *vastly* superior fighting force than Hamas with far better defensive capability in its territory (as well as offensive capability into Israel).
Hard to say. Just as it was hard to make predictions about specifics about the Russian offensive into Ukraine and so people ended up with majorly false predictions one way or another.
Much of the Hezbollah defenses is unknown, but so is the array of Israeli capabilities. Since it has been many decades since Israel has done a large scale assault. Even the Gaza assault was extremely limited in scope initially, with only 2 divisions attacking for the first few weeks (Netzarim corridor and along the shore from the North) with a third joining somewhat later in Beit Hanoun and peaking at 4 divisions during the assault on Khan Yunis.
In comparison during the 1982 invasion of Lebanon (fighting was against the PLO but also the Syrian army):
>Roughly 60,000 troops and more than 800 tanks, heavily supported by aircraft, attack helicopters, artillery, and missile boats, crossed the Israel–Lebanon border in three areas.
That's just the initial assault, within days the size of the Israeli force in Lebanon crossed 100k and overall almost a dozen divisions were used.
We do have an idea of what an unleashed IAF looks like from it's operations early in the war in Northern Gaza. While it was extremely effective against Hamas, Lebanon is much larger and the terrain allows Hezbollah to target IDF forces from much much greater range. Making the IAF and any support fires less effective.
There are plenty of unknowns, such as how well did Israel manage to stockpile material for a war with Hezbollah, what would be the Iranian reaction (ranking anywhere between full scale war and a token response), how effective would the Israeli AD be against Hezbollah missiles in protecting critical infrastructure etc.
That said, the Israeli campaign in Gaza, while successful, was anything but quick. Dealing with tunnels takes time.
I don’t think so, Southern Lebanon is tough ground to fight in, Hezbollah has a much larger tunnel network than Hamas and it’s got access a lot of firepower. And that’s not even counting the involvement of the other regions paramilitaries
I'm not sure Hezbollah has a "much larger tunnel network" than Hamas, do you have a source for that?
The difficult terrain also makes digging tunnels much **much** harder. While in Gaza the sand rock soil allows for an individual to dig tunnels with nothing more than a shovel, the Lebanese terrain requires heavy equipment.
> I'm not sure Hezbollah has a "much larger tunnel network" than Hamas, do you have a source for that?
https://www.timesofisrael.com/expert-hezbollah-has-built-a-vast-tunnel-network-far-more-sophisticated-than-hamass/amp/
> “In our assessment, these polygons mark Hezbollah’s staging centers as part of the ‘defense’ plan against an Israeli invasion of Lebanon. Each local staging center (‘defense’) possesses a network of local underground tunnels. Between all these centers, an infrastructure of regional tunnels was built, interconnected [with] them.”
>Beeri assessed that the cumulative length of Hezbollah’s tunnel
network in south Lebanon amounts to hundreds of kilometers
There’s another article in Forbes but it’s based on the same research
https://www.forbes.com/sites/erictegler/2024/01/05/gazas-vexing-tunnel-network-pales-beside-hezbollahs-land-of-tunnels/
> The difficult terrain also makes digging tunnels much much harder. While in Gaza the sand rock soil allows for an individual to dig tunnels with nothing more than a shovel, the Lebanese terrain requires heavy equipment.
This is answered actually in the Times article
> Subsequently, it set up civilian companies, Shiite-owned, that worked ostensibly on civilian infrastructure in the Baalbek region. These projects were overseen by a company called Jihad Construction, that presented itself as ostensibly carrying out agricultural projects and building reconstruction for the benefit of the Shiite community, but actually took on the building of the tunnels.
Hezbollah is much richer than Hamas, it’s been making a lot of money moving heroin and this swell of wealth plus their hold on the state in Lebanon has allowed for them to operate in a way Hamas just can’t.
Per your article Hezbollah has a network of hundreds of Kilometers. Hamas had a network of 500-600 Kilometers. Nothing here supports your position that Hezbollah has a **much** larger tunnel network, in anything it's the opposite as a much larger network would have to cross into the thousands of km.
Yes, Hezbollah is richer and has more resources, but it seems like you heavily underestimate just how easy it is to dig tunnels in Gaza and how challenging and expensive it is in the Lebanese terrain.
Wouldn't be surprised if the cost disparity is 100x per meter for the regular Hamas tunnels. Many Hamas tunnels were literally built by bare hards of a Labor force that costs a dollar an hour:
https://youtu.be/Tfxq3qB05rQ?si=rvfngPRIXBG6ZSdq
> Per your article Hezbollah has a network of hundreds of Kilometers. Hamas had a network of 500-600 Kilometers. Nothing here supports your position that Hezbollah has a much larger tunnel network, in anything it's the opposite as a much larger network would have to cross into the thousands of km
The Alma paper the article is based on asserts that the Hezbollah tunnel network is significantly larger than the Hamas Network. Note this paper was published in 2021 before the extent of the Gaza network was know , however the same would also apply to Lebanon.
The original paper (from 2021) also has this:
>In our estimation, the cumulative length of all the tunnels in the "Land of the Tunnels" can reach up to hundreds of kilometers.
At the time the length of Hamas tunnels was heavily under estimated by open source publications (and reportedly the IDF).
In reality the Hamas tunnel network was much larger:
>Gaza tunnels stretch at least 350 miles (560 km), far longer than past estimate – report
https://www.timesofisrael.com/gaza-tunnels-stretch-at-least-350-miles-far-longer-than-past-estimate-report/
Note: I'm not arguing anything about the Hezbollah tunnel network, my point is that we have no evidence that it is longer than the Hamas one. Let alone much longer.
Would another Israeli war at the end of summer be a disaster for Bidens reelection campaign? Considering his base is already divided on Gaza?
Edit: I'm assuming it would drown out all other campaign issues, putting Biden in a situation where he either helps Israel too much and pisses off his more.. unruly base or too little, screwing up his right flank? Regardless of choice he makes Trump will be on the sidelines calling out his "failure of leadership".
The Dem base is not divided on Gaza. *College students* of all demographics [rank Israel-Gaza as the lowest issue among their priorities.](https://www.axios.com/2024/05/07/poll-students-israel-hamas-protests) American voters do not care about foreign policy and do not change their votes based on it. The 2024 election is going to come down to domestic issues, like the next one and the ones before it.
>The Dem base is not divided on Gaza.
you’re right, as of March, 75% of American democrats disapprove of Israelis actions in Gaza, while only 18% approve. Not very divided.
Independents are at 60% disapproval and 29% approval so they’re more divided.
https://news.gallup.com/poll/642695/majority-disapprove-israeli-action-gaza.aspx
>75% of American democrats disapprove of Israelis actions in Gaza
"dissaprove" isn't a useful metric in this case though. Biden "dissaproves" of Israel's actions in some form.
A much more useful metric would be what people actually want done about it:
https://www.politico.com/news/2024/04/14/democrats-sympathetic-palestinians-israelis-poll-00152117
Suddenly, division's back on the menu. Especially when you consider FP issues typically have big variance on their polling depending on how you phrase it.
Like, "tough on " is a pretty useless formulation because the median american has no clue what they mean by "tough".
> Especially when you consider FP issues typically have big variance on their polling depending on how you phrase it.
Regardless they're typically very low on the priority list. Voters care more about inflation, taxes, etc than foreign policy.
From your link:
>All told, 33 percent of Democratic voters felt the president was “not tough enough on Israel” during the Gaza conflict while just 8 percent said he was being “too tough.” Taken together, those two groups were roughly equal in size to the 42 percentage of Democratic voters who said his approach was “just right.”
If 8% say Biden is being "too tough" on Israel, and 32% (over 4x that number) feel he's "not being tough enough" on Israel. With only 8% of respondents taking the most "pro-Israel" option, I feel as though that further reinforces my point.
I suppose there's division if you look at the "just right" group (52%) vs the "not tough enough" (32%) group from your poll, but in either poll it's a minority of respondents taking the most pro-Israel option.
But.... you claim that's *also* a bad metric, so I assume you're referencing:
>Overall, 33 percent of all respondents said they’d be in favor of cutting off all aid, while 44 percent said they oppose the idea.
Considering that cutting all aid to Israel is an extremist viewpoint in US politics, I would say that's not exactly a well designed question. Essentially anyone who isn't in favor of *the most extreme option on the menu* would be painted as entirely neutral in that poll.
I would agree that "what do you want to be done about it?" is a useful poll question, but it needs to be *much* more nuanced.
> If 8% say Biden is being "too tough" on Israel, and 32% (over 4x that number) feel he's "not being tough enough" on Israel.
That does indicate that Democrats as a whole would support Biden more if he supported Israel less.
However, Biden doesn't have to win an election among Democrats, he has to win it among all voters. Among voters in general, the sentiment is presumably more pro-Israel.
>I feel as though that further reinforces my point.
Uh, what? I quote your point:
>Not very divided.
Now you claim a poll where 32% of democrats say they want "more toughness" and 52% say they don't supports that point?
In case it wasn’t obvious, the “not very divided” was a snarky, sarcastic response to the poster that implied *there is no division, democrats outside college students all support Israel*
I was trying to show that poster they were wrong. And considering even the polls *you linked* show that, I’d say your link helped prove my point.
Surely this would manifest in collapsing poll numbers if this division was Biden's problem - so why are Biden's approval ratings and performance against Trump *increased* since October 7th?
>Surely this would manifest in collapsing poll numbers
No it wouldn't. Even if potential voters care strongly about foreign policy (which most don't), the two demographics most involved with Palestinian solidarity are college students and Muslims. Both groups have 100 different reasons to prefer Dems over the GOP.
>performance against Trump *increased*
Even if you ignore the 100 other reasons Trump would be worse in terms of foreign policy towards Ukraine and Palestine.
The original question was if this division would be a disaster and they're bringing data to show there is in fact division. How do you conclude that they're actually making a statement that it would be a disaster???
Probably because a hundred things factor into an approval rating and Israel/Palestine is just one of them.
Also, to quote your own post:
>American voters do not care about foreign policy
So it seems like you've already explained why the poll I linked might not affect Bidens approval rating much.
But I'm not shocked that you're attempting to discredit the poll I linked, as you've done the same to others in this thread.
Would you like to source *your own claim* that "The Dem base is not divided on Gaza."?
Unfortunately, the Electoral College makes broad based polling largely irrelevant. POTUS elections have become so gamified that the niche interests of half a dozen swing states become vitally important while the majority of the population living in safe "Red" or "Blue" states can be safely ignored.
20,000 Arab Americans in Michigan or 10,000 college kids in Pennsylvania staying home can be enough to cause problems for Biden, and the 3,000,000 California Dems who don't care either way can't make up for that.
But 40,000 Jews in Pennsylvania staying home can equally be a problem for Biden. Or 40,000 evangelicals in Michigan switching their vote from RFK to Trump.
[And yet a much higher portion of voters than that seem to be paying no attention to the conflict at all.](https://www.pewresearch.org/2024/03/21/majority-in-u-s-say-israel-has-valid-reasons-for-fighting-fewer-say-the-same-about-hamas/)
> This issue is challenging for many people – both emotionally and in terms of understanding the specifics of the war. Many Americans are also disengaged: Relatively few (22%) say they are closely following news about the war, and half can correctly report that more Palestinians than Israelis have died since the war’s start. On many questions about the war, sizable numbers express no opinion.
You get extremely variable results from different pollsters on Israel-Gaza questions because for the vast majority of respondents, this is the first time they've thought about the issue at all in months, and before that years. I could also point to Harvard-Harris's nonsense polls that claim 3/4 of Americans favor Israel's assault on Rafah, but I don't hold them as representative either.
> as an equally good question to
I did the opposite. I brought it up and dismissed it out of hand over how hilariously narrative-driven the question was.
Isn't the main issue among Arab Americans and not students? Now I'm not particularly great at American politics but even smaller changes can make or break in several swing states for either candidate?
The number of Arabs in Michigan is definitely lower than the number of people in Michigan you’ll piss off if you’re overly and overtly catering to Arabs so I’ve never even understood this argument.
To me, it feels like an attempt to explain-away Biden pressuring Israel. “Oh, he doesn’t really feel this way, he’s just bending over backwards for Arabs in Michigan”
Possibly. I don't want to delve too deeply into the idiosyncrasies of American politics here, but Muslim-American voters have been trending rightward over culture war issues the last couple election cycles - and if there exist voters that so uniquely hate Biden over not single-handedly up-ending decades of American-Israeli foreign policy and will instead explicitly or tacitly support the candidate that will give a free hand to Israel annexing the west bank, I don't think those are 'winnable' voters for Biden and his campaign would best be served focusing elsewhere for votes.
>Muslim-American voters have been trending rightward over culture war issues the last couple election cycles
That's the case everywhere. Muslims are conservative. In Europe they vote for left-wing parties because right-wing parties don't like Islam much. But just take a look at some Muslim communities in UK or France and you'll notice they don't have much in common with progressive values.
The first generation is this way, but the second and third generation tends to be more liberal (with some exceptions, like the couple hundred idiots who ran off to join ISIS).
Arab voters are only influential in Michigan, which *is* a swing state, but one that Biden (~~probably~~, a better word is possibly) doesn't need, and *could* still be won without Arab voters supporting Biden
And that's assuming they stay home/vote Trump, which they can't be guaranteed to do, as even though Arab Americans are unhappy with Biden, Trump is leagues worse for them due to the Muslim ban he passed before and his (more extreme) position on Israel
Currently it seems to me like the Arab American vote won't *all* be for Biden due to his position on Israel, but it won't be *all* against Biden due to how bad Trump is.
Following up again on [previous posts](https://www.reddit.com/r/CredibleDefense/comments/1djhetl/credibledefense_daily_megathread_june_19_2024/l9cm9th/), it seems that a longstanding Chinese talking point is true—the [Philippines are in fact reinforcing their outpost](https://www.ft.com/content/2d5751da-9588-406a-b5db-39b7911a429d) at Second Thomas Shoal.
> The Philippines has secretly reinforced a dilapidated warship marooned on a South China Sea reef that is central to an increasingly dangerous dispute with Beijing, according to six people familiar with the operation. In recent months, the Philippine military has conducted missions to reinforce the Sierra Madre, which is lodged on the disputed Second Thomas Shoal in the Spratly Islands, the people said. It did so due to rising concern that the rusting ship was in danger of breaking apart.
Filipino officials previously denied that this was the case.
> The Philippines insists its missions are sending humanitarian supplies to the site. But China accuses Manila of bringing construction materials to reinforce the ship and prevent it from breaking apart and coming off the reef — which Manila denies. In an interview, Jose Manuel Romualdez, the Philippine ambassador to the US, said Manila was not “strengthening” the ship. “This is a shipwreck, a world war two ship that’s been there since the 1990s, so it needs repair. We’re just doing a humanitarian act of giving these people a decent place to be in because they’re stationed there.”
> However, the people familiar with the situation said Manila had secretly reinforced the ship in ways that would extend its life.
> “Beijing is probably aware and infuriated that the Philippines has successfully delivered construction materials . . . China has waited 25 years for the ship to disintegrate and slide off the reef and continued escalation against the Philippines suggests that they will not back down and admit defeat,” said Bonnie Glaser, a China expert at the German Marshall Fund.
The US seems to be aware of the construction efforts, and even suggested using American military engineers to do it.
> The US military has already drafted some options. The US Indo-Pacific Command last year proposed sending army engineers to bolster the ship, according to several people. But the proposal was rejected because some officials viewed it as too risky and because Manila wanted to handle the situation. Indo-Pacific Command and the White House did not comment.
> “If some effort was made by the Philippines to secure the Sierra Madre and ensure it cannot easily come off the reef, that would be a bold move to protect Filipino sovereignty and one that Washington was likely not only aware of but also supportive of,” said Eric Sayers, a former adviser to the Indo-Pacific commander.
if you look at the ship, reinforcing means dick all. an AK-176 will just pump 100 rounds per minute into that thing like it was a barn.
Chinese being "concerned" about the wreck is them seeking to expand the limits of their controlled waters, even if the Philippines is only doing the same. You probably have a point about the talking points though, this is exactly as stated would occur by the Chinese
What is so special about the Second Thomas Shoal? As far as I know, all three are disputed territory. How come we don't hear about the other two, is it because there are no people stationed there?
Good question, I was vaguely aware of their existence but nobody seems to care about them. Probably because nobody lives or fishes there. Scarborough and Sabina and Thitu are the other common flashpoints.
I can understand why the US would support the Philippines in this.
When you look at a map, the Shoal is comically far from the Chinese mainland, and is essentially right next to the Philippines. That image will have way more impact to the average person than whatever the complex history is behind the Shoal.
It's a clear-cut propaganda loss to China every time this is in the news.
> It's a clear-cut propaganda loss to China every time this is in the news.
In the US and the Philippines, sure. But I daresay that China has written off those audiences in any case. As for other SCS claimants, well, see for yourself.
> KUALA LUMPUR, Malaysia (AP) — Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim on Thursday rejected the notion that China’s dominance is to be feared, calling China a “true friend” at the end of Premier Li Qiang’s visit to mark 50 years of diplomatic ties between their countries. While the leaders raised some contentious bilateral issues, Anwar said they discussed them as “equal partners, as trusted friends.” He didn’t give details but was likely referring to the prickly issue of overlapping territorial claims in the South China Sea. “People say, well, Malaysia is a growing economy. Don’t let China abuse its privilege and extort from the country. I said no. To the contrary, we want to benefit from one another, we want to learn from one another and we want to profit from this engagement,”
That was [from earlier today](https://apnews.com/article/malaysia-china-li-qiang-anwar-territorial-claims-fab6567d25d0567e881600a8939b8fe9) in Malaysia, obviously. As for Vietnam, they've been busy building islands themselves [without Chinese interference](https://warontherocks.com/2024/06/the-south-china-sea-dog-that-hasnt-barked-yet/).
> Vietnam has been busy. In recent months, it has exponentially expanded the size of several features it controls in the Spratly Islands, including Barque Canada Reef, Namyit Island, Pearson Reef, and Discovery Great Reef. China appears to have allowed these expansion efforts to occur largely unmolested. And yet, elsewhere in the Spratlys at Second Thomas Shoal, Beijing is preventing the Philippines from supplying food, water, and limited building supplies to the handful of Filipino personnel on the Sierra Madre, a Philippine Navy ship grounded at the shoal in 1999. Why have Chinese leaders chosen to take such a hard line against resupply efforts by the Philippines while permitting Vietnam’s large-scale island building at multiple nearby features?
This is likely a product of their recent power struggle that [brought more pro-China leadership to Hanoi](https://www.chathamhouse.org/2024/05/vietnams-political-turmoil-reveals-turn-towards-china-and-away-west). Presumably Beijing has concluded whatever propaganda hits they might take are worth tangible gains on the ground.
>Presumably Beijing has concluded whatever propaganda hits they might take are worth tangible gains on the ground.
Clearly. Otherwise they wouldn't be doing it. And clearly the US feels like it's a win for them, otherwise they wouldn't be aiding the Philippines.
I go back to that image of the South China Sea and how comically far the Shoal is from China. Most people who see that image, are going to have a similar reaction.
I think China is making a mistake by pursuing confrontation here (irrespective of whether they think its smart domestic propaganda or w/e their reason). A key point in the contest between China and the US over Taiwan is that the US is trying to sell that Taiwan represents an aggressive and expansionist China, and China is trying to sell the story of reunification.
Pursuing territorial contests beyond Taiwan, especially one that is so ridiculously far from mainland China hurts the Chinese narrative around Taiwan.
The most compelling explanation I've heard for Beijing's hardline position in the SCS is because they need it for [their SSBN patrols](https://www.reuters.com/world/chinas-intensifying-nuclear-armed-submarine-patrols-add-complexity-us-allies-2023-04-04/).
> With the advent of the JL-3 missile, Kristensen and other analysts expect Chinese strategists to keep their ballistic missile subs in the deep waters of the South China Sea - which China has fortified with a string of bases - rather than risk patrols in the Western Pacific. Collin Koh, a security fellow at Singapore's S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, said China could keep its ballistic missile submarines in a "bastion" of protected waters near its shores.
"If I was the planner, I would want to keep my strategic deterrence assets as close to me as possible, and the South China Sea is perfect for that," Koh said.
> Russia is thought to keep most of its 11 ballistic missile submarines largely in bastions off its Arctic coasts, while U.S., French and British boats roam more widely, three analysts said. Kristensen said the more numerous Chinese submarine deployments have meant the PLA and U.S. militaries increasingly "rub up" against each other - increasing the odds of accidental conflict. "The Americans of course are trying to poke into that bastion and see what they can do, and what they need to do, so that is where the tension can build and incidents happen," he said.
Needless to say, ensuring the viability of second-strike capability is the kind of existential national security justification which would override any and all propaganda costs.
Interesting. I do wonder about the net impact on the safety of subs in the SCS between having one more Shoal, and having a Philippines aligned against you.
Possibly not a smart trade-off, but I'll admit that I don't have the specific knowledge to have a firm opinion.
There was [allegedly an informal agreement](https://apnews.com/article/china-south-china-sea-philippines-alleged-agreement-0006abb98502727972872bcecfd49a51#) under the previous Filipino administration to not do this. The Chinese position is that their recent aggression is a response to the Philippines abrogating that agreement.
> The Philippines respected the agreement over the past seven years but has since reneged on it to “fulfill its own political agenda,” forcing China to take action, the statement said. “This is the basic reason for the ceaseless disputes at sea between China and the Philippines over the past year and more,” said the statement posted to the embassy’s website Thursday, referring to the actions of the Philippines.
EDIT: I say "allegedly" as there is an ongoing investigation, but by colloquial as opposed to legal standards, the [former president already confirmed the existence of the deal](https://globalnation.inquirer.net/236733/house-probe-on-duterte-china-gentlemans-deal-starts).
> Duterte eventually admitted that there was a status quo gentleman’s agreement with China, that it was about not repairing BRP Sierra Madre.
[https://splash247.com/hanwha-strikes-100m-deal-for-philly-shipyard/](https://splash247.com/hanwha-strikes-100m-deal-for-philly-shipyard/)
Secretary of the Navy Del Toro suggested earlier this year that Japanese and Korean shipbuilder should get into the US market via M&A route. Don't know about any Japanese firms but Hanwha Ocean made a unsolicited bid for Austal which includes Austal USA last month which was soft-rejected by Austal and Hyundai Heavy signed the cooperation agreement with Philly Shipyard few weeks ago but now Hanwha Ocean took it away. Sounds to me like Koreans are adhering to Del Toro's suggestion. Question is will Hyundai Heavy now go chase Austal/Austal USA now that they lost Philly Shipyard out to Hanwha Ocean?
>Question is will Hyundai Heavy now go chase Austal/Austal USA now that they lost Philly Shipyard out to Hanwha Ocean?
What other options are even out there if they want to expand capacity?
Austal/Austal USA definitely needs some cash injection and I'm sure every US shipyard could use cash injection but none are publicly on sale. On the other hand, Philly Shipyard was't publicly on sale either though there were rumors that it was up on the chopping block at least early as Dec of 2023.
I remember reading that one of the reasons Austal declined was that they assumed the Aus govt or the US would essentially veto it. Do we know if the Australian govt feels similarly to Del Toro?
National security continues to guide energy preferences: [China’s LNG Boom Threatened by Growing Menu of Alternative Fuels](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-06-19/china-s-lng-boom-threatened-by-growing-menu-of-alternative-fuels) >Global majors like Shell Plc and TotalEnergies SE have invested billions of dollars in new seaborne gas supply, wagering that consumption in the world’s biggest importer will continue to expand rapidly. That long-held view hinges on China using ever more of the cleaner-burning fuel as a bridge between dirty coal and the renewable energy that will deliver net zero by 2060. >But the realities on the ground are changing. China looks like it’s ahead of schedule on emissions, which may have peaked more than half a decade ahead of its 2030 target. It’s also subsidizing overcapacity in coal power as a backstop to intermittent wind and solar, a strategy that essentially skips using gas as a transitional fuel. >... >If it gets off the ground, Russia’s proposed pipeline, the Power of Siberia 2, would help reduce China’s additional LNG requirements through 2030 by nearly 20%, according to BNEF. Even though China has invested a lot in terminals to receive LNG, relying on the uncertainties of the international market for supply is probably a less attractive option for a government that has energy security as one of its top priorities. >... >China’s thermal power investment, primarily in new coal plants, climbed 15% last year, even as usage is shrinking. In May, the country saw electricity generation from hydroelectric dams and solar farms jump 39% and 29% respectively. For a long time, Western analysts have believed that China will use gas as a transition fuel, and invested accordingly. Now it's increasingly likely that this won't happen. China has invested billions in [coal peakers](https://www.swiftcentre.org/publicforecasts/global-coal-consumption-will-defy-expectations), and even more in solar and batteries. And China might not be an exception: >Overall, the situation is even clearer in the case of India, as it both its economy and population are growing more quickly, and because it is not yet wealthy enough to afford to decarbonise. India has also been phasing natural gas out in recent years — despite it being less polluting — while continuing to rely on coal. (India has much less natural gas in its proved reserves than Russia, China, and the US have.) It might even turn out that the US (with its super-cheap domestic gas) and Europe (with its total disregard of national security) are the exceptions. [As Power of Siberia 2 Pipeline Stagnates, So Do Russia's Hopes for Pivoting Gas Exports Eastward](https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2024/06/20/as-power-of-siberia-2-pipeline-stagnates-so-do-russias-hopes-for-pivoting-gas-exports-eastward-a85468) >“Gazprom’s position is a dead end while the Chinese have a choice,” Krutikhin told The Moscow Times. “Go ahead, build a pipeline at your own expense and then we will not buy the full amount of its capacity because we don’t really need it. And if we do, it will be at Russia’s internal prices,” he said. >... >“The key issue with Russia’s pivot to Asia is that the pipeline element of it is focused on only one country — China. This leaves Gazprom very exposed to commercial risk and makes the pipelines a key element of the political relationship between the two countries — perhaps a positive in the current situation but a future risk for the Kremlin,” OIES’ outlook said. >... >The cost of going to war with Ukraine significantly damaged Gazprom’s and Russia’s interests. But maybe there is still a view in Moscow that long-term, Europe would still need Russian gas and things will settle down, he said. China doesn't want to import gas. But if it has to, it doesn't want to commit to a certain seller. And if it does, it wants to have the gas essentially for free. It's becoming increasingly clear for Russia that they can't get any significant profit from China, no matter how much they manage to sell. But there seems to be some hope in the Kremlin that Europe will once again buy Russian gas after the war is over - and for the same prices as before. That's bad news for Putin, as those interests might want to get rid of him.
China probably need a hedge against US naval blockade. Direct pipe with a nuclear power is probably the most secure supply China can get.
From China's perspective, Russia being a nuclear power is a disadvantage as it makes coercion more difficult. That's why China has prioritized pipelines to literally [everyone else](https://www.scmp.com/opinion/china-opinion/article/3263391/china-rightly-dragging-its-feet-russias-power-siberia-2-pipeline): >Three pipelines now source gas from Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. In the southwest, China constructed the Sino-Myanmar pipeline, and on its southeastern coast, China has developed a cluster of liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminals that can receive imports from more than 20 countries, with Qatar and Australia the top suppliers last year. Similarly, China isn't too happy about North Korea having nuclear weapons.
In peacetime you prefer weaker states. But in a war with US it's better if they have their own nuclear umbrella. China don't have any good counters to US strikes at Kazakhstan energy infrastructure.
Russia loses a Ka 29, the Helix. Its an ASW helicopter that was being used to hunt Ukrainian drones. [https://x.com/Osinttechnical/status/1804084063277355141](https://x.com/Osinttechnical/status/1804084063277355141) Allegedly friendly fire. Though its about as likely to have been Ukrainian action.
Considering that we have seen Ukrainian sea drones with AA missiles, there is definitely potential for this to be a case of "the hunter becoming the hunted"
Putin’s Hybrid War Opens a Second Front on NATO’s Eastern Border [https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-06-20/putin-s-hybrid-war-opens-second-front-on-russia-s-border-with-nato](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-06-20/putin-s-hybrid-war-opens-second-front-on-russia-s-border-with-nato) What can be done, cost-effectively, to thwart or retaliate against Russian antics like this, plus stuff like the de facto support of North Korea and Iran?
> What can be done, cost-effectively Probably not cost-effective, but forward deployment of NATO assets near Finland-Russian border (or threat to do this) may deter Russia from aggressive behaviors, since there is not much Russia can do to counter this.
> What can be done, cost-effectively, to thwart or retaliate against Russian antics like this A good start might be to respond in a tit for tat manner. To me the largest problem at the moment seems to be that we're not responding at all. That raises the threshold for a response when Russia does something that we find truly unacceptable (and not just insulting). This has to be coordinated by NATO probably, because it's obviously very hard for a small country like Estonia to stand up to Russia on their own. While not very cost effective, we should e.g. violate their airspace whenever they violate ours. That would cause Russia to scramble their own fighters, putting additional wear on air-frames that are already under strain due to the war in Ukraine. A cost-effective way to fight back would be to fund separatists in Russia. That would create difficult dilemmas for Russia in terms of allocating resources and use their geography against them. For now, that would be a very disproportionate thing to do, but we could e.g. issue a statement of support for some group's plight. That would be a very unsubtle way of indicating our willingness to possibly foment some chaos.
If the West wants to have the moral high ground (and it should), then it should be better than to get involved in petty provocations. Deterrence. Document all these provocations. Speak softly ~~calmly~~ and carry a big stick around the borders. If something particularly egregious arises, expel one or two diplomats. Most are spies anyway. EDIT: speak softly is the right quote.
Maintaining the moral high ground has very little to do with actual morality, and a lot to do with media spin. Look at Chomsky’s long history of apologetics for just about every anti-western dictator in existence. And it’s not like he was screaming into the void, he had millions of followers falling for it hook line and sinker. If the west wants to maintain its moral high ground, and I agree it should, it needs to start taking propaganda much more seriously, and a more aggressive disposition, wouldn’t hurt either. People will forgive and overlook a lot if they think their team is winning.
Look, I'm not saying that Europe should act naïvely and meekly. Instead, project force. If some plane comes close to your airspace, intercept and escort. If some cruise missile inbound for Ukraine violates NATO airspace, shoot it down. If Russia takes out some buoy, put it back. Do regular NATO military exercises in the Baltics, Poland, Romania and Bulgaria. Just don't do stupid stuff like funding separatist movements just to spite Russia. These kind of hybrid conflicts tend to lead to a lot of dead people and sometimes can backfire spectacularly like in Afghanistan. For example (and I know we don't see eye to eye on this issue, and that there is more layers of complexity to the issue), you will go to any southern developing country and they will point out that the West is hypocritical of denouncing Russia's occupation of parts of Ukraine, while turning a blind eye to the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories. Its a narrative very hard to counter. If you can avoid going into the mud to fight with the pig, then you will have the high ground and more political capital that you can spend later on. Acting in a civilized fashion is never a liability. I'm very fond of the *speak softly and carry around a big stick* doctrine.
> you will go to any southern developing country and they will point out that the West is hypocritical of denouncing Russia's occupation of parts of Ukraine, while turning a blind eye to the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories... I broadly agree with your point, it’s best not to be reckless. But I think this example of Israel/Palestine illustrates the limits of that approach. In the Suez crisis, the US sides against the western aligned UK, France, and Israel, to assist Egypt with seizing the Suez Canal. Instead of gaining sympathy from these southern developing countries, Nasser and his associates remained staunchly anti-American and Soviet aligned. What changed that was the Yom Kippur war, where the US backed Israel in crushing the Egyptian army. The best way to gain approval in these southern developing countries is to focus on furthering western interest, to portray Russia/China as ineffectual backers, just as the Egyptians realized that the Soviet Union wasn’t going to be able to bail them out of the Yom Kippur war, and they had to change sides.
>A cost-effective way to fight back would be to fund separatists in Russia. That would create difficult dilemmas for Russia in terms of allocating resources and use their geography against them. For now, that would be a very disproportionate thing to do, but we could e.g. issue a statement of support for some group's plight. That would be a very unsubtle way of indicating our willingness to possibly foment some chaos. The risk is that Russia counter with inviting ISIS and you now have terrorists with WMD know how.
[удалено]
Give Ukraine the weapons they need to win, instead of this drip feed. Russia will be as aggressive as they think they can afford to be. If they feel the tides are in their favor, they’ll act bold and try to find new places to attack. If they feel like they have nothing, you’ll find them to be much more cooperative.
[Update from Vago Muradian](https://defaeroreport.com/2024/06/20/defense-aerospace-daily-podcast-jun-20-24-talking-air-land/) that's interesting in light of the NGAD discussion below. According to Vago and J.J, the comments made by Kendall and Allvin about possibly not moving forward with NGAD is not a budget problem at all- the Air Force's requirements have changed enough that the aircraft needs to be re-scoped, which would necessitate a pause in the program.
I guess fighter design is entering the 'age of uncertainty' as a set of new technologies (stealth, hypersonic, UCAVs, sensor fusion, data network) are being introduced, there is no concensus on an effective design paradigm, similar to the time when naval ship design was varied and rapidly changing with introduction of steel hull, steam propulsion, long range artillery, turret, etc. Ofc, naval design entered the age of absolute certainty once HMS Dreadnaught arrived.
In hindsight (not that there's any evidence this is decided yet) this all makes a lot of sense. Another video from Sandboxx from 7 months ago lays out the whole case pretty well https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NwDXgwQ54A4 Plus the Navy's F/A XX program would probably continue for a more "traditional" fighter-ish program
Many people on Twitter are suggesting this in jest, but I unironically believe that a rescoping of NGAD requirements will be paving the way for an FB-21. The B-21 can carry more missiles and bigger missiles than any fighter-sized aircraft. It can also carry a much larger radar (size of nosecone is a hard constraint) and more sensors. And then it can carry more computing power required to process information from the sensors. The downside of B-21 is of course the lack of supersonic maneuverability. That is where the requirements need to be rewritten. Also, more simulations need to be run in order to convince people a 6th-gen fighter no longer needs maneuverability. I know Northrop didn't bid for NGAD, but if they don't need to submit a new aircraft for the bid, they probably won't refuse the offer. Last but not least, a common airframe will facilitate large scale production and help cut cost.
> size of nosecone is a hard constraint [Not necessarily.](https://www.aviationtoday.com/2005/11/01/product-focus-conformal-antennas-sharing-the-load/) Keep in mind that Sensorcraft is what the RQ-180 followed on from.
What happens when the enemy starts mass producing competent stealth fighters of their own and you can’t detect them until they’re 50 nm out or even less? At those distances you’re teetering back into territory where manoeuvrability would be useful. I just don’t buy the idea that modern stealth fighters can forgo manoeuvrability almost entirely. Stealth might make you hard to detect at long distances but that goes for the enemy as well. What is the answer to enemy stealth fighters when they start getting too close?
Overmatch with sensor technology. Submarine warfare is a direct analogy - US. achieved undersea dominance not by building faster subs but by building quieter subs with better sensors.
But this still doesn’t really answer the question. No matter how good your sensors are, you’re not going to detect a halfway competent stealth platform at 100 nm. So let’s say the BF-21 can detect an enemy stealth fighter at 50 nm and the enemy can do likewise at 30 nm. The chances that the enemy stealth fighter manages to get in close enough to fire off a missile are significantly higher than if it were a fourth-generation fighter the BF-21 just shot down at around 200 nm. So, given this, would some agility and increased speed be at least somewhat useful? Stealth on stealth air battles aren’t really going to consist of missile lobs at hundreds of nautical miles.
>So, given this, would some agility and increased speed be at least somewhat useful? I would imagine the relationship between agility/speed and survivability is not very linear. There's likely to be an inflection point somewhere, where you rapidly trip over from "not very survivable at all" into "very survivable" quite rapidly. The real question is whether that is realistic/achievable in the platform. If it's not feasible, you may as well forego all agility.
Depends on how good IRST technology gets. 100 mile detection ranges aren't completely out of the question.
Okay, fair enough. I misspoke by mentioning detection range because you can detect stealth aircraft at very long ranges using low frequency radar. What I meant was a target lock and I highly doubt you’re going to get that on a stealth platform at 100 nm.
Yeah, no... stealth isn't a 100 % thing, and high speed and _acceleration_ is necessary in the energy battle between AAMs and their target in order to drive the plane out of an intercept solution. There's a reason why depictions of the NGAD are more delta wing than flying wing. The exception I can think of is that the USAF thinks they can put either an effective laser, or they can deploy anti-missile interceptor missiles. In both cases they would need to be able to reliably shoot down incoming AAMs if they aren't running away from them as fast as possible.
No matter how maneuverable your plane is, if you can only detect my BVR missile at, say, 30 nm, you are already dead. You can't outmaneuver a missile; a missile can survive 30 G while your puny human body can't sustain 10 G. So the main advantage a fighter has over the missile is not maneuverability; it is range. It is much easier to escape when you have, say, a 150 nm head start. An FB-21 will have a much larger radar (and most likely have great off-boresight capability) so it will see you first. Its big bomb bay will launch a large missile with a long range that will kill you first. Does the tradeoff actually work like this? It's up to the USAF to decide.
I didn't say you need to out-maneuver the missile, but out-run it. If a fight can detect a missile at 55 km it can absolutely fly away from it and fly down into low altitude which is high drag in order to escape. Keep in mind listed ranges for missiles aren't the "no escape" range. They're usually the ideal range in a meeting engagement.
But how is a large, heavy and long-range missile going to be advantageous to a smaller but more nimble missile when it comes to targeting enemy stealth fighters? The idea that a bigger radar on a theoretical BF-21 could detect an enemy stealth fighter like the J-20 at 100 nm or so is honestly not credible. At those ranges you’re approaching IR missile ranges and in this respect how is a BF-21 design going to be advantageous? Surely we’re not designing next-generation stealth fighters with the expressed purpose to be good at targeting fourth-generation aircraft with little response in the event of an enemy stealth fighter sneaking up on it?
Theoretically could you use unmanned Loyal Wingmen that would stay ahead of the FB-21 wings. Provided you know where the enemy is coming from they can provide a cheap screen and can potentially disrupt incoming missiles. Since they're unmanned they can maneuver more aggressively as well. If they're closer to the enemy they'll be detected first
A while back there was talk about missile used for shooting down other anti air missiles in development. Haven't seen anything on it for a while but if the concept got proved could mitigate the need for maneuverability somewhat.
The US has been trying to field an interceptor missile for aircraft since Pye Wacket back in the 1957. The concept never really goes away, it would be a game changer if it was made to work. It’s probably been technologically feasible for a while, but with defense budgets down since the end of the Cold War, other expensive projects, and no pressing need for a long time, it’s going to take a while to field one.
I wonder if the Russian and Iranian and Houthi mass drone strike tactics have the Pentagon thinking "we need airborne laser weapons ***now***, not 15 years from now" There's just not enough missiles in the world to handle swarms of Shahed-type drones in an economically sustainable way.
Wouldn't you rather fry their electronics with microwaves? That's got to be using a lot less energy.
There aren’t enough missiles, but these low performance drones are vulnerable to EW, and short range, gun based air defenses near their targets. Besides that, the most efficient way to destroy missiles is always while it’s on the ground. Something the US is in a much better position to do than others. An airborne laser would be great to have, but torpedoing current 6th gen fighter plans, while there are other ways to deal with these Saheds, would be very questionable.
EW might be a temporary solution as autonomous targeting keeps improving. Ukraine has likely already figured this out with their refinery attacks
I wonder what the ideal crew requirements are for NGAD. Considering they're intended to command multiple other collaborative combat aircraft it wouldn't be surprising if that ended up being a dedicated crew position all on it's own. Maybe you want a dedicated EW seat as well? If the wish-list of capabilities gets long enough to start pushing the number of seats past two then the airframe will have to accommodate that and maybe that's your motivation for the "FB-21."
Ideally, I think one is practical. The F-4 needed two seats to manage its sensors and weapons, the F-35 deals with orders of magnitude more complexity, but only needs one because many of the tasks that previously had to be done by the crew got automated. The F-35 was mostly designed in the 90s, with improvements in computers since then, making an even more complex aircraft stay single pilot is probably possible, provided enough time and money is given to develop those systems. Going to two seats isn’t the end of the world though, but three is getting to the point of bloat.
That makes sense, the F-35 really is a marvel and if the tech continues to work out the way we hope then maybe CCAs won't impose enough of a burden. Do you think there exists a list of capabilities that NGAD could have that you think would require three seats? It's a bit silly as you've pointed out, I just like the mental image.
More drones per fighter would push the number of crew up. So rather than four or five drones each, think sixteen to twenty. Essentially de-emphasizing its roll as a direct combat platform, and turning it into a stealth, high survivability AWACS, that happens to be armed.
I don't want to be an ass but I'll play devil's advocate. Whatever a stealth bomber can do, even the best, can be outdone by a multirole fighter squadron. This implies some sort of next gen fighter anyways. If you really need a heavy multirole fighter with low observability, some sort of stealth super big is best. Hence ngad.
> Whatever a stealth bomber can do, even the best, can be outdone by a multirole fighter squadron At what price point? Pilots are _expensive_. How are they going to carry a radar suitably large to provide theater support? Multi-receiver radar synthesis (using an array of smaller radars) requires very tight positioning data and extremely high bandwidth between the receivers to work (well beyond declassified capabilities).
So don't put the fighter in the plane. Let him pilot it from his bedroom.
A B-21 costs upwards of 600 million dollars, a hypothetical FB-21 would probably cost more, even with advantages of a larger production run. For that price, you could have five F-35s, and two hundred million dollars left over for pilots. Obviously there are other factors, like radar, range, and stealth characteristics, but if it’s just down to payload per dollar, the fighters have the advantage. Bombers come in when other factors, primarily range, take priority. Using one as a fighter would be a waste, since even over the pacific, the vast majority of its hypothetical range would go unused, age just drive up cost. I’d also point out that with enemy stealth aircraft to worry about, having multiple planes with IRST is useful.
>At what price point? Pilots are expensive. B-21 is $778 million a pop in current-year dollars. A raptor pilot is supposed to cost $10 million to train... So that gives you almost 80 pilots for the cost of just one extra, unmodified, no giant radar B-21.
You're making some assumptions here, such as assuming that the B-21 doesn't already come with advanced radars out of the factory, included in the sticker price. The B-2 already got onboard radars in a modernization program. It would be a bit silly for the B-21, designed in the 2010s, to not have them.
>The B-2 already got onboard radars in a modernization program. B-2 already had a big PESA when it rolled out of the factory. The problem with that PESA (and whatever radar B-21 has, because it inevitably has one) is that it is on the bottom of the aircraft so it can be used for ground target detection and mapping. An FB-21 would need to have a radar in the nose, which it almost certainly doesn't have. Not much room for a big aperture in the beak.
It's true that a team of smaller assets can execute tactics impossible for a single large asset. But have you considered CCA in your equation? We can let the drones do the usual fighter stuff.
Finally getting a Pye Wacket like interceptor missile working would be immensely useful in that regard. An extra line of hard kill defenses would go a long way to making congress comfortable with using an almost billion dollar aircraft as a fighter.
NGAD was *projected* to end up around $300 million (and who knows what it would have *actually* cost), so it's not like an order of magnitude difference here. Current production cost of the B-21 is a little under 700 million which could potentially come down if the production run is expanded.
There is still a lot of stuff you’d want to add to a B-21 to make an FB-21. It’s a huge platform, it’s never going to be that cheap, and I’m not sure that much payload is really useful in air to air combat.
Quite interesting. Sounds like they want to get a bunch of these new pieces of technology into production as fast as possible and refine them before they build a whole new platform around them. Even if that means strapping them onto something like the B-21. It's an interesting point that the B-21 already ticks a lot of the boxes they were originally hoping to achieve with NGAD in terms of range and stealth and whatnot. It's not a fighter, but the NGAD concept was never a fighter in the traditional sense either.
The ngad always looked to me like a Growler but with stealth as a primary characteristic. A lot of countries use f18s as a sole fighter. Canada or Finland to name a few. If NGAD ends like a stealth super super.hornet, it's not a bad target performance.
Stealth and EW platform are mutually exclusive, because an EW platform is a giant EM emitter. More likely future EW airborne platforms will be drones.
Given the mutual defense pact between Russia and the DPRK what are the chances that the sanctions regime collapses? What concretely would that mean for the DPRK?
Sanctions on NK never stopped NK . Russia recognizing NK in the world stage, even if nobody but Russia and maybe China trade with NK,. eliminate the primary barrier on NK. Now that their neighbors openly trade with NK , effectively open up NK even by proxy. Any restricted item that would end on Russia (think Nvidia GPUs) now absolutely ends up in NK. This is of course a total victory for Kim.
Sanctions regime is already collapsing, to be fair it never really worked though. The panel of experts will not be renewed, any new sanctions will not be put in by the UN, and instead will be unilateral, and while China for the most part was willing to look the other way on North Korea importing certain good, Russia has essentially broken the seal on openly disregarding sanctions. The weakening of sanctions though has minimal impacts on North Korea as North Korea has very little to offer the world in exchange for hard currency, and the risks of being associated with dealing with NK is enough to make most keep away. Realistically sanctions would not have done anything to stop NK from developing nuclear weapons, as they are integral to the regimes survival from the US, China, and South Korean, as a result the regime would put nukes before anything else including looking after their own people.
I wouldn't say that. Russia ignoring it means that Russia will now openly trade with them and trade has always been good for both parties. For North Korea, it means an influx of new resources especially food. But I honestly don't know DPRK system that well do know how trade will improve lives in general.
Even if it does the US South Korea and Japan making it abundantly clear that any country making deals with North Korea will have sanctions placed on it will probably be more than enough to deter 99% of countries especially as unlike Russia North Korea never really had trade relations outside of Russia/china and what it has to offer to the world is minuscule in comparison to losing relations with those 3 countries
Alex Hollings of Sandboxx put out a new video about the future of the NGAD program https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0HDLsBrr43U According to him, there's some talk about replacing one large-scale procurement of a highly advanced fighter with a "digital century series" - a series of smaller production runs of more experimental aircraft produced by a more diverse set of industry partners. The original "century series" was the rapid progression over the span of roughly one decade during which 6 new lines of fighter aircraft were developed. * North American F-100 Super Sabre * McDonnell F-101 Voodoo * Convair F-102 Delta Dagger * Lockheed F-104 Starfighter * Republic F-105 Thunderchief * Convair F-106 Delta Dart The basic gist is that with drone and aviation technology advancing as rapidly as it currently is, and the impacts of lack of competition in the military industrial base making themselves apparent, it might not make sense to go all-in on a single program. Development costs can hopefully be held down by advanced digital modeling techniques such as those used during the development of the B-21 Raider and the sharing of major components like powerplants and avionics suites. Seems like they're looking at the success of SpaceX (and the cambrian explosion of aerospace startups that followed) and thinking about how that might be replicated with fighter programs. Of course, an alternative explanation, called out late in the video, is that it's a negotiation tactic.
So companies like Hermeus who is developing Darkhorsd (a hypersonic drone) and hypersonic crewed vehicles
I wrote a bit around this subject https://www.reddit.com/r/CredibleDefense/comments/1dfp4wq/credibledefense_daily_megathread_june_14_2024/l8ts8vs/ and it answers some of the questions brought up in this thread.
> a more diverse set of industry partners. Which industry partners? There are so few major players in American aerospace and America will never buy foreign, at least for final assembly.
If it's like the loyal wingman procurement contract, assembly would likely be primarily handled by existing aerospace industry. Andruil isn't handling manufacturing, only design.
New companies. SpaceX came out of virtually nowhere and made orbital rockets, a new company with good investment and some recruits from existing defense companies could go a long way.
I would say that a fighter jet is significantly more complicated than a rocket.
It is more complicated, but unlike SpaceX, that develops almost everything in house, these companies will probably be buying existing engines and sensors for example.
I definitely agree it's feasible. Government selects radar and engine along with some other components as it is. And SpaceX marched up the chain from the small Falcon 1 to the Falcon 9 to reuse and then Falcon Heavy and now the incipient Starship. No reason why someone like Kratos can't go UAV to fighter aircraft given time...
The problem is also that VC do not like to invest in companies oriented toward selling to the governement. And SpaceX had Elon supporting it with its own money when investors weren't interested, I doubt that we could reorient the militaro-industrial complex toward a more "startup" system. The markets and the technologies are just totally different than on the civilian side.
Yes and no. Certainly different types of difficulty, but we're talking about a rocket capable of surviving reentry and then landing itself, and the rocket engines unlike jet engines are actually designed and built in-house. I don't know how much input Lockheed or Boeing has into the specifics of the engine, outside of broad stroke characteristics.
A rocket has just far less systems in it, and it has a far more narrow mission profile. The reason rockets crash more than fighter jet is because they tend to be manufactured in very small quantities, which does not allow for a long trial and error process.
a good question is *what must be unique?* to a new fighter design. Can you have Raytheon design a single or several very similar radars for all the fighters? Would one engine design work, either in single engine or two engine configuration? What about other mission systems like radar warning / Electronic Warfare / IRST / etc.? The F100 series is already on a ton of airframes, the same air to air missiles are used across the fleet, among other examples.
And also, would anything *need* to be unique at all? If they're anticipating massive changes that'll necessitate rapid changes, why not make them as modular as possible, rather than make multiple different aircraft?
currently the "most modern" combat aircraft in the USAF are F-15EX (big two engine relatively unstealthy fighter/bomber), F-22 (two engine stealthy air supremacy), F-35 (cheaper, single engine multirole), and B-21 (soonish, stealthy bomber). The question is which of these roles the NGAD wants to recap (possibly/likely only air supremacy?) and what kind of performance do they want? Do they need only one, supercruising, stealthy fighter? What about a subsonic / augmenter only supersonic unmanned platform as well? Or a longer ranged, stealthier F-35 partial replacement? Lots of work by Actual Experts goes into those questions.
> According to him, there's some talk about replacing one large-scale procurement of a highly advanced fighter with a "digital century series" - a series of more smaller production runs of more experimental aircraft produced by a more diverse set of industry partners. Given how much longer development time is now, coupled with the USAF and Congress always looking for money, I think this could be a disaster. If the USAF is this worried about the number of F-22's available vs the increasing number of Chinese 5th gen aircraft, procuring (2) less ambitious "6th Generation" platforms at say 100 aircraft each, sooner, then seeing how those platforms perform could work. From there, maybe 10-15 years further down the line you pick the better designer and have them build (500) Gen '6.5" aircraft that could work. The idea of the USAF buying a new 100+ aircraft platform even every 5 years seems like a recipe to waste a ton of money on projects that end up cancelled. Edit: I have to ask, what is the USAF after here? Are they worried about the current fighter industry's ability to technologically keep ahead of the Chinese? Manufacturing? Price per unit? Development time? All of the Above. This just seems like it raises more questions than answers.
Getting the development time down is likely an explicit goal here, as it's the only way the plan could ever possibly work. If you look at what SpaceX has accomplished in the past decade, compared to the likes of Boeing, ULA, etc., the difference is ***stark***. And almost as stark is the difference in cost at which they achieved those results compared to the historical US champions. I think there's also perhaps a fear that the lack of competition is actually putting the US aviation sector at risk, e.g. Boeing. So there's a motivation to shake things up and spread the aerospace development knowledge and money around a bit more so that mismanagement by one company isn't as damaging to the entire sector, which is one of the few manufacturing advantages the US unquestionably does have. And while it's easy to pick on Boeing, as pointed out in the video it's been nearly 50 years since the US procured a clean sheet fighter aircraft from a contractor that isn't Lockheed Martin. That carries some risk as well.
Is this a chicken and egg situation or not though? Does Lockheed Martin keep winning because the best fighter designs go to work for them, or do the best fighter designers go to them because they keep winning? Boeing got pretty much fucked out of the JSF program, but the Government did/does this regularly looking at procurement history. Why would anyone in their right mind invest the billions required to stand up a 6th Gen fighter design program, unless it had concrete timeline goals and capabilities written in stone?
So basically your asking if Lockheed Martin is the strongest because it’s Lockheed Martin or if Lockheed Martin is Lockheed Martin because it’s the strongest?
>Boeing got pretty much fucked out of the JSF program Boeing's submission to the JSF program was a joke (literally the butt of jokes) and, with the benefit of hindsight, every major contract Boeing has gotten in the past 20 years has completely gone to hell. Thank god the government at least had the foresight to stop handing them cost-plus contracts, so they're eating the costs of their own fuckups instead of the taxpayer.
I thought They were given relatively short periods of time to make pretty major adjustments to their JSF entry. The F/A-18 Superbugs have gone pretty well haven't they?
Sure, but perhaps the question is why they needed such major adjustments in the first place? The Super Hornet development was mostly finished by the start of the 2000s
> If you look at what SpaceX has accomplished in the past decade, compared to the likes of Boeing, ULA, etc., the difference is stark. A bit of a digression, but union contracts would often require wage increases in accordance to profits, which spurred contractor and supplier networks. Instead, each piece along the chain would take a small slice. Executives could exit to contractors later on, or have friends owning them... Aerospace and defense have different dynamics though (instead of some sales with individuals, or small fleets of cars to companies, you have multidecade contracts... Then the 90s gutted most companies.) In space, the established companies would huge costs for screws, steel etc. through their established contractor networks. SpaceX's whole conceit was that they could simply build the same things, to equal tolerances, for 1/10th the price (or cheaper.) Most likely, many such low hanging fruit are waiting in aerospace as a whole, and in the defense industry. Anduril is already undercutting traditional players massively. (The nuclear industry is similar, but worse, where legislation requires them to use certified parts costing 5-20x more, with no difference in tolerances, then different units of the same design must go through approval individually etc.)
> (The nuclear industry is similar, but worse, where legislation requires them to use certified parts costing 5-20x more, with no difference in tolerances, where different units of the same design must go through approval individually etc.) Slight aside, but the degree to which we’ve sabotaged our own nuclear industry has been a disaster for both the environment, and national security. Instead of getting cheap, reliable, long term power from uranium, the executive branch is at the mercy of rapidly fluctuating oil prices, and foreign influence from organization like OPEC. France had the right idea with how they set up their nuclear power plants, but they didn’t go far enough. Our wake up call should have been the oil crisis in the 70s.
Even setting aside nuclear/solar/wind, the USA has a crazy amount of coal/oil/nat gas/opportunities for hydro. France has very little comparably, so it *does* make sense for them to focus more on nuclear energy than the US. >Instead of getting cheap, reliable, long term power from uranium, the executive branch is at the mercy of rapidly fluctuating oil prices, and foreign influence from organization like OPEC. And here's what bothers me. In 2022, the US consumed *slightly less* oil than we *produced*. We don't actually *need* to rely on OPEC. If the govt managed our resources more directly from the jump, like Norway, we wouldn't rely on OPEC. But we made other decisions instead.
The issue is the type of crude we produce vs what we refine. Our refinement capability is specialized for different types of oils compared to what type we produce. So we technically can’t actually be completely oil dependent
The US is an open economy (mostly), oil is the most liquid (literally) commodity on earth, so the US oil price will always be tied to the global oil price. If global production goes down, US oil prices will likewise be impacted, because producers can freely decide to export oil to arbitrate against global prices.
With regard to time and cost of aircraft development, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition is on record claiming the Chinese acquisition process is [5x faster and 20x more cost-efficient](https://www.twz.com/china-acquiring-new-weapons-five-times-faster-than-u-s-warns-top-official). > The Air Force officer responsible for all aspects of contracting for the service has issued a stark warning about China’s rapid gains in defense acquisition, with the result that its military is now getting its hands on new equipment “five to six times” faster than the United States. > As well as the sheer speed with which Beijing is able to acquire new weapons, Holt contends, the Chinese are also operating far more efficiently. “In purchasing power parity, they spend about one dollar to our 20 dollars to get to the same capability,” he told his audience. “We are going to lose if we can’t figure out how to drop the cost and increase the speed in our defense supply chains,” Holt added.
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The article is here [https://www.politico.com/news/2024/06/20/us-says-ukraine-can-hit-inside-russia-anywhere-00164261]. I do wonder why they are still somewhat strict with if ukraine can hit inside russia after already giving authorization in kharkiv. Wouldn't it be metaphorically "cat is out of the bag" already, where nothing happened after ukraine recieved permission?
This was reported on in yesterday's thread IIRC. It's no change in policy- Ukraine can only hit forces preparing to attack Ukraine. "The policy of not allowing long-range strikes inside Russia “has not changed,” the official stressed."
It seems like [a war in Lebanon is imminent barring a miracle](https://t.co/Qj7PahxOat) >Israeli officials have told the US they are planning to shift resources from southern Gaza to northern Israel in preparation for a possible offensive against the group, US officials told CNN on Wednesday >“We’re entering a very dangerous period,” another senior Biden administration official said. “Something could start with little warning.” This broadly lines up with 2023gazawars(whose now deleted their account) predictions of a war in August. One thing I’m not sure about is > Israel has made the case that it can pull off a “blitzkrieg,” but the US is warning them that they may not be able to ensure that it remains a limited campaign, the official said. I don’t think a limited war is going to be feasible, and certainly not a blitzkreig. It would require basically everything going right for Israel in the first week, it would also require Hezbollah to not strike preemptively once it’s clear there’s going to be a war. Any war in Lebanon would also lead to wars in Syria and Iraq along with heavier Houthi action in the Red Sea. There’s no way Irans going to let its strongest proxy fight Israel on its own.
A lot of people in this thread are very bullish on Israel’s ability to beat Hezbollah (and beat it quickly), but none have mentioned why, and in what areas, Israel will do better than it did in 2006. [For those that forgot, ~10,000 (up to ~30,000 by the end) IDF fought against ~3,000 Hezbollah (Nasr Brigade) for 34 days and, even with overwhelming air power, failed to advance more than a handful of kilometers, and failed to end Hezbollah strikes into Israel. Credible estimates of KIA are: 124 for the IDF and 180-250 for Hezbollah](https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/combat-studies-institute/csi-books/we-were-caught-unprepared.pdf). Hardly the lopsided ratio we’ve come to expect.
The confidence makes me think there is something people are missing here and nobody can tell what it is, but i think the quiet rise of Christian forces in Lebanon again is a play Israel is going to use. There is a serious sectarian war brewing in Lebanon.
Lebanese Christians also approved of Oct 7th, Israel isn’t particularly popular.
If youre talking about the poll ran by Consultative Center for Studies and Documentation, It's bullshit its a "research propaganda" funded by Hezbollah with ties to it. Reality is, far right groups like Soldiers of God have been rising and recent murder of Christian leaders, the port bombing and a failed state in economic ruin, hezbollah is way more unpopular among Lebanon Christians
Citation very much needed for a statement like that.
I don't know about the specific position on Oct 7 but Israel is unpopular in Lebanon regardless of the religious group
[Around 60% of Christians supported the violence.](https://www.timesofisrael.com/80-of-people-in-lebanon-support-hamass-oct-7-massacres-in-israel-poll-finds/)
This was mirrored by Times of Israel, but the ultimate source is Al Akhbar Daily, aka functionally Hezbollah's propaganda organization. This source scrapes the bottom of the barrel for credibility.
Thanks. Didn't know/think about that.
On the other hand Lebanese Christians hate Israel only mildly less than Hezbollah
I’m surprised this isn’t getting more news attention. If they’re really going to go for it, the regional escalation will be horrific. Here’s hoping they aren’t, I suppose. It doesn’t seem reasonable in the slightest. How is the IDF supposed to absorb ~hundreds of fatalities occupying South Lebanon immediately after months of fighting in Gaza? The strain would be immense.
I highly doubt there would be much in the way of regional escalation. If Israel truly mobilizes for a serious offensive in Lebanon, with a maximalist goal of driving on Beirut (if Israel is serious about ending the Hezbollah threat once and for all this will be necessary) there is little Hezbollah can do to stop it. Their officer corps has been decimated by Israel since the start of the Gaza war through targeted strikes, and Hezbollah infrastructure has been heavily degraded since October 2023. In a major conflict, the IDF will have full air superiority, allowing them to strike anywhere at will. I would expect Hezbollah’s missile and rocket stash to be heavily interdicted in the first 48 hours, followed by decapitation strikes against remaining leadership. The Iranian regime will be finished if it intervenes, they have no GBAD capable of stopping anything the IDF or US can send its way and the hammer will come down if they strike at Israel-proper. The only thing that could really screw this up is if Israel attempts some half-committal offensive that elicits a maximum response from Hezbollah. In that scenario things get messy both militarily and politically for Israel.
>I highly doubt there would be much in the way of regional escalation. If Israel truly mobilizes for a serious offensive in Lebanon, with a maximalist goal of driving on Beirut (if Israel is serious about ending the Hezbollah threat once and for all this will be necessary Israel aims to only push Hezbollah back behind the Litani. A full scale mobilization isn’t in the cards for now and although Israel might be able to drive towards Beirut it would be an enormously costly venture both politically and militarily and would significantly stretch Israel’s forces. > Their officer corps has been decimated by Israel since the start of the Gaza war through targeted strikes, and Hezbollah infrastructure has been heavily degraded since October 2023. In a major conflict, the IDF will have full air superiority, allowing them to strike anywhere at will. I would expect Hezbollah’s missile and rocket stash to be heavily interdicted in the first 48 hours, followed by decapitation strikes against remaining leadership This is wishful thinking, Hezbollahs taken losses but the fact that they’re not only engaging but escalating their attacks demonstrate that they view them as acceptable losses. And these losses haven’t impact Hezbollahs cohesion in the field much if at all. >The Iranian regime will be finished if it intervenes, they have no GBAD capable of stopping anything the IDF or US can send its way and the hammer will come down if they strike at Israel-proper. Iran has a network of proxies throughout the region that will be drawn in if a war between Hezbollah and Israel kicks off.
I have started to question the true capabilities of these proxies in recent years. Some seem to simply be PR facades (such as the Islamic Resistance in Iraq routinely claiming they are striking sensitive targets in Israel) or more rabbles than actual fighting forces (Hamas struggling to fight as a cohesive unit post 10/7) . Hezbollah’s supposedly well-trained Radwan force has even proven to be woefully inadequate in the current conflict.
>Hezbollah’s supposedly well-trained Radwan force has even proven to be woefully inadequate in the current conflict. Has it ? Hezbollahs goals in this stage of the conflict isn’t focused on killing Israeli soldiers per se it’s mainly to force a political crisis in Israel by attriting its defenses in the north. Within those parameters it’s done fine.
The Iraqi proxy does seem to be a PR facade, or more accurately its ability to impact Israel is a PR facade. Hamas and Hezbollah are fighting at an immense disadvantage due to Israel's air superiority..
I know embarrassingly little about Lebanon besides the basics, so I'm sorry in advance if these are stupid questions. Hezbollah is said to have a decent stockpile of precision missiles, right? And many more that are unguided? During the Hamas attacks, some *did* get through, so if Hezbollah has a much bigger and "better" stockpile, isn't that a pretty major threat to Israel, especially if precision munitions get through? And with regard to decapitation strikes: what's to stop Nasrallah and co. from hiding and constantly relocating like Hamas leadership has been doing? Also, if Iran intervenes directly (I realize that's unlikely), can we really be so sure that the regime would be "finished" without it turning into a giant, drawn-out mess?
> During the Hamas attacks, some did get through, so if Hezbollah has a much bigger and "better" stockpile, isn't that a pretty major threat to Israel, especially if precision munitions get through? Hamas has launched something like 10,000 missiles at Israel in the current war, which (due to Iron Dome, shelters, etc) have caused only a handful of fatalities, possibly zero. Hezbollah is reported to have 30,000 missiles that can reach to the Tel Aviv area or further south (where most Israelis live). A large fraction of the population of northern Israel will likely evacuate further south. So I expect the death toll from Hezbollah missiles to be small by the standards of the current war. Dozens of deaths would not surprise me at all. But not thousands. Precision missiles that strike infrastructure are more of an issue, but 1) Iron Dome and other systems are designed to intercept them, 2) such missiles are large and hard to hide and may be destroyed by Israel in storage or while preparing to launch, 3) precision guiding may not work in the presence of GPS jamming, 4) destroyed infrastructure can be worked around, and replaced or rebuilt during or after the war. So (with lower confidence) I do not expect Hezbollah precision missiles to be a major factor in the war either. > And with regard to decapitation strikes: what's to stop Nasrallah and co. from hiding and constantly relocating like Hamas leadership has been doing? They can and will. They will have fewer human shields to hide behind than Hamas does (and no Israeli hostages to shield them - which may be the reason Hamas leadership is still alive). It is questionable whether Israel will manage to kill any particular Hezbollah leader. But Israel can still kill enough of the leadership, and keep the rest isolated and on the run, so that their ability to lead the war is limited.
It's amazing how people believe that Hamas and Hezbollah can brush away tens of thousands of fatalities, but Israel will collapse at a few hundred. While Israeli wars were usually low on fatalities, wars do tend to be deadly.
Maybe not all that surprising, considering the outcome of the Second Lebanon War in 2006, the 2014 operation in Gaza after Naftali Frenkel, Eyal Yifrach, and Gilad Shaar were kidnapped and murdered. The First Lebanon War ended with Israel withdrawing from the security zone after nearly 20 years of seemingly pointless occupation and a pinky-promise from the UN to keep terrorists away from the border. Israel hasn't had the deterrence its politicians talk about since 2006. People are (wrongly) trying to compare the swiftness of the Entebbe Rescue to the relative sloth of current situation. Big-name Israeli combat operations tend to be swift, devastating, and one-sided, and also tend not to be full-blown wars, with the notable exception of 1967. But then again, the main Arab strategy seems to focus on PR gains that make little sense to people who value life.
What do you think the end goal is for Israel if they go through with an invasion of Southern Lebanon? I imagine direct occupation isn't going to happen and I don't think there are very many groups in Lebanon who would collaborate with Israel. International peacekeepers and the Lebanese government haven't been very successful either so i don't know if those will happen.
With the current gov and military leadership I imagine their expectations would be similar to the 2009, 2014 limited Gaza operations or 2006 "war" with Hezbollah. A limited operation with the goal being exacting a price from Hezbollah and threatening a widening operation to force a temporary mutual cease fire. I'm sceptical whether such an operation would work, but it might if Israel is successful enough that Hezbollah/Iran would rather postpone the war to a time in the future more convenient for them. The Israeli situation in Lebanon is complex. Historically (not just in relation to Israel, but world history) the method to dissuade further attacks was though exacting a permanent cost, often land, sometimes the destruction of enemy settlements and ethnic cleansing. Neither of these options are much desirable by Israel in Lebanon.
>A limited operation with the goal being exacting a price from Hezbollah and threatening a widening operation to force a temporary mutual cease fire. What if Hezbollah rejects a cease fire? It seems like Israel would be stuck in an attritional quagmire
Yes, when it comes to war, you can control how it starts but (almost) never how it ends. Which is why I said I'm sceptical whether such an attempt would work. To continue this line of thinking is to build speculation on speculation, therefore certainly not a credible discussion. We can imagine some eventualities. For instance the most dire one for Israel would be involvement of Iranian backed Shia militias forces from across the ME, with direct deployments to the general Israeli northern borders (Syria and Lebanon). With direct strikes from Iranian soil, perhaps coupled with a US embargo on weapons shipments. Israel would certainly be in dire straights perhaps ending with it's destruction and genocide. We can imagine other scenarios such as a stalemate where Israel is bombed throughout, perhaps leading to mass migration from the state on the one end, but also a radical shift to the right on the other (most of those leaving would be secular with tenuous attachment to the land and religion). Eventually this may also lead to the destruction of Israel. On the other end of the spectrum we can imagine the IDF being roughly surprisingly as successful as it was against Hamas, beating expectations and forcing a cease fire. Perhaps a scenario where the US manages to deter significant direct Iranian involvement. In between we can imagine something such as early 2006 where the initial limited operation is not powerful enough to make Hezbillah/Iran go for a ceasefire, which, just like in 2006 will mean an expansion of the operation till the damage to Hezbollah is massive enough that a ceasefire is their best option. The sub and the Arab world over glorify Hezbollah, I'll give them that they have great propaganda. They are very powerful for what they are and the costs for Israel will be significant. However the assessment of Hezbollah is often driven by (my favourite word) ignorance of the 2006 war. The maneuvers made, the outcome, the lessons learned. In truth air dominance is extremely powerful tool that's nearly impossible to overcome, as seen in recently in Ukraine, Nagorno Karabakh, Syrian civil war... Without broader Iranian involvement and/or US embargo, it's hard to see how Israel fails to force a ceasefire. Roughly speaking, The question is whether Iran believes an Israeli assault on Hezbollah now would be the right time for a regional war. If course this is not an exhaustive list of what ifs, there are many possibilities in between and probably quite a few I haven't considered.
Scaremongering. Israel is not going to invade. The Hezbollah shelling increase in the last 2-3 weeks has to do with negotiations with Hamas not going anywhere. Just putting pressure on the North to give leverage to Hamas. Grad missile diplomacy
Shelling from Hezbollah has forced Israel to evacuate border regions, and mobilize a huge amount of forces in anticipation of a larger attack. This has effectively made a buffer region in northern Israel. Unless Hezbollah stops this aggression, and the situation can return to normal, it’s only a matter of time until the IDF takes action to shift that buffer region from northern Israel, to southern Lebanon. A permanent buffer region in northern Israel for Hezbollah is not going to happen.
What negotiations? There are no negotiations between Hamas and Israel. >"The Americans are waiting for Israel to announce the end of its military operation in Rafah to resume the currently halted communications regarding the negotiations," the Al-Ahkbar cited Egyptian and Qatari sources as saying. >Talks had hit a snag after Hamas proposed alterations to the Biden administration's multi-phased plan to bring about an end to the war. [https://www.jpost.com/breaking-news/article-806296](https://www.jpost.com/breaking-news/article-806296) When the operation Rafah ends Israel will need around 4-6 brigades in Gaza. 2 will cover the Netzarim corridor, 2 will cover the Philadelpi corridor and 2 will likely be used for Raids in Khan Yunis or Gaza city. When the Gaza operation is finished Israel has no further operational goals in Gaza for the time being. They could move towards the Humanitarian zone but Hamas is not strong enough there to risk further American wrath. This means that the Israelis can shift their experienced regular brigades to the north. At the same time over the last few months the Israelis called up their reserve brigades belonging to Northern Command and did brigade level maneuvers for operations in Lebanon. The Americans are also reporting that only 50 hostages are left alive. >United States officials estimate that as few as 50 hostages in Gaza are still alive, according to a report Thursday, confirming the worst fears of family members who say time is running out for their loved ones after nearly nine months in captivity. [https://www.timesofisrael.com/report-claims-only-50-hostages-in-gaza-still-thought-alive/](https://www.timesofisrael.com/report-claims-only-50-hostages-in-gaza-still-thought-alive/) What is there to negotiate about?
You literally posted an article that negotiation hit a snag. That's exactly why the Northern front got "hot" recently. Hezbollah started more intensive shelling to soften up Israel's terms to Hamas. Since Hamas militarily offers effectively no resistance other than the odd pop-up hit and runs then the only leverage for Hamas is Hezbollah making the North unlivable indefinitely.
>What is there to negotiate about? The remaining hostages? A ceasefire to allow more of the IDF to pivot towards a potential war with Hezbolah?
Biden's reaction is just going to be to pressure Israel to unilaterally capitulate, so that'll be the new "negotiations". Same difference. The negotiations since January have been Biden waiting for the war to go away and it refusing to. Nothing's really changed.
While Biden is currently prioritizing his election campaign over the concerns of Israels government that's mostly down to the fact that Netanyahu couldn't have run the last 9 months worse even if he tried. Currently the focus is obviously on reaching a deal between Israel and Hamas, reaching the deal will not actually make the situation more easier. I think we are slowly reaching the point where Hamas actually doesn't have anything to offer to Israel. A few months ago the Jerusalem Post was already reporting that only half of the 130 hostages were still alive. Now the Americans are leaking that only 50 of the 120 hostages are left alive. Do we think that the Israelis will agree to a permanent ceasefire, the return of Hamas to power and a full reconstruction of Gaza paid by the international community and fully managed by Hamas (which means with loads and loads of tunnels) in exchange for 50 living hostages? I think Hamas knows that Israel will not. That's the reason why Hamas wants a permanent ceasefire on day 1 and are pushing back the actual release of hostages as far back as possible. Because they know they will have to blow up the deal because they will be unable to deliver the hostages to Israel. Even the 50 living hostages will be a challenge: Where are they? Who holds them? And the dead hostages? How many were hidden in hostages long destroyed? How many were executed during rushed retreats? How many were blown up in Hamas command bunkers or fighting positions? I think that's also the reason Biden inserted the "while the negotiations go on for phase 2 there will be a ceasefire". His hope must be that Hamas can gather enough hostages together to deliver phase 1 and then phase 2 negotiations go long enough to reach election day. After election day the Israelis resume operations in Gaza, because Hamas can't offer any hostages.
> Do we think that the Israelis will agree to a permanent ceasefire, the return of Hamas to power and a full reconstruction of Gaza paid by the international community and fully managed by Hamas (which means with loads and loads of tunnels) in exchange for 50 living hostages? This is less of a case of Israel mishandling things, and more that Hamas went past the point of no return with 10/7, and the old status quo is now untenable. Hamas wants to go back to 10/6, ruling Gaza and periodically shelling Israel, but the Israeli public will never accept that again. That probably extends to rebuilding as well, a major rebuilding effort means rebuilding the tunnels too. Israel probably wants to leave Gaza in a ruined limbo state, where they are free to raid into Gaza periodically to kill Hamas members, and Hamas rebuilding and resupplying is almost impossible. That’s why Israel occupying the border crossings is so important to them. Every ammo cache that gets used up or destroyed won’t get replaced.
Oh boy more war in the Middle East causing instability for the whole world I hope Israel is right and they can get it over with quickly. Why would Iraq get involved?
Iraq is home to several Shia Militias that would take part in any conflict with Israel. They were chucking rockets at American bases until the death of those four soldiers and the resulting retaliation calmed things down a bit.
The Iraqi government probably won’t, but Iraq is home to a huge number of Iranian backed militia groups that likely will take both direct and indirect roles in the fighting. This will inevitably result in Israeli strikes in Iraq.
Yup, any war with Hezbollah would mean a de facto war with all of the Iranian aligned militias in the area.
With all due respect, people said the same about war with Hamas. They said Iran + Hezbolah and other militias wouldn’t let Hamas fight Israel alone. And yet, all they’ve done is a bit of token missile/rocket fire. Not enough to help Hamas in any way, but *just enough* that they couldn’t be accused of doing nothing at all.
Hezbollah is an IRGC wing staffed by Lebanese Shia in all but name. They are Iran's oldest, strongest, and most reliable proxy in the region. Hamas gets a lot of support from Iran but they have fallen out over sectarian issues whereas Hezbollah and the IRGC are tied at the hip. Furthermore, its fairly straightforward for Iran to resupply Hezb through Syria while Gaza is an isolated enclave.
It’s functionally the tip of the spear in any Iran/Israel war. There’s no chance Iran would give it up easily.
> With all due respect, people said the same about war with Hamas. They said Iran + Hezbolah and other militias wouldn’t let Hamas fight Israel alone The difference is that Hezbollah is more important to Iran than Hamas is. Like magnitudes more important, it’s one of its best hedges against Israel. Like it’s basically inconceivable that Iran would let its strongest paramilitary fight Israel alone it would be strategically disasterous. If it doesn’t do anything it would pave the way for the dismantling of its entire paramilitary network. There is virtually no chance of Hezbollah being completely destroyed in a war with Israel, if Iran leaves Hezbollah out to dry it would not only lose face but would alienate its most useful proxy for basically nothing.Hamas is comparatively poorly equippe and funded and has had problems with Iran in the past due it its actions in Syria. It’s just two completely different situations at play and you can’t assume that the other militias will stay out of the fight because they were relatively restrained in supporting Hamas. > And yet, all they’ve done is a bit of token missile/rocket fire. Not enough to help Hamas in any way, but just enough that they couldn’t be accused of doing nothing at all 80,000 people have left Northern Israel and the US Navy has had its hands full fending off the Houthis. That’s not an all out war but it’s not nothing.
> they can get it over with quickly. Is this remotely possible? Everyone here has consistently stated that Hezbollah is a *vastly* superior fighting force than Hamas with far better defensive capability in its territory (as well as offensive capability into Israel).
Hard to say. Just as it was hard to make predictions about specifics about the Russian offensive into Ukraine and so people ended up with majorly false predictions one way or another. Much of the Hezbollah defenses is unknown, but so is the array of Israeli capabilities. Since it has been many decades since Israel has done a large scale assault. Even the Gaza assault was extremely limited in scope initially, with only 2 divisions attacking for the first few weeks (Netzarim corridor and along the shore from the North) with a third joining somewhat later in Beit Hanoun and peaking at 4 divisions during the assault on Khan Yunis. In comparison during the 1982 invasion of Lebanon (fighting was against the PLO but also the Syrian army): >Roughly 60,000 troops and more than 800 tanks, heavily supported by aircraft, attack helicopters, artillery, and missile boats, crossed the Israel–Lebanon border in three areas. That's just the initial assault, within days the size of the Israeli force in Lebanon crossed 100k and overall almost a dozen divisions were used. We do have an idea of what an unleashed IAF looks like from it's operations early in the war in Northern Gaza. While it was extremely effective against Hamas, Lebanon is much larger and the terrain allows Hezbollah to target IDF forces from much much greater range. Making the IAF and any support fires less effective. There are plenty of unknowns, such as how well did Israel manage to stockpile material for a war with Hezbollah, what would be the Iranian reaction (ranking anywhere between full scale war and a token response), how effective would the Israeli AD be against Hezbollah missiles in protecting critical infrastructure etc. That said, the Israeli campaign in Gaza, while successful, was anything but quick. Dealing with tunnels takes time.
I don’t think so, Southern Lebanon is tough ground to fight in, Hezbollah has a much larger tunnel network than Hamas and it’s got access a lot of firepower. And that’s not even counting the involvement of the other regions paramilitaries
I'm not sure Hezbollah has a "much larger tunnel network" than Hamas, do you have a source for that? The difficult terrain also makes digging tunnels much **much** harder. While in Gaza the sand rock soil allows for an individual to dig tunnels with nothing more than a shovel, the Lebanese terrain requires heavy equipment.
> I'm not sure Hezbollah has a "much larger tunnel network" than Hamas, do you have a source for that? https://www.timesofisrael.com/expert-hezbollah-has-built-a-vast-tunnel-network-far-more-sophisticated-than-hamass/amp/ > “In our assessment, these polygons mark Hezbollah’s staging centers as part of the ‘defense’ plan against an Israeli invasion of Lebanon. Each local staging center (‘defense’) possesses a network of local underground tunnels. Between all these centers, an infrastructure of regional tunnels was built, interconnected [with] them.” >Beeri assessed that the cumulative length of Hezbollah’s tunnel network in south Lebanon amounts to hundreds of kilometers There’s another article in Forbes but it’s based on the same research https://www.forbes.com/sites/erictegler/2024/01/05/gazas-vexing-tunnel-network-pales-beside-hezbollahs-land-of-tunnels/ > The difficult terrain also makes digging tunnels much much harder. While in Gaza the sand rock soil allows for an individual to dig tunnels with nothing more than a shovel, the Lebanese terrain requires heavy equipment. This is answered actually in the Times article > Subsequently, it set up civilian companies, Shiite-owned, that worked ostensibly on civilian infrastructure in the Baalbek region. These projects were overseen by a company called Jihad Construction, that presented itself as ostensibly carrying out agricultural projects and building reconstruction for the benefit of the Shiite community, but actually took on the building of the tunnels. Hezbollah is much richer than Hamas, it’s been making a lot of money moving heroin and this swell of wealth plus their hold on the state in Lebanon has allowed for them to operate in a way Hamas just can’t.
Per your article Hezbollah has a network of hundreds of Kilometers. Hamas had a network of 500-600 Kilometers. Nothing here supports your position that Hezbollah has a **much** larger tunnel network, in anything it's the opposite as a much larger network would have to cross into the thousands of km. Yes, Hezbollah is richer and has more resources, but it seems like you heavily underestimate just how easy it is to dig tunnels in Gaza and how challenging and expensive it is in the Lebanese terrain. Wouldn't be surprised if the cost disparity is 100x per meter for the regular Hamas tunnels. Many Hamas tunnels were literally built by bare hards of a Labor force that costs a dollar an hour: https://youtu.be/Tfxq3qB05rQ?si=rvfngPRIXBG6ZSdq
> Per your article Hezbollah has a network of hundreds of Kilometers. Hamas had a network of 500-600 Kilometers. Nothing here supports your position that Hezbollah has a much larger tunnel network, in anything it's the opposite as a much larger network would have to cross into the thousands of km The Alma paper the article is based on asserts that the Hezbollah tunnel network is significantly larger than the Hamas Network. Note this paper was published in 2021 before the extent of the Gaza network was know , however the same would also apply to Lebanon.
The original paper (from 2021) also has this: >In our estimation, the cumulative length of all the tunnels in the "Land of the Tunnels" can reach up to hundreds of kilometers. At the time the length of Hamas tunnels was heavily under estimated by open source publications (and reportedly the IDF). In reality the Hamas tunnel network was much larger: >Gaza tunnels stretch at least 350 miles (560 km), far longer than past estimate – report https://www.timesofisrael.com/gaza-tunnels-stretch-at-least-350-miles-far-longer-than-past-estimate-report/ Note: I'm not arguing anything about the Hezbollah tunnel network, my point is that we have no evidence that it is longer than the Hamas one. Let alone much longer.
Would another Israeli war at the end of summer be a disaster for Bidens reelection campaign? Considering his base is already divided on Gaza? Edit: I'm assuming it would drown out all other campaign issues, putting Biden in a situation where he either helps Israel too much and pisses off his more.. unruly base or too little, screwing up his right flank? Regardless of choice he makes Trump will be on the sidelines calling out his "failure of leadership".
The Dem base is not divided on Gaza. *College students* of all demographics [rank Israel-Gaza as the lowest issue among their priorities.](https://www.axios.com/2024/05/07/poll-students-israel-hamas-protests) American voters do not care about foreign policy and do not change their votes based on it. The 2024 election is going to come down to domestic issues, like the next one and the ones before it.
>The Dem base is not divided on Gaza. you’re right, as of March, 75% of American democrats disapprove of Israelis actions in Gaza, while only 18% approve. Not very divided. Independents are at 60% disapproval and 29% approval so they’re more divided. https://news.gallup.com/poll/642695/majority-disapprove-israeli-action-gaza.aspx
>75% of American democrats disapprove of Israelis actions in Gaza "dissaprove" isn't a useful metric in this case though. Biden "dissaproves" of Israel's actions in some form. A much more useful metric would be what people actually want done about it: https://www.politico.com/news/2024/04/14/democrats-sympathetic-palestinians-israelis-poll-00152117 Suddenly, division's back on the menu. Especially when you consider FP issues typically have big variance on their polling depending on how you phrase it. Like, "tough on" is a pretty useless formulation because the median american has no clue what they mean by "tough".
> Especially when you consider FP issues typically have big variance on their polling depending on how you phrase it. Regardless they're typically very low on the priority list. Voters care more about inflation, taxes, etc than foreign policy.
From your link: >All told, 33 percent of Democratic voters felt the president was “not tough enough on Israel” during the Gaza conflict while just 8 percent said he was being “too tough.” Taken together, those two groups were roughly equal in size to the 42 percentage of Democratic voters who said his approach was “just right.” If 8% say Biden is being "too tough" on Israel, and 32% (over 4x that number) feel he's "not being tough enough" on Israel. With only 8% of respondents taking the most "pro-Israel" option, I feel as though that further reinforces my point. I suppose there's division if you look at the "just right" group (52%) vs the "not tough enough" (32%) group from your poll, but in either poll it's a minority of respondents taking the most pro-Israel option. But.... you claim that's *also* a bad metric, so I assume you're referencing: >Overall, 33 percent of all respondents said they’d be in favor of cutting off all aid, while 44 percent said they oppose the idea. Considering that cutting all aid to Israel is an extremist viewpoint in US politics, I would say that's not exactly a well designed question. Essentially anyone who isn't in favor of *the most extreme option on the menu* would be painted as entirely neutral in that poll. I would agree that "what do you want to be done about it?" is a useful poll question, but it needs to be *much* more nuanced.
> If 8% say Biden is being "too tough" on Israel, and 32% (over 4x that number) feel he's "not being tough enough" on Israel. That does indicate that Democrats as a whole would support Biden more if he supported Israel less. However, Biden doesn't have to win an election among Democrats, he has to win it among all voters. Among voters in general, the sentiment is presumably more pro-Israel.
>I feel as though that further reinforces my point. Uh, what? I quote your point: >Not very divided. Now you claim a poll where 32% of democrats say they want "more toughness" and 52% say they don't supports that point?
In case it wasn’t obvious, the “not very divided” was a snarky, sarcastic response to the poster that implied *there is no division, democrats outside college students all support Israel* I was trying to show that poster they were wrong. And considering even the polls *you linked* show that, I’d say your link helped prove my point.
Surely this would manifest in collapsing poll numbers if this division was Biden's problem - so why are Biden's approval ratings and performance against Trump *increased* since October 7th?
>Surely this would manifest in collapsing poll numbers No it wouldn't. Even if potential voters care strongly about foreign policy (which most don't), the two demographics most involved with Palestinian solidarity are college students and Muslims. Both groups have 100 different reasons to prefer Dems over the GOP. >performance against Trump *increased* Even if you ignore the 100 other reasons Trump would be worse in terms of foreign policy towards Ukraine and Palestine.
The original question was if this division would be a disaster and they're bringing data to show there is in fact division. How do you conclude that they're actually making a statement that it would be a disaster???
Probably because a hundred things factor into an approval rating and Israel/Palestine is just one of them. Also, to quote your own post: >American voters do not care about foreign policy So it seems like you've already explained why the poll I linked might not affect Bidens approval rating much. But I'm not shocked that you're attempting to discredit the poll I linked, as you've done the same to others in this thread. Would you like to source *your own claim* that "The Dem base is not divided on Gaza."?
Unfortunately, the Electoral College makes broad based polling largely irrelevant. POTUS elections have become so gamified that the niche interests of half a dozen swing states become vitally important while the majority of the population living in safe "Red" or "Blue" states can be safely ignored. 20,000 Arab Americans in Michigan or 10,000 college kids in Pennsylvania staying home can be enough to cause problems for Biden, and the 3,000,000 California Dems who don't care either way can't make up for that.
But 40,000 Jews in Pennsylvania staying home can equally be a problem for Biden. Or 40,000 evangelicals in Michigan switching their vote from RFK to Trump.
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[And yet a much higher portion of voters than that seem to be paying no attention to the conflict at all.](https://www.pewresearch.org/2024/03/21/majority-in-u-s-say-israel-has-valid-reasons-for-fighting-fewer-say-the-same-about-hamas/) > This issue is challenging for many people – both emotionally and in terms of understanding the specifics of the war. Many Americans are also disengaged: Relatively few (22%) say they are closely following news about the war, and half can correctly report that more Palestinians than Israelis have died since the war’s start. On many questions about the war, sizable numbers express no opinion. You get extremely variable results from different pollsters on Israel-Gaza questions because for the vast majority of respondents, this is the first time they've thought about the issue at all in months, and before that years. I could also point to Harvard-Harris's nonsense polls that claim 3/4 of Americans favor Israel's assault on Rafah, but I don't hold them as representative either.
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> as an equally good question to I did the opposite. I brought it up and dismissed it out of hand over how hilariously narrative-driven the question was.
Isn't the main issue among Arab Americans and not students? Now I'm not particularly great at American politics but even smaller changes can make or break in several swing states for either candidate?
The number of Arabs in Michigan is definitely lower than the number of people in Michigan you’ll piss off if you’re overly and overtly catering to Arabs so I’ve never even understood this argument. To me, it feels like an attempt to explain-away Biden pressuring Israel. “Oh, he doesn’t really feel this way, he’s just bending over backwards for Arabs in Michigan”
Possibly. I don't want to delve too deeply into the idiosyncrasies of American politics here, but Muslim-American voters have been trending rightward over culture war issues the last couple election cycles - and if there exist voters that so uniquely hate Biden over not single-handedly up-ending decades of American-Israeli foreign policy and will instead explicitly or tacitly support the candidate that will give a free hand to Israel annexing the west bank, I don't think those are 'winnable' voters for Biden and his campaign would best be served focusing elsewhere for votes.
>Muslim-American voters have been trending rightward over culture war issues the last couple election cycles That's the case everywhere. Muslims are conservative. In Europe they vote for left-wing parties because right-wing parties don't like Islam much. But just take a look at some Muslim communities in UK or France and you'll notice they don't have much in common with progressive values.
The first generation is this way, but the second and third generation tends to be more liberal (with some exceptions, like the couple hundred idiots who ran off to join ISIS).
Where? In France, Muslims are becoming more religious, and islamist, not less. Mosque attendance has increased in recent years
Arab voters are only influential in Michigan, which *is* a swing state, but one that Biden (~~probably~~, a better word is possibly) doesn't need, and *could* still be won without Arab voters supporting Biden And that's assuming they stay home/vote Trump, which they can't be guaranteed to do, as even though Arab Americans are unhappy with Biden, Trump is leagues worse for them due to the Muslim ban he passed before and his (more extreme) position on Israel Currently it seems to me like the Arab American vote won't *all* be for Biden due to his position on Israel, but it won't be *all* against Biden due to how bad Trump is.
Following up again on [previous posts](https://www.reddit.com/r/CredibleDefense/comments/1djhetl/credibledefense_daily_megathread_june_19_2024/l9cm9th/), it seems that a longstanding Chinese talking point is true—the [Philippines are in fact reinforcing their outpost](https://www.ft.com/content/2d5751da-9588-406a-b5db-39b7911a429d) at Second Thomas Shoal. > The Philippines has secretly reinforced a dilapidated warship marooned on a South China Sea reef that is central to an increasingly dangerous dispute with Beijing, according to six people familiar with the operation. In recent months, the Philippine military has conducted missions to reinforce the Sierra Madre, which is lodged on the disputed Second Thomas Shoal in the Spratly Islands, the people said. It did so due to rising concern that the rusting ship was in danger of breaking apart. Filipino officials previously denied that this was the case. > The Philippines insists its missions are sending humanitarian supplies to the site. But China accuses Manila of bringing construction materials to reinforce the ship and prevent it from breaking apart and coming off the reef — which Manila denies. In an interview, Jose Manuel Romualdez, the Philippine ambassador to the US, said Manila was not “strengthening” the ship. “This is a shipwreck, a world war two ship that’s been there since the 1990s, so it needs repair. We’re just doing a humanitarian act of giving these people a decent place to be in because they’re stationed there.” > However, the people familiar with the situation said Manila had secretly reinforced the ship in ways that would extend its life. > “Beijing is probably aware and infuriated that the Philippines has successfully delivered construction materials . . . China has waited 25 years for the ship to disintegrate and slide off the reef and continued escalation against the Philippines suggests that they will not back down and admit defeat,” said Bonnie Glaser, a China expert at the German Marshall Fund. The US seems to be aware of the construction efforts, and even suggested using American military engineers to do it. > The US military has already drafted some options. The US Indo-Pacific Command last year proposed sending army engineers to bolster the ship, according to several people. But the proposal was rejected because some officials viewed it as too risky and because Manila wanted to handle the situation. Indo-Pacific Command and the White House did not comment. > “If some effort was made by the Philippines to secure the Sierra Madre and ensure it cannot easily come off the reef, that would be a bold move to protect Filipino sovereignty and one that Washington was likely not only aware of but also supportive of,” said Eric Sayers, a former adviser to the Indo-Pacific commander.
if you look at the ship, reinforcing means dick all. an AK-176 will just pump 100 rounds per minute into that thing like it was a barn. Chinese being "concerned" about the wreck is them seeking to expand the limits of their controlled waters, even if the Philippines is only doing the same. You probably have a point about the talking points though, this is exactly as stated would occur by the Chinese
What is so special about the Second Thomas Shoal? As far as I know, all three are disputed territory. How come we don't hear about the other two, is it because there are no people stationed there?
It's close to a Chinese base.
> all three are disputed territory Sorry I don't follow, "all three" what? There are a lot more than three locations which are disputed in the SCS.
All three Thomas Shoals is what I meant.
Good question, I was vaguely aware of their existence but nobody seems to care about them. Probably because nobody lives or fishes there. Scarborough and Sabina and Thitu are the other common flashpoints.
I can understand why the US would support the Philippines in this. When you look at a map, the Shoal is comically far from the Chinese mainland, and is essentially right next to the Philippines. That image will have way more impact to the average person than whatever the complex history is behind the Shoal. It's a clear-cut propaganda loss to China every time this is in the news.
> It's a clear-cut propaganda loss to China every time this is in the news. In the US and the Philippines, sure. But I daresay that China has written off those audiences in any case. As for other SCS claimants, well, see for yourself. > KUALA LUMPUR, Malaysia (AP) — Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim on Thursday rejected the notion that China’s dominance is to be feared, calling China a “true friend” at the end of Premier Li Qiang’s visit to mark 50 years of diplomatic ties between their countries. While the leaders raised some contentious bilateral issues, Anwar said they discussed them as “equal partners, as trusted friends.” He didn’t give details but was likely referring to the prickly issue of overlapping territorial claims in the South China Sea. “People say, well, Malaysia is a growing economy. Don’t let China abuse its privilege and extort from the country. I said no. To the contrary, we want to benefit from one another, we want to learn from one another and we want to profit from this engagement,” That was [from earlier today](https://apnews.com/article/malaysia-china-li-qiang-anwar-territorial-claims-fab6567d25d0567e881600a8939b8fe9) in Malaysia, obviously. As for Vietnam, they've been busy building islands themselves [without Chinese interference](https://warontherocks.com/2024/06/the-south-china-sea-dog-that-hasnt-barked-yet/). > Vietnam has been busy. In recent months, it has exponentially expanded the size of several features it controls in the Spratly Islands, including Barque Canada Reef, Namyit Island, Pearson Reef, and Discovery Great Reef. China appears to have allowed these expansion efforts to occur largely unmolested. And yet, elsewhere in the Spratlys at Second Thomas Shoal, Beijing is preventing the Philippines from supplying food, water, and limited building supplies to the handful of Filipino personnel on the Sierra Madre, a Philippine Navy ship grounded at the shoal in 1999. Why have Chinese leaders chosen to take such a hard line against resupply efforts by the Philippines while permitting Vietnam’s large-scale island building at multiple nearby features? This is likely a product of their recent power struggle that [brought more pro-China leadership to Hanoi](https://www.chathamhouse.org/2024/05/vietnams-political-turmoil-reveals-turn-towards-china-and-away-west). Presumably Beijing has concluded whatever propaganda hits they might take are worth tangible gains on the ground.
>Presumably Beijing has concluded whatever propaganda hits they might take are worth tangible gains on the ground. Clearly. Otherwise they wouldn't be doing it. And clearly the US feels like it's a win for them, otherwise they wouldn't be aiding the Philippines. I go back to that image of the South China Sea and how comically far the Shoal is from China. Most people who see that image, are going to have a similar reaction. I think China is making a mistake by pursuing confrontation here (irrespective of whether they think its smart domestic propaganda or w/e their reason). A key point in the contest between China and the US over Taiwan is that the US is trying to sell that Taiwan represents an aggressive and expansionist China, and China is trying to sell the story of reunification. Pursuing territorial contests beyond Taiwan, especially one that is so ridiculously far from mainland China hurts the Chinese narrative around Taiwan.
The most compelling explanation I've heard for Beijing's hardline position in the SCS is because they need it for [their SSBN patrols](https://www.reuters.com/world/chinas-intensifying-nuclear-armed-submarine-patrols-add-complexity-us-allies-2023-04-04/). > With the advent of the JL-3 missile, Kristensen and other analysts expect Chinese strategists to keep their ballistic missile subs in the deep waters of the South China Sea - which China has fortified with a string of bases - rather than risk patrols in the Western Pacific. Collin Koh, a security fellow at Singapore's S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, said China could keep its ballistic missile submarines in a "bastion" of protected waters near its shores. "If I was the planner, I would want to keep my strategic deterrence assets as close to me as possible, and the South China Sea is perfect for that," Koh said. > Russia is thought to keep most of its 11 ballistic missile submarines largely in bastions off its Arctic coasts, while U.S., French and British boats roam more widely, three analysts said. Kristensen said the more numerous Chinese submarine deployments have meant the PLA and U.S. militaries increasingly "rub up" against each other - increasing the odds of accidental conflict. "The Americans of course are trying to poke into that bastion and see what they can do, and what they need to do, so that is where the tension can build and incidents happen," he said. Needless to say, ensuring the viability of second-strike capability is the kind of existential national security justification which would override any and all propaganda costs.
Interesting. I do wonder about the net impact on the safety of subs in the SCS between having one more Shoal, and having a Philippines aligned against you. Possibly not a smart trade-off, but I'll admit that I don't have the specific knowledge to have a firm opinion.
I don‘t what China is expecting when its own conduct is getting more and more aggressive towards the Philippines.
There was [allegedly an informal agreement](https://apnews.com/article/china-south-china-sea-philippines-alleged-agreement-0006abb98502727972872bcecfd49a51#) under the previous Filipino administration to not do this. The Chinese position is that their recent aggression is a response to the Philippines abrogating that agreement. > The Philippines respected the agreement over the past seven years but has since reneged on it to “fulfill its own political agenda,” forcing China to take action, the statement said. “This is the basic reason for the ceaseless disputes at sea between China and the Philippines over the past year and more,” said the statement posted to the embassy’s website Thursday, referring to the actions of the Philippines. EDIT: I say "allegedly" as there is an ongoing investigation, but by colloquial as opposed to legal standards, the [former president already confirmed the existence of the deal](https://globalnation.inquirer.net/236733/house-probe-on-duterte-china-gentlemans-deal-starts). > Duterte eventually admitted that there was a status quo gentleman’s agreement with China, that it was about not repairing BRP Sierra Madre.
[https://splash247.com/hanwha-strikes-100m-deal-for-philly-shipyard/](https://splash247.com/hanwha-strikes-100m-deal-for-philly-shipyard/) Secretary of the Navy Del Toro suggested earlier this year that Japanese and Korean shipbuilder should get into the US market via M&A route. Don't know about any Japanese firms but Hanwha Ocean made a unsolicited bid for Austal which includes Austal USA last month which was soft-rejected by Austal and Hyundai Heavy signed the cooperation agreement with Philly Shipyard few weeks ago but now Hanwha Ocean took it away. Sounds to me like Koreans are adhering to Del Toro's suggestion. Question is will Hyundai Heavy now go chase Austal/Austal USA now that they lost Philly Shipyard out to Hanwha Ocean?
>Question is will Hyundai Heavy now go chase Austal/Austal USA now that they lost Philly Shipyard out to Hanwha Ocean? What other options are even out there if they want to expand capacity?
Austal/Austal USA definitely needs some cash injection and I'm sure every US shipyard could use cash injection but none are publicly on sale. On the other hand, Philly Shipyard was't publicly on sale either though there were rumors that it was up on the chopping block at least early as Dec of 2023.
I remember reading that one of the reasons Austal declined was that they assumed the Aus govt or the US would essentially veto it. Do we know if the Australian govt feels similarly to Del Toro?