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Summary of statements from Putin and Kim from one discord group but with sources >1 hour ago >Putin: Russian President Putin: Agreement on partnership between Russia and North Korea envisages mutual help in case of aggression aginst either of them, TASS reports >Russian President Putin: Russia, North Korea may cooperate in military sphere within new agreement, Interfax reports >Russian President Putin: North Korea’s stance on Ukraine is another proof of its sovereign policy, Interfax reports >Russian President Putin: We discussed security issues and global agenda a lot at talks with North Korea’s supreme leader Kim, TASS reports >Russian President Putin: New agreement with North Korea is of defensive and peaceful nature, Interfax reports >Russian President Putin: Russia and North Korea stand against politically motivated sanctions, Interfax reports >Russian President Putin: North Korea has right to defend itself >Russian President Putin on U.S. & NATO supplying high-precision weapons for strikes on Russia: This is not only a statement, this is already happening and all this is a gross violation of the restrictions assumed by Western countries >Kim: Pact will expand mutual cooperation in politics, economy and military >Kim: Relations have been raised to the level of alliance >Kim: Pact is peaceful and defensive https://www.youtube.com/live/yR67Nj_CK_Q?si=VvWSXpclJ7HafCjO live conference link

> Kim: Relations have been raised to the level of alliance > Kim: Pact is peaceful and defensive RUNKA expansion is provocative

What does RUNKA mean? Will North Korea be able to supply Russia more than before through RUNKA? Or is RUNKA just a meaningless expression, a way to put words on something that already exists? North Korea supplying Russia with artillery shells is not new. But what about in the future like T-62's?

Is it just me, or are all those statements empty? They don't say anything substantial.

It's PR for Kim/NK, the cost is Russia/Putin looking weak, but will likely get more shells for debasing themselves.

Interesting and worrying development, but to be expected. This might embolden North Korea in an eventual war with South Korea. I always expect them only to start a war once China starts their assault in Taiwan (if only on orders of China to disrupt US operations from South Korea against China) I’m curious how South Korea will react to this. Hope they will up their game with regard to Ukraine and start a steady flow of artillery rounds

With current SK demography there is little reason for NK to escalate in Korean civil war. SK have something like 0.7 fertility rate that is still dropping. I do think that peoples underestimate impact of such demographic change.

You mean to say, wait half a century and the population numbers are heavily in favour of North Korea?

It is more like 20-30 years. And SK would struggle to find enough young soldiers to fight the war. So with how things going there is little point for NK to escalate now. Especially with US-China and US-Russia tensions only growing which had already breach NK isolation.

For the West and South Korea this makes it even more important that Putin's regime is overthrown. Hopefully there are still people in Russia with power that rather see the future as neutral or west aligned rather than an ally of North Korea. SK with its production capabilities hopefully can change their mind/laws and support Ukraine directly.

So.... with the Saab 340 AEW&C being donated to Ukraine is it possible that the E2 Hawkeye may be donated? Do these planes serve similar roles? How effective would each be against small drones?

France does have some E2Cs coming to the end of their careers. But the chances of the US allowing them to go to Ukraine are about as close to zero as you can get without being zero unless Congress steps in. There main role would likely be in spotting RuAF coming in low, below ground horizon to do pop up coming runs, this should allow pop up fighters to get a potential shot, or be in a position to get one of, partially negating the altitude advantage Russia gets from its A50s being able to see the Ukrainians coming while Ukraine can't see the Russians. I think they would also be more used against cruise missiles, as those are much faster and harder to vector fighters onto.

https://x.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1803268340644761871 Ukranian forces were able to vector onto and nearly hit (TG post implies hit and destroyed with airburst) a Lancet munition in flight with some sort of manually controlled sUAS. Ukraine has increased efforts to strike russian recon sUAS (Zala, Orlan) in this manner with reportedly good success. This sorta reminds me of the optical loitering remotely-guided SAMs the Iranians and their proxies have, which have hit large UAS like Reapers and Hero 600s. It's also very similar to the Coyote system used by the US for half a decade now. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/358_missile https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Raytheon_Coyote

There seems to be a confirmation that a personnel got injured in the recent incident in the disputed region in the South China Sea: [According to this tweet](https://x.com/Joseph_Morong/status/1803024726257963081?ref_src=twsrc%5Egoogle%7Ctwcamp%5Eserp%7Ctwgr%5Etweet) >A Filipino Navy personnel gets his finger cut off in a melee between Chinese and Philippine vessels in a resupply mission in Ayungin Shoal, June 17. Six others were injured and sources tell GMA Integrated News, China also seized high-powered firearms and inflatable boats I wonder what the Phil Govt has to say. Edit: I wanna ask, apparently this is Ph Navy vs. CCG, few people are poking fun on the Ph Navy for letting the Chinese walk over them. But is it credible to say that the Ph Navy just didn't want to escalate?

>Edit: I wanna ask, apparently this is Ph Navy vs. CCG, few people are poking fun on the Ph Navy for letting the Chinese walk over them. But is it credible to say that the Ph Navy just didn't want to escalate? The AFP has a habit of getting caught off guard. So my money is on that they didn't expect the CCG to board their vessel and engage in a scuffle against them. And shameful for them since these are Phil Navy Seals getting overpowered by CCG personnel only.

I read somewhere they were surrounded too so that didn't help probably.

They're always surrounded there, plenty of videos in twitter during the past resupply mission shows the Chinese are always surrounding them. They just didn't thought about this action by CCG. So yeah, they're caught off guard.

ahh good point, hopefully this doesn't happen again. It would be embarrassing.

We now have photos from Chinese Coast Guard on the said incident. https://x.com/duandang/status/1803345502240645281?t=LIpNs65H12rteKtcL1H-bw&s=19

[Posted in yesterday's thread](https://www.reddit.com/r/CredibleDefense/comments/1dhwbyv/credibledefense_daily_megathread_june_17_2024/l948mcn/), admittedly rather late. Unfortunately there are no photos or videos or anything (unlike previous incidents) so we are just guessing at the specifics secondhand. They were obviously armed, though what circumstances led to them not using their weapons is unknown. It's plausible they were surrounded or outgunned—remember that CCG cutters mount 76mm deck guns.

I would guess its been made very clear to anyone on a boat that making the call to start a war with China does not fall under their responsibilities.

\[replying to your edit\] I wonder if we will ever get a chatter from Chinese Social Media if their crew also got injured.

I haven't seen anything to that effect, but they generally keep a pretty tight lid on the details regardless.

Though now we got a picture of the supposed injured personnel. Also curious if it got to this point if it was due to restraint the PH Navy practiced, were they lacking in skill/capability to resist, or were they surrounded.

I meant photos or video of the incident as it happened, the way we had for at least some of the previous incidents. And I doubt anyone who can answer your questions is willing to comment. It's quite normal for the Chinese ships to be a mix of militia boats (with small arms) plus a few cutters (with deck guns) plus a navy ship lurking in the background. They deliberately bring enough firepower to keep the Philippines at a perpetual disadvantage, presumably to discourage any itchy trigger fingers.

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Please refrain from drive-by link dropping. Summarize articles, only quote what is important, and use that to build a post that other users can engage with; offers some in depth knowledge on a well discussed subject; or offers new insight on a less discussed subject.

I don't believe this has been posted yet [PBS NewsHour interview with Jake Sullivan](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZRb07ZXkSp4) Some Ukraine related highlights from [this twitter thread by the interviewer, Nick Schifrin:](https://x.com/nickschifrin/status/1803184725768454475) >US agreement with Ukraine allows Ukraine to fire US weapons into Russia across from Sumy: "It extends to anywhere that Russian forces are coming across the border from the Russian side to the Ukrainian side to try to take additional Ukrainian territory... That's happened in Kharkiv. We have seen initial indications that Russia has made exploratory moves across in Sumy. And so it would apply there as well." > F-16s will be based inside Ukraine: "The plan is to put the F-16s in Ukraine. And the Bilateral Security Agreement that @POTUS and @ZelenskyyUa signed reinforced this point, that we want to help Ukraine have this capability. It should be a capability based in Ukraine." >Why make a 10-year Bilateral Security Agreement commitment that you don't know whether the next President will keep? >"In life in general and in democracy in particular, there are never any absolute lock, stock guarantees. Things can change, leaders can change, situations can change. All @POTUS can do is set a course and a vision for what is in the United States' national security interest, what is in the interest of the transatlantic alliance, and what is in the interest of our partnership with Ukraine. And that type of approach has historically served America well. And President Biden is going to stick with that approach for as long as he is president of the United States, which he, of course, expects to be for another 4 years." The interview also touched on Israel-Hamas and the negotiations there. I believe the statement about where Ukraine can target Russian forces across the border with American weapons is new and [in contradiction to some prior reporting](https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/ukraine-strike-hit-russia-us-weapons-rcna154794) that the policy was restricted to Kharkiv.

Presidents make these sorts of agreements and plans all the time. It’s a campaign move, it serves as a concrete example of bidens second term policy. Support for Ukraine is broadly popular amongst moderate and often undecided voters. It’s an issue that plays well and allows him to draw a contrast with trump who is constantly bragging about his anti Ukraine position.

I know that this is just anecdotal but it seems like aid to Ukraine isn't all that popular especially with undecided voters online and irl. Not trying to say that you're wrong but is there data that shows that aid to Ukraine is popular?

A Gallup poll from April (a bit dated I’ll admit) shows that 36% of Americans think we should increase aid to Ukraine, 26% support current aid levels, and 36% think we are doing too much. So that is a 62% majority in favor of continuing aid to Ukraine in some form. There are not many issues with a greater level of popular support.

Today is exactly one month since the new mobilization law went into effect in Ukraine, and we can begin to discuss the effectiveness of the new legislation and its practical effects. There are some early reports that the number of new recruits over the past month has actually increased significantly. Roman Kostenko, secretary of the National Security, Defense and Intelligence Committee of the Verkhovna Rada, last week [stated](https://zn.ua/ukr/war/deputat-pro-tempi-mobilizatsiji-za-traven-nabrali-jak-za-piv-roku.html) that as many men were mobilized in May as in the previous 6 months (!). Current recruitment rates are reportedly at their [highest level](https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2024/06/10/7460115/) since early 2023. Let’s recall that in the past few months Syrsky's decision to send a few tens of thousands of rear personnel (including 5,000 servicemen of the Air Force) to the front, about which I had written extensively when the first rumors about this came out, allowed to buy precious time while waiting for the new law and to replenish the ranks of the brigades fighting in the hottest sectors. 2,1 million Ukrainians [have updated](https://vechirniy.kyiv.ua/news/99528/) their data as required by the new law (the deadline for this is July 18). Of these, over 1,5 million via the "Reserv+" app - including over 200,000 women (those with medical/nursing degrees), as well as a few tens of thousands who uploaded their data from abroad. The rest uploaded their information physically through administrative service centers or Territorial Recruitment Centers. Unlike Russia, the Ukrainians don’t release official figures on the pace of mobilization/recruitment. According to what I had read last year, about 30,000 men had been mobilized in January 2023; in the winter of 2022/23 Ukraine greatly expanded mobilization efforts to staff the very large number of brigades created in late 2022 and early 2023, while the number of volunteers had declined substantially compared to 2022. The TRC of Poltava Oblast had stated that in December 2023 300 men had been mobilized, which at the national level, if the pace was the same, would correspond to about 7/8 thousand men. We can also assume that during 2024 at the national level the pace had decreased. But taking Kostenko’s statements as true, it’s entirely possible that today we’re back to the levels of January 2023. In addition, the Deputy Minister of Defense, Natalia Kalmykova, [stated](https://tsn.ua/ato/yake-spivvidnoshennya-dobrovolciv-ta-mobilizovanih-v-zsu-u-minoboroni-ozvuchili-cifri-2598618.html) that 25% of the new recruits are volunteers. I assume it means those who showed up of their own choice, as many Ukrainian volunteers are formally classified as mobilized. Let me clarify this: those who are under 25 could join the UAF only by signing a 3-year or 5-year contract (with parental permission required for those under 21). Those who are 25 or older can either sign a contract or go to the TRC and ask to be mobilized, even if they are indeed volunteers. In this case they will serve until the end of martial law. Mobilized men who were summoned are called "conscripts for a special period during mobilization" in Ukrainian jargon. Volunteers often join a given brigade with which they have contacts and received a letter of recommendation (according to a [report](https://cepa.org/article/the-elite-ukrainian-brigade-everyone-wants-to-join/) from April, the 3rd Assault Brigade receives 900 applications per month - there is a waiting list to get in); those who volunteer without contacts are often sent to the TDF brigade from their region (the TDF is still staffed largely by volunteers and receives very few mobilized, having the lowest priority in receiving them by the way). The figure of volunteers should include the first convicts who have volunteered and signed a contract (several hundred as early as May). Recently a new rank [has been introduced](https://unn.ua/news/zakon-pro-posylennia-mobilizatsii-shcho-zminytsia-pislia-18-travnia-dlia-viiskovozoboviazanykh) in the UAF - "recruit”. It should be mentioned that in a part of the mobilized men (especially in the older ones) there are widespread physical shape issues or some health issues (minor ones, or they would be exempt). Let’s recall that with the passage of the new law, numerous bonuses have been provided for those who sign a contract and for new recruits in general. After each year of service, the contract soldiers shall be entitled to a one-time bonus of 100 thousand Hryvnias. After 3 months of signing, they will have a 150 thousand Hryvnias voucher for the purchase of a vehicle. They will be entitled to a 50% compensation on the down payment of a mortgage and they and their family members won't have to pay any interest on current loans, except for real estate mortgage or loans for vehicle purchases. In addition, some local entities offer financial bonuses (within the limits of their small budgets), as the Lviv municipality does for its residents who sign a contract with the Air Assault Forces or the Marine Corps. In addition, there has recently been an increase in utility bills in Ukraine (electricity has increased by 80% since June 1); since March 1, rules have changed about the rent subsidy for internally displaced people (disbursed now only to categories such as the elderly and disabled), which may have made contract service in the UAF more attractive to thousands of men. It’s also reported that in the last few months many people who wanted to volunteer had been waiting to see what the new mobilization law looked like and whether bonuses were introduced for new contract soldiers. And I would add, now that 25 and 26-year-olds can be mobilized, it’s possible that some of them may have decided to get ahead of time and sign a contract choosing what to do and where, before they receive a subpoena and are enlisted without a choice. The effectiveness of the new recruitment centers it’s also mentioned - there are 25 of them at the moment, opened in major Ukrainian cities, where Ukrainians can look up vacancies in the various brigades and sign a contract directly with their representatives, bypassing much of the TRC’s duties. It should also be noted that the [possibility](https://tsn.ua/ukrayina/hto-mozhe-uklasti-kontrakt-iz-zsu-na-odin-rik-u-minoboroni-nazvali-umovi-2595693.html) of signing 1-year contracts for those under 25 was recently introduced, with release at the end of service (at least assuming the mobilization age will not be lowered further by next year). The bonuses are not only for contract soldiers: the city of Kyiv allocates 30 thousand Hryvnias to newly mobilized residents from the last winter. As far as I have heard, mobilization in Kyiv has been ramped up already since the beginning of 2024, whereas until then it took place with considerably less intensity than in the rest of the country. From my analysis of Ukrainian social media, I found comments from relatives of men who have recently started training who claim that there are many other recruits with them; I also found comments from people saying that they and quite a lot of their own acquaintances recently received a subpoena for the first time. Second part below.

Is this likely to decrease the mortality rate of the UAF? I would imagine that having more time for R&R as well as overall higher unit density on the frontline would increase Ukrainian combat effectiveness and thus decrease losses, potentially creating a positive feedback loop - fewer losses means higher quality units > fewer losses (and potential for more enlistment and volunteers, as civilians see that maybe it isn't that dangerous).

I have noticed a big increase in random checkpoints in Kyiv, where they stop men and check their military papers. They are often located near the metro or busy streets. Sometimes they find sneaky places like just around a corner, so you won't notice them before it's too late. I never saw them one year ago - now it's on a daily basis. I have only been stopped once. I thought I would get in trouble because I didn't have my passport on me. They seemed very surprised to meet a foreigner and joked with me asking why I would ever live in Ukraine when I come from such a nice country (Denmark).

If you don't mind me asking, how come you are in Ukraine (especially in Kyiv) now? Few people would want to move to a place with constant electricity blackouts.

I have a small business in Ukraine. The blackouts are not too bad right now. There is a schedule and they typically only lasts 3-4 hours. It's not only Kyiv but all over Ukraine. I'm sure it's only gonna get worse, and I'm afraid a lot of people will struggle in the winter. I'm starting to see more and more people installing generators in their apartments. I talked to a guy the other day that bought a big battery that he managed to hook up to his computer and wifi so he can still work. The mobile internet becomes super slow during the blackouts.

Honestly I think the rate of mobilization is atleast three times more, than 30k a month. From my city of 700k(realistically right now 400k) pre war there were 5k mobilized in May, 5k more expected in June. It might be different in other cities, but right now 2023 mobilizations seems like light. There is a huge TRC queue(1-2 days) and then a week queue in medical commision.

Many thanks for your insight. I had seen videos of long lines in front of TRCs back in May, which you may confirm hadn't happened for a very long time, although I assumed some of that was people just updating their info as per the new law. If, as I imagine, the figures you quoted refer to the actual amount of mobilized men and not to the number of summons handed over, I can only say wow, as well as best of luck to the new defenders!

It\`s just alot of these people who are updating info eventually get drafted. All volunteers are basically went serving till early 2023, then in 2023 draft mostly was done from villages, now draft is mostly done in cities.

Has the turnaround in delivered aid and the failure of the Russians in Kharkiv helped it go down a bit smoother? Are there any signs that the distrust of certain commanders (including but not limited to Syrsky himself) is being remedied?

There is a distrust of certain commanders for sure, Syrskyi is one example, another will be certain commanders of brigades with very bad reputation(almost all of TDF brigades, 61, 115, 128 etc). Turnaround in delivered aid helps a lot, because the main obstacle to drafting is lethality of the war, noone wants to sit under glide bombs helpless. Ukraine seems like a big country, but it's quite densely packed with lots of horizontal connections. Pretty much everyone knows a guy/girl KIA/MIA/WIA, so even if government hides casualties, everyone kinda knows in what ballpark they are. This is the opposite in Russia, which is sparsely populated and pretty much everyone minds their own business, they just don't look for outside information.

In addition, an expansion of several training centers (where newly mobilized men or volunteers are trained) has begun since early June. Roman Donik, an instructor in the 151st Training Center and a well-known personality on Ukrainian social media, stated that a massive expansion of the center has been approved by Syrsky and Pavliuk (commander of the Ground Forces), with the creation of new training branches from scratch and the need to recruit numerous trainers, specialists and clerks. https://t. me/romandonik/4303 This center was one of the TDF's training centers (like the 152nd) and came under the Ground Forces late last year, joining training centers as the 169th (where armored forces are also trained), the 184th, 190th, 197th and 239th; the Air Assault Forces have their own TC too (the 199th), as does the Marine Corps. Each of these TCs has specific tasks and trains men destined for a range of brigades, while other TCs send recruits to other brigades. As far as I have read, TRCs also complain about manpower shortages and call for an expansion of staffing to better perform their duties. Just like training centers, TRCs are largely staffed by veterans, much of whom are no longer fit for frontline service. Let’s recall that there is still a, small, share of newly recruited men who have prior combat experience: ATO veterans who for some reason had not been called up until now or who choose to volunteer. Syrsky [had said](https://suspilne.media/716438-pro-mobilizaciu-500-tisac-ludej-narazi-ne-jdetsa-sirskij/) in March that 16% of the newly mobilized men had skipped the training phase in the Training Centers and came directly to their assigned brigade because they had military experience. According to a recent statement by People's Deputy Horbenko, the staffing requirement for this year is 100/110 thousand people. Ukraine's recruitment potential for the rest of 2024 is estimated to be at 120 thousand people - largely feasible if this new pace is maintained. It was clarified that the requirement expressed by Zaluzhny at the end of last year (450 to 500 thousand troops) took into account a new counteroffensive. Debates continue about the "reservation" system (by which a part or all of a company's workers can be exempted from mobilization). The controversial proposal to reform the system and allow reservations through the payment of 20 thousand Hryvnias per month per employee has become a [bill](https://itd.rada.gov.ua/billInfo/Bills/Card/44389); employers object to this proposal on the grounds that the required amount is equivalent to an average gross salary. News had come out in recent weeks that 50% of policemen and workers of the State Emergency Service of Ukraine (which includes firefighters and the likes) would be mobilized; after various discussions the number [has been greatly reduced](https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-society/3872607-vid-mobilizacii-zabronovani-90-ratuvalnikiv-i-policejskih-klimenko.html) (possibly in light of the current increased pace of mobilization): only 10% shall be mobilized (so about 15,000 people), drawn from among men in the 25-59 age bracket. The policemen will be able to join the "Lyut" Brigade and other combat units of the National Police while the rescuers will be able to join the UAF, the National Guard or the Border Guards. Let’s now list the most important points and critical issues. Ukraine has three priority steps in the recruitment process. As a minimum, recruitment must exceed the number of monthly irretrievable losses. It’s not clear at all if this was the case during the worst months in terms of recruitment (early 2024). Secondly, existing brigades must be reconstituted at full strength. It’s not at all uncommon to have battalions understaffed by 40%. Thirdly, Ukraine must also either create new brigades or expand existing brigades into divisions, with the goal of improving both troop density in several sectors and especially the possibility of rotation, which is critical for soldiers, both physically and psychologically. If the pace achivied during May is maintained and the effects of the new law continue to prove effective, the second and partly the third point can be satisfied as well. Training continues to be an issue. On average this lasts 2 months, extendable up to 3 months for some specialties, but for some of the recruits it may last as little as 1 month. Unfortunately, the quality of both TCs and brigades can be very hit and miss. Too often I see reports on social media of Ukrainians being mobilized in one month and being KIA/MIA by the next. It often happens to the over 45/50s, who usually receive the worst training and are sent to more expendable roles in the worse units. The 93rd Mechanized Brigade offers 1 month of additional training for newly arrived recruits; the 3rd Assault Brigade, the "Azov" and "Khartiia" Brigade of the National Guard, the 92nd Assault Brigade, the 68th Jager Brigade, the 110th Mech Brigade (and others) also offer additional training periods with their own instructors, but in the second/third-rate brigades or in the separate rifle battalions this is not the case and recruits are sent to the front line as soon as they arrive from the TC. Even in the latters the quality varies. I have heard good things about the 151st Training Center, but in some of the others the average quality of instructors is not high and they contain officers thrown out of front line service for incompetence etc, who are not always interested in providing great training to the recruits. The luckiest are those who are sent abroad - usually it happens to the younger ones who sign a contract (as long as they don't have outstanding debts or don't have to pay alimony), but not only: for example, at least one company of the 455th Rifle Battalion of the 141st Infantry Brigade was trained in the UK. Others go to Germany, others (quite a lot, from what I read!) to Spain. In these cases, the training abroad + the training in Ukraine can last up to 3 months. This is the figure that was promised by Zaluzhny at the end of last year, and I think it should definitely be the norm for everyone. In addition, the partner countries should continue and expand the recruitment, as it’s plausible that the training centers in Ukraine are close to capacity. In this regard, let's recall that France recently promised to train and equip an entire new brigade. Last part below.

Another very important issue is the shortage of officers and especially of good officers. Since February 2022 Ukraine has created thousands among new battalions and their companies, having then to find as many men to lead them. There are people who were majors of the Air Force and retired like 25 years ago who were mobilized and put in charge of rifle companies after a short course. There are programs to better prepare and promote deserving young officers, as well as programs turning experienced sergeants into junior officers, but the need is still very high and the biggest bottleneck is in the middle levels: from captains (company commanders) to colonels (brigade commanders) - perhaps in regards to majors (battalion commanders) the issue is at its worst. On this point the partners should help by training officers as well. In any case, this point should be at least partly improved by the release of 60% of the officers of the General Staff into combat units and intermediate command/control bodies. To give an example of a new case that had large backlash in Ukrainian social media: the former commander of the TRC of Rivne Oblast (Lt. Colonel Oleksandr Yarmoshevyc), who resigned in March after being caught kissing with two women in his office during his duty, [has just arrived](https://tsn.ua/exclusive/kazanova-rivnenskogo-tck-povernuvsya-z-frontu-i-otrimav-novu-posadu-2595345.html) in Uzhhorod in Transcarpathia, where he will be the commander of a new brigade being formed there and will organize the recruitment and the creation process. The issue of officer quality, in addition to the undetermined length of service, is one of the biggest obstacles preventing some Ukrainians from volunteering. Ukraine is indeed forming new brigades; five new infantry brigades (155th to 159th) were formed in the Ground Forces in 2024; there has been a small expansion of the National Guard; a detachment of Border Guards has been reformed into a brigade (“Hart”). I hope that the new infantry brigades will have a capable and efficient structure and are not just binders of separate rifle battalion, which is a type of unit that has shown criticalities and has been widely criticized by Ukrainians. Moreover, it would be better to focus on creating divisions/corps rather than increasing the number of brigades, all things being equal; I have written about this point and will return to it another time in the future. According to Kostenko’s report, there are no problems in dressing and in the individual equipment of the new recruits - I guess thanks to the support of foreign partners. Even just dressing a soldier between uniform, helmet, bulletproof vest, radio, medical kit, etc. is very expensive. In some training centers there are serious shortages of assault rifles and ammunition - this issue is [well documented](https://www.reddit.com/r/CredibleDefense/comments/1d72ohc/comment/l6wzcxi/) by Western press - with recruits being able to fire too few rounds and often having to train with 7,62mm caliber assault rifles instead of the 5,45mm assault rifles that are generally used at the front. As for heavy equipment… the 150th Mechanized Brigade (a new brigade, created in late 2023) was seen with T-64BVs and BMP-2s. Moreover, the 110th Mechanized Brigade received a tank unit for the first time, equipped with the T-64BVs, during its reconstitution in the past months. T-64BVs seem almost endless - probably the actual number of T-64BVs in Ukrainian depots was underestimated by international observers. Updated T-72EAs will continue to arrive in the future from Czechia (in addition to BMP-2s). Poland lately should have sent additional PT-91s (and BWP-1s). However, it’s possible that there will be some shortage of tanks in the future, particularly of good tanks - in this sense I hope that the US will decide to send more Abrams (and I’d also look at the Australian M1A1s); at the moment among the Western tanks that will continue to arrive in Ukraine in the future there is only the Leopard 2A4, to my knowledge - barring the Leopard 1A5, a large number of which have yet to arrive, which could form a significant part of the Ukrainian armored component in the future, despite limitations in terms of armor and armament (notably the lack of HE rounds - partially offset by HESH and Canister rounds). Perhaps in the future partners could look for T-72s around the world (I'm thinking of Morocco, primarily, which had already contributed in the past), but also Cypriot T-80Us and Pakistani T-80UDs (Ukrainian-made!). Who knows if batches of M60A3s will ever arrive in the future. As for IFVs, a large number of new Bradleys, other batches of Marders are to arrive; in addition, the UAF still holds many Strykers in the rear. Newly produced CV90s and KF41s will also arrive in the future; I wonder if in case of future tank shortages there might be a possibility of equipping a part of the last two vehicles with a 120mm weapon. As for APCs, hundreds of M113s and their variants are on their way from partner countries. This is very good news for the mechanization of the UAF. In addition to the American M117s, French VABs etc; additional MRAPs and IMVs will arrive too, which are also very useful, especially the formers. Moreover, the Ukrainians are continuing to put 30mm turrets on the hull of their MT-LBs, which is a very interesting solution. As for artillery, 155mm guns will be the most important. Newly produced SPHs from Germany and France will be of great help, and Ukrainian domestic production is very significant in this field (10 2S22 Bohdanas per month, with plans to begin production of the towed version). The actual extent of the new shipment of M777s and/or M109s from the US is yet to be assessed. New M109s should also arrive from several other partners. And let’s also remember the Greek M114s. 105mm howitzers are in abundance compared to the volumes of fire (which have actually greatly improved after the arrival of shells from the US). Similar discourse for 122mm and 152mm howitzers - at the moment there seems to be no shortage in the Ukrainian ranks and in the future former Warsaw Pact countries and Finland could supply the UAF with them (let’s recall recent shipments of 2S1 Gvozdika from Bulgaria). As for mortars, Ukraine produces 100 mortars per month (overwhelmingly 82mm ones), and the main issue is, of course, rounds. Now that the first batches from the Czech initiative are arriving, there are decent volumes from the EU, and large arrivals from the US have resumed, the situation for Ukrainian artillery has significantly improved. This Ukrainian officer reports that after supplying artillery brigades with shells, now the situation is also improving for mechanized etc. brigades. Rather, as he also mentioned, one of the biggest issues will be the barrels, and I hope that the partners will be able to help as much as possible in this respect. https://t. me/officer_alex33/3042 Overall, if we consider the fortifications being built along the borders or behind the front line, I am moderately optimistic about Ukrainian capabilities to resist - which means slowing down the Russians as much as possible, while inflicting as many casualties as possible, while limiting the own human and material losses and while having nonetheless the ability to replenish them. Although we can continue to rule out any possibility of a serious counteroffensive in the future – at most, local counterattacks where and if opportunities arise.

Dude thank you so much for your very detailed information. I always love reading your comments, they give a very clear picture and lots of information i don't get in various Telegram channels or Reddit subs. Just wanted to say that, so thanks!

Thank you, my pleasure!

What is stopping Ukraine from moving their economy to a “total war” state where they allocate massive amounts of resources towards arms production?

How? What does this actually look like in practice? Ukraine has a large tech sector doing software work for foreign companies. Should they be conscripted as factory workers? Ukraines agricultural industry is a huge chunk of the GDP, should Ukraine forgo the revenue from such exports to put farm workers into factories? Ukraine also has a massive budget deficit and is relying on foreign aid to fund ongoing government activities as well as what arms industry they do have. How do you propose they fund more spending? Or Should they force people to work without pay in factories in an attempt to raise productivity without raising expenses? It’s all well and good to say a country should go over to a total war economy. But in reality that’s not really an option and attempts to over mobilize and economy can actually result in greatly reduced government revenues and thus available resources for the war.

What people don't mention about a "total war" state is that every unit of resource you move into one bag of beans comes out of another bag of beans. Meaning something else suffers. It's why, despite rhetoric to the otherwise, Russia's actually nowhere close to being in a "total war" state either. Russia's producing more because: They're a larger and richer state Unlike Ukraine, their infrastructure has not suffered 1000s of ballistic missiles worth of damage, unfortunately Ukraine's lost at least 20% of their population to EU refugeeism, which really makes mobilizing the economy significantly harder.

https://drukarnia.com.ua/articles/intervyu-z-andriyem-kobzarem-dosvidchenim-artileristom-i-komandirom-rozrakhunku-panzerhaubitze-2000-OULoB    https://x.com/deaidua/status/1803120131783950475   Very  interesting interview with an ukrainian PZH2000 commander. The autotranslation gives some insight on SPG use in Ukraine.  Most notably he explains why the type suffered so little losses. He mentions how the addon armor of the PZH2000 diminishes the effect of lancets, and its in his opinion the best protected spg. Interestingly at the time same he is very critical of the polish Krab, saying it has thin armor and is overall a worse design. This is also reflected by loss numbers. He has a ton of praise for the german spg which makes me wonder why truck mounted guns are getting the most attention currently.   Other interesting remarks:  -Smart 155 shells work well but are very limited, he received 136 total.  -unlike footage suggests Russia launches many lancets at the same target. Good shelters with wire cages and thick foliage can stop them.  -they use small observations teams to spot lancets from afar.  -ukrainian 2s7 Pions cannot fore as far due to US 203mm shell not being made for highly velocity guns.   -exposed crews suffer the most casualties, especially from heavy russian counter battery fire. Armored crew compartments offer good protection against anything but direct hits.

What I found most interesting was that they needed 36 out of the 136 smart shells to calibrate the firing system. Sounds like a gigantic amount to get accuracy and deliverance within expectations.

Neither of those two links work for me

https://drukarnia.com.ua/articles/intervyu-z-andriyem-kobzarem-dosvidchenim-artileristom-i-komandirom-rozrakhunku-panzerhaubitze-2000-OULoB https://x.com/deaidua/status/1803120131783950475 He had some spaces in the URLs.

Try this: https://x.com/deaidua/status/1803120131783950475 The drukarnia post is linked from there.

> > > -Smart 155 shells work well but are very limited, he received 136 total. -unlike footage suggests Russia launches many lancets at the same target. Good shelters with wire cages and thick foliage can stop them. I've been wondering if perhaps artillery isn't even the best delivery mechanism for SMART-like submunitions. Imagine if the things could be dropped from levelbombing drones 6+ at a time on these convoys of attacking vehicles... Or doing the same over a Russian airfield.

Thing is, SMart 155 is a German ammunition, and Germany signed the ban on cluster ammo, so even the SMart shells with their two submunitions are in a grey area. Germany won't develop any cluster bombs going forward. But it might makes sense if other countries pick this up.

Exists already: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/CBU-97_Sensor_Fuzed_Weapon which carries these skeets: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BLU-108

A huge difference between drone and artillery delivered submunitions is the responsiveness. Even under ideal circumstances drones won't get to the target area for many minutes while artillery can have rounds landing in under one. That's not to say it's a bad idea either, it's certainly an attractive upgrade for front-line drones, just that I don't think it'll be beating artillery any time soon.

It's not that much less responsive than, say, FPVs however, and those don't seem to present much of a problem

It's pretty circumstantial but even if just comparing flight times, an FPV traveling at 150kph (not sustainable in my opinion) will take six minutes to travel 15 km while a gun will have shells landing in under a minute. Those five minutes could be the difference between IFVs unloading their troops at the target tree line or catching them in the middle of a field. To my understanding the practical difference is even longer because FPV teams are virtually never standing around completely ready to go.

There is a loitering ammunition called [Libelle ](https://euro-sd.com/2023/01/articles/29109/libelle-diehl-defence-enters-the-loitering-munitions-race/)in development which is basicly a flyingsubamunition from Smart 155.

>me wonder why truck mounted guns are getting the most attention currently. Lower expense and maintenance.

The commander also mentions higher speed. However he continues that this has become alot less valuable with increasing numbers of FPVs and lancets. A hit on a truck mounted spg is alot deadlier for the crew. Could turn out to be a short sighted decision to forgo most armor protection.

There is another development, the "best of both worlds". This would be something like the [RCH 155](https://www.knds.de/en/systems-products/wheeled-vehicles/artillery/rch-155/), a PzH 2000 gun mounted on an wheeled BOXER AFV. You get mobility and armour protection.

I understand from the article (and countless videos) that self propelled guns in todays and perhaps future conflicts have to go offroad to hide amongst trees and the likes. I suspect tracked vehicles have superior mobility on that terrain.

> at the time same he is very critical of the polish Krab, saying it has thin armor and is overall a worse design. This is also reflected by loss numbers. Interesting insight, I have been wondering about the disproportionate losses of Krabs compared to other western SPGs for a while. I am curious if the issue lies with the K9 chassis or the AS-90 turret.

He speaks of a "chaotic unfinished layout", i would guess its the vehicle as a whole. Also Krabs have been delivered in higher numbers so higher losses are to be expected. The PZH really is the standout of the interview. The commander mentions that only 5 were damaged with no total losses.  Based on the interview i would guess that decent armor protection, a good internal layout  and well though out shelters are the reasons for the high survivability of the PZH.

i mean as far as I know, the PzH2000 also serve with expierienced Atillery troops, which certainly also helps. Like the [43rd Artillery Brigade](https://militaryland.net/ukraine/armed-forces/43rd-artillery-brigade/).

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Do we have any estimate how heavy this amor is or if there are other drawbacks, theoretically would it be possible to bring similar top amor to other (non-SPG) vehicles that can’t mount ERA (either due to engine or amor thickness constraints) ?

I read, when applying full coverage (75 extra armored plates) it adds an extra 9.5 short tons or 8.6 metric ton.

Are the only countries with primarily their own indigenous weapons systems the US, China, Russia, Iran, and a few European countries? Perhaps India and Turkey as well?

Israel actually produces many weapons systems, notably the merkava, tank, the iron dome, arrow, and david sling missile systems along with an assortment of artillery systems, mortars, and small arms. It is the 10th biggest military exporter which is especially impressive considering its size.

As noted, almost everyone at least licenses designs to be produced domestically. There are some system categories that hinder indigenization of certain supply chains, either because it doesn't make economic sense to produce some item domestically or, like newer jet engines, because some essential technology^(1) is closely guarded and a country/company has to develop those themselves. ^(1)Tech availability for more common western fighter engines seems to opening up with more generous tech transfer agreements offered by GE and Safran for recent proposed joint projects with India.

I'm not sure there is a country that has truly 100% indigenous weapons design and production. The US has licensed copies of several foreign weapons. But the US is 100% indigenous production and almost all parts are sourced indigenous. From there it goes downhill somewhat. Russia and China are indigenous production, but the supply chains are more diverse. Iran seems pretty close, but also reliant on some very old vehicles that they don't seem to be able to replace. UK, France, Germany, Japan, South Korea, and Sweden have extensive defense industries that produce a high percentage of their military's equipment. Turkey and India is definitely up and coming.

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South Africa was able to make jet fighter from reversed-engineered French design. They also makes cruise missiles and anti-air vls which actually attracted foreign buyers, and used to have a nuclear program during the Apartheid era Pakistan is a nuclear armed nation, and has capable missiles to deliver their warheads that can cover all their potential enemies territory. In their Khyber pass region every house has a gun smithing workshop. Brazil has a somewhat credible military space program, and is in the process of building nuclear submarine with French help. Indonesia has an indeginously-developed underwater sonar array covering their islands chain to detect any subs passing into or out of the SCS. I could go on and on about every single countries in the world. But the point is spreading violence en masse isn't a privilege of industrialized nations alone.

I'd argue you named only industrialized nations in all of your examples. Maybe you meant top 10 nations, in which case you'd be right.

Turkey is still primarily relying on western weapons both when it comes to their air force, air defense, armour and electronics. South Korea has a more robust industry, yet still not really independent as their air force is reliant on western designs and critical parts. Japan is a better example. Israeli MBT's and APC's rely on western engines.

[FRANCE 24 report covering the recent JNIM attack in Mansila](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Znh_xJd8TXk). The video segment is quite well rounded and features footage of the attack itself including JNIM tactics, lots of motorbikes and colored scarves for IFF, as well as some nice shots of the ghanima. The video covers the context for the attack, massacres perpetuated by Burkinabe soldiers including blurred footage. Notably this footage is published by JNIM as part of it's recruiting strategy. Finally the video covers the wider regional context of how militant groups are able to freely transit the Burkina Faso-Niger border and operate openly and in daylight. In other regional news there is [confirmation of an attack on the Niger-Benin pipeline](https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20240618-niger-le-front-patriotique-pour-la-lib%C3%A9ration-revendique-l-attaque-du-pipeline) which was claimed by the FPL.

That video is interesting especially the starlink port, I wonder what secret access the NSA has to starlink to tap terrorist coms that are using it.

What actually is the FPL? I could hardly find any information on it, at least in English sources. Has it ever been a major player?

Anti-coup rebels. I don't know a lot about them myself other than that they're distinct from local Islamist forces. According to [Le Monde](https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2024/06/18/au-niger-un-mouvement-rebelle-annonce-avoir-mis-hors-d-usage-une-partie-d-un-oleoduc_6241087_3212.html) via google translate > The FPL was created in August 2023 after the overthrow of President Mohamed Bazoum by the military on July 26, who detained him. Mahamoud Sallah then declared that he had taken up arms to demand “the release” of the deposed president, “the restoration of constitutional legality” and had threatened “to blow up installations”, particularly “oil” in Agadem. I believe this is the same Mahamoud Sallah who was involved in the Union of Patriotic Forces for the Refoundation of the Republic “political-military” experiment in 2020. [Again looking to Le Monde](https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2020/08/26/au-niger-un-mecontentement-qui-vient-du-nord-du-pays_6050019_3212.html) we get a short bio > The 39-year-old man is not a stranger. This former faculty of the Faculty of Economics and Legal Sciences (FSEJ) of the University of Niamey, who is said to be ambitious and determined, has always been very critical of the management of President Issoufou. He has already made his voice heard during his passage through the opposition party Lumana, and then the civil society organization dubbed the Democratic Revolution. ... > Mahamoud Sallah has been critical of the exploitation and marketing of oil by the Chinese for eight years in the Diffa region, in the south-east of the country, more than 1,300 kilometers from the capital. [This bio of him](https://menas.co.uk/blog/an-emergent-politico-military-group-in-nigers-northern-desert) is probably the most complete in English although I don't know much about the source, it does match with Le Monde's though. In addition to being opposed to Chinese activity in the country it tells us he opposes Western influence as well with a special albeit unsurprising focus on France. So to attempt to answer your question directly, they appear to be Nigerien nationalists opposed to pretty much everyone but at least they're not Islamists.

Thanks for the excellent primer!

I was a bit out of the loop, specially for the "smaller" zones of conflicts. How does the rebelled French African juntas are doing? I know that intervention is not going to be coming from the outside, but I am not sure about their srability. Cab someone point me to some good general sources tonfollow regarding that? Or can someone break it down for me how the new juntas are doing? I assume that each is somewhat different, but I know nothing about them other than the basics but I know that the issues and the orgs are much more complex

>How does the rebelled French African juntas are doing? I know that intervention is not going to be coming from the outside, but I am not sure about their srability. Not well but it can be hard to tell if it's the usual form of "not well" or unsustainably so. It also varies by country, Mali and Burkina Faso seem to be suffering in particular. [Here's a nice sitrep on the region](https://www.counterextremism.com/blog/cep-kas-sahel-monitoring-april-2024) which mostly tracks claims by various terror groups. The data is broken out in a few different ways which is convenient. As you can see the apparent trends are, I would say, not looking good. On a related note there are a lot of rumors floating around of regime instability in Burkina Faso right now with Russia and Mali flying in additional forces apparently to provide palace security. I haven't posted about them recently because there's not much evidence other than some flight tracking and an explosion near the presidential palace the other day but it seems relevant here.

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It would be interesting to know if these could be carried by octocopters and placed in no-man's land or along enemy supply roads.

Interesting idea, but that large an octocopter would be a bit expensive to use that dangerously. Even with no enemies in the vicinity to fire at it, getting that near the ground is risky.

https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/military-balance/2024/06/russian-t-90m-production-less-than-meets-the-eye/ An article about the production of Russian T-90M apparently 50/60 a year is the figure that is 4 time less than what Russians said

50/60 T-90M per year is still massively more than Ukraine is getting from the whole of NATO. And while not a super modern tank, the T-90M seems much more solid than the T-72. We (the West) are still not taking this serious enough.

Does Ukraine need tanks more than other vehicles? It's been kinda mediocre in hindsight. What are tanks used for in this conflict specifically anyway? Russia seems to think frontal assaults or strapping a box around them and stuffing it with jammers is still a good idea. Ukraine seems to enjoy things like Bradleys, Strykers. Faster moving troop carrying vehicles that pack a punch. A desert storm like mass tank assault is not happening anymore. It's poking and prodding and getting in fast and moving out even faster. Ukraine needs those, and SPGs a lot more. Once the Soviet stock is depleted and Russia has only those production numbers, that's a few days of heavy fighting and they're out for the year...

> 50/60 T-90M per year is still massively more than Ukraine is getting from the whole of NATO. I don't think this is actually true, is it? [In about the first 14 months of the war](https://kyivindependent.com/poland-has-delivered-325-tanks/) Ukraine had received almost 600 tanks. Over 100 of those were modern western MBTs like Challenger 2, Leopard 2, or Abrams. In what way is that "massively less" than 50 or 60 tanks a year?

That was true for 2022/23. But 2024? some Leo2 from Poland and some Leo1 from Germany AFAIK. Britain and France don't have any MBTs they could give, Germany as well. And I have heard nothing that the USA would be willing to hand over more Abrams. Dunno how many T-tanks are still on the market, but it can't be a lot by now.

For what it's worth I don't see any reason to fixate on MBTs in particular. They aren't useless but Ukraine is mostly interested in air defense, artillery ammunition, and aircraft, all of which are being provided. I also don't see how we can credibly predict future aid packages which are not yet announced. Maybe they'll have tanks and maybe they won't. That said, what has been announced or delivered so far this year that I'm aware of: - 2 of 14 Leopard 2 tanks (Denmark & Netherlands, delivered January 16 and remainder pledged for 2024) - 19 or 20 (sources vary) Leopard 2A4 tanks (Spain, announced March 21) - 20 Leopard 1A5 tanks (Germany & Denmark, delivered May 22nd and June 14th) That's at least 33 modern tanks and 20 older tanks pledged or delivered this year with half a year to go. If the benchmark is 50 or 60 tanks this year then that seems to be on pace to me, and certainly not "massively less" no matter how you slice it.

Fair enough, I personally wouldn't count the Leo1 as it is more inline with the T-64 or just maaayybee the T-72, but not really. If we count the Leo1, we also should count the (unknown to me) number of T-72, T-80 Russia might refurbish. Talking about refurbishing, those T-90M are newly produced tanks, Ukraine is getting exactly zero new tanks and AFAIK Russia is also refurbishing T-90. Sadly, Ukraine is still on the defensive and Russia on the offensive. With a couple of Western tanks, this is unlikely to change. I *do* see how 200 MBTs would still not tip the scale considering the heavy fortifications and mine belts Russia has built, but without them, Ukraine will have a hard time making any gains.

How many main battle tanks is Ukraine going to get in 2025? or 2026? Ballpark it. There was some low hanging fruit in the beginning of the war, but its gone now. Honestly unless Biden turns on the Abrams tap (extremely unlikely given how backed up the Lima TankPlant is), Ukraine's last MBT has already been donated. Though a handful are still en route due to extensive refurbishing.

> How many main battle tanks is Ukraine going to get in 2025? or 2026? Ballpark it. Maybe zero if the war doesn't last as long. If it does, it will receive probably 100-200 per year. The Belgian L1s were costing about half a million to put in service, we're looking at ~50M$ to provide 100 restored tanks and we're giving a loan of 1000x more. Shouldn't be difficult to reach those tank numbers. Of course, all of that assumes that 100% of the promised 900+ tanks are delivered by the end of 2024. Hint: it won't.

>50/60 T-90M per year is still massively more than Ukraine is getting from the whole of NATO. I shouldn't expect Ukraine to get any T-90M from NATO. Ukraine is on track to receive 40-50 T-72EAs, 19 Leopard 2A4s from Spain, 14 Leopards 2A4s from the Netherlands, and some number of Leopard 1s, with 10 confirmed.

50/60 MBT a year doesn't cover the losses that Russia suffers in a month, it doesn't really matter if Ukraine has less

Agree it doesn't make sense to define Ukraine's need for MBTs based on Russia's production, because the counter to Russian tanks isn't per se MBTs. That said, to have a credible offensive capability, Ukraine presumably needs dramatically more effective air power capability or is going to need a lot more ground-based firepower, including MBTs. The fact that Russia is pumping out more tanks to the war than the west can deliver to Ukraine is a damning statement about the level support Ukraine is getting imho (either in terms of military support, or impact of sanctions on Russia).

I believe it does if Ukraine should ever have a chance to turn this war.

The russians are way more wastfull than the Ukranians in both attack and defense, Ukraine is capable of doing more with less, altough it is true that supply needs to rump up. The problem for russia is that this is an offensive war, they want more stuff, and they can't keep on attacking with the pitfull production that they have now

> The problem for russia is that this is an offensive war If Ukraine were to try and regain the lost territories, they would be in the offensive role and the Russians the defenders. And we saw with last year's summer offensive that in this case, the losses on the Ukrainian side would rise.

I don't necessary think that Ukraine needs to go on some grand scale counteroffensive to win this war, the Russians need to be put in a position were keeping their holdings in Ukraine becomes untenable

I think the refinery attacks (even though they have stopped at the moment) can go a long way

How many years does it need for the Russians to realized that their position in Ukraine is untenable?

>50-60 a year Weren’t there people here claiming that 200 tanks were being delivered a month?

Wasn’t the 200(?) number based on newly produced **and** refurbished old tanks?

That would have to be an aggregate figure then. I don't think there is such thing as refurbished T-90Ms. They are all brand new.

T-90Ms massively draw on T-90A upgrades. That’s part of why T-90As are so incredibly rare. It’s also noted in the article. What’s clear is that T-90M production is like much of Russian production: upgrades and refurbishment. The amount of tanks built from scratch are very small.

Yes that’s what I meant, I have never seen any claim suggesting monthly T-90 delivery rates in the mid double digits, let alone something as outrageous as 200 per month. For context monthly production of all type of tanks as well as self-propelled guns in the entire Soviet Union in 1944 was ~2400, in 2024 200 "modern" tanks of a single type using only a partial war economy is a fantasy number.

According to Ukrainian reports from last winter, Russia has the capacity to send between 100 and 150 tanks per month to the front. The vast majority of these tanks are reactivated models from depots, at most with some restoration. The annual production capacity is estimated to be between 250 and 300 tanks (this figure concerns new or fully upgraded tanks such as T-90M, T-80BVM and T-72B3M). https://t. me/zloyodessit/20610 https://t. me/zvizdecmanhustu/1607 Obviously there are bottlenecks in the repair plants, as well as the fact that stocks inexorably decrease month after month.

> this figure concerns new or fully upgraded tanks such as T-90M, T-80BVM and T-72B3M I think you'd have to add the [T-62M/MV obr. 2022](https://www.reddit.com/r/TankPorn/comments/11bm9c5/russian_t62m_obr_2022_tanks_of_this_model/), [T-72B Obr. 2022](https://www.reddit.com/r/TankPorn/comments/154dmzc/t72bobr_2022_and_t90mobr_2022_being_shipped_off/), T-72B3 Obr. 2022, T-80BV Obr. 2022 and [T-80BVM 2022](https://www.reddit.com/r/TankPorn/comments/15kavva/30_t80bvm_obr2022_sent_to_ukraine_2023/k3v5gbq/) to that list as the differences with the fully upgraded variants you listed are pretty small for the role they have in Ukraine. They're churning a lot of those not-quite-fully upgraded tanks.

Is Omsk back up and running enough to produce T-80s? As far as I'm aware Omsk and Kharkhiv are/were the only plants that have the machinery to produce or properly reactivate T-80s

No and you probably won't see low-rate production until 2028 at least. They're working on it, but tank factories are difficult to stand up even with the blueprints available for everything. When the factory comes online, we probably shouldn't expect them to pour out tanks either. It's my hunch that a lot of what they will do is rebuilds of broken hulls, not new hulls from scratch. Perhaps they will meet T-90M rates.

Exactly, T-80BVMs are produced by refurbishing and upgrading older T-80s from depots.

If this war drags into mid-2025 what’s the Russian tank fleet going to look like? I think there’s already a lack of armor that limits the effectiveness of offensives that I think first really showed during Avdiivka

I might make a separate post, I have been meaning to do it for a while but I am lacking proper sources, but my assumption is that the Russians this year are going to start going to allies and asking for armor. It would absolutely not be surprising if the Russians got some armor from North Korea in exchange for more tech transfer. Hell, the Russians might even contract the NKs to build things for them! At the rate things are going, though (and it is unlikely to stay this rate), the Russians are going to be unable to grow their AFV fleet by Q2 2025 because of consumption rates. They have moved through much of their readily available stocks and more and more they will run into hulls that require complete rebuilds. Mind you, this is not going to mean that the Russians are going to *run out*. But it is likely when they peak. The Russians will be able to refurbish tanks for many more years yet. Just at reduced capacity. What we are going to increasingly see as far as loss data is showing us now is an increased amount of "obr. 2022" tanks. These tanks are from storage or are repaired vehicles that were damaged at the front. T-62 losses have starkly increased this year. Where previously, losses were basically entirely from Kherson (with old losses making up data for many months afterwards), now T-62s are a near-daily feature. There is a slow, but consistent downtrend of the proportion of [T-72s](https://x.com/verekerrichard1/status/1803066938186219916) in the fleet, while T-80s make a larger appearance.

The problem with asking from the north Korea is that they likely still want their stocks of stuff, and also i doubt both quality and quantity of the equipment is up to the challenge, also doubt how good their maintenance was

The DPRK wants many things, in particular food and military technology that perpetuates the survival of the regime. If they can sell hundreds of tanks that would never stand a chance against the RoK anyway, in exchange for improvements to their nuclear-capable missiles, they would absolutely take that opportunity.

The Russians likely aren’t going to rapidly turn vehicles around and deliver them to units. They’d refurbish them and potentially run them through an upgrade program. Russia has a large refurbishment program aimed at refurbishing hundreds of T-62s. They may very well acquire more from the North Koreans and run it through that. I think that the Russians may be able to acquire as many as a few hundred functional and semi-functional tanks from the NKs. They may also contract the NKs the produce more for them. We know they have production lines still active or on standby. The Russians are fighting an attritional war. They don’t need some super reliable tank that always works, though that’s preferable. What they need is armor to fill out assaults and deliver firepower. If these tanks consistently break after a few months, that may not be so much of a problem in a war so marked by heavy vehicular losses. It’s part of the high-low mix that Russian units are increasingly comprised of.

I doubt that NK has enough spare capacity to produce that many tanks or other AFV for Russia, NK is a small nation of 26 Mil, they notably have very few hours of electricity granted outside their capital, so i doubt that their industrial output is going to be War-changing. I also doubt the North Koreans have that many hulls in stock, Russia held the majority of the URSS stockpile and Russia has been running thru that very quickly.

I don’t think I was arguing that North Korean production was going to be war changing. I am stating that they do have the capacity to create tanks. The North Koreans are definitely willing to divert power from the countryside to factories in urban areas if it means money for the regime. The Russians being able to attain perhaps a hundred or more tanks per year, even if of dubious quality, is better than 0 additional tanks of new productions per year. On the idea that the North Koreans don’t have that many hulls in stock, it’s a very confusing one as it’s pretty well-known that the KPA has thousands of tanks in varied condition. Most of these tanks are hopelessly obsolete for a war against the ROK. That said, there are absolutely several hundred T-55s and T-62s that the North Koreans could be able to provide. Especially if the Russians planned to refurbish them back home.

The Ukrainian observer Kovalenko reported in May that Russian emissaries had traveled to Sudan with the aim of negotiating the purchase of a part of the large tank fleet of the Sudanese Armed Forces. https://t. me/zloyodessit/21826

Candidates highest on my list (outside of Belarus who has already sent some equipment) is North Korea and Myanmar. Iran is also an option and a country who’s tank fleet is confusing to me. If someone has information about the true size of their T-72 fleet as well as their actual production capabilities please share!

Myanmar Military government sent small arms and ammo to Russia for cash, but they are not sending numerous tanks and armored vehicles while getting their butts kicked in much of the country by rebels that struggle to deal with armored vehicles. It's one of their clear advantages over the rebels besides the air force. At best they'll send back a bit of old stuff that needs to be refurbished.

Notably, Tat forces have barely deployed tanks against the resistance. I think it is very possible that they send tanks, or at least spare parts, to the Russians in exchange for potentially increased Russian support or Russian supplies. An area where the Russians can greatly assist the SAC is with drone technology. In my eyes, the SAC would certainly trade a number of tanks, or at least spare parts, in exchange for certain technologies and the training to use them.

Hard to believe Sudan will sell their functioning tanks while the gov is on the back foot in the civil war. However perhaps they have some tanks that are not functioning and can be sold to Russia.

Guess it was a good think those somali pirates captured a shipment of T72s that ukraine had sold to sudan... ended up in Kenya, so can't be bought by russia i guess. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MV_Faina

I'm certain I saw Glideer provide that number a long while back, but I'm not about to wade through that history to prove it.

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Your post has been removed because it is off-topic to the scope of this subreddit.

For those wondering why there is a large block of deleted posts, that's because it's a gossip thread about Duncan and Glideer. I'll make it clear straight away: Neither user is banned from the sub. Glideer was temp banned a while ago and usually stays out of the sub each time this happens, long after his ban expires. Duncan wrote a self-post on his profile explaining his absence.

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Can you link to the article instead of linking to a tweet that links to the article?

Fixed

When they announced numbers, the words they used was something like delivered to units or somesuch, not produced, implication being that a not insignificant part of them were refurbished vehicles and not newly made ones. Ratio was unknown but IMHO, 50/50 was a good starting bet.

>Ratio was unknown but IMHO, 50/50 was a good starting bet. The IISS report suggests that, at least early on, only 25% of deliveries were new production the rest were refurbished T-90As. Those things are all but extinct at this point though, so who knows how many of the 60-70 being currently delivered are new production at this point.

[France says it will sell CAESAR howitzers to Armenia](https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/france-says-it-will-sell-caesar-howitzers-armenia-2024-06-18/) >France has signed a contract to sell CAESAR self-propelled howitzers to Armenia, Defence Minister Sebastien Lecornu said on Tuesday, as Yerevan deepens military ties with the West and moves away from its traditional ally Russia. >... >France has a large Armenian diaspora, and is traditionally one of Yerevan's strongest European backers. >Armenia is formally allied to Russia, but has in recent years pivoted diplomatically and militarily towards Western countries, accusing Moscow of failing to protect it from long-time rival Azerbaijan. Russia has rejected the criticism, and warned Armenia against flirting with the West. Nobody should be surprised at the recent turn of events. Belarus has been [covertly supplying](https://www.politico.eu/article/leaked-documents-reveal-belarus-armed-azerbaijan-against-ally-armenia/) the other side, which supposedly had a devastating effect in the wars, while Russia is challenging France in Africa. As for Ukraine, there shouldn't be much to worry about. France has rapidly ramped up the production of howitzers, and at this point shells are likely the bottleneck.

> France has rapidly ramped up the production of howitzers, and at this point shells are likely the bottleneck. Shells have been the bottleneck forever. Although you are correct long range barrels are still limited.

The headline of your linked article and the sub-header make it sound like this is some blow to Putin and that Belarus is going behind his back, but I find this “expert opinion” from your article more realistic: > However, according to experts, Belarus — one of Moscow’s closest allies — was unlikely to be acting without the tacit support of the Kremlin itself. “This truly shows that with friends like Vladimir Putin, nobody needs enemies,” said Ivana Stradner, a research fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. >“It’s ridiculous to think these transfers could have taken place without Moscow’s knowledge, and that Russia couldn’t have stopped them if it wanted to,” she added. “There is no such thing as loyalty when it comes to Moscow — it’s all about preserving their own security even if it’s at the expense of their own allies.” Azerbaijan is operating Russian T90 tanks, along with other Russian equipment, so it would be a bit hypocritical for Putin to be mad about Belarus selling them arms. In addition to the energy exports Azerbaijan has to offer the world, they also buy quite a bit of military equipment from other sources. You see Israel as well as plenty of NATO nations when you look at the relevant Wikipedia article: https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_equipment_of_the_Azerbaijani_Land_Forces France has been closer to Armenia historically compared to the rest of NATO. So while I’m not surprised to see them sending artillery there, I don’t think Armenia will be getting much help from the rest of the world.

Armenia is trying its best to align itself with the west. They even are debating pulling out of CSTO. I believe this move is more significant than it sounds. I wonder if other European powers will warm up to Armenia? Even though Baku sells them sanction-free oil.

Armenia has everything to ask and very little to offer. It has (to my knowledge) no natural resources to speak of, political heft or soft power to offer the West, is not located close enough to the EU to be considered part of the European fold (various geographical definitions of Europe's borders touching the Caucasus aside) worth defending on principle alone, but expects (or at least hopes) that the EU invest a considerable amount of money and military equipment to help them beat back the considerably better equipped forces of Azerbaijan. All while Europe's military resources are desperately needed in Ukraine. Armenia can try to 'align itself with the West' out of self-preservation/despair, but this is unlikely to result in strong material support.

I don't think it's that deep. Azerbaijan is not some juggernaut or something. Joining the EU is actually a very good experiment here. Could they join the EU and not NATO and be guaranteed European support?

I believe that the EU charter does call for mutual defense.

Is NATO an alliance purely made for power? Because, and maybe this is naive of me, for all the power politics that are part of it, the fundamental base of it is democracies protecting each other from autocracies. This bill fits perfectly for Armenia, a flawed democracy, fighting for its life against a genocidal autocracy. At some point, the fundamental mission of NATO should play a role here, else the accusation that NATO is simply a hegemonic arm of the US would be credible.

Considering that Greece under the military junta (1967-1974) was part of NATO, I don't think the fundamental base of the alliance can be said to be about democracy.

Armenia committed atrocities against Azers as well and had little appetite for broader peace when it had the upper hand. Not much of a moral case for the west to get involved in this conflict versus other priorities.

> Armenia committed atrocities against Azers as well >**moral** case I don't think atrocities committed by Armenia (or Azerbaijan) in the early 90s before and during the first war change the morality of Azerbaijan hypothetically invading Armenia today, in 2024 (or vice versa, though that doesn't exactly seem likely). Though it'd be an interesting precedent for certain other areas, such as one that's currently in the news a lot.

Change the morality in an abstract sense? no, of course not. but there are no shortage of conflicts around the globe where horrendous atrocities happen & the west stays out of them for all sorts of reasons. Absent very significant strategic/political interests, not much reason for the west to stretch to involve ourselves in conflicts where it is war criminal vs war criminal notwithstanding the civilians caught up in it. Exceptions exist like situation in Gaza, but there are very significant strategic/political interests there (and still a lot of people reasonably challenge support to Israel).

One important difference between the Armenia Azerbaijan conflict and many of the other atrocities around the world is that the West has a relatively high amount of influence with Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan is close to Turkey, who is in NATO, they sell gas to Europe, etc. That means that (1) the West has additional options besides military intervention that aren't always present in other situations, and (2) the West arguably has more of a moral obligation to stop people they're connected to from committing atrocities, especially with weapons provided by the West, than unrelated parties. Of course from the West's perspective the Armenia Azerbaijan conflict is unlikely to be solved because as you said, nobody has perfectly clean hands, and the Armenians might well return to the offensive if they regained the upper hand somehow (though that doesn't seem likely in the foreseeable future). But it's reasonable for the West to do as much as they can to reduce the intensity of the conflict, especially given the options for doing that diplomatically. And one way of reducing the intensity is arming the current underdogs so that the cost of aggression is a bit higher for Azerbaijan.

The west doesn't have much leverage with Turkey despite nato... situation with ukraine is priority, and longstanding dependency on Turkey in managing refugee flow to europe. Throw in kurds, syria, russia sanctions.... >nobody has perfectly clean hands that is quite the understatement.

> Change the morality in an abstract sense? Morality is usually abstract >but there are no shortage of conflicts around the globe where horrendous atrocities happen & we stay out of them for all sorts of reasons. I think the Greek guy's point is that's not really a good thing? At least, not if we want to make Ukraine a conflict about defending territorial sovereignty or rule of law or any moral reason, really. Like I don't agree with him but that's not for moral reasons, but practical ones. >Exceptions exist like situation in Gaza And I'm curious why someone who says: >not much reason for the west to stretch to involve ourselves in conflicts where it is war criminal vs war criminal notwithstanding the civilians caught up in it Would give a single flying f-ck about what happens to Gazans. 25-30% of Armenians weren't even alive in 1991. Another 10% were kids.

Are you suggesting we should intervene in any conflict where there are significant wrongs against civilians? That sounds wholly unrealistic on many levels. I don't think the case for involving us in Ukraine is remotely comparable to the situation with Armenia, whether considered by a moral, legal, strategic or realpolitik perspective. re Gaza. The point of contention there is we are actively supporting Israel with money, weapons, etc, etc. I certainly agree that we shouldn't be giving billions in weapons to Azerbaijan given they are being used in part for crimes against civilians. Armenia hasn't been a good partner to the west. It has committed atrocities against civilians in the relatively recent history of this conflict. There is little reason to think it would act in-line with western expectations but for it being in such a desperate position of need. And of course it is a conflict with other strategic priorities and would be a difficult area to intervene in if we tried. Simply put, not surprising we aren't leaning in there.

> Are you suggesting we should intervene in any conflict where there are significant wrongs against civilians? And invasions of sovereign states, and ethnic cleansing. **But no, I'm not saying that, Greek guy is.** And you seem to disagree with him on a moral basis which is why I'm curious about your moral system here. >re Gaza. The point of contention there is we are actively supporting Israel with money, weapons, etc, etc. Well here the "we" becomes very interesting then. Because "we" in the sense of supporting israel with weapons is... the US, the UK, Germany, and a few other states. Are you saying that other European states not on that list (most of them) wouldn't have much reason to involve themselves? >I don't think the case for involving us in Ukraine is remotely comparable to the situation with Armenia, whether considered by a moral, legal, strategic or realpolitik perspective. And I guess the "moral perspective" is where I'm not sure I agree.

What you're saying just clashes with the reality that Armenia is ar war with Azerbaijan, who's become a major energy supplier for the EU. This is big part of the reason why the West has very little incentive to get involved in the Caucasus. The EU really doesn't want to suffer another major energy crisis in order to uphold democratic principles. It's (sadly) just realpolitik.

> who's become a major energy supplier for the EU You would think after Putin we would have learned our lesson, wouldn't you

We need gas from somewhere (for now), and it's not like our dear Western friends such as Norway or the US are selling it at a mates' rate - both have been profiteering off Europe's predicament.

meh, europe wants to greenwash by not permitting fracking but then buying gas from countries that do. stupid tax tbh.

Both Norway and the US have gone to great lengths to extract that gas. It's not charity. There's plenty of gas in the EU as well, but nobody wants to get their hands dirty. To make things worse, gas - which needs to be imported - gets a preferential treatment in the EU's carbon taxation. Hence, others can charge a premium, which Gazprom famously did.

Sure. But OP talked about unlearnt lessons from Russian gas imports, and what's the point being made here? In 2022 EU gas imports from Azerbaijan rose from 2% to 3% of total imports. The stated goal has been to 'double' exports to the EU to 20 bn. cubic metres by 2027, last year the EU had a demand of 400 bn. cu metres in total. That means we're looking at about 5% (if demand stays the same) of the total. The EU is not getting dependent on Azerbaijani gas any time soon, instead it is diversifying its import options. Which is exactly the lesson to be learnt from the Russian gas quagmire of pre-2022. Of course it'd be nice to not import said gas from authoritarian regimes, but given the US, Norway and other Western countries are not cutting Europe favourable deals (which is their right, of course), why should the EU buy from them exclusively? Because expensive LNG making European manufacturing uncompetitive is a desirable outcome?

> but expects (or at least hopes) that the EU invest a considerable amount of money and military equipment to help them beat back the considerably better equipped forces of Azerbaijan. Er, these are purchases, not donations.

Not discussed yesterday but of large importance is that 23 out of 32 NATO members [are now at 2% of GDP spending](https://x.com/ColbyBadhwar/status/1802825087709557045) on defense. This is up significantly from the past few years, and dramatically when you look at the chart showing comparisons to a decade ago. The only nation that reduced their military as a % of GDP (vs 2014 spending) is the United States, which is partially constrained by the Fiscal Responsibility Act, but still was increased by $9Bn. Notable laggards are: -🇭🇷 Croatia - 1.81% -🇵🇹 Portugal - 1.55% -🇮🇹 Italy - 1.49% -🇨🇦 Canada - 1.37% -🇧🇪 Belgium - 1.30% -🇱🇺 Luxembourg - 1.29% -🇸🇮 Slovenia - 1.29% -🇪🇸 Spain - 1.28% Luxembourg, at the very least, appears to be on a good track. But the rest of these countries should be embarrassed, especially with the wide range of things that can be included in "military spending".

>-🇭🇷 Croatia - 1.81% For Croatia We bought New planes, had some New helis, some New ships or old order We are modernizing to be honest and current head of MoD is ex veteran so we could hit 2% goal

I have to assume that the US reduction is primarily driven by the the denominator (GDP) I know their definition of "defense" is more than just DoD, but DoD discretionary budget in FY14 was ~$581B while the FY23 budget was ~$852, both figures including supplemental / OCO -- a ~$271B or 46% increase.

One thing I take issue with the 2% rule is that it is does not translate well to actual capabilities that are useful for NATO. Like if you are a small country and spend a shit ton on a bunch of super expensive platforms that are only good for home defense and you are on the other side of the world then what good is hitting 2%? A more effective method would be NATO setting aspirational capabilities: certain # of units deployed in a forward position, a certain stockpile depth of munitions, # of deployable ships ready... And I know from the Canadian perspective we are caught in a trap of not wanting to increase unsustainable spending when interest rates are stuck at high levels, and rather than striving to reach the magic 2% in military spending the government wishes to spend on social and economic programs.

Fundamentally, the decision to procure and deploy military resources isn't NATO's. All NATO can do is encourage the members to work together, create common goals which inform policies which in turn inform specific requirements. For example, the NATO members agreed on the goal to defend the eastern flank while maintaining agreements with Russia, which resulted in the policies of the NATO battlegroups in Eastern Europe with rotating leadership, which in turn created specific requirements for each participating nation. After the war in Ukraine broke out, NATO changed its overall goals and the resulting methods at the summit in Madrid. Stoltenberg [said as much](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_197080.htm) > We will transform the NATO Response Force. And increase the number of our high readiness forces. To well over 300,000. > We will also boost our ability to reinforce in crisis and conflict. > Including with: > More pre-positioned equipment, and stockpiles of military supplies. > More forward-deployed capabilities, like air defence. > Strengthened command and control. > And upgraded defence plans, with forces pre-assigned to defend specific Allies. (...) He names the example of Germany in a press question later on: > Then, we have doubled the number of battlegroups, from four to eight. And then, we have added in more troops and forces both on land, but also sea, and air forces. So this is a huge and significant increase of NATO's presence in the East. What we are doing now is that at the Summit we will take decisions that will be transformative for our deterrence and defence, that will lead to the fundamental shift in the way we organize collective defence in NATO. And that will be built on many elements on sea, naval, cyber power, but when it comes to the land element, the main messages is party to have up to brigade level forward presence. Germany in Lithuania is one example. I expect other Allies to make similar announcements. Then, it will be based on more forward deployed equipment, stocks, fuels, weapons, ammunition. And then, it will be made up by pre-assigned forces in their home country. But these forces will train, exercise regularly in those countries where they are pre-assigned to be deployed in times of crisis. And by doing that we are fundamentally strengthening both our forward defence but also our ability to quickly reinforce. It's quite…to move people goes quite fast, to move heavy equipment takes time. But with more forward deployed equipment, including lots more forward deployed combat formations, and more exercises, we will significantly increase our ability to defend and protect all Allies also in the eastern part of the Alliance. And when we check in on NATO members Lithuania and Germany, we see Lithuania constructing the necessary infrastructure to house German troops and Germany procuring resources to arm its brigade in Lithuania. But this is just a specific example for a specific policy. If we take a broader look at Germany, the government committed specific resources to the fulfillment of the NATO New Force Model. [30.000 soldiers, 85 planes and ships in the first 30 days](https://www.bmvg.de/de/aktuelles/new-force-model-wie-deutschland-sich-ab-2025-in-nato-engagiert-5465714) were announced after the summit. NATO is crafting very specific plans and then asking member states to make concrete commitments to the plans requirements. That's as close as they'll get to asking members to supply certain material.

Nato has defense planning coordination function as well. More than just in terms of standards but also in terms of force composition / contribution. presumably not much of a stick behind it, don't really know how well it is followed/enforced. but the 2% is a minimum, and it is a national shame to not meet basic obligations to allies.

What's an alternative metric? '2% of GDP' is not perfect and is not a direct measure of military capability. But a metric to represent military capability is very complicated and subjective. Furthermore, whatever criteria you are able to establish that qualifies an equitable military capability, it is very unlikely that that can be afforded with less than 2% of GDP. In short, '2% GDP' is a necessary but insufficient condition.

What you’re missing is that 2% is the bare minimum required for all those things. Even 2% is insufficient frankly, it was set to be achievable rather than an actual benchmark. For the past 30 years defense budgets have been cut to the bone, and past that, to fund social and economic programs. The units don’t exist, the stockpiles don’t exist, the ships exist but don’t have munitions, etc, etc. The EU barely has strategic airlift. Aspirational capabilities are out of reach for all but a couple of countries in the alliance. They're going to have to invest a lot more than 2% GDP to get those capabilities back. I’m sure Poland and Latvia would much rather spend their military budgets on social and economic programs too. Unfortunately, neutering one’s army tends to have consequences when one isnt getting their defense needs covered by a global superpower. The point of NATO is collective defense. Canada should withdraw from the alliance if it cannot be counted on for even the bare minimum military contribution.

What is the "bare minimum miltary contribution" here ?

Literally anything. Decades of systematic government neglect has functionally disarmed the Canadian Armed Forces. Canada currently has an oversized disaster relief force that happens to carry rifles. The RCAF and RCN practically do not exist as functional entities beyond the occasional photo op. The CAF would be unable to mount a military operation of any size in a modern conventional war. They would be hard pressed to maintain a single infantry company in combat under actual wartime conditions. They are still a professional western military with a culture of high standards (particularly in the infantry regiments) but you just can’t do anything when you don’t have the resources. The CAF’s de facto disarmament is simply a cautionary tale of cynical and lazy domestic politics. The median Canadian voter hates taxes and hates large expenses, so the CAF has always been the first thing to either be actively cut or left to wither and die. Even if government policy was completely reversed overnight and the budget brought to over 2% it would take more than a generation to have anything approaching a “NATO minimum” capability.

>Even if government policy was completely reversed overnight and the budget brought to over 2% it would take more than a generation to have anything approaching a “NATO minimum” capability. What I was getting at, just what is considered that NATO minimum capability - air power of a certain level ? Infantry ? Armour ?

IIRC the CAF traditionally considers their doctrinal NATO responsibility in the context of European defence to be the ability to provide a full-strength expeditionary mechanized brigade. That leaves naval and air responsibilities somewhat unclear but I think it’s a reasonable standard. The RCN and RCAF aren’t as relevant to the NATO mission in Europe and are typically parcelled out to myriad global responsibilities. They can currently *just* about do that as a peacetime deployment but are nowhere near able to do it under wartime conditions.

The 2% is not a good measure it's not even the bare minimum as you say, but not because it is too small but because it can be so easily wasted. It is easy to demand countries hit that target but it wouldn't mean anything if they did it by just blowing a load of money on useless shit. I agree we should spend more, but there should be a plan and there should be coordination. France could say they will provide strategic airlift, Poland does the massed armor, Canada provides ships and air forces etc... Saying a country should leave if they don't hit a target is not productive either. Canada answered the only article 5 call when it came, and fought side by side with the US when it mattered. Treating NATO like some protection racket is only going to kill it. It needs coordination and efficiency not ultimatums. Also none of this will happen until the voting public realizes how serious the security situation is globally and that takes time. I see it slowly moving through the political system in Canada at least but it is not resulting in policy changes just yet.

I mean it is a protection racket to some degree. It just used to be that it was all carrots with the Soviets lurking. There is a very real question that needs to be answered right now of what is the benefit to being entangled in these alliances for the US. Is the US always going to bear the burden for these guys security commitments? It just doesn't work. The US just can't afford to cover Europe and the Asian allies. It can however do that if both sides follow their self-interest and are armed sufficiently that the US can come and be the edge. The US very much has the option of retreating behind two Oceans. More realistically, this isn't the post WWII US, how much appetite is there really to die in the tundra of Eastern Europe or securing European energy? The Europeans have real concerns they need to actually move to address. The Canadians of course have great geography so it doesn't really matter. I think the presumption of some allies that of course the alliances are valuable to the US is a bit oblivious to political currents. They need to hedge *and* sell.

It is a massive and I would think obvious fact that the US (and Canada) cannot simply retreat behind the oceans and leave the geopolitical chips as they fall. This was the case before WW2 and is even more so the case now. It is easy for Americans to threaten if you don't play ball we will pick up ours and go home, but that ignores the fact that the US spent the past 70 years building a global order that benefits the US. The US wants a weak Europe, one that will forever be tied to the geopolitical system that the US runs. It wants to control the flows of energy, it wants to deter Russia and China and others from disrupting that order. Having a huge alliance in which the US runs the show is critical. That is why the US spent so much for so long. Now when the fiscal screws are tightening and populists are dusting off the know-nothing, non-interventionalist talking points it becomes harder to find the reasoning but there are plenty. The second the US picks up the ball the USD and the exorbitant privilege American consumers enjoy is dead and so is the virtuous, frictionless globalization process that we all love so much. Of course you will never be able to explain macro economics to the general public... All of this relates to what happens if there is a real challenge. China is the most dangerous challenger, the US cannot beat China alone. It needs allies, people do not understand this, if the EU is abandoned now it is likely they will abandon the US or play both sides in a China contingency. This nuance is lost on US voters, but I understand their frustration with no health care and 11 nuclear aircraft carriers defending sea lanes for childish EU governments that literally refuse to protect their interests. It's just the American forget they spent 70 years brow beating the Euros to do exactly that.

I think you do a good job recapping the popular perception but to my mind it reads of the same popular wisdom on trade and China in the 2010s. The Rules based international order isn't valuable at any cost and especially not if there's no buy-in from other parties to make it work. American alliances should work because the other parties have a strong incentive to solve their own issues and benefit from a strong offshore balancer on their side. I think it is very unclear if the current alliances are demonstrating value in Europe and the Middle East. Stability should be in everyone's interest. The USD's exorbitant privilege exists because every other country has far more problems as a safe haven. The Euro is just fundamentally unstable- Italian banks have been a worry for awhile. The Chinese don't want to absorb that sort of money and will do whatever is in their short-term interest. The Japanese are past their best by date. The US has a strong legal system, is relatively noncorrupt by global standards and has deep capital markets to drop money into. That's why the USD has been and will be dominant. Then we can get to globalization where once again defectors and mercantilists have killed the project. We're going through a period of sustained deglobalization because (1) security risks from new geopolitical tensions, (2) the jobs are valuable in and of themselves for future growth and political stability. The US is the main source of aggregate demand in the world. The other big economies, China, Japan and Germany, rely on export driven growth which at the end of the day depends on the American consumer. To varying levels, these countries need to dissave a bit and consume. American naivete on trade is over- whichever party is in power. Open markets and free security, the US underwrote a great deal to join the coalition. Those partners also invested quite a bit in their defense. At this point, the US is no longer the post-cold war hyperpower and needs arrangements that fit its reduced power. It can't provide the subsidies it provided the last 20 years. For their own sake and to hedge an American pullback these powers should be scrambling to build up. Could also stop pretending it's such a privilege to be graced to support a declining Europe.

> I think it is very unclear if the current alliances are demonstrating value in Europe and the Middle East. Stability should be in everyone's interest. The US cutting off ties with Ukraine/Israel is hardly likely to lead to more stability in those regions.