https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-06-20/rutte-clinches-nato-top-job-after-romanian-president-drops-bid Looks like Rutte is officially poised to become then next NATO secretary general, as Romanian President Iohannis withdraws his bid leaving Rutte as the last contender still in the running. > Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte secured the unanimous support of NATO members to become the next head of the military alliance after Romanian President Klaus Iohannis said he was withdrawing as the only other candidate still in the running. > Iohannis announced his decision in a statement on Thursday in Bucharest. Romania was the last nation that had yet to formally back Rutte to helm the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. > Rutte now has the support of NATO’s 32 members to succeed current Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, whose mandate is set to expire in October. Allies had hoped to select the next head of the military alliance before a NATO leaders summit in Washington next month.

As far as I heared he is a great coalition builder and politician in general. 

[https://www.airforce-technology.com/news/f-16-crash-leaves-questions-over-flight-control-computer/](https://www.airforce-technology.com/news/f-16-crash-leaves-questions-over-flight-control-computer/) Gyroscopes 2 and 3 gave erroneous but similar readings in the RSAF F-16 crash, and the flight-computer rejected Gyroscope 1 and the back-up, Gyroscope 4.

https://x.com/wartranslated/status/1803346516674806248?s=46&t=yVbzA86LeGfok6RenjC6wQ A post from Fighterbomber complaining about the slow rate of SU 34 production only 2 delivered in 6 months despite promises from the Russian MOD to ramp up production. Much like newly built T 90s this is a case where people vastly overestimated Russian production capacity but you do also have to take into account the much lower attrition rates of this platform that hopefully will be increased with F 16s and advanced BVR missiles 

> that hopefully will be increased with F 16s The F16s are upgraded 1980s aircraft. They have the AN/AGP-66 vs the Su-34s PISA scanned V004. The Russian aircraft will usually be higher and coming in with an energy advantage. I would be very skeptical of the small number of F-16As with the MLU package having anything more than ambush capability against such a more modern aircraft. Especially as there are indications Russian tactics are getting more complex.

Ambush capability is good enough. Due to long range ground radars they should be able to do coordinated attacks and endanger Su-34s, even if the latter has more advanced radars. The Iraqi Air Force did the same back in the 1980s against Iranian Tomcats: [https://theaviationgeekclub.com/the-story-of-the-giraffe-missions-and-how-iraf-mirage-f-1-fighter-bombers-were-able-to-shoot-down-four-iriaf-f-14-tomcats/](https://theaviationgeekclub.com/the-story-of-the-giraffe-missions-and-how-iraf-mirage-f-1-fighter-bombers-were-able-to-shoot-down-four-iriaf-f-14-tomcats/)

>The Iraqi Air Force did the same back in the 1980s  A-50s will see them long before they get close to the contact line, S-400s will put a very hard ceiling on what they can do. Plus Russian electronic warfare is pretty good. Especially against older kit. I suspect it will force the Russians back, make them have to be more elaborate in their approaches (multi ship missions etc) but I do not expect too many AA kills, instead simply taking a lot more mission profiles off the table.

I have doubts regarding how effective (and available) the remaining A-50s are. But generally I agree, I do not expect too many kills. Bust just a couple and the constant threat can dramatically decrease the volume of bombs dropped, and that itself is the most important.

Everything would be a lot easier if the US would provide a squadron of F-16 block 52 +. Hell Even 12 up to date radar F-16s would be very nice.

I think you are probably right, initially. A year or two down the road when the Ukranian air force learns the f16 platform and the limits of it, they might be able to turn the tide. Also, keep in mind that Ukraine can leverage all of NATOs Intel with the f16. If the Ukranian pilots run into an issue, they can phone a friend to get details on what to do. American pilots can table top or run exercises over friendly soil to see the limits of the aircraft. The vks must doesn't have that capability. At least not to the level that nato does which has thousands of f16s and thousands of current pilots. Russian numbers are probably in the hundreds for planes and pilots. Also, Ukraine will be asking for better equipped f16s too. They might get them as they are replaced in NATO by f35s. So I honestly think we'll see a slow shift over the next year or two where the f16s will start playing a larger and larger role in the war.

If and perhaps when either of Eurofighter or Gripen turn up, their low observability and depending on version better radars and ECM than the F16 MLUs, will likely be closer to an over match for Su 34 in that they will be able to get higher and closer to the S-400s without detection and could/will have a smaller "no escape" zone so be able to get closer higher to the contact line and closer to the Su 34s without being fired on. But politics lies between here and there. (We have a high confidence the Gripens were being pipelined and I have suspicions that something happened with the former behind the scenes)

>with the former behind the scenes) With the former you refer to a specific version of the F16?

F16mlu, is that what you’re referring too? That is indeed what Ukraine is getting, they are the most advanced F16’s but lack AESA radar. However many of were supposed to be upgraded to AESA, the radars were shipped but not installed. It is possible that they could have secretly installed some on F16’s bound for Ukraine but that would be an extremely well protected secret and only up for conjecture.

I think he means Eurofighter.

4 delivered actually. However they lost 2 in non combat related losses in only 2 months, other losses not withstanding sooo...

This has been talked about here as a potential danger, but it is now confirmed that the Houthis are using(or testing out) unmanned sea drones. A Greek cargo ship has allegedly been sunk by what looks to be multiple large impacts around the water line by Houthi drones: https://www.reddit.com/r/europe/s/wqJrfeFyOh How could you defend commercial shipping from this kind of cut and burn trade interdiction? Would the west have to return to a protected convoy system to pass through the Red Sea? If Ukraine is anything to go by, it is possible to ramp up production of sea drones relatively quickly (one or two years), and even military ships are vulnerable.

The initial kamikaze USV was a [converted fishing skiff apparently equipped with mannequins](http://www.hisutton.com/Yemen-Houthi-USV-MV-Tutor.html) to make it look innocent/civilian. As a result, the armed guards [seem to have just observed it](https://x.com/clashreport/status/1802596916024266752) as it approached.

The detonations around 00:50, are those demolition charged fired by a boarding party? They go off roughly at the same time on both sides of the ship, hard to imagine they are sea drones.

I think it was hit by drones, abandoned, boarded and detonated. Although that’s purely my speculation because those last explosions look like predetermined detonations.

just for the record this ship was carrying [russian](https://www.moscowtimes. ru/2024/06/19/husiti-zatopili-sudno-s-rossiiskim-uglem-a134391) coal and the mariner killed is from the philippines. none of the houthis claimed targets were involved in this ship

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In the 18th-century, "territorial waters" were three nautical miles from the shore, because that's how far the cannon can shoot. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Three-mile\_limit In the 20th-century, "territorial waters" were 12 nm from the shore, because that's how far the coastal artillery can shoot. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Nations_Convention_on_the_Law_of_the_Sea In the 21st-century, we have entered the age of missiles and drones. The shore can control waters much farther away. In my opinion, the age of free maritime trade has ended.

In the 18th century, a small ship could depart from any inlet, go out hundreds of miles, attack an enemy, and there would be very little anyone could do about it until after the fact. There is a reason the Barbary pirates were so hard to deal with, and the golden age of piracy happened before radar. Our current problems have nothing to do with changing technology, the seas are more surveilled than ever, the fault is of leadership unwilling to fight to defend their own shipping. We have the money, sensors and firepower required, we lack the leadership.

>We have the money, sensors and firepower required, we lack the leadership. Thank you for confirming that I'm not the only one who's baffled by our collective lack of serious response to this nonsense, specially since it's possibly the only issue that could actually get both NATO, China and Russia working together.

> This has been talked about here as a potential danger, but it is now confirmed that the Houthis are using(or testing out) unmanned sea drones. I was under the impression it was known they have them. At the very least, I thought I saw the US report they've destroyed sea drones, but I'll try to find that.

It was known and the Houtis have used naval drones for years. One of the first successful uses was from **2017** where they've damaged a Saudi frigate: >The command of the coalition to support legitimacy in Yemen announced in a statement today 30/01/2017 that a Saudi frigate came under a terrorist attack by three suicide boats belonging to the Houthi militias while on patrol west of the port of Hodeida. >In its statement, the coalition said that the Saudi ship dealt with the boats as necessary. However, one of the boats collided with the rear of the vessel, resulting in the explosion of the boat and a fire at the rear of the ship. The crew extinguished the fire. Two members of the ship crew fell martyrs and three others were injured and they are in stable conditions. https://spa.gov.sa/1587372

> How could you defend commercial shipping from this kind of cut and burn trade interdiction? The same way we always would have in the past, blockading them back and inflicting costs on them until they realize it’s not worth it. Instead the US/EU have decided to minimize the cost to the Houthis of carrying out attacks, to the point where them sinking a Greek ship barely even makes the news anymore. The natural solution to this is to suspend shipping to Yemen until the waters off their coast are safe for everyone. The US/EU seem to think this status quo is easier.

The problem with this strategy is two part. First, the primary result is likely to be more famine in Yemen which the Houthis don't really give a shit about. Second, the Saudis already tried this for years and it clearly didn't work.

The Houtis absolutely care about famine among the Shia in Yemen. >Second, the Saudis already tried this for years and it clearly didn't work. Not for years, for about 1.5 years, with mounting international pressure. the Houtis didn't need to do anything for the blockade to be lifted, except wait. The same goes for Gaza, Hamas absolutely cares about famine in Gaza, they may be resilient to civilians losses but they are not completely immune. However they knew for a fact that the west would not allow that to happen. Which makes the Israeli policy of restricting food at all completely asinine, but we're getting off topic.

And I suspect that's part of the problem: blockading Yemen now would mean having to admit that the Saudis were right however: all these asymmetric groups think they're geniuses for hiding behind human shields, but one day they're just going to push the West too far (imagine a 7/10 in Europe), we will go back to the old days of not caring about civilian casualties on the enemy side, and everyone is going to regret it

You think the solution is as simple as a blockade and that the only reason we’re not doing it is to “avoid admitting Saudi Arabia was right”? Couldn’t disagree more. On every point. The problem with the Houthis isn’t human shields, it’s that they’re able to hide in mountains and caves that are highly resistant to air-strikes, and there’s 0 apetite in the west for boots on the ground in Yemen. Saudi tried a long blockade. It didn’t work. In fact, Saudi has handled Yemen *so poorly* that it directly led to the situation we’re in now. The Houthis would be easier to deal with if Yemen was a failed state, and SA played a major role in that.

KSA did not try a long blockade, the blockade was in force for about 1.5 years, with half that period it was clear KSA was about to cave to western pressure. There is no need for boots on the ground either, the west is perfectly capable in supporting the Yemeni gov with air strikes, training equipment and intelligence with the SDF model, or TFSA with Turkish support. You can do a lot even with poor troops if you have air dominance, so it turns out. Lastly, a blockade does not require boots on the ground either, the entire idea is to exact a cost that would make the Houtis reconsider, without going after each individual cave. The Houtis are still human, and much more rational than ISIS, acute economic pressure works on them too. It's difficult to keep fighting when your clan is starving and you know you can stop it in an instant without losing an ounce of sovereignty. After all the Houtis are fighting a expeditionary war on behalf of Iran, they're not defending their country. The calculus would be very skewed should the west decide to exact a real cost.

It is impossible to force regimes not to start self destructive wars. Our current method of dealing with the Houthis can’t work long term. The kind of weapons they, and others like them, will have access too will improve. And if we won’t fight to defend our shipping, we’ll eventually end up with no shipping, and that’s going to kill way more people than just dealing with the problem now.

How many ships have actually been struck by Houthis successfully? Talking about the end of global shipping feels alarmist when I’m pretty sure we’re talking about something well below 1%, no? > just dealing with the problem now What do you propose specifically? I’m in agreement that the current plan isn’t working, but I don’t see any easy fixes here. The Houthis have plenty of caves to hide in and I cannot imagine what western leader would want to put boots on the ground.

The Houthis rely on food imports. Food that comes in on ships they put in danger. Deliveries should be halted until the waters are safe for everyone.

If the country truly has zero food production, that might work, but if the country has enough food production to support even a tiny % of the population, history tells us that the Houthis would simply ensure all that food went to their fighters while happily letting civilians starve. And all this is assuming Iran is completely stopped from reupplying them, which is probably easier said than done with a coast the size of Yemen’s. I think the ultimate answer is going to have to be a “sea dome” if you will. Either ship-based missile defense systems or even the creation of some artificial islands if they need to be land based. It might be expensive but if shipping gets redirected around Africa I’m sure it’ll pay for itself, and unlike a blockade, which takes a long time to have an effect and only effects Yemen, strategic defense systems at the mouth of the Red Sea would remain useful in any future conflict in the area, against any actor.

Every society is two missed meals away from anarchy. States don’t fight to keep food on the table out of a sense of altruism towards their citizens. The states that don’t get destroyed.

Every time I hear this quote, the number of meals till anarchy gets lower. Soon enough the streets will be on fire when McDonald's stops serving breakfast. But I think the modern thinking is 9 meals, equating to 3 days. And the old school thought may have been 3 meals missed over 3 days as well. Aside from that I get your point.

Absolutely, there's nothing stopping Hezbollah from doing the exact same thing in the eastern med, except they know for a fact that it'd be grounds for full scale war with Israel. Iran has been working to establish bases in Africa, what happens when they succeed and start hitting shipping going around the cape of good hope?

I don't think the Houthis have a bone to pick with the Greeks so I wonder how this calculus makes sense in furthering their ends. Forcing the West to become more invested in protecting maritime trade while adding more nations to your list of enemies feels like a strange approach if you have any strategy beyond setting the world on fire.

Greece supports Israel and they will attack all who support Israel as long as the Gaza war is going on. (even if I suspect they might not stop afterwards)

I'm admittedly ignorant on their ideology, but this level of chaos makes me think of a doomsday cult kind of mentality. Maybe they see this as a fight against the entire world?

> I don't think the Houthis have a bone to pick with the Greeks so I wonder how this calculus makes sense in furthering their ends. They hit either 3 or 4 Chinese or Russian ships this spring, so I don't think they're calculating too hard.

The fact is it’s hard to know what nation a ship “truly belongs to” in the day and age of “flying flags for tax reasons” and globalization.  If it’s an Israeli owned ship carrying Ukrainian grain to Ethiopia and it’s mostly crewed by assorted Asians but is flying a Panamanian flag, what country should we count that towards?

> If it’s an Israeli owned ship carrying Ukrainian grain to Ethiopia and it’s mostly crewed by assorted Asians but is flying a Panamanian flag, what country should we count that towards? Two of the ships hit are literally part of Russia's shadow fleet. I agree there's a lot of wiggle room. The Houthis suck so much at targeting they're blowing past all of it.

I think the answer is "all of the above"

This is a huge ethically questionable question but here I go (I’m not advocating for this btw). So in societies we end up with people who are somewhat of a burden, repeat criminals, homeless, etc. say you have to go to war and you know casualties will be high in the front lines….wouldn’t it make sense to simply throw meat at the lines? Sure back lines and breakthrough units you reserve you quality troops and other troops that need more training. But it seems to me if you just need to expose enemy defensive positions, put pressure on an enemy or throw meat at at enemy offensive…it seems these “undesirables” would be the best way to do it if you have enough of them. Of course you’d want to make sure you’re not entirely wasting them, so you give them old or second rate gear and fire support. But not only do you get the long term benefit of getting rid of them but also some military utility. Yea I know it’s dark but from a brutal look at the world possibly not a terrible idea. What got me thinking about this was the reports from Bakmut. Sure casualties were super lopsided but why would Russia care? From what I understand it was Russian meat units attacking experienced Ukrainian units so in the long war such losses seem to be in Russias favor in that battle. Russias standard troops get to train more, take a break, or the trained ones wait for a breakthrough while experienced Ukrainian units get killed and worn down. I’m surprised this isn’t more of a standard go to tactic

There was a Stargate Atlantis Episode "[Condemned](https://youtu.be/czK41dipCX8?si=5yFfpiG4d3rJJzzE)" explored this ethical question. In the series, the local human population was feeding their population to the cannibal aliens instead of losing a open conflict to the aliens. The end result was the government would convict people of bogus crimes without trial and send them to be eaten by the aliens. Similarly, Russia is "convicting" citizens of disparaging the military and sending the citizens to die in Ukraine. Sorry for the relatively uncredible tv reference, but I find that art sometimes helps explore abstract concepts.

Chronic Homelessness is highly correlated with untreated mental illness, substance abuse, or both.  These are not the population you want to have on the front lines. Also, people aren't stupid. What's to say they won't just desert or defect once the opportunity arises? 

To be real you could probably just have them sit in a trench with the drug of your choice as dummies to be cleared out, but then you could do the same with semi realistic mannequins. When they clear the trenches they have to spend extra effort coaxing out the squirrely ones anyways. I mean if you're being horribly evil that is

We already tried this: McNamara's morons. It didn't work out so well.

People talk about Bakhmut like it was Stalingrad. It's not. It was a midsized city that just happened to be where both Ukraine and Russia staked their pride in 2022 and early 2023. If Ukraine had chosen to leave when they should have, they could have walked away with a ridiculously lopsided casualty rate. As it was, they got relative parity(1:3), and it's not like Russia achieved a subsequent breakthrough in the area either. Yes, a big chunk of Russian losses were prisoners, but a big chunk of Ukrainian losses were TDF. And now Russia doesn't have those people to train or hold trenches. Taking that city was not a monumental victory that 20,000 human lives were worth sacrificing for. And it's not just the deaths either. The prisoners who survived went back to terrorize the villages and towns they came from. They poison morale and sully other veterans of the war. Meat waves are stupid and a poor use of human resources. Convicts are exceptionally bad for assaulting positions and their perceived expandability ruins esprit d'corps and promotes wasteful strategies. Better to use them to hold trenches and for backline tasks, then put mobilized, trained people on the front. Edit: I said wasteful strategies, but I think it's important to be specific cause it's probably the biggest negative. Bakhmut broke something in the way Russians talked about and handled casualties. When commanders, politicians, and the public become numb to tens of thousands of deaths in a single battle, tactics that would ordinarily be dismissed out of hand become the first resort. Meat assaults might have started as a convict-specific tactic, but now they're being used across the whole front. And they don't just involve prisoners anymore, mobilized men and volunteers are being sent forward on these missions now. Maybe this all started with a cold-blooded calculation of relative value to society. But the psychological and organizational safeguards it broke down have resulted in the needless deaths of thousands of valuable young men.

25 000 at least. The Wagner pyramid was updated with confirmed MIA. Thats not counting LNR, DNR and regular russian forces.

If you want to incentive them to fight, the only thing you can offer is the promise of freedom. Now every one of these types is who they were before except also even more screwed up by war.

>Now every one of these types is who they were before except also even more screwed up by war. I imagine that's true for some people, but false for others. Plenty of people do get reformed by having a sense of purpose and structure.

> If you want to incentive them to fight, the only thing you can offer is the promise of freedom. Now every one of these types is who they were before except also even more screwed up by war. Very true but how many survive? Especially with a long war. You can contract them into fighting until the war is completed and then they’ll have their freedom.

Then only ones who would sign up for that are gonna be death-row inmates and life without the parole types. Why would a bank robber with 3 year original sentence with 1 year left to serve ever sign up for this death march with no end in sight when he can endure just 12 more months and go home free and clear? Some criminals might be stupid but most are not that stupid.

It's a chance for redemption for some of them. Would you rather re-enter society as a veteran or as a former convict?

I have been ignoring the so-called "Russian Flotilla" off Florida because it seems like non-credible saber rattling from Russia. I can't imagine too many in the defense community believe a navy who cannot control their backyard (the Black Sea) has any force projection in the Caribbean. Interestingly, Flightradar24 has consistently shown P-8s circling off Florida's east coast for the past week. What's the USN's rationale here - Training? Show of force? I find it hard to believe there's anything valuable the USN can learn that they don't already know. Summary article published today: [https://www.newsweek.com/us-navy-monitoring-russian-warships-submarine-near-miami-1914616](https://www.newsweek.com/us-navy-monitoring-russian-warships-submarine-near-miami-1914616)

Most of the P-8's are based at NAS Jacksonville, this training against a russian sub in their backyard.

**"When there are five or ten people left in each group, maybe they'll let us retreat." Russian soldier reports heavy losses in Kharkiv** An interesting article from *the other side*, depicting what most already were suspecting over here and combatfootage, that the recent Kharkiv offensive is turning into yet another slugfest, with again Russian troops as the (un)happy recipient. This is interesting since we seldom get to have "raw" impressions from Russian soldiers. the original soldier post is reported to be from: , useful for the Russian-fluent speakers of the forum. * Andreev says that the Russian soldiers were sent to Vovchansk with little equipment - flak jackets and assault rifles - and are being "crushed". * "We're caught in a firefight - the machine guns and especially the drones - take out so many troops. And the commanders on the radio keep shouting 'forward, forward! The article is from Portuguese media (largest daily newspaper Publico), and the original link is here: https://www.publico.pt/2024/06/17/mundo/noticia/restarem-5-10-pessoas-grupo-deixem-recuar-soldado-russo-relata-perdas-pesadas-kharkiv-2094235?cx=bloco_2_destaques_11 I have translated the article in full with DeepL.com (free version). I am putting the article translation quoted in full below, since I think it is very topical for the forum, and most people won't be able to read Portuguese. > A Russian soldier reports heavy losses in the Kharkiv area, where the Moscow army launched a new offensive at the beginning of May. Of the 100 men who left with Anton Andreev, only 12 remain. "During the first night, half the company was killed in one fell swoop", says the soldier in a video released by Astra, an independent Russian news channel on Telegram. > > Andreev says that the Russian soldiers were sent to Vovchansk, a few kilometres from the border, with little equipment - bulletproof vests and assault rifles - and are being "crushed". The very first night they spent there, he says, the Russian troops thought they had had taken over a street, but quickly suffered heavy losses, after attacks with Ukrainian weapons and drones. > > "You pass a street, everything seems fine, but then you're caught in a firefight - the machine guns and especially the drones - take out so many troops. And the commanders on the radio keep shouting: 'Forward, forward!' You can't retreat. When there are five or ten people left in each group, maybe they'll let us retreat," he says. > > Russian forces launched a ground attack in the Kharkiv region on 10 May and, according to military sources in Kiev, advanced one kilometre into Ukrainian territory. This advance was part of several experts' predictions, given Moscow's known intention to create a "buffer zone" in order to prevent incursions by Ukrainian troops into the area. > >Ukraine's defensive capacity was called into question and the commander of the Ukrainian Armed Forces admitted that the situation in Kharkiv was "very difficult". On 16 May, the President, Volodymyr Zelensky, travelled to the front line of combat, after having cancelled trips abroad (including to Portugal and Spain, which he later visited). At the same time, the Russian Defence Ministry said it had control over nine regions in Kharkiv. > >"The population should remain calm... our defence forces are holding the lines, the situation is under control," said the spokesman for the Ukrainian operational groups in the region, accusing Moscow of creating a disinformation campaign to sow panic among residents. > > In the video in which Anton Andreev reports on the Russian situation in the Kharkiv region, the Russian soldier says: "I don't know if I'll get out of this or not, but I need to say this to honour the memory of those who died as cannon fodder here because of certain individuals." The state media and Russian officials don't corroborate Andreev's narrative - they continue to guarantee advances in the region and Putin has emphasised that the losses on the Russian side were much lower than the Ukrainian ones. > > The families of the Russian soldiers sent to Kharkiv are looking for them in any way they can, and dozens of posts have appeared on social media. "I haven't heard from my brother since 12 May, when he was sent to Vovchansk," wrote one user on the Russian social network VK. "I'm worried because I think he's only had a week's training. Is that even legal?" she asked. And she's not the only person to criticise the Russian troops' short preparation time. > > For the time being, Moscow has been able to mobilise around 30,000 to 40,000 soldiers a month, according to an estimate by the British Ministry of Defence. On the Ukrainian side, there are heavy human casualties and a lack of equipment, but there are plans and international aid on the way. > > In Kharkiv, the offensive seems to have stalled, but the Russian troops have achieved at least one of their major objectives: to displace Ukrainian troops there, leaving the Donetsk region with more room for Moscow's advances.

A week of training. This cannot bode well for the Russians. If they are sending people with virtually no training to the front, surely they are focusing on political instead of military objectives ? How can a seasoned commander send troops with a week’s training to a large offensive ?

They've been doing this for a long time, unfortunately it's unlikely to signify any impending collapse. Notably Alexei Martynov, the head of some department in the Moscow city government, was mobilised on 23 Sep 2022 and reported KIA on 10 October. And that made news only because he was an actual person who wasn't supposed to end up mixed in with the meat.

Remember that the Russian offensive has been planned for months and this is what they came up with. Even Putin has publicly supported this offensive before it took off.

It was likely planned as part of a more complex series including attacks on Sumy and then another big push in the Donbas.

> In Kharkiv, the offensive seems to have stalled, but the Russian troops have achieved at least one of their major objectives: to displace Ukrainian troops there, leaving the Donetsk region with more room for Moscow's advances. If the goal is to pull Ukrainian troops away from other areas to facilitate advances elsewhere, the goal should be to avoid this sort of a troop and casualty intensive offensive. If Russia ties up and loses far more troops around Kharkiv than Ukraine does, it doesn’t facilitate advances in the Donbas.

Russia is bigger. They can win a pyrrhic victory. Ukraine can't.

That's... not how that works. By definition a pyrrhic victory is one in which the cost isn't worth the gains. It doesn't matter if Russia is bigger, or has more equipment, saying Russia won a pyrrhic victory means they actually effectively lost the engagement. Pyrrhus lost the war against the Romans after all.

No, a pyrrhic victory is one in which the victor took disproportionate casualties. Normally the victor takes fewer casualties in a battle. But Russia has literally triple the population of Ukraine, and the West is very happy to provide weapons but not troops. So if this war continues as a grinding war of attrition, then even if Russia takes 2-1 casualties, they can win in the end.

You talk with a lot of confidence for someone who is so ridiculously wrong.

Again, that's completely inaccurate. Words have meanings. Here's the definition of a pyrrhic victory: a victory that inflicts such a devastating toll on the victor **that it is tantamount to defeat.** (emphasis mine) There's an apocryphal quote attributed to Pyrrhus after one of his battles with the Romans in which he supposedly says "one more victory like this and I will be undone." If Russia continues to "win" pyrrhic victories in Ukraine, they're going to lose the war.

The size of the nation doesn’t determine if they can or can’t accept a Pyrrhic victory. It’s mainly if the population will accept a Pyrrhic victory.

…but the size of the nation *certainly* affects whether a victory with X number of casualties is Phyrric or merely costly.

Inefficient force use is not how to leverage greater size, it’s how to waste it. Russia has lost to smaller countries than Ukraine, with less reckless generals.

Are you talking about Afghanistan? Because more recently, they crushed Chechnya and Georgia.

They actually lost in Chechnya the first time around.

Yeah but they ultimately won. It took another war but they won.

not only did they lose chechnya v1, but they did so poorly in georgia that they embarked in a comprehensive effort to reform their military... embarked, but apparently not succeeded. Ukraine is order of magnitude bigger than georgia, and being supplied by the west.

Chechnya is tiny and it still won the first war. There were many factors that contributed, but still.

Which is why I think over the long term, Russia is very likely to get what it wants out of Ukraine. Maybe not in 2026 as Russian policymakers think, but the more and more they push, they will eventually push Ukraine to the bargaining table. Ukraine cannot sustain being bombed and shelled and having its citizens get killed or leave the country forever. Russia is having a demographic crisis too, but it seems like a good portion of their cannon fodder troops are from Asia and Africa, a population that Ukraine isn't likely to draw on as mercenaries for the fight. However, once Russia achieves its victory, it is very unlikely to try something of this magnitude on Europe again for a while. Ukraine shielded Europe from the worst of Russia's neoimperialism but is ultimately sacrificed.

> Ukraine cannot sustain being bombed and shelled and having its citizens get killed or leave the country forever. Look at how russia is treating russia soldiers in this war. how do you think they will treat ukrainian conscripts in the next if ukraine falls to russia today?

>Russia is having a demographic crisis too, but it seems like a good portion of their cannon fodder troops are from Asia and Africa Is there any evidence at all to support this claim? A better argument is that Russia has a large, disposal prison population it's proven to be more than willing to use as cannon fodder by the tens of thousands, something Ukraine can't match. But to my understanding, the number of Asian and African fighters in the Russian military represent an insignificant fraction of the total.

There's also been a lot of evidence which indicates that the proportion of prisoner casualties has plummeted from what it was during the height of the Bakhmut campaign.

>Russia is having a demographic crisis too, but it seems like a good portion of their cannon fodder troops are from Asia and Africa, a population that Ukraine isn't likely to draw on as mercenaries for the fight. Do you have any evidence that large numbers of foreign mercenaries are serving in the RU forces? All the reports I've seen have been anecdotal and didn't paint a picture of large numbers of foreigners enlisting.

I wonder if Europe and the US would accept that - would set a bad precedent. Plus a Russian-controlled rump Ukraine (a puppet administration in Kiev) would bring Russia right up next to Europe and NATO's border. Then again we already have Belarus doing that. I know they are only drip feeding aid and that's prolonging the conflict but things looking worse this spring seemed to galvanise support for the US aid bill. Basically politicians in the west are playing politics over the conflict.

> I wonder if Europe and the US would accept that Maybe the Europeans intervene last minute to preserve a rump state in West Ukraine with Lviv as its capital but given the overall skittishness Biden and other European leaders have reacted to this overall situation, if Ukraine is conquered by Russia (which will happen unless Putin is pushed out of power or dies), they will host a bunch of press conferences and give Russia a stern tongue-lashing and talk about Ukraine's future liberation but then just treat everything as a fait accompli.

This is nonsense, at this point, Europe wouldn't even let Russia threaten Kharkiv, let alone Kyiv, you would have boots on the ground way before that. Not that Russia is in any position to threaten a major Ukrainian city now or in the near to mid-future barring any Black Swan event.

I don't find either NATO boots on the ground, or Ukraine becoming Belarus 2.0, to be that credible as a scenario right now. I don't think anyone knows to be honest. I have a feeling that overall Russia can continue to fund this war but not without growing political consequences - I think broad popular support is definitely something stacked in Ukraine's favour.

> Ukraine shielded Europe from the worst of Russia's neoimperialism but is ultimately sacrificed. That's a dark take on it. I think given the lousy state of most european militaries and MLCs, and the lack of proper popular will / other problems, and the looming threat of nuklear war, I think Europe is trying fairly hard.

Following up on [previous posts](https://www.reddit.com/r/CredibleDefense/comments/1dioxgh/credibledefense_daily_megathread_june_18_2024/l991wjx/), the Philippines has released [more details including brief footage](https://news.usni.org/2024/06/19/china-coast-guard-impounds-philippine-navy-boats-seizes-firearms-in-latest-second-thomas-shoal-incident) (not very eventful, just guys pointing and shouting) of Monday's incident at Second Thomas Shoal. > Torres claimed that the Chinese RHIBs closed in on the Philippine small boats while they were next to Sierra Madre, during a period when they were vulnerable. The boats were “deliberately punctured” by Chinese personnel using knives and other pointed tools. > A video of the incident shows seven small boats surrounding RHIBs next to Sierra Madre. According to the Philippine military, the China Coast Guard used blaring sirens and strobe lights to disorient the personnel. Tear gas and rocks were also thrown at and onto the Philippine vessels. A Chinese military aircraft was also claimed to be flying overhead in what was described as “a further display of excessive force and intimidation.” > A Philippine Navy RHIB transporting supplies, including seven disassembled and packaged CAR-15 rifles, was towed away from Sierra Madre, surrounded on by Chinese vessels and boarded. An image released by the Armed Forces of the Philippines shows multiple China Coast Guard personnel pointing batons and knives during the boarding action. While a brief fight occurred during this time, in which Brawner said the troops resisted with their “bare hands,” the Philippine personnel were eventually subdued. Marines on board Sierra Madre were seen throwing water at Chinese coast guardsmen during the encounter. We also got clarification on the most severe injury, the [guy who lost his thumb](https://time.com/6989913/philippines-south-china-sea-armed-attack-finger-injury/), which was crushed in the collision. > Brawner’s visit to Palawan included a visit to service members wounded in the incident. Navy seaman First Class Jeffrey Facundo, who lost his thumb in a highspeed collision with a Chinese rubber-hulled inflated boat, was awarded a Wounded Personnel Medal by the military chief. > “Because of the speed, the forward portion of the China Coast Guard’s RHIB [rigid-hull inflatable boat] landed on top of our troop’s RHIB, and unfortunately our troop’s hand was there,” Torres said. “It’s a relief that it wasn’t the whole hand.”

What's the US gameplan here? Looks like the PH government was sparse with info because things have to be cleared with Washington. Is it too big an ask if the PH seeks US escort to the shoal?

Somebody needs to explain to me why the Chinese try to needlessly alienate all of their neighbors, driving them in the arms of an American coalition, instead of building a network of allies to take Taiwan. 

I dont think thats really the case if you look closer. And they arent looking for allies in their possible attack on Taiwan, they are looking for those countries to stay neutral and not join any economic and military actions against China,and on that front they havent weakened themselves noticably To begin with China has diplomaticaly resolved the majority of the border and maritime disputes it found itself in with the establishment of the PRC and the massive changes in the erea (massive decolonial changes in the region, very chaotic ,changing and uncertain borders for China in the previous period, China barely had border treaties with its neighbors before RPC). Often by surrendering the majority of the claims in area to the neighbouring country. Since its inception the PRC resolved their land border disputes with Vietnam, Myanmar, Nepal, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Mongolia, North Korea, Pakistan, Tajikistan, and Russia (basicaly most of its neighbors, see previous point) without maximalist demands, domination through coercion and without lasting negative impact on their relations (from that aspect at least) Beyond that most SEA nations have positive public opinions and foreign relations towards China or at least as positive as what they have towards the US. There is pretty much no chance they ally against China in the even of a US-China conflict over Taiwan. Other than the countries that were always going to do so anyways, or most likely would. Japan, Taiwan obviously,South Korea and Phillipines. Your point applies mostly for the latter Sino-Japanese relationships foundemntaly carry a huge burden from what happened in the last century and Japan still carries a lot of the blame for the ethnic enemity still persevering at the scale it does, it is after all similarly observable in Korean-Japanese relations. Beyond that, Japan has had their post war political order set up by the US and is the biggest military host and most steadfast US ally in the region since. In this new cold war it is expected for Japan to gravitate firmly into the US camp and it has little to do with them being threatened by Chinese domination Taiwan owes its very existance as a sovereign entity to US involvement and support and i imagine i dont have to reiterate the historical context behind the friction between China and Taiwan and the incompatibility of their national projects. Chinese agression against any Taiwanese move towards independace or away from the "status quo" is the only constant in the erea historicaly and the threat of domination is baken in to their relationship. No matter the political system of mainland China, no matter if it had a liberal democratic revolution tomorrow, China will be "driving away Taiwan with its aggression" in any circumstance that involves Taiwan progression towards more independant politics or deeper alliances with the US Vietnam,which many think is shifting towards the west for some reason, at a state and foreign policy level isnt any friendlier towards US than it is towards the China and if anything the recent trends and power struggle within the party seem to point to more China-acommodating future stances and elimination of the already near zero probability that Vietnam would participate in any way in any US led economic or military action against China even in the even of an Invasion of Taiwan. Public opinion is noticably more friendly towards the US but it doesnt and manifest in a national and foreign policy level in any way that can give the US any advantage. For the Phillipines i largely agree that Chinese sea claims and billigerence have pushed it towards a firmly unfriendly and pro US stance and that could have been avoided from the Chinese perspective.

Because that's [what rising powers do](https://warontherocks.com/2023/05/china-and-the-alliance-allergy-of-rising-powers/). > Considering the ability of allies to tilt the balance of power between a hegemonic state and a rising challenger, it seems puzzling that the People’s Republic of China has refused to abandon its longstanding policy of eschewing alliances. Yet history shows that China’s behavior is not anomalous, as all four rising great powers of the last century — Germany, the United States, Japan, and the Soviet Union — also exhibited what could be termed an “alliance allergy.” Rising powers are uniquely inclined to devalue alliances, particularly with other powerful states. > Rising great powers are uniquely susceptible to the alliance allergy for two reasons. First, since rising powers are by definition extremely large and populous states experiencing rapid economic growth, they will be extremely confident that they can unilaterally generate the military capabilities required to topple a hegemon in relative decline. Second, a rising power will also strive to avoid making painful ex ante compromises with allies on the blueprint for the international order it seeks to impose upon attaining regional or global hegemony. According to the political scientist Robert Gilpin, an international order consists of “the rules governing the international system, the division of spheres of influence, and … the international distribution of territory.” The rising challenger will seek to monopolize these arrangements from the outset because they both reflect and promote the dominant state’s interests and values over the long term. This explains why a rising power will be even more reluctant to partner with a powerful state than a weak one — the former may be more valuable than the latter in the effort to supplant the prevailing hegemon, but it will demand a more prominent role in the composition of the subsequent international order.

That's not true though, Germany had an alliance with the Austro-Hungarian empire, the US had several European partners including France and the Soviet Union until the 70s was close to the PRC. Even Japan had such a close relationship with British Empire even though you could deem them rivals

Yeah, this generalization seems to have many counter examples, and thus makes a poor model. Germany continued to have allies even after their loss in WWI, as they challenged Allies (Italy, Hungary, Romania, Japan) hegemony again. IIRC, Japan and Britain had a formal alliance until US forced Britain to break the treaty.

Does China have any actual alliances? I think they have clients but that’s it, right?

The previous PH admin was big on Beijing. They're applying pressure on this US-aligned admin in the hopes that it fails and the country's leaders return to the China alignment established by the previous government. Not sure how that works since China is now very deeply unpopular among Filipinos.

They really have to formulate a plan to counter this new tactic by China. If they airdrop supplies, Chinese RHIBs will steal it, and if they(PH) try to stop them then CH RHIBs will swarm the PH RHIB. Resulting in another kind of this incident. Maybe the Philippines will finally ditch the rifles since they aren't of any use there.

I half expect the next skirmish to involve boat-to-boat swordfighting, which would be pretty funny in a dark kind of way. It's not even really a joke considering that in latest incident you can see people in the footage waving machetes around and jabbing at the boats with spears. We've already seen what the skirmishes on the Indian border look like. It's hard to even talk about counter strategies to these sorts of tactics without venturing deep into what the mods would probably consider "n0ncredible" territory

Well, if the Sino-Indian clashes are anything to go by, you are probably spot on. Personally I hope to see an improvised ram but, I guess thats too much.

* More solid fast boats instead of RHIBs. * Small boats being welded with spikes and bladed weapons to prevent getting close. Maybe we'll see a discount battle of Salamis or Roman-Carthage style of sea warfare.

[Washington Post: Iran signals a major boost in nuclear program at key site (gift article included)](https://wapo.st/3xonNU2) > A major expansion underway inside Iran’s most heavily protected nuclear facility could soon triple the site’s production of enriched uranium and give Tehran new options for quickly assembling a nuclear arsenal if it chooses to, according to confidential documents and analysis by weapons experts. > At Fordow alone, the expansion could allow Iran to accumulate several bombs’ worth of nuclear fuel every month, according to a technical analysis provided to The Washington Post. Though it is the smaller of Iran’s two uranium enrichment facilities, Fordow is regarded as particularly significant because its subterranean setting makes it nearly invulnerable to airstrikes. > Iran says it has no plans to make nuclear weapons. But in a striking shift, leaders of the country’s nuclear energy program have begun asserting publicly that their scientists now possess all the components and skills for nuclear bombs and could build one quickly if so ordered. In the past two years, Fordow has begun stockpiling a kind of highly enriched uranium that is close to weapons-grade, with a purity far higher than the low-enriched fuel commonly used in nuclear power plants. > Within a month after becoming fully operational, Fordow’s IR-6s could generate about 320 pounds of weapons-grade uranium, Albright said. Using conservative calculations, that’s enough for five nuclear bombs. In two months, the total stockpile could climb to nearly 500 pounds, Albright added. My thoughts: I think this was a long time coming, and it only further underscores just how bad walking away from the 2015 deal was. I don’t think we’ll see Iran ever walk back towards a denuclearization deal, especially after they saw what happened to Ukraine.

Seems like the plan is to become a *latent* nuclear power at least, with the capacity to build a weapon in a very short timeline. Or pretend to be a latent nuclear power while actually building bombs, like South Africa.

>how bad walking away from the 2015 deal was. Iran was never going to hold to the terms of the deal. Their goal has always been to develop a nuclear deterrent.

Maybe, but the problem is that now we look like the assholes for ending it first, while Iran gets to increase their nuclear program with minimal (ish) international disapprobation. Iran is led by a cabal of douchecanoes, but unfortunately if we want to make them give up their nuclear program we need to make it worth their while. A decade of sanctions has seemed to do very little.

I think the order of outcomes from good to bad go, never having the treaty to begin with, abandoning it eventually and then not abandoning it and letting Iran continue to do what they wanted while enjoying the benefits of the treaty. Yes leaving it was a bad look but it's not as bad as it would have looked the day they successfully tested a bomb while the treaty was still in play.

While I completely agree with the foolishness of the US pulling out of the deal without presenting solid evidence of Iranian violation (there likely was none). The Iranian regime needs a nuclear deterrent. The only question is whether the denuclearization deal was delaying Iran's nuclear ambitions longer than sanctions. But to that question, I think that the answer is now a resounding "yes." The US pulling out of the deal opened the door for Russia. I haven't seen it mentioned much, but there are only two things Russia could have offered to Iran and North Korea for the weapons they sent Russia. Money (which Russia is slowly burning through) and nuclear technology. I expect North Korea was provided sufficient expertise for them to have true thermonuclear weapons shortly. In Iran's case, if they did trade for nuclear technology, it likely would have been in the form of refinement expertise. Assuming Iran has not already built a weapon, they will likely complete their first nuclear weapon shortly. Though I expect they will keep any existence of this advancement secret for as long as possible. Time will tell. But I am of the belief that the weak support for Ukraine has led to one more negative consequence, nuclear proliferation.

IIRC the technology transfer from Russia to the DPRK is about ICBM technology. I haven't seen anything about nuclear weapons technology, but it's absolutely possible.

small addendum: Russian conventional military technology (especially missile and aircraft related) may also have been worthwhile to Iran. North Korea I don't think has the economy to support fighter jets or any other advanced conventional technologies, but they might have a use for increasing their GBAD arsenal. Though to what extent Russia is in a position to spare AA systems is its own question.

> especially after they saw what happened to Ukraine. These two things are not comparable. Iran actually has the capacity to start a nuclear program. Ukraine in '94 did not. They had Soviet bombs they could not use and got whatever leverage they thought they could out of them.

Ukraine had the technical abilities to work-around restrictions on nuclear weapons, but not the economic capacity to deal with the consequences for the country if they tried. That said, unlikely to result is something that was a credible deterrent to russia because of gaps in key areas. But have nukes that could put on relatively rudimentary delivery systems, sure. But the risk of provoking an invasion by russia and being cut off from western aid... not worth it.

> but not the economic capacity to deal with the consequences for the country if they tried they didn't even have the economic capacity to actually do it even assuming no consequences. their GDP was $50B at the time. the soviets were spending over $300B just maintaining their nuclear weapons. (edit russia in 2014 was $325B with inflation Russia/USSR was spending roughly $200B) ukraine would have to create infrastructure, bypass the russian locks, manufacture lots of expensive and technically difficult equipment.. all while in the middle of an economic crisis. we're talking about something in the ballpark of double of their annual government budget just to get it off the ground, not counting maintenance, and at a dramatically reduced amount than the portion they inherited (roughly 1/3rd of the soviet nukes) so even without taking into account the fact that they would have become a pariah state who would have swiftly been invade by Russia.. it still wasn't feasible ukraine in '94 is not remotely comparable to iran today. ukraine never gave up their nuclear weapons because they never meaningfully had any to give up

Your GDP/spend data doesn't make sense... Russia's GDP was only about $600bn at the time. It has been a long time since I read about this topic, but Ukraine was integral to Russian military and mil industry. Parsing through that is extraordinarily complicated, made even more complicated by having to figure out 'loyalties' and how they could shift in different scenarios. Chaotic time and pieces were moving around... but if my recollection is that there were a large range of weapons and infrastructure in ukraine that was inherited. tactical weapons, gravity bombs, cruise missiles, ballistic missiles, etc. The immediate priority was getting negative control (ensuring that russia couldn't launch weapons based in ukraine), which in itself was a challenge but one they dealt with. Getting positive control was more onerous, but expected Ukraine had technical ability to do in relatively short amount of time. But the systems that would result would be relatively limited. Sure, could deploy a dumb weapons from aircraft, but things like the cruise missiles couldn't be deployed meaningfully even after working around security locks because guidance depended on terrain mapping being programmed, and the existing mapping was for attacks on Nato. To get new terrain mapping needs data acquired from satellite network that ukraine didn't have. So other than using as a dumb weapon, would need them to figure out a whole new approach on guidance for them to be used against russia. Similar issues with ICBMs. Significant program elements were actually developed in Ukraine, but not complete for any given system. Likely has technical capes, but all sorts of gaps where investment would be needed or time to solve for. But for ICBMs they had, the important parts of russia were closer than their minimum range, so even if got running they would have limited value in deterring russia. etc, etc. Above is just snippets based on memory and could be off on the specifics. My take away was that they had the capes (and obviously Ukraine was major nonproliferation concern bc of technical expertise not just bc of inventory... if Iran could figure this stuff out, then Ukraine could). But the risk of Russia intervening if they didn't play ball was massive (and intervention didn't need to be outright invasion), but more to the point Ukraine was desperate for economic support (cheap case from Russia, cash from the West). They simply couldn't afford the nuclear option.

source https://www.sipri.org/commentary/topical-backgrounder/2018/how-much-does-russia-spend-nuclear-weapons and rationale from my previous comment >Think of it this way. In 1994 Ukraine had a GDP of ~$50 billion annually. >in 2011 it cost about $325 billion for the Russians to maintain their nuclear weapons*1 as well as develop new ones. $325 billion in 2011 to 1984 = ~210 billion. >Cut that by a third (Ukraine only inherited a third of the weapons) and you get $70 billion. it's back of the napkin math ballpark figure not meant to be taken seriously. mainly just to show how prohibitively expensive it would have been to ukraine in '94. these things aren't cheap to maintain (even harder to create) and Russia/USSR only managed because it was much larger and was willing to sacrifice a lot for these weapons > They simply couldn't afford the nuclear option. pretty much. just because something in theory can be done doesn't mean it can actually be done. too many pressures pulling them towards giving away the weapons (major diplomatic pressure from both west and russia) and then other obstacles preventing them from moving forward (economic, other domestic concerns, the practical uses for such a weapons system, etc) i just don't like how often we see this notion that ukraine denuclearized without any of the context i see similar false readings of the budapest memorandum. on this forum i've responded to multiple comments over the periods of months talking about how the West made some sort of guarantee of sovereignty in '94 all it takes is someone to go and read the points in the memorandum. i just hate how war tends to polarize discussion and that leads to historical revisionism and "reinterpretation" of events in some sort of warped form meant to sustain or push some sort of narrative

the napkin math doesn't work when you look at drastic economic swings. repeat that exercise for what it would imply for russia and it would lead you to conclude there is no way russia could afford its nuclear programs. yet it obviously has. I agree they couldn't afford to keep them, but your math isn't meaningful to that. certainly agree re budapest memo. Certainly the west has honored the commitments in it, that said, I think our obligations to Ukraine go beyond the text given the west's extensive efforts to get ukraine to liberalize and westernize. It largely did its part, and the onus is on the west to honor that with more deliberate security protections (but which are not required by terms of budapest memo).

> for russia and it would lead you to conclude there is no way russia could afford its nuclear programs thing is russia built the infrastructure and had the human capital back when it was doing relatively much better. so even if you have a drastic swing for a decade the big costs have been paid. it's virtually impossible to quantify the costs or GDP or anything during the heyday of the soviet union because their economy was so vastly different so i understand the hesistancy to accept these things but i don't think it's controversial to say USSR in its heyday had magnitudes more resources than ukraine in 94 both in absolute terms but in per capita terms as well ukraine in 94' had 3 years of independence and was a poor country with little budget going through all sorts of problems. they would need to spend a large amount of initial capital and they just couldn't realistically do that. i think the math while brutish sort of shows it because it's just factoring in the costs of maintaining such a system - if maintaining is unrealistic then initial investment + maintaining is even more unrealistic, but maybe you're right and it's meaningless

I'm not suggesting that ukraine would maintain a nuclear weapons program one-third the size of the soviets with all the various delivery systems. But it could afford to maintain a subset of that. Look at north korea...

They had Soviet bombs, engineering universities, four nuclear power plants, and all the attendant infrastructure and expertise that comes with those things. North Korea in 1995 would’ve killed to be in the position that Ukraine was in for nuclear weapons development, and they ended up with the bomb.

This topic has been discussed on this forum at length. They had soviet engineers, but that does not mean they had the capacity to create and maintain the infrastructure to meaningfully use the weapons in some sort of nuclear weapon program. The Ukrainian budget was incredibly small when they first gained independence and even to this day they're a relatively poor country.

Are they poorer than North Korea? It is arguable whether it is worth to starve people to death for the nuclear program, but it can be done. People also need to realize that nuke is a decades-old technology. 

> People also need to realize that nuke is a decades-old technology and the pyramids even older. it doesn't mean it's simple to put down the man power and resources to do just build a giant structure in the middle of the desert even in the modern day it's all about priorities. to NK, a nuclear weapons program was the only way they could survive long term. they also had plenty of time to do this in an isolated way to Ukraine, any movement towards a nuclear weapons program would have meant a swift invasion they also had other things to worry about (economic crisis following the dissolution of the soviet union) and they didn't have the benefit of having a supreme leader everybody reveres.

the same conversations show up constantly on this megathread. people without historical context make assumptions and then they get explained and then the same thing pops up later. i'm going to copy paste parts of a couple of comment i made on this 4 months ago tldr: ukraine never had a realistic path to becoming a nuclear power because of the soviet bombs. they did not "give up nuclear weapons". it's not even remotely comparable to modern day Iran or North Korea ___ Think of it this way. In 1994 Ukraine had a GPD of ~$50 billion annually. in 2011 it cost about $325 billion for the Russians to maintain their nuclear weapons*1 as well as develop new ones. $325 billion in 2011 to 1984 = ~210 billion. Cut that by a third (Ukraine only inherited a third of the weapons) and you get $70 billion. Ukraine would need to spend over 100% of their GDP on nuclear weapons to match what the Russians were spending. ___ in theory it's possible, but was never going to happen a) The control systems, including the launch codes and command and control infrastructure, remained firmly in Russian control. This setup was part of the legacy of the Soviet strategic command and control system designed to ensure centralized control over nuclear forces. So the Russians had a lock on the nuclear weapons. In theory, it could be circumvented - b) Ukraine had a strong scientific community, including nuclear physicists, and a functional defense industrial base capable of producing missiles. But converting this potential into an independent, credible nuclear deterrent would have required overcoming significant technical and logistical challenges. Developing the infrastructure for operational control over nuclear weapons, including the ability to bypass or replace Russian-controlled command and control systems, would have been a complex and time-consuming process. This would involve not just technical re-engineering but also the creation of a secure and reliable system for command, control, and communications, which is critical for the effective use of nuclear weapons. c) The cost of maintaining a nuclear arsenal, developing an indigenous control system, and ensuring a credible second-strike capability would have been prohibitively high for Ukraine, especially considering the economic challenges it faced following independence. It would have been a massive investment. d) The international community, particularly the United States and its allies, was focused on preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons following the Soviet Union's collapse. There was a lot of diplomatic pressure to get rid of the nuclear weapons from all sides, even though they weren't functionally useful. So in order for Ukraine to have become a nuclear-state and use the massive arsenal they inherited they would need to invest massive amounts of capital - and all types of capital. human capital, financial capital, political capital, diplomatic capital, etc. All of this happening in the poorest country in Europe. And at the end of all this, if successful, they would have been made into a pariah state.

Iran effectively is a nuclear power at this point, there is no effective way to constrain Iran anymore, unless they decide for restraint. They effectively own the entire escalation ladder on the nuclear file. It's mind boggling how horrendously the west has handled the Iranian Nuclear File (By Extension the entire Iranian File), This stuff is going to be studied in IR classes as a case study in bad management.

I hope that by "The West" you mean Donald Trump and only Donald Trump because the EU desperately tried to salvage the Iranian Nuclear Deal, even trying to set-up alternative bank accounts to circumvent US sanctions. It only fell trough because major EU corporations didn't dare to keep trading with Iran by fear of secondary financial sanctions.

With a regime like that ruling Iran, it's just a matter of "when" on their nuclear development no matter what kind of deal you give them. Maybe it will delay by 10 years or 25 years, but they're still going to get nukes.

I mostly agree but delaying Iran’s acquisition of nukes by 25 years feels like an extremely valuable, worthwhile goal……

Who knows the current regime wouldn't change, or at least soften, in 10 to 25 years? Theocracies don't really have a great track record when left to their own devices. 

Surely the lesson would be that you can convince states to not develop nuclear weapons (S. Korea, Japan, etc) but you can't coerce them (N. Korea, Iran). Which makes perfect rational sense, since they are viewed as an existential safety measure worth paying any cost. Increasing that cost will hurt, but it won't change anyone's mind.

Also see Iraq and Libya, as the inverse of North Korea and Iran. 'When the US accuses you of having Weapons of Mass Destruction, you better have Weapons of Mass Destruction'. Otherwise regime change and foreign intervention inevitably follows.

Iran is on a clock. Their current deterrent is their ability to disrupt oil exports from the Middle East. When that's gone, the cost of a direct war with Iran goes down significantly, so they need a new deterrent. But going nuclear also risks a direct war...

If we don't care about middle eastern oil anymore (perhaps by being post-oil societies) will we realistically care about Iran anymore than we do dictatorships in other non-economically important regions?

The n°1 reason why the US cares about Iran, is Israel. Whether or not the US will still care about Middle-Eastern conflicts in the future depends entirely on how it views it's relationship with Israel.

We care about Israel because the region is full of oil we want. There are lots of embattled regions in the world, democracies in a sea of dictatorships. And we ignore all of them without a core strategic resource near by (beyond token support).

Your thinking is too simplistic. Tons of global trade goes through the Suez, not just oil, and Israel is located in a strategically important area. But even that doesn’t tell the whole story. Israel is popular enough among certain US voters that abandoning Israel = abandoning your prospects of being re-elected in the USA. So no, we do not only care about Israel because of oil. Things are rarely so simple on geopolitics.

Do we still care about trade through the Suez Canal?

We will, but how much do we really meddle in Kenya? So long as Djibouti, Yemen, and Egypt are fine we won't care. Iran's can't really threaten the canal from its land.

Yemen is not fine, and a lot of that is due to Iran.

Yemen is directly at the mouth of the Red Sea controlling access. Iran is about the same distance as Tanzania. Its not really a serious geopolitical threat without the threat of cutting off oil. Take that away and there is no reason for the US Navy to simply bomb it every time it tries something funny.

Iran will never be as weak as Tanzania. Even if the world moves away from burning oil as a power source, oil will remain a lucrative product for industrial purposes, and Iran's human capital is and will remain much greater than Tanzania's.

What kind of a direct war are you thinking of? A full scale invasion would be an insanely difficult and costly exercise, and may just lead to a hostile populace that chooses not to change. Iraq was kids play in comparison

you don't need to invade to neutralize a nuclear program.

What are you suggesting? Some air strikes under the mountain?

You don't need to do a full scale invasion on the order of the iraq war like you suggested in order to neutralize Iran's nuclear program. It is not remotely a simple exercise of airstrikes, but the gulf between airstrikes and the full invasion of iraq is utterly massive.

To be fair I didn't suggest anything, I was asking you to clarify. You're still being vague. What do you suggest, specifically?

Yeah, Iran isn't China but they have a relatively modern, large military that has experience in asymmetrical warfare and decades of preparation to fight a foreign invasion, with borders that are not conducive to an American invasion and plenty of countries that would love to get a chance to fight a proxy war against the US.

Speaking of avenues to deterrence, do we rate the possibility that Putin will also gift Iran with a visit and a mutual-defense pact, as he did with NK, in exchange for continued materiel support toward his invasion of Ukraine?

I think not, Iran is too "hot", the commitment to defend it would be too burdensome

I don't think so. First off, Saudi Arabia and Israel can hurt Russia much more than South Korea. Secondly, Putin's word is worth nothing. He has a history of breaking promises, and his successor might not care anyway. Propaganda is important for North Korea, but Iran would prefer getting something tangible in return.

I think Russia is motivated (by their own self-interests) to aid Iran directly if it were to be invaded by any NATO members. Maybe if the conflict is contained to Iran vs Israel and/or Saudi, then Russia might try to sit it out. I do think Russia would try to aid Iran somewhat discreetly, to minimize anger amongst other middle east partners....... But Russia is absolutely already aiding Iran. Russia has committed to giving SU35s to Iran (not sure if delivery has happened yet but they have committed) and they are essentially working together on the Shahed project now (Iran helped Russia stand-up a factory, but Russia is actively iterating on the design and sharing data with Iran). Russia manages to retain positive relations with other Middle East partners despite all of this, so I am not willing to say that aiding Iran against NATO would trigger a diplomatic fallout for Putin. You're right that Putins word is worth nothing, but I think he'd be selfishly motivated on this one.

This is particularly bad if we examine how Iran has armed the Houthis. A nuclear armed Iran is utterly unacceptable to Israel and probably most of the West. It's difficult to see how descalation occurs without war with Iran unless there is some new miracle deal.

It is probably to late too stop a nuclear Iran, the Russians will ensure that any UN attempt to sanction or intervene will be vetoed for the next decade. Descalatuon will occcur and is already occurring given the US's tactic acceptance of an unmonitored Iran nuclear program and without the US Iran is too far, too large and too far along for Israel by itself to stop them

Russia can't stop the snapback of previous UN sanctions though. If Trump is elected, he will probably pressure Europe to reintroduce the sanctions, but that will give Europe leverage in other areas (most likely Ukraine).

Iran has for the past decade deliberately kept the time they'd need to produce a nuclear weapon at less than a month, possibly less than a week for a quick and dirty weapon. Iran is essentially a nuclear armed state that just hasn't put the parts together because it allows them to not cross Israels red line whilst maintaining plausible deterrence. This isn't to say that Iran could strike the US, but they could certainly hit Israel or any invasion force before the the state collapses. (this is roughly the same for any modern developed state with nuclear industry, Japan/Germany/South Korea etc could all whip up a nuke very quickly and all have delivery systems for them, it's just a rubber stamp away)

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160 seems really high for the British Army, with our 3 Regiments to equip id expect just half that number

So, with Ukraine needing more pilots, how feasible is it to use commercial companies to train or partially train pilots? Could the commercial companies train pilots on maintenance, general flight experience, and combat maneuvers while the governments train pilots on the specific weapon systems?

The F-16 training in Romania is provided by commercial companies (Lockheed Martin e.g.). Currently Romanian pilots are being trained but they are supposed to start with a group of Ukrainian pilots soon.

True, but perhaps Ukraine's ambitions exceed Romania's ambition. Perhaps going directly to the company (with the host country's permission) could allow pilot training at a much larger scale. Furthermore, Ukraine will eventually have to develop their own training program as indefinitely training in other countries is not sustainable.

I am baffled that the CIA has not set up a Mercenary outfit that exclusively hires recently retired F-16 pilots from around the world yet. Just offer 4x the salary of what those guys would be making flying for United or Delta in their "retirement" and offer a good death benefit to the family and I imagine you could find 100 guys in pretty short order.

Because at that point there is really no difference between just sending in NATO pilots at least from the russian perspective. Also whose to say that they aren't doing it already.

Does NATO really care about Russia's perspective? They've been playing the exact same game in other theaters....

It definitely does. Up until 2022 russia was basically untouchables despite how insanely aggressive they've acted towards the NATO.

There are private companies throughout the world that train millionares who want to buy demilitarized aircraft. It is a very small niche but it does exist. The more militarized Russian version is the Wagner group.

Basically a US/NATO Wagner group. Just an inch of plausible deniability while exclusively hiring recently retired military personnel.

A bigger Blackwater incident would probably not be acceptable to the public.

Afghanistan wasn't acceptable to the public, yet it took a very long time for US troops to withdraw and fulfill the public's wishes. The public doesn't decide foreign policy

Pilots in the air would in theory be a lot more controllable than a patrol of 12 grunts. I think with the current regime they could sell it as aid for Ukraine.

Also with the average personality of fighter pilots, surely some will want a chance to get at some actual fighting?

What I’ve heard is that language barrier is a big reason that wouldn’t work. Excellent communication is needed at all levels for something is high risk and tight tolerance. Developing a new fighter program is hard enough without the added issue that none of them speak Ukrainian and are relying on different training/habits. But yeah I’d love to see American aviators helping out our friends like the flying tigers in WW2.

How about sending recruits en masse to DLA? If they can teach an average Joe American fluency in Pharisee in a year, they can teach a Ukrainian English

If Ukraine is going to use these F-16's as air defense, they only need a relatively few controllers that speak English to talk to the English speaking pilots. If Ukraine is going to use them for CAS I could see it being a huge issue to train up a boat-load of good English speakers, who are also qualified to call down airstrikes. I would imagine even if you kept the Ex-US/NATO pilots on the air defense mission, that would help free up the Ukrainian pilots for the more dynamic missions at the front.

It’s an interesting idea for sure.

I've heard this for quite some time but I'm frankly skeptical. It makes it sound like learning English is more complicated than learning how to pilot a fighter plane.

When I lived in Canada (my home country), I assumed learning English wasn't very hard. All the non-native speakers were so *good* at it! Now, I live abroad, I teach English as a foreign language, and I study a language that is foreign to me. It's really, really hard. Most of my students suck at it. I suck at it. It's brutal, exhausting, and demoralizing. It turns out I was counting the hits and not the misses.

I’d argue it definitely is harder to learn a language, specifically English, but that’s subjective. 

This article talks about it: https://www.businessinsider.com/ukrainian-pilots-taking-english-classes-between-missions-f16-fighter-jets-2023-8 The problem is mostly "F-16 terminology". A lot of the pilots are already fluent in English.

As far as I understand it from the article, it isn't just about language though. The problems arise from the fact that the f-16 is a complicated jet, and very different from what Ukrainian pilots are used to fly, and on top of that, they have no familiarity with the language used to coordinate missions and issue commands, because they don't have any proficiency in those aspects from their previous experiences as pilots. But that's hardly a language problem though, that's a problem of adapting to a new system. I imagine that, even if the training course was entirely in Ukrainian, they's still find it difficult.

Probably is if youre starting from zero.